Tanzania - Election 2025
Hundreds of people have reportedly been killed in Tanzania after taking to the streets to protest this week’s presidential election, which saw the increasingly authoritarian incumbent, President Samia Suluhu Hassan, run unopposed for another term after her main challengers were jailed or barred from standing.
Some 700 people have been killed in three days of election protests in Tanzania, the main opposition party said Friday, with protesters still on the streets in the midst of an internet blackout. “As we speak the figure for deaths in Dar (es Salaam) is around 350 and for Mwanza it is 200-plus. Added to figures from other places around the country, the overall figure is around 700,” John Kitoka, spokesman from the main opposition party Chadema, said. “The death toll could be much higher,” he warned, saying killings could be happening during the nighttime curfew.
Tanzania held its general elections on October 29, 2025, in what proved to be one of the most controversial and contentious electoral processes in the nation's democratic history. Incumbent President Samia Suluhu Hassan, who was seeking a second term, was widely expected to secure the second term after opposition candidates were barred from running. The poll is also anticipated to be a shoo-in for her party, which has never lost an election since independence. Tundu Lissu, the main opposition leader, is in jail on treason charges, which he denies, and his party boycotted the vote. Sixteen fringe parties, none of which have historically had significant public support, were cleared to contest against Samia.
Human rights activists in Kenya hailed the anti-government protests, saying the neighbouring country was undergoing a democratic re-awakening moment. The Civil Society Groups are now calling on the Africa Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the East Africa Community (EAC) to hold President Samia Suluhu accountable for suppressing demonstrators. With anti-government protests entering a second day in the East African Nation, human rights activists in the region say security agencies are using excessive force to suppress demonstrators. Tanzania remains on edge for a second day as protests continued to spread across major cities following a disputed general election. Police in Dar es Salaam on Thursday fired gunshots and tear gas to disperse demonstrators who defied curfew orders and returned to the streets demanding free and fair elections.
The European Parliament condemned the elections, describing them as neither free nor fair and called for the immediate release of opposition leader Tundu Lissu, who faces treason charges. In a joint statement, European lawmakers said the vote took place in an atmosphere of repression, intimidation and fear, adding that the fraud did not begin at the ballot box it has been unfolding for months.
President Samia Suluhu Hassan, the country’s f irst woman leader, assumed office in March 2021 after the unexpected death of President John Magufuli. President Hassan has supported economic reforms that give the private sector a greater role in the economy. More than 37 million registered voters from a population of approximately 60 million were eligible to cast ballots for the president, members of the National Assembly, and ward councillors across the country's 29 mainland regions, as well as for leadership positions in the semiautonomous archipelago of Zanzibar. The election was marked by widespread protests, violence, internet blackouts, and accusations of authoritarian governance that drew international condemnation and raised serious questions about the state of democracy in the East African nation.
The incumbent President Samia Suluhu Hassan, representing the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party, sought her first full term in office after ascending to the presidency in March 2021 following the sudden death of former President John Magufuli. Hassan's candidacy was confirmed in August 2025 by the Independent National Electoral Commission alongside sixteen other presidential candidates. However, the political landscape was dramatically altered when the electoral commission disqualified the main opposition parties from participating, leaving Hassan virtually unchallenged despite the numerous candidates on the ballot. The electoral commission approved Hassan's running mate Emmanuel Nchimbi, and the campaign officially commenced on August 28, concluding just before polling day.
The Chama Cha Mapinduzi, commonly known as CCM or the Party of Revolution, has maintained an unbroken grip on power since Tanzania's independence in 1961, making it one of Africa's longest-ruling political parties. The party and its predecessor have won every election since multiparty democracy was introduced in 1995. However, the 2025 election represented a significant regression in democratic practices, with voter registration standing at a level reminiscent of the one-party system era despite the electorate having grown fivefold since 1990. The ruling party's dominance has historically been maintained through various means including electoral advantages, institutional control, and increasingly in recent years, the suppression of opposition voices through legal and extralegal methods.
In the months leading up to the election, Tanzania witnessed an intensifying crackdown on political opposition, civil society, and independent media. The main opposition party, Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo, commonly known as Chadema, was disqualified from participating in the election in April 2025 after the electoral commission claimed the party had failed to sign a code of conduct document by the required deadline. Days before this disqualification, Chadema's charismatic leader Tundu Lissu was arrested at a rally in the southern town of Mbinga on April 9, 2025. Lissu, who had spent years in exile in Belgium during the Magufuli era and survived an assassination attempt in 2017 that left him with seventeen bullet wounds, was charged with incitement and treason for calling for electoral reforms and suggesting that citizens should boycott the election if meaningful reforms were not implemented.
The charges against Lissu carried the death penalty and were non-bailable, effectively removing him from the political arena during the crucial campaign period. His arrest and the subsequent disqualification of Chadema represented a devastating blow to Tanzania's political opposition and democratic institutions. Lissu remained in prison throughout the election period, with his trial beginning in early October. Attempts by Chadema's deputy chair John Heche to attend Lissu's trial resulted in his temporary detention, further illustrating the government's approach to opposition figures. The treason charges were based on Lissu's advocacy for a "no reforms, no elections" campaign, which courts interpreted as an attempt to disrupt the electoral process.
The second major opposition figure to be barred from the race was Luhaga Mpina, the candidate for the Alliance for Change and Transparency, known as ACT-Wazalendo, which represented the second-largest opposition party. Mpina, a sitting member of parliament and former government minister who had broken away from the ruling CCM in August 2025 to join ACT-Wazalendo, was disqualified by the electoral commission following an objection from the attorney general. The commission claimed that Mpina's party had failed to comply with nomination procedures during the presidential primaries. This disqualification left Hassan facing only candidates from minor parties with no established national presence or realistic chance of victory, effectively transforming what should have been a competitive democratic election into what critics described as a predetermined outcome or coronation.
President Hassan had initially raised hopes for democratic reform when she assumed office in 2021, implementing what she called her "4R" philosophy of reconciliation, resilience, reforms, and rebuilding. In her early tenure, she lifted bans on opposition political rallies that had been imposed under Magufuli, released some imprisoned opposition leaders, restored operating licenses to media outlets that had been shuttered, and initiated dialogue with opposition parties about electoral reforms. These moves led many observers to believe that Tanzania might return to its historically more moderate political culture after the authoritarian excesses of the Magufuli years. However, by late 2023 and into 2024, Hassan's government took an increasingly repressive turn that many analysts argued represented a consolidation of authoritarian control rather than a genuine democratic opening.
In 2024, the government introduced new electoral legislation including the Presidential, Parliamentary and Councillors' Elections Act and a revised Independent National Electoral Commission Act. While government officials and supporters argued these reforms enhanced order, transparency, and predictability in the electoral system, critics contended that the legislation maintained excessive government influence over the electoral commission and failed to create a genuinely level playing field for political competition. The reforms did establish a new electoral commission and included provisions for biometric voter verification, but the president retained the power to appoint commission members, raising concerns about the body's independence. The opposition's demands for more fundamental reforms, including reducing presidential powers and ensuring truly independent electoral management, were not adequately addressed in the legislation.
The period leading up to the election was characterized by systematic repression that extended well beyond the disqualification of major opposition parties. International human rights organizations documented a disturbing pattern of enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, torture, and attacks against opposition members, activists, journalists, and religious leaders. United Nations human rights experts reported more than 200 cases of enforced disappearance in Tanzania since 2019, with a significant concentration occurring during the election season. Amnesty International released a comprehensive report detailing what it characterized as a "wave of terror" that included enforced disappearances, torture, unlawful killings, and severe restrictions on freedoms of movement, expression, and peaceful assembly between January 2024 and October 2025.
Among the documented cases was the reported abduction of Humphrey Polepole, a former CCM official who had become a government critic, who was allegedly violently abducted on October 6, 2025, after making a series of public statements critical of the government. The pattern of disappearances and attacks appeared designed to instill fear and discourage political participation and criticism. Human Rights Watch documented at least ten specific instances of politically motivated assault, harassment, abduction, and torture in the months before the election. The Tanzanian government consistently dismissed these allegations as "unsubstantiated and misleading," reaffirmed its commitment to human rights and the rule of law, and urged international organizations to engage directly with authorities before publishing critical reports.
The international community's response to Tanzania's democratic deterioration was mixed and complicated by competing interests. Traditional development partners faced reduced leverage as global aid budgets shrank and priorities shifted toward perceived political stability and economic pragmatism. Several European nations including Belgium, Sweden, Germany, and Ireland withdrew their election observation missions, signaling their concerns about the legitimacy of the process. The United States maintained a monitoring presence but did not deploy traditional election observers. The European Union delegation limited its involvement to what was described as diplomatic observation rather than comprehensive election monitoring. This withdrawal of credible international observers raised serious concerns about transparency and accountability in the electoral process.
However, some regional organizations did eventually deploy observation missions. The Southern African Development Community and the East African Community, which had initially been denied full accreditation, ultimately sent observer delegations in late October 2025, though critics argued their participation served to legitimize a fundamentally flawed process. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region deployed a parliamentary delegation of twenty-three lawmakers and election experts from six countries including Burundi and Angola, arriving in Tanzania on October 23. These regional observers were tasked with monitoring media freedom, campaign conduct, security, and rights during the election period, though the extent and effectiveness of their oversight remained questionable given the constraints under which they operated.
In the final days before the election, the government implemented additional restrictions that further undermined the democratic character of the process. Access to the social media platform X, formerly known as Twitter, was reportedly restricted nationwide, with full access reserved only for government officials. This digital censorship limited online civic participation and reduced the flow of information during the crucial final campaign period. Social media platforms including TikTok and Facebook had become increasingly important for political discourse and mobilizing young voters, and the selective blocking of certain platforms represented a significant constraint on political communication. Critics argued that these restrictions were designed to prevent the organization of protests and limit the opposition's ability to communicate with supporters.
The election itself was held on October 29, 2025, which the government declared a public holiday to facilitate voting. Polling stations opened at 7:00 AM local time and were scheduled to close at 4:00 PM, with ballot counting beginning immediately afterward. The Independent National Electoral Commission had established approximately 99,000 polling stations across the country to serve the more than 37 million registered voters. Early voting had begun in Zanzibar on October 28. However, voter turnout was notably low, particularly among young people, at numerous polling locations across the country. The previous general election in 2020 had recorded a turnout of just over fifty percent, and early indications suggested that 2025 might see even lower participation, reflecting widespread disillusionment with the political process.
The election day itself descended into chaos and violence in multiple locations across Tanzania. Despite heavy security deployments in major cities, hundreds of protesters took to the streets in Dar es Salaam, the country's commercial capital and largest city with a population exceeding seven million, chanting slogans including "We want our country back." The protests represented a significant departure from Tanzania's historical reputation for political stability and peaceful civic engagement. Demonstrators expressed their fury at the exclusion of the main opposition candidates and the broader pattern of democratic erosion under Hassan's government. The protests quickly escalated beyond peaceful demonstration into violent confrontation with security forces and destruction of property.
In various parts of the country, protesters stormed polling stations, destroyed ballot boxes, scattered ballot papers, and set fire to election materials and government facilities. A police station along Nelson Mandela Road, the main thoroughfare from Dar es Salaam's port, was burned down by demonstrators. A government office was also set ablaze. Protesters lit fires on major highways, including at the Namanga border crossing with Kenya, disrupting transportation and commerce. In the Meriwa area on the main road between Dodoma, the capital, and Dar es Salaam, police dispersed demonstrators, and authorities closed the Singida-Arusha road due to fears of further unrest. The scale and intensity of the protests reflected deep-seated frustration with the political situation that had been building throughout the campaign period.
The government response to the protests was swift and forceful. Security forces deployed tear gas, rubber bullets, and in some cases live ammunition to disperse demonstrators. Multiple casualties were reported across the country. Amnesty International confirmed that at least two people died in Wednesday's protests, including one civilian and one police officer. A Tanzanian human rights activist reported receiving information about at least five deaths during the election day violence. At the Namanga border with Kenya, two Tanzanian nationals aged 27 and 28 were shot dead during protests, with scores of others injured. The use of lethal force against protesters drew immediate condemnation from international human rights organizations, which called for thorough and independent investigations into the violence and accountability for those responsible.
In response to the widespread unrest, authorities imposed an overnight curfew in Dar es Salaam and other affected areas. Government spokesperson Gerson Msigwa announced that all civil servants should work from home except for those whose duties required physical presence at their workplaces. Schools in affected areas were also closed. Ferry services between the mainland and Zanzibar were suspended due to security concerns. International flights to and from Dar es Salaam's Julius Nyerere International Airport were cancelled, and airports in the northern city of Arusha and near Mount Kilimanjaro were temporarily closed. Major roads, including the main route to Dar es Salaam's international airport, were blocked by security forces to control movement and prevent further demonstrations.
The Tanzanian government also implemented a comprehensive internet blackout across much of the country during and immediately after the election. Internet access was severely disrupted in Dar es Salaam and other major cities, making it difficult for citizens to communicate, organize, or share information about events on the ground. Despite these restrictions, protesters adapted by using the Zello application, which allows smartphones to function as walkie-talkies and can operate on limited connectivity. Through Zello, demonstrators discussed plans for further actions, including potential marches on government buildings. The combination of physical security measures and digital censorship represented a comprehensive strategy to suppress dissent and control the narrative around the election.
The protests continued into the day following the election, demonstrating that the unrest was not simply a spontaneous reaction but reflected deeper structural grievances. On Thursday, October 30, dozens of protesters returned to the streets in the Mbagala, Gongo la Mboto, and Kiluvya neighborhoods of Dar es Salaam, where police again fired gunshots and tear gas to disperse them. The ongoing protests represented a major test for President Hassan's government and highlighted the significant legitimacy challenges facing her administration. The violent response to peaceful protest also risked further inflaming the situation and deepening the political crisis. International observers noted that the level of unrest was unprecedented in recent Tanzanian history and reflected a fundamental breakdown in the social contract between the government and significant segments of the population.
Despite the chaos and violence, the Independent National Electoral Commission proceeded with vote counting and began announcing preliminary results. Early results broadcast on state-run Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation, which had largely avoided covering the protests and unrest, showed President Hassan winning commanding majorities in the constituencies that had completed tallying. In eight out of 272 constituencies counted by Thursday morning, Hassan had garnered over 96 percent of the vote. Given that she faced only minor opposition candidates with no national profile or significant campaign infrastructure, such overwhelming margins were entirely expected but did nothing to address the fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the process.
The electoral commission had announced that it would declare the winner of the presidential election within 72 hours after voting concluded, giving it until November 1 to announce final results. Under Tanzanian law, the commission had up to seven days to declare the final outcome, and importantly, these results could not be challenged in a court of law, eliminating any judicial avenue for contesting electoral irregularities. This lack of judicial review represented one of the key democratic deficits that the opposition had demanded be reformed before the election. Results for parliamentary and councillor positions were to be announced immediately after vote tallying was completed in each respective constituency.
The international reaction to the election was one of widespread condemnation. Members of the European Parliament issued a statement declaring that the elections in Tanzania were "neither free nor fair" and urged democratic partners to "stand firm in the defense of democracy and human rights." Various international human rights organizations characterized the election as a sham and called out the systematic exclusion of credible opposition candidates, the violence against protesters, and the broader pattern of repression that had characterized the electoral period. The Kenya Human Rights Commission raised particular alarm about the absence of credible election observation groups in Tanzania and the withdrawal of European monitoring missions.
However, the practical impact of international criticism was limited by Tanzania's strategic importance and economic relationships. Tanzania has been pursuing ambitious development goals under its Vision 2050 blueprint, which aims to transform the country from a lower-middle-income to an upper-middle-income economy by 2050. The government has secured major infrastructure deals, including a $1.4 billion agreement with China to refurbish the Tazara railway connecting Tanzania and Zambia, which would quadruple the line's capacity and open new trade opportunities. Tanzania has also ramped up production from newly discovered offshore natural gas reserves in a $42 billion project backed by international investors. These economic initiatives have given the government leverage in its relationships with international partners who may be reluctant to jeopardize commercial interests by taking strong punitive measures.
The Tanzanian government's approach to the criticism has been to deny wrongdoing while emphasizing the country's economic progress and stability. Officials pointed to increased tourism revenues, steady economic growth of approximately 5.5 percent in 2024, and expansion in the agriculture, mining, and natural resource sectors as evidence of effective governance. President Hassan campaigned on promises of major infrastructure projects, universal health insurance, and continued economic development. Her supporters argued that she inherited a deeply challenging political situation and a government that was resistant to her leadership, and that consolidating control was necessary to implement her agenda and overcome internal opposition within her own party.
The broader context of the 2025 Tanzanian election reflects troubling regional and continental trends toward democratic backsliding and increased authoritarianism. Freedom House, which had previously categorized Tanzania as "Partly Free" since 2016, moved the country to the "Not Free" category in 2025, signaling an authoritarian turn characterized by declining political freedoms and civil liberties. Tanzania's trajectory parallels similar developments in other African nations where long-ruling parties have responded to increased political competition by tightening controls rather than embracing democratic reforms. The systematic exclusion of opposition, weaponization of legal systems against critics, harassment of civil society, and violent suppression of protest have become common features across multiple African countries.
The case of Tanzania is particularly significant because the country had historically been seen as a relative success story in terms of maintaining stability and gradual democratic development. The ruling CCM party's predecessor led the independence struggle and the party had managed to maintain popular legitimacy through much of the post-independence period without resorting to the extreme levels of repression seen in some neighboring states. The current democratic erosion therefore represents not simply the continuation of authoritarianism but rather a reversal of previously established democratic norms and practices. This regression has occurred despite initial hopes that President Hassan would represent a reformist alternative to her predecessor's autocratic style.
The role of former President John Magufuli's legacy in shaping current politics remains complex and contested. Known as "the Bulldozer" for his uncompromising hardline tactics, Magufuli transformed Tanzanian politics from a relatively moderate dominant-party system into a repressive political environment that effectively banned opposition activity and normalized political violence. His sudden death in March 2021, widely believed to have been caused by COVID-19, created expectations for political change that have ultimately been disappointed. While Hassan initially sidelined some of Magufuli's key allies and appeared to chart a different course, the current trajectory suggests that the authoritarian infrastructure and political culture established during his tenure has proven resilient and perhaps has been further consolidated under different leadership.
Some analysts suggest that Hassan faces internal pressures within the CCM that push her toward authoritarian governance, including resistance from party factions and the challenges of being the country's first female president in a deeply patriarchal political culture. Her supporters contend that consolidating power is necessary to overcome this resistance and implement meaningful reforms. However, critics argue that after four years in office, Hassan must be judged on her own actions rather than being evaluated primarily in comparison to her predecessor or as a victim of inherited circumstances. The systematic dismantling of political opposition, the pattern of disappearances and attacks on critics, and the violent suppression of protest represent deliberate policy choices rather than unfortunate necessities.
The demographic context adds another dimension to the political crisis. Tanzania has a young and growing population, with a significant proportion of citizens having no adult memory of the one-party era or the early years of multiparty democracy. Young Tanzanians have grown up with expectations of political participation and freedom of expression that are being fundamentally challenged by current trends. The low voter turnout among young people reflects not apathy but rather disillusionment with a political system that appears to offer no meaningful choice or avenue for change. The protests, particularly in urban areas, were driven largely by young people expressing frustration with unemployment, limited opportunities, and a political system that seems unresponsive to their needs and aspirations.
The implications of the 2025 election extend well beyond Tanzania's immediate political situation. The election represents a test case for how the international community responds to democratic erosion in strategically important countries with growing economies. The mixed response from international actors, with some maintaining engagement while others withdrew support, illustrates the challenges of balancing democratic principles with other foreign policy interests. The continued involvement of some regional observer missions despite the obviously compromised nature of the process suggests that regional diplomatic considerations may sometimes take precedence over democratic standards, potentially setting troubling precedents for future elections in the region.
The events surrounding Tanzania's 2025 election also highlight the limitations of formal electoral processes as indicators of democracy when the broader political environment is fundamentally compromised. The presence of multiple candidates on the ballot, the establishment of polling stations, and the counting of votes can create a superficial appearance of democratic procedure while the substance of competitive democracy is entirely absent. The disqualification of credible opposition, systematic repression of dissent, control of media and information flows, and inability to challenge results in court all combine to render the electoral exercise largely meaningless as an expression of popular would or mechanism for democratic accountability.
As preliminary results confirmed the expected outcome with President Hassan securing an overwhelming victory, attention turned to the deeper questions about Tanzania's political future and the durability of the current system. The violent protests demonstrated that significant segments of the population reject the legitimacy of the process and are willing to take considerable personal risks to express their opposition. Whether this resistance can be sustained and organized into meaningful political pressure for change, or whether it would be successfully suppressed through continued repression, remains to be seen. The government's deployment of military forces alongside police to maintain order suggests a recognition that the situation may require sustained coercive capacity.
The economic implications of the political crisis also merit consideration. While the government points to continued economic growth and major infrastructure projects, the political instability, international criticism, and violence associated with the election could affect investor confidence and Tanzania's relationships with development partners. The restriction of internet access, closure of airports, and disruption of transportation during the election period had immediate economic costs. More broadly, the erosion of rule of law, weakening of institutions, and climate of fear created by disappearances and repression can have long-term negative effects on economic development, innovation, and human capital formation that may not be immediately visible but accumulate over time.
The situation in Tanzania reflects a fundamental tension in contemporary African politics between the aspirations of citizens for democratic governance, accountable leadership, and political participation on one hand, and the interests of ruling parties in maintaining power and control on the other. This tension is particularly acute in countries like Tanzania where democratic institutions were relatively well-established but remain vulnerable to erosion when political elites perceive their positions as threatened. The 2025 election would likely be remembered as a critical juncture in Tanzania's political trajectory, marking either a temporary setback in a longer process of democratic consolidation or a more fundamental shift toward entrenched authoritarianism.
The aftermath of the election would be crucial in determining Tanzania's direction. Key questions include whether the government would pursue further repression or seek some form of reconciliation with opposition forces, how the international community would calibrate its engagement with the Hassan administration, whether the protests and resistance can be sustained or would dissipate in the face of government pressure, and whether civil society and independent institutions can maintain any space for operation and advocacy. The next parliamentary term would also test whether any meaningful opposition voice can be preserved within formal political institutions or whether the National Assembly would become entirely dominated by the ruling party with only token representation of alternative views.
For Tanzania's citizens, particularly young people who led much of the protest activity, the election represents both a profound disappointment and potentially a catalyst for continued political engagement and resistance. The unprecedented nature of the unrest suggests that traditional assumptions about Tanzanian political culture and the population's willingness to accept authoritarian governance may need to be reconsidered. While the immediate outcome of the election was predetermined by the exclusion of credible opposition, the broader struggle over Tanzania's political future remains unresolved, with significant implications not only for the country's 60 million citizens but for democratic prospects across the East African region and the African continent more broadly.