Serbia - Post-Milosevic Politics
Since October 2000, Serbia has been led by democratically elected governments that have publicly committed to supporting stability and security in the region. There have been periodic spikes in political tension and threats of politically motivated violence in both the Sandzak region and south Serbia. In the Sandzak region, these tensions have led to sporadic, localized violence between competing political groups. This violence is usually directed at opposing party figures and has not targeted unrelated civilians or businesses.
Routine federal elections in September 2000 resulted in a narrow official victory for Slobodan Milosevic and his coalition against Vojislav Kostunica, the consensus presidential candidate of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), an umbrella group of 18 anti-Milosevic political parties. After Milosevic's victory was documented to be fraudulent, citizens across Serbia turned out in street protests in support of Kostunica. On October 5, 2000, Milosevic was forced to concede defeat after mass protests across Serbia. The new F.R.Y. President Vojislav Kostunica was soon joined at the top of the domestic Serbian political scene by the Democratic Party's (DS) Zoran Djindjic, who was elected Prime Minister at the head of the DOS ticket in parliamentary elections that December.
Although initial reform efforts were highly successful, especially in the economic and fiscal sectors, by the middle of 2002, the nationalist Kostunica and the pragmatic Djindjic were openly in conflict with each other. Djindjic repeatedly feuded with Milosevic's successor, the more cautious former Yugoslav president, Vojislav Kostunica, who wanted slower and less painful social changes.
Despite the initial euphoria of replacing Milosevic's autocratic regime, the Serbian population by mid-2002 slid into apathy and disillusionment with its leading politicians in reaction to this political maneuvering. Two rounds of voting for the republic presidency in late 2002 failed because of insufficient voter turnout (Serbian law required participation by more than 50% of registered voters).
On March 12, 2003, Prime Minister Djindjic was assassinated by organized crime elements threatened by his pursuit of anti-crime measures. The murder resembled the gangland style murders that marked the bloody era of former President Slobodan Milosevic, and commentators expressed concern that nationalist supporters of the former strongman were involved in the killings. Many of those accused for organized crime in general, and for political murders in particular, were active members, and sometime on high positions in police and intelligence service in Djindjic’s Government Mr. Djindjic was often criticized for allowing the extradition of the former leader to the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. Zoran Zivkovic, a vice-president of Djindjic's DS party, was elected Prime Minister in March 2003, but a series of scandals plagued the new government, which ultimately led to early elections.
Republic of Serbia presidential elections were held on November 16, 2003, but the results were declared invalid because of insufficient voter turnout. Following the December 2003 parliamentary elections, a new minority government was formed with the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), G17+, and the Serbian Renewal Movement/New Serbia (SPO/NS) coalition and the tacit support of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). Former F.R.Y. president Vojislav Kostunica was named Prime Minister.
After two rounds of voting in late 2002 and a third in November 2003 failed because of insufficient voter turnout, the election law was changed to allow for a valid election with turnout of less than 50% of registered voters. In elections held on June 27, 2004 Boris Tadic (DS) defeated Radical Party candidate Tomislav Nikolic by a slim margin and was elected President of Serbia.
Following the adoption of a new Constitution in October 2006, Serbia held parliamentary elections on January 21, 2007. Serbia was without a functioning government after the parliamentary elections on January 21, as no party won enough seats to form its own government. Serbia's pro-democratic parties reached a power-sharing deal to form a new government, averting the possibility of ultra-nationalists regaining power. Serbia's pro-European Democratic Party and moderate Democratic Party of Serbia reached a deal. On 08 May 2007 nationalist parties were joined by other parties to elect ultra-nationalist Tomislav Nikolic as speaker of parliament. Nikolic had opposed Serbian cooperation with the UN's war-crimes tribunal, and his election prompted expressions of concern from the European Union and the United States. A new government was formed on 11 May 2007, with a coalition of the DS, DSS, and G17+. The coalition chose Vojislav Kostunica to continue in his position as Prime Minister.
Serbia's adoption of a new Constitution in 2006 required the Speaker of Parliament to call for presidential elections nearly 18 months before the end of Tadic's term of office. On February 3, 2008, in run-off presidential elections, Boris Tadic again defeated Radical Party candidate Tomislav Nikolic by a slim margin and was re-elected President of Serbia. Serbia's Parliament had been in office since February 2007.
| Serbian Political Parties |
2008 vote |
2008 Seats |
|
For a European Serbia--(ZES) DS, G-17, SPO, LSV, SDP |
38.7% | 102 |
| Radicals (SRS) | 29.1% | 78 |
| Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) | 11.3% | 30 |
| Socialists (SPS), (PUPS), (JS) | 7.9% | 20 |
| Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) | 5.2% | 13 |
| Hungarians (MK) | 1.8% | 4 |
| Bosniaks Coalition | 0.8% | 2 |
| Albanian Coalition | 0.5% | 1 |
| Others--Below Threshold | 4.7% | |
| Total | 100% | 250 |
After winning re-election in February 2008 and forming a pro-European coalition government with the Socialists and ethnic minority parties in July 2008, Serbian President Boris Tadic set European integration as the country's top strategic goal. Tadic, a charismatic leader, is the country's most influential politician; although on paper his powers are relatively modest, in actuality he wields wide executive authority through his party power. Despite this, he is often indecisive and politically timid. He heads a government made up of those who fought Milosevic in the 1990s.
In September 2008, Radical Party (SRS) deputy president and two-time presidential candidate Tomislav Nikolic split from the SRS and formed the Forward Serbia caucus. Together with former Radical General Secretary Aleksandar Vucic, Nikolic officially formed the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in October 2008. As of September 2011, the SNS held 20 seats in parliament due to defections from the SRS, while the SRS maintained 58 seats. The SNS joined two local governments in western Serbia in early 2009 and in December 2009 scored a victory over the DS in the Belgrade municipality of Vozdovac. Local observers have described these electoral victories, as well as an SNS rally in February 2011 in Belgrade that drew an estimated 50,000 participants, as signs of the party's consolidation.
By late 2009 figures who built their names by standing up to the United States were generating headlines that would have been unthinkable just a few months earlier. During the visit of Aleksandar Vucic, the vice-president of the Serbian Progressive Party (and former Secretary General of the Serbian Radical Party) to Washington, the headlines were "Serbia Can't Advance Without America" (Politika) and "We Need Both the Russians and the Americans" (Kurir). Speaking of the 1999 NATO intervention in an interview published October 8 in the daily Alo, Vucic said, "That year cannot be forgotten, but we have to go forward. Some time has passed, some of it is history today. But we have kids, a future, and a serious man has to keep that in mind."
In discussing the new law on media in 2009, Interior Minister Dacic, who in an earlier life was Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) spokesman for Slobodan Milosevic, made a clear break with the past, "I was among the first ones to be black-listed by the EU and the United States because of the previous Law on Public Information. And I am still waiting for a visa for my official trip to America even though I am deputy prime minister. As long as I am its president, the SPS will not vote for conflict with the media and the journalists, the cancelling of TV broadcasts of parliamentary sessions, beating citizens, a return to the majority electoral system, or wars."
Organizers for the 20 September 2009 Belgrade Pride Parade reluctantly cancelled the event at the last minute after the government, citing security concerns, banned the event at its desired location and proposed what the organizers deemed unacceptable alternative venues. Although government officials argued that this Solomonic decision prevented bloodshed and destruction of property, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community and its supporters in civil society maintained that the government effectively capitulated in the face of threats by right-wing nationalist organizations and soccer hooligans. The fierce rhetoric against the event and the collective sigh of relief when the event was cancelled clearly demonstrated that Serbia failed to pass an important litmus test for tolerance and the value system promoted by the law against discrimination adopted in March.
The October 10, 2010 Pride Parade in Belgrade was marred by significant violence. Approximately 6,000 demonstrators, mostly young soccer hooligans and nationalist extremists, attempted to attack and disrupt the parade. When police prevented them from reaching the parade, they attacked several buildings, including foreign embassies and political party headquarters, in downtown Belgrade. The rioters injured 147 police officers and caused approximately USD 1.4 million in property damage. The Serbian government cancelled the planned October 2011 and October 2012 Pride Parades at the last minute, ostensibly because of threats of violence by the same nationalist and extremist groups that attempted to disrupt the 2010 parade.
A number of ultra-nationalist organizations, such as "Obraz" and "Nasi," are active in Serbia. Popular support for such organizations appears to be very limited. In 2012 these organizations issued numerous statements and so-called "blacklists" targeting certain Serbian political leaders, local NGOs, and media outlets alleged to be "pro-Western." To date, the calls of these organizations for action against their targets have not resulted in any violent incidents.
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