Foreign Relations - Iran
The Yemeni civil war has been ongoing since 2014. The conflict is between the internationally recognized government, backed by a Saudi-led military coalition, and Houthi rebels supported by Iran. As of April 28, 2020, the Houthis controlled all of the former North Yemen except for eastern Marib Governorate and parts of the northern, southern, and central governorates of Saada, Al-Jawf, Al Hudaydah, Hajjah, Sanaa, and Taiz.
Most of the violence in 2023 has been centered around Yemen's Abyan and Shawba governates. In August 2023, AQAP launched an explosion that killed a military commander and three soldiers from the Security Belt Forces, an armed group loyal to the STC. The conflict is widely seen as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The country's humanitarian crisis is said to be among the worst in the world, due to widespread hunger, disease, and attacks on civilians.
Significant gaps existed in Western knowledge of Iranian activities in Yemen due to the sensitivity of the subject and very limited access to events in Sa'ada. On 10 March 2023 Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic ties after years of tensions, leaving Yemenis surprised – and confused. The Chinese-brokered rapprochement announced by Saudi Arabia and Iran last week in Beijing came after several rounds of talks, including in Iraq and Oman. It was to lead to the reopening of their respective embassies within two months and the activation of a security cooperation arrangement, with the two regional powerhouses pledging to respect state sovereignty and not interfere in each other’s internal affairs.
Saudi Arabia has led a military intervention in Yemen since 2015 in support of the internationally recognised government fighting the Houthis. Iran, meanwhile, has said it supports the rebels politically but denies sending them weapons, as alleged by Saudi Arabia and others. The Houthis in recent years have targeted a number of oil facilities and airports in Saudi Arabia and its coalition partner, the United Arab Emirates.
Iran was trying to use Shi'a communities in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen like they use Hizballah in Lebanon as a political card. The ROYG viewed Zaydi Shiites as less extremist and closer in practice to Sunnis than the Twelver Shiism predominant in Iran. The ROYG used to grant Iranians living in Yemen hajj visas to travel overland to Mecca, but stopped issuing the visas some time ago because the ROYG was uncomfortable about Iranians traveling through Sa'ada into Saudi Arabia.
Since the outbreak of hostilities in 2004, the ROYG had used many different arguments, including the Houthis' alleged ties to Iran and Hezballah, to attempt to convince the USG to declare the Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). In 2008, the ROYG gave post a dossier of information purporting to show ties between the Houthis and Iran. The US Embassy passed on the file to the inter-agency community in Washington. US Analysts agreed that the information did not proove Iranian involvement in Sa'ada.
The Houthis rose up against the Yemeni government in 2014 and triggered the ongoing civil war on the southern tip of the Gulf Peninsula. The Saudi Arabia-led military alliance joined the fight a year later. Iran, which considers the Houthis part of an “axis of resistance” against Israel and the United States, holds sway over Lebanon’s Hezbollah, militias in Iraq, and the Syrian armed forces of President Bashar al-Assad. However, the Houthis differ from Iran’s other partners. Unlike some allied militia in Iraq and Syria, the Houthis have never been an Iranian proxy. They have their own unique history, grievances and agenda. The Houthis are less tied to Tehran than Hezbollah members, and they are not under the Iranian command and control system and act largely autonomously.
Contrary to the Saudi narrative, Iran’s relations with the Houthis are a very recent phenomenon and a direct consequence of the Saudi invasion of the country. Moreover, prior to 2010, the Saudis – who used to work closely with the Houthis – did not even refer to the group as Shia.
Despite repeated ROYG accusations of Tehran's material and financial support to the Houthi rebels in Sa'ada and increasingly belligerent media exchanges between Yemen and Iran, by 2009 Iranian influence in Yemen had been limited to informal religious ties between Yemeni and Iranian scholars and negligible Iranian investment in the energy and development sectors. While Iran had good strategic reasons to involve itself in Yemeni affairs - including Yemen's proximity to Saudi Arabia and the presence of a large Zaydi Shiite population ) the only visible Iranian involvement remained the Iranian media's proxy battle with Saudi and Yemeni outlets over support for the Houthis.
After two high-profile Iranian official visits to Sana'a in early 2009, the formal bilateral relationship rapidly deteriorated as a result of renewed fighting in Sa'ada governorate. Iran maintains an embassy in Sana'a headed by Ambassador Mahmoud Zada. As of 2009 Iran was not providing any military training to the Yemenis, and there had been no announced military sales between the two countries in recent years. Iranian Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani visited Yemen in May 2009 to discuss Iranian investment in Yemen's energy and infrastructure sectors and the bilateral relationship. During Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's June visit to Sana'a, his second in two years, both nations maintained at least a public appearance of normal bilateral cooperation. Mottaki told local media at the time, "Iran is pursuing an honest and friendly approach towards Yemen. Iran wants progress, security and prosperity for Yemen."
With the August 2009 onset of the sixth war in Sa'ada, however, the ROYG reverted to its previous position that Iran was intent on meddling in Yemen's internal affairs. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Chief of Protocol Abdullah al-Radhi, who spent over a decade in Tehran as a student and diplomat, including a tour as Yemen's ambassador to Iran, echoed the near-unanimous attitude of ROYG officials when he state on 23 August 2009 that he believed Iran wants a strong political card to play in Yemen similar to Hizballah in Lebanon. He said that Yemen tried to normalize the relationship with the visits of Larijani and Mottaki, but Yemen "cannot accept" Iranian attempts to convert the Yemeni Zaydis to Twelver Shiism. Radhi also said that the Iranians are still upset about Yemen's support for Iraq during and since the first Gulf War.
Although the ROYG maintains that Iran was providing material and financial support to the Houthi rebels in Sa'ada, little evidence had surfaced by 2009 that supported this claim. President Saleh told General Petraeus in a 26 July 2009 meeting that the National Security Bureau (NSB) had a DVD showing Houthi rebels training with Hizballah uniforms and tactics. In an August 17 meeting, NSB Deputy Director Ammar Saleh told Senator McCain that Iran was working against Yemeni stability because it believed that a weakened Yemen would hurt the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, both traditional enemies of Iran. In the same meeting, NSB Director Ali Mohammed al-Ansi claimed that the ROYG had arrested two separate "networks" of Iranians in Yemen on charges of espionage in connection with the Houthis and that one of the accused admitted to providing $100,000 every month to the Houthis on behalf of the Iranian government. Ansi told Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan on 06 September 2009 that the ROYG was unable to share the evidence from this case because it was still in the courts.
ROYG spokesman Hassan al-Lawzi repeated accusing Iran of supporting the Houthi rebels. On 01 September 2009, Foreign Minister Abubakir al-Qirbi publicly warned Iran that interference in the Sa'ada conflict would have a negative impact on bilateral relations and that, if such interference continued, Yemen could be forced to make "hard decisions," according to media reports. Qirbi also lodged an official complaint with the Iranian Embassy in Sana'a detailing Yemen's displeasure with Iranian support for the Houthis. Director for External Financial Relations at the Ministry of Finance Fouad al-Kohlani said 19 August 2009 that the Houthis' level of organizational sophistication and military successes against government forces indicated a higher level of financial resources than the Houthis could attain on their own. He speculated that because of its strategic interest in gaining a foothold near Saudi Arabia, Iran was likely the Houthis' financial backer.
The Iranians, for their part, continued to deny any interference in Sa'ada. On 23 August 2009, the Iranian Embassy in Bahrain stated that Iran had no connections to events in Yemen and "supports any movement that works to unify the ranks of the Yemeni people," according to Bahraini media. The Iranian Embassy in Sana'a repeated these statements on September 7, Yemeni media reported.
Media reports on 22 August 2009 cited ROYG officials claiming to have uncovered six storehouses of Houthi-owned, Iranian-made weapons ) including machine guns, short-range rockets and ammunition ) near Sa'ada City. In an August 25 meeting, however, Ministry of Defense Chief of Staff Major General Ahmed al-Ashwal said that a limited number of weapons "of Iranian manufacture" were found in the area, but would not provide information on the quantity or type. ROYG refused to allow Iranian vessels access to Aden harbor, reportedly over ROYG concern that Iran was using Eritrea to ship weapons to the Houthis. According to Presidential Advisor for Sa'ada Affairs and Sa'ada native Mohammed Azzan, however, the Houthis do not need to receive weapons from outside of Yemen because they can easily capture or purchase them from the Yemeni military.
Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) Chairman and the Zaydi-affiliated al-Haq Party Secretary General Hassan al-Zayd, who communicates on a daily basis with Houthis and other Sa'ada residents, agreed that the Houthis' weapons came from the Yemeni military ) either through capture or abandonment on the battlefield or via black-market arms deals by corrupt military commanders - and not from an external source such as Iran, as of 2009.
By 2009 the general consensus among civil society was that Iranian government influence in Sa'ada was minimal, but the Houthis might receive some financial support from Iranian groups or individuals. The JMP's Zayd, who travels to Sa'ada frequently, said 26 August 2009 that Iran had not been involved historically in the conflict in Sa'ada, but with changingdomestic circumstances in Iran, might have become involved in the latest round of fighting. He added, however, that he has no knowledge of any Iranian nationals in Sa'ada in recent years.
NDI's Deputy Country Director Murad Zafir speculated that Iranian groups are likely giving money to the Houthis, but he did not know to what extent. With that money, the Houthis buy weapons from corrupt elements of the Yemeni armed forces that sell weapons and munitions, Zafir alleged. Civil society actors, however, were also unable to provide any concrete evidence of the involvement of any Iranian nationals in Sa'ada.
By 2009, Iran's most visible involvement in the sixth war in Sa'ada had been the Iranian media's proxy battle with Saudi and Yemeni outlets over Iranian support for the Houthi rebels (Ref B). Continuing a tradition that dates back to the earliest stages of the Sa'ada conflict, the ROYG accused Iran of financially and materially supporting the Houthi rebels. For its part, Iran ) through state media outlets including English-language Press TV and Arabic-language al-Alam TV ) claimed that Saudi Arabia is directly involved in the military campaign against the Houthis. The Sa'ada conflict has thus become a propaganda war between Yemen, eager to enlist the support of its Sunni Arab neighbors and the U.S., and Iran, allegedly seeking to nurture a Shi'a proxy force on the Arabian Peninsula. On 24 August 2009, Iranian al-Alam TV quoted rebel leader Yahya al-Houthi as denying Iranian support for the Houthis. Iranian media have consistently shown video footage intended to embarrass the ROYG, including images of alleged soldiers fleeing the fighting and Houthis dancing on top of abandoned ROYG armored vehicles.
Little evidence ( or even debate ) existed regarding Iran's role with the Southern Movement. The southern secessionist movement, which was formally a secular organization that has among its ranks former Sunni jihadists, had not established connections with either the Houthis or Iran. General Mohammed Saleh Tammah, a leader of the movement, stated that the movement had repeatedly rejected offers of collaboration with the Houthis. Tammah said 06 September 2009 that the movement's leaders wanted to continue peacefully advocating for separation, rather than affiliating themselves with the Houthis or external actors willing to advocate violence such as Iran.
Some limited evidence, on the other hand, indicates that Iran might be a more willing partner with southerners fed up with the current regime. The ROYG asked the then-Iranian military attache to leave Yemen in 2008, purportedly because he had attempted to make contact with separatists in the southern governorates. Former Yemeni Ambassador to Iran Radhi said that the Iranian Ambassador in Muscat had been instructed to "study the south of Yemen," especially Hadramout and Shabwa governorates.
Perceived Iranian influence in other arenas was limited to informal religious ties between Yemeni and Iranian scholars and negligible Iranian investment in the energy and development sectors. Despite Yemen's 40% Zaydi Shiite population, religiously-based interaction between Yemen and the world's largest Shi'a country was limited, perhaps because the form of Shiism Zaydis practice hews closer to Sunni Islam than the Twelver Shiism of Iran. There was a lot of "coordination on Yemen" between Qom and Najjaf, with 40-50 Yemenis studying Islam in Najjaf, and some (NFI) studying in Qom as well. Given that Yemen has over 9 million Zaydis, it appears that the number of religious students studying in Iraq and Iran combined was very small.
Iranian direct investment in the Yemeni economy is negligible, according to local Iranian businessmen Behrooz Rohani, Executive Manager of Hawk Oil Services, and Amir Shahran, a senior partner at Yemen Energy Services Company. The only significant Iranian commercial activity in Yemen involved the ROYG,s tortuous experience hiring the Tehran-based Parsian HV Substations Development Company to build the substation of the Marib 1 power plant. ROYG officials at all levels told EconOff that the decision to hire the Iranian firm was purely political, rather than economic, stemming from a desire in 2005 to expand relations with Iran. The delays caused by the technical incompetence of the Iranian firm resulted in hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in foregone savings from switching away from expensive diesel and towards natural gas in the power sector.
The Iranian government funds two hospitals in Sana'a that are among the better medical facilities in the capital. The management of the hospitals was Iranian, but the staff was largely local.
Yemen's formal relationship with Iran was by all accounts relatively fragile, and continued to deteriorate . Since the start of the Sa'ada conflict in 2004, Yemen looked to pin the Houthis' strength and resilience in fighting the ROYG on the Iranians. Despite Yemen's seemingly heartfelt concerns that Iran was backing the Houthi rebels and the ROYG's desire to convince its powerful friends (the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) of Iran's nefarious intentions in Yemen, it was initially unable to produce any concrete evidence of what it says was wide-scale meddling. If Yemen had any concrete evidence that the Houthis had connections to either Hizballah or Iran, it would have produced it immediately; the lack of such evidence likely indicated that the ROYG lacked any real proof of such links. On the other hand, Iran had clear strategic interests in gaining a foothold in Yemen (Sa'ada) and developing a proxy ally in the Houthis similar to Hizballah in Lebanon.
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