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South Sudan - 2018

South Sudan remains one of the world’s most challenging places to deliver humanitarian assistance. Harassment, detention, injury, kidnappings and the killing of aid workers have continued, despite the parties’ expressed commitment in the December 2017 cessation of hostilities agreement to uphold international humanitarian law.

Indicators of the humanitarian situation in South Sudan paint a bleak picture. Refugee registration figures and estimates for internal displacement indicate that a total of around 4.2 million people (one in three South Sudanese) have been displaced by conflict since 2013. Of these, some 2.5 million (the majority women and children) are living in neighbouring countries, while 1.8 million are internally displaced.

The performance of the economy remained poor during 2018. Currency depreciation was rapid and accompanied by high inflation. Consumer price inflation in the year to March was measured at 161 per cent. Although the Central Bank maintained a fixed official rate of around 137 South Sudanese pounds to the United States dollar, the currency depreciated on the market from around 230 pounds per dollar in February to 300 pounds per dollar in May. Oil production, at around 120,000 to 130,000 barrels per day, remains consistent with the average over the past four years. Despite buoyant international oil prices, overall fiscal performance did not improve, raising concerns about the management of the additional oil revenue. Public sector workers continue to face prolonged delays in receiving salaries, in some cases reportedly extending to five months, and levels of spending on public services and infrastructure remain very low.

The security situation in the greater Upper Nile region remained volatile, with fighting reported between Government alongside aligned forces and pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition. As fighting continued to move south, on 1 May, armed youth reported to be under the command of a government official and supported by two SPLA tanks shelled the swampy areas south-east of the Adok port from Meer village and looted cattle, killed an unknown number of civilians and committed human rights violations. Fighting between the warring parties resumed throughout the first week of May 2018.

The situation in greater Equatoria remained tense, with reports of clashes between SPLA and pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition. On 26 February, the two warring parties reportedly clashed in Minyori, Yei area, resulting in the killing of an opposition commander. Further clashes were reported on 7 March in Mitika, Lasu, and in Kili, Mukaya County, where opposition forces reportedly looted and burned down houses.

In Western Bahr el-Ghazal, the situation remained tense, with reports of clashes and civilian displacement. The security situation reportedly further deteriorated as opposition forces clashed with the joint forces of SPLA and the Justice and Equality Movement in the Sopo and Deim Zubeir areas on 5 April, resulting in civilian displacement.

Intercommunal violence continued in Warrap, Lakes, Unity and Jonglei, while in the Lakes, Gok and Western Lakes areas, civilian disarmament coincided with a decrease in communal conflict, notably between the Rup and Kuei Dinka sections. While some attributed the decrease to armed civilians retreating deeper into rural areas to avoid the disarmament, others warned that failure to disarm communities would create opportunities for armed actors to conduct cattle raids and attacks.

Following the adjournment of the second session of the high-level revitalization forum of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on 16 February 2018, IGAD utilized the subsequent three-month period in the lead-up to the resumption of the forum on 17 May to engage the parties in shuttle diplomacy in order to provide impetus to the peace process and bridge their divergent positions on governance and security issues. In this respect, the IGAD Council of Ministers and the IGAD Special Envoy held consultations with the Transitional Government of National Unity in Juba, the former First Vice-President, Riek Machar, in Pretoria and with other parties and entities in Addis Ababa.

The South Sudan Council of Churches facilitated sessions of intra-South Sudanese dialogue to help the parties to bridge their differences on the 10 outstanding governance and security issues identified as critical to revitalize the Agreement. In a signed statement drafted by the Council of Churches on 21 May 2018, the parties recommitted to the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement and agreed to implement a quota of 35 per cent for the participation of women at all levels of government and to continue the consultations on governance and security issues. However, in view of the lack of substantial progress in reaching a compromise by the parties, IGAD introduced bridging proposals on 21 May on the outstanding issues. On 22 May, the parties submitted their reactions to the IGAD bridging proposals, maintaining their entrenched and divergent positions, in particular on responsibility-sharing, the structure and composition of states, the number and allocations of seats in the legislature and on transitional security arrangements.

South Sudanese arch-foes signed a final power-sharing deal on 05 August 2018, aimed at ending the civil war that had killed tens of thousands of people and displaced millions in the world's youngest country. President Salva Kiir and his bitter rival Riek Machar were in neighbouring Sudan to sign the deal, under which the rebel leader was set to return to a unity government as the first of five vice presidents. Once a final peace deal is signed, the foes will have three months to form a transitional government under the new format, which will then hold power for a further 36 months. The power-sharing deal lays out a plan for a 35-minister transitional government including 20 Kiir allies and nine backers of Machar, along with representatives of other rebel factions.

A similar peace deal was signed in 2015 but fell apart a year later in a deadly battle that saw Machar flee into exile. Foreign observers remain skeptical of the latest project, citing well-known animosity between Kiir and Machar, and a string of previous peace deals that failed soon after being signed.