Islamist Insurrection in Mali
"Al Qaeda militants are moving closer to seizing the capital of the West African nation of Mali, which, should the city fall, would become the first country in the world run by the U.S.-designated terrorist group. The rapid advance of the jihadists in Africa comes after Islamist groups took power in both Afghanistan and Syria, but, if they take Bamako, it would be the first time militants with direct and current connections to al Qaeda achieve such a feat." reported Benoit Faucon in the Wall Street Journal Oct. 30, 2025.
The situation in Mali is extremely serious and represents one of the more significant challenges posed by Al Qaeda-linked militants in recent years, though it's important to understand the precise nature of what's unfolding rather than what may be suggested by dramatic headlines.
Since early September 2025, the militant group JNIM had been conducting an economic siege of Bamako, Mali's capital city. JNIM, which stands for Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin or the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, is directly affiliated with Al Qaeda and represents one of the more powerful jihadist organizations operating in West Africa's Sahel region. Rather than attempting a direct military assault on the capital, the group had implemented a sophisticated blockade strategy, systematically attacking fuel tankers traveling from neighboring Senegal and Ivory Coast, through which the majority of Mali's imported goods and energy supplies transit. They've been burning trucks, setting up checkpoints, and effectively strangling the capital's lifelines.
The impact on daily life in Bamako had been devastating. Long queues stretch outside the few gas stations that still have fuel, with desperate residents sometimes fighting for a place in line. Schools and universities have been shut down nationwide because students and staff cannot reliably travel. The US Embassy issued an urgent advisory telling American citizens to depart immediately using commercial aviation, warning that the security situation had become unpredictable. Airlines have started canceling flights. The prices of basic necessities are skyrocketing as the blockade impacts not just fuel but all goods that need to be transported into the city. For a country that is already the sixth least developed in the world, with half of its twenty-five million inhabitants living below the poverty line, this crisis is pushing an already fragile situation toward collapse.
Mali had been grappling with a severe security crisis for more than a decade. The country descended into chaos in 2012 when jihadist groups, some affiliated with Al Qaeda and others with the Islamic State, began seizing territory in the north. Various international interventions followed, including French military operations and UN peacekeeping missions, but the violence had only spread and intensified over the years. In 2020 and 2021, the country experienced military coups, and Mali is now ruled by a military junta that had increasingly isolated itself internationally. The junta broke ties with former colonial power France, expelled UN peacekeepers, and formed a new alliance with neighboring juntas in Niger and Burkina Faso. The military government had also brought in Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group to help fight the insurgency, though this partnership had been marked by allegations of serious human rights abuses against civilians.
JNIM's activities extend far beyond the current blockade. Throughout 2024 and into 2025, the group had conducted devastating attacks across Mali's central and northern regions, burning entire villages, displacing thousands of people, and killing civilians. Over two thousand schools across Mali had already closed due to insecurity even before the recent nationwide shutdown, affecting more than six hundred thousand students. In September 2024, JNIM fighters conducted a brazen attack directly in Bamako itself, striking a military police training school and facilities at the airport complex. That attack killed more than seventy people and wounded over two hundred, representing one of the highest death tolls suffered by Malian security forces in recent years. It was the first attack of its kind in Bamako in years and demonstrated that even the capital, normally insulated from the daily violence afflicting rural areas, was no longer safe.
The current fuel blockade represents an evolution in JNIM's strategy. Rather than trying to storm Bamako with fighters and tanks, they're using economic warfare to demonstrate the government's inability to protect basic services and supply lines. Some analysts suggest this is designed to force the military government to concentrate its limited resources in urban areas, leaving the rural regions where jihadist groups have established strongholds even more vulnerable. It's a way of showing that the militants can strike anywhere and that the junta's claims of having the security situation under control are hollow. The Malian army had attempted to escort fuel convoys with military protection, but these efforts have had limited success, with convoys still being attacked and drivers too frightened to make the journey.
However, it's crucial to be clear about what this situation represents and what it doesn't. Bamako had not fallen to Al Qaeda. The capital remains under government control, and the military junta, however embattled, still governs from the city. JNIM had not seized the presidential palace, does not control the city's neighborhoods, and is not administering the capital as a jihadist emirate. What they have done is demonstrate an alarming capability to project power into the capital's periphery, to interdict its supply lines, and to create a humanitarian crisis that undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government. This is a siege in the economic and strategic sense rather than a direct territorial conquest.
That said, the trajectory is deeply concerning. Mali's security situation had deteriorated dramatically over the past year despite the military junta's promises to restore stability. The government's decision to cut off fuel supplies to remote areas held by militants backfired badly when JNIM retaliated with the blockade, showing that the jihadists have both the capability and will to respond to government pressure in ways that hurt ordinary citizens. The fact that the militants can operate so effectively on major highways leading into the capital suggests they have significant freedom of movement and local support or intimidation networks throughout southern Mali, not just in the traditional northern conflict zones.
The broader regional context makes the situation even more alarming. Mali's crisis doesn't exist in isolation. The entire Sahel region, that vast belt of semi-arid territory stretching across Africa below the Sahara, is experiencing a wave of jihadist violence and state collapse. Burkina Faso and Niger face similar insurgencies and have also experienced military coups. The three countries have formed their own alliance and withdrawn from regional organizations, leaving them increasingly isolated from international support and democratic accountability. The withdrawal of French forces and UN peacekeepers from the region had created security vacuums that militant groups have exploited. Meanwhile, the governments have turned to Russian mercenaries whose brutal tactics against civilians may be fueling more support for the insurgents.
What makes Mali particularly significant is that if JNIM were to actually seize control of Bamako and establish jihadist governance over a national capital and recognized state, it would indeed be unprecedented for Al Qaeda. While Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and the brief ISIS control of territory in Syria and Iraq have shown that jihadist groups can govern territory, a scenario where an Al Qaeda affiliate directly controls an internationally recognized capital would represent a new and dangerous development. It would provide the group with the resources, legitimacy, and platform of a state, potentially inspiring similar movements across the region and beyond.
For now, that worst-case scenario had not materialized. But the current situation shows how vulnerable Bamako is and how effective JNIM had become at challenging state authority. The blockade may be intended as a prelude to something larger, or it may be designed to simply weaken the government to the point where it can't effectively oppose jihadist control in vast rural areas. Either way, Mali stands at a precipice, and the international community had largely stepped back from engagement just as the crisis reaches a critical phase. The people of Bamako, struggling to find fuel and food, facing shuttered schools and an uncertain future, are living through what may be remembered as the beginning of the state's effective collapse, even if the formal trappings of government remain for now.
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