1976-1980 Resource Burden of the Soviet Space Program-part 1
[The Soviet space resources burden and the Soviet command economy were based on its allocation of its resources in the form of tons of material, equipment, personnel, and personnel human power as its barter currency for each Soviet “Five Year Plan” fiscal planning during the Cold War. -CPV]
Resource Burden of the Soviet Space Program*
INTRODUCTION
POST-STALIN SPACE DRIVE AND IMPERATIVE
*Prepared by John P. Hardt and George D. Holliday. Dr. Hardt is Senior Specialist in Soviet Economics and Dr. Holliday is Specialist in International Trade and Finance, Economics Division, CRS. This chapter is based on a similar chapter appearing on Soviet Space Programs 1971-75, vol. II, pp. 85-98. Some modest updating to provide insights in the alternatives of the 1980's has been added.
Since its emergence to prominence in the 1950's, the Soviet space program has reflected national economic, political, and military goals to a larger extent than the U.S. program. The correlation of Soviet national objectives in military and civilian space has been facilitated by the apparent centralization of decision making in the Politburo of the Communist Party. (1) Moreover, the administration of Soviet military and civilian space has been less distinctly separated than in the United States. Consequently, reliance on favored research and development institutions and the more sophisticated military-industrial support industries have placed Soviet space in the favored position with military claimants on resources. In a sense, the old resource allocation choice between "guns and butter" placed space in the preferred position of the former. Under Stalin's rule, it was clear that this broad question of resource allocation choice was not an operative policy issue. Only in the Brezhnev period, especially since 1967, does such a choice appear to have been an active consideration for party economic decision makers. In the modern Soviet context, for example, we may say that the decision to build new chemical fertilizer plants or new military or space facilities might result from these broad "guns or butter" type considerations by the top leadership. (2)
For most of the Stalinist period and the transitional rule of Nikita Khrushchev, resource allocations to the military and space programs were largely given or stipulated for Soviet economic planners. The special personal relationship of Academician Sergey Korolev and party leader Khrushchev doubtless contributed to the special space priority in the post-Sputnik period. With the passing of the two from the scene politically and physically, the space priority has probably been more institutionalized, and less personalized.
EMERGENCE OF SPACE BURDEN IN POST-KHRUSHCHEV PERIOD
As the military claims on investment funds began to be assessed more critically in the late 1960's, the space claims may have come under increasing scrutiny. There appears to be an increasing awareness of the alternative use of scarce resources in the space program. The sophisticated demands of civilian investment programs for projects such as petrochemical plants appear to have been given increasing attention. In considering these competing demands for resources, the part of the space budget that did not contribute directly to military strategic systems was probably under the most severe pressure.
In assessing the resource burden, we have in mind two rather different kinds of questions:
1. Objectively, what were the quantity and quality of resources made available to the space programs?
2. Subjectively, how did the leadership appear to view the burden of space programs in terms of the options foregone in other allocations—the opportunity costs?
From the former measurement of resources devoted to space, we might also be able to throw some light on the question of the selective efficiency of the programs. Equivalent allocations to space programs in countries such as the Soviet Union and the United States probably resulted in different outcomes.
The more subjective questions of opportunity costs—although more difficult to assess—might provide insights on future program developments, help to explain past space program choices, or indicate a basis for the cooperative program in space. The alternative costs or perception of needs may have influenced Soviet decisions on competing with the United States in the "race to the Moon," choosing between manned and unmanned flights, and assigning priority to development of a space shuttle. Moreover, if the economic gains were deemed sufficient, the political costs of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation may have appeared more tolerable. To be sure, many of these choices were technologically constrained. However, the margin between economic and technological feasibility is difficult to establish with any precision. More funds for research and development might overcome technological constraints.
The objective question is primarily a measurement problem. Attempts to measure, in turn, are limited by the accuracy of Soviet data or the willingness to disclose the data and by problems of translating Soviet measurements—either in physical or monetary terms—into measurements susceptible to international comparisons. If Soviet leaders have been increasingly interested in choice among space and other programs, the accuracy of measurements may be presumed to have improved. However, the limitation on disclosure of information in the Soviet system makes such a judgment difficult to document. The secrecy system has been and continues to be so pervasive and restrictive that direct access to the kind of information normally available in the West is severely limited. Moreover, the access of many Soviet officials and professional analysts to Soviet data is also sharply restricted. This important information precondition is so crucial in influencing what an outsider may deduce or what most insiders may know, that a detailed discussion of the Soviet state secrecy laws, their current application, and impact is the first step in our analysis.
SOVIET SECRECY
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STALINIST SYSTEM
For students of the Soviet economy, the barriers posed by official secrecy are formidable. Even in areas that have only marginal national security implications, such as crop forecasts, statistics on grain reserves, production of certain valuable minerals, and balance of payments accounts, economic data are closely guarded, and access is apparently limited to a very small number of officials and specialists. The Western observer who wishes to learn about such matters from Soviet publications is required to piece together various bits of related data, make some assumptions about how the Soviet economic system functions, and derive estimates that are often very crude. In military-related activities such as space spending, this task is even more complicated as the absence of published data is virtually absolute. For example, despite evidence of the existence of a large Soviet space program, no space expenditures are listed in the officially published Soviet budget. Soviet space officials add little to our knowledge of this subject, generally limiting themselves to generalizations about large or increasing space expenditures.
This extreme secrecy is in accordance with the policy followed by Soviet leaders since the late 1920's. The first signs of this policy came when the Soviet Government discontinued the previously rather liberal publication of various statistics related to the economic well-being of Soviet citizens. (3) The concept of "state secret" developed and was codified into law with the apparent goal of not only safeguarding national security but also protecting the regime from disclosure of politically embarrassing information that would reveal its priority system in resource allocations. The scope of information declared to be state secrets grew rapidly in conjunction with the leadership's attempt to develop Soviet military power and to impose economic austerity on the population while pursuing a policy of rapid industrialization.
On April 27, 1926, the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. issued for the first time a "List of Information Constituting State Secrets." The list outlined three categories of state secrets: Military, economic, and "other" (primarily matters relating to foreign policy), in practice it provided the legal basis for party and government officials to withhold from public disclosure whatever they deemed necessary.4 It was eventually superseded by revised lists promulgated on June 8, 1947, and April 28, 1956. The 1947 list was much more detailed and exhaustive than its predecessor. Not only were the types of secret military information more carefully detailed, but several kinds of nonmilitary information were added. Particularly noteworthy was the addition of a new category of classified information: "discoveries, inventions and technical improvements, and research and experimental work in all fields of science, technology and national economy, until they are finally completed and authorized to be published." (5) The new provision reflected a greater awareness by the leadership of the importance of scientific and technical progress to Soviet economic growth and military power.
POST-STALIN RETENTION OF SECRECY
The 1956 list provided the present legal basis for administering Soviet secrecy laws. Two later Soviet textbooks, published in 1970 and 1971, cited the list as being the law in force at that time. (6) While it is somewhat more moderate than the 1947 list, it still includes an imposing array of military and nonmilitary information as state secrets. Virtually any information related to military tactics and strategy, location and number of troops and bases, amounts of armaments and military equipment, and various other military matters are listed. Naturally, since Soviet space activities are carried out in facilities that have military as well as civilian applications, information about them is generally guarded as state secrets.
In addition, a wide range of information of an economic nature is included on the secrecy list. Examples of economic items on the list are indicative of the difficulties in analyzing sensitive economic activities such as space spending: (7)
General information on the location of military-industrial enterprises, production capacities, plans for production of armaments, military equipment and ammunition and data on the fulfillment of the plans in concrete terms as a whole for the U.S.S.R. all-union and union-republic ministries, chief administrations, and enterprises of all-union significance; discoveries and inventions of major scientific and national economic significance before the heads of ministries and departments have granted permission for their publication; such other information as may be added by the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to the list of matters subject to state secrecy. An important feature of this list is its open-ended nature. In practice, the last item in the list has been used as the basis for keeping secret whatever the leadership believes necessary. The application of this provision may also be retroactive. All of which enforces an environment of secrecy.
The penalties for disclosure of state secrets are specified in laws enacted in 1958 as part of a general legal reform in the early post-Stalin period. Four articles in the Statute on State Crimes, Articles 1, 2, 12, and 13 and one article in the Law on Military Crimes, Article 23, provide for a variety of penalties depending on the severity of the crime. Penalties range from death for treason and espionage to confinement for 2 to 5 years for smaller offenses, such as, "disclosure of state secrets”. (8)
The effect of such penalties is to inhibit any Soviet official from speaking or writing of matters that are routinely publicized in the West, unless prior approval has been obtained from top party leaders. One of the valuable aspects of U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation has been the leadership s approval of release of certain kinds of information related to the Soviet space program. Such information, however, has not included data on Soviet space spending.
Soviet space allocations and space activities fit largely under the coverage of the pervasive secrecy system. As a result, direct information on either space budgets or activities are difficult to obtain directly from Soviet sources. To be sure, an annual state budget is published with single line items for military and science. Space activities are included in those categories. But there is no reason for confidence in any consistent interpretation on the comprehension reliability, or comparative meaning of these figures. Likewise, the Soviet published information on space activities from which allocations might be derived are sketchy at best. Indeed, it seems fair to state the spirit of the Soviet state secrecy laws is an accurate gauge of intent, that is, allocations to space and accomplishments in space are by and large to be kept strictly secret. For Soviet officials who might wish to obtain access to such information and release it in their published works the criminal penalties of the legal system would seem to be an effective deterrent. Information on space therefore comes largely from four sources:
(1) Activities monitored in the West, especially by the United States.
(2) American intelligence estimates built largely on a complex aggregation of relevant data.
(3) Selective data released by the Soviet authorities largely for prestige purposes.
(4) Information obtained from scientific exchanges such as the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.
The last two sources are very selective and incomplete measures of the Soviet space programs as a whole, especially over time. As a result, we must rely heavily on the estimates of Soviet space spending of the intelligence agencies in the United States, especially the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense Even though published information by Soviet authorities is limited, the accuracy of Western estimates may be improving due to the effective use of technical means such as satellite surveillance. (9) Supplemented by comprehensive economic data, the process of setting parameters and estimating the scope and structure of Soviet space programs may be reasonably reliable.
References:
A. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1976-80, SUPPORTING VEHICLES AND LAUNCH VEHICLES, POLITICAL GOALS AND PURPOSES, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE, ADMINISTRATION, RE-SOURCE BURDEN, FUTURE OUTLOOK PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF HON. BOB PACKWOOD, Chairman, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES SENATE, Part 1, Dec. 1982.
1. Cf. Francis T. Miko, Organization and Administration of the Soviet Space Program in this volume.
2. Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Economy: 1974 Results and Prospects for 1975, March 1975, p. 21
3. Leon Herman, Varieties of Economic Secrecy in the Soviet Union, Santa Monica, Calif The Rand Corp., December 1963, P—2849, p. 5.
4. Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost' (Socialist Law), 1926, No. 32, Item 213, cited in George Ginsburgs and Armins Rusis, Soviet Criminal Law and the Protection of State Secrets, in Z. Szirmai, ed.. Law in Eastern Europe, Layden, A.W. Sythoff, 1963, p. 11.
5. Ginsburgs and Rusis, op. cit., p. 28. .
6. Kurs sovetskogo ugolovnogo prava v shesti tomakh. Chast osobennaia. Tom IV. (-rosudarstvennye prestupleniia i prestu pleniia protiv sotsialisticheskoi sobstvennosti (Treatise on Soviet Criminal Law. Special Part, vol. IV. State Crimes and Crimes Against Socialist Property. Moscow 1970-213- Sovetskoe Ugolovnoe Pravo. Osobennaia Chast' (Soviet Criminal Law. Special Part.), Moscow, 1971:32-33.
7. A Valerian and Semen S. Studenldn. Sovetskoe Administrativnoe Pravo (Soviet Administrative Law), Moscow, Gosiurizdat, 1959, cited in Zigurd L. Zile, Robert Sharlet and Jean C. Love The Soviet Legal System and Arms Inspection, New York, Praeger, 1972, pp. 223-224. The 1956 list of state secrets was renewed by decree of Sept. 15, 1966, F. J. M. Feldbrugge (editor) Encyclopedia of Soviet Law, Leiden: Oceans Publishers, 1973, p. 600.
8. Osnovy ugolovnogo zakonodatel stva Soiuza SSR i Soiuznykh Respublik, Zakon ob ugolovnoi otvetsvennosti za gosudarstvennye prestupleniia (Basic Criminal Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Articles, 1, 2, 12, and 13 and Zakon ob ugolovnoi otvetsvennosti za voinsSeprestuplenna. Article 23, of Dec. 25, 1958, also cited in Ginsburgs and Rusis, op cit, pp. 32-35.
9. Testimony of William Colby, .Director of Central Intelligence-Agency, in U.S-Congress Joint Economic Committee, subcommittee on priorities and Economy in Government. Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China –1975. Hearings, 94th cong., 1 st. sess., June 18, and July 21, 1975, p. 23 (Hereafter, Allocation, 1975)
