1964 Mutiny
From the end of the war in 1945 until independence in 1961, the Tanganyikan element of the King's African Rifles was a typical colonial fOrce—small in number, a garrison army rather than a field force, and dedicated more to ceremony than to operations. When Tanganyika received its independence, its army consisted of two battalions of African soldiers led by British officers and noncommissioned officers. This force totaled nearly 2000 Africans including several African officers, none above the rank of Captain. The military, which had played no significant part in the independence movement, remained politically passive during the immediate post-independence period.
On 12 January 1964, a revolt took place on the island of Zanzibar. Rebel Africans, held down by the ruling Sultan and the Arab-controlled Zanzibar Nationalist Party, seized the police armory and other government buildings. The Sultan fled the island. Resistance brought death to 500 Arabs as the Afro-Shirazi Party took over Zanzibar.
The Tanganyikan Rifles, the name given the army after independence, viewed the events on Zanzibar as a simple operation. As a result of this and several long standing grievances, the army mutinied just eight days later. The government of the new republic was taken by surprise.
The mutiny began late on Sunday night, January 19, 1964, when the troops of the First Battalion of the Tanganyika Rifles deposed their officers and moved out of the Colito Barracks (now Lugalo Barracks) on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam and occupied key government buildings in the city. By Monday morning the mutineers controlled the State House, the home of the president, police stations, radio stations, and transportation terminals. The mutiny had all the appearances of a coup d'etat and following so closely the revolution on Zanzibar of the previous week, officials feared the worst.
President Nyerere and Vice President Kawawa went into hiding to protect themselves and their government as Minister for External Affairs and Defense Oscar Karnhona negotiated with the mutinous soldiers. The army stated that it was not trying to overthrow the government but simply wanted better pay and Africanization of its officer corps. Two-thirds of the officers including all those above the rank of captain were still British; after two years of independence the soldiers and lower ranking officers considered that unacceptable.
On the second day of the mutiny the Second Battalion stationed at Tabora and a company at Nachingwea joined in the mutiny, which meant that the country's entire armed force was in a state of rebellion. President Nyerere returned and met with the leaders of the mutiny but was unsuccessful in his efforts to get the troops back into their garrisons. In effect there was a standoff, but even with assurances from the mutineers that this was not a coup, the situation remained extremely volatile. Looting of shops had taken place in the capital, and the spirit of mutiny had spread across the borders to the armies of neighboring Kenya and Uganda.
The army’s grievances centered around the desire for an increase in pay and Africanization of the officer corps. Soldiers from the First Battalion in Colito Barracks, just five miles outside Dar es Salaam, moved in on the capital and commandeered government buildings, the airport, and the radio station, since there was no real attempt to overthrow the government and the fact that they were poorly organized, the Mutineers took no further action.
As it turned out the mutiny was not a political event; the causes were purely military—pay, promotions, and command affairs. Corning as it did at a time when the country was trying to establish itself economically and its people were being called on to sacrifice in the austere present in order to provide a more abundant future, the mutiny seemed to belong more to the colonial past than it did to the new era.
After meeting with the Minister for External Affairs and Defense, the soldiers agreed to return to their barracks while the government reviewed their demands for better pay and replacement of British officers. Some soldiers, however, did not return to Colito but remained in Dar es Salaam. Their continued rebelliousness led to rioting and to the looting of primarily Asian shops. Seventeen deaths were recorded as a result of this action.
As negotiations continued, it became apparant that several of the leaders of the mutiny were beginning to regret that they had failed to attempt an overthrow of the government. They began demanding “blackmail type ” conditions which caused the negotiations to reach a stalemate.
By Saturday January 25, with mutineers still in control in Dar es Salaam, Tabora, and Nachingwea, the president reluctantly asked for British help in resolving the situation. The British quickly landed a force of Royal Marine commandos front the nearby aircraft carrier H.M.S. Centaur. In a short time the British marines had routed the First Battalion mutineers from the streets of the capital and had subdued the rebels at the other two locations. British Commandos began the task of rounding up and disarming the army. This also included action against the Second Battalion in Tabora which had joined in the mutiny. The disarming efforts went smoothly and no serious incidents were recorded.
With the exception of the few civilians who took part in the rioting, the mutiny had no real effect on the population. The looting of primarily Asian stores did not reflect total civil or military animosity toward Asians.
Although the mutiny was repressed, Nyerere and the country the entire episode, particularly calling on British harces to control Tanganyikans, was a great embarrassment. Furthermore the Tanganyikan army was in a state of collapse. Taking stock of the country's military situation after the mutiny had been quelled and after the British marines had been replaced by Nigerian soldiers, top government officials decided that the future security forces-- both military and polim - would have to be drawn from the politically active segment of society.
The previously held idea that such forces should be apolitical was discarded in favor of a new premise that urged soldiers and policemen to become party members and to participate actively in political affairs. Many of the ring-leaders of the mutiny were tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison; other participants were discharged from the service and sent back to their villages. The Tanganyika Rifles were disbanded.
The government conceded that Africanization of the army had not taken place fast enough. As quickly as possible, British officers and noncommissioned officers were replaced by Africans. British Commandos remained in their peace keeping role for approximately three months when they were replaced by Nigerian troops who remained in Tanzania for six more months while the army was being totally reorganized and staffed.
This reorganization was the result of the government’s realization that the loyalty of the army could not be assured in its existing state. Immediate steps were taken to increase the pay of military personnel. African noncommissioned officers were promoted to officer rank to fill the vacancies created by the dismissal of British officers.
The army was redesignated the Tanzanian People ’s Defense Force ( TPDP ) and placed under the command of Brigadier Sarakikya, whose loyalty during the mutiny was unquestioned. By 1965, a well—screened force of approximately 1300 men had been formed, organized in three battalions, and stationed in Dar es Salaam, Tabora, and Nachlngwea.
Additional measures were taken to provide further assurance of the loyalty of the army. First, the army was not allowed to ruminate in its barracks but instead, was put to work on such nation—building projects as village development and road building. The new army also announced plans for self—help projects such as the establishment of classes designed to make every soldier literate, the establishment of a dairy farm in Tabora, and the development of poultry, corn, and peanut farms by the battalions in Dar es Salaam and Nachingwea.
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