Airborne Assault Troops [VDV] - Great Patriotic War
An important role in the offensive strategy of the Red Army was assigned to airborne assault forces. They had to seize bridges and crossings, airfields, road junctions, important industrial facilities, as well as support partisans and underground workers behind enemy lines. By end of the First World War, Germans and Frenchmen delivered saboteurs through the front line on the airplanes. These were the first combat landings. But two or three people participated in them, no more. In the 1920s, the British gained some experience in transporting troops through the air. In the process of "maintaining order" in the colonies in India and the Middle East, they transported small units, weapons and ammunition for them on airplanes, and also tried to supply remote posts and small garrisons by air. The Soviet scope was completely different. This was due primarily to the fact that only the Soviet Air Force then had high-capacity aircraft - heavy multi-engine bombers.
The first parachute landing in the world was thrown out on August 2, 1930 during the exercises of the Moscow military district from the plane Farman "Goliath"; with him in two batches dropped landing of 12 people.
The Soviet Union made substantial progress in developing concepts for airborne force employment by the start of the Great Patriotic War. When German forces attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the USSR was in the process of forming five airborne corps of about 10,000 men each. The widespread destruction of transport aircraft, however, together with the need to concentrate on the production of fighters and bombers during the war, and the often pressing requirements for effective ground assault troops, severely limited the opportunities to employ airborne brigade, corps, and the later-organized divisions in an airborne role. Nevertheless, the Soviets claim to have conducted more than 50 airborne assault landings during the Great Patriotic War.
Of all great powers, the Soviet Union’s record of wartime airborne operations was so disastrous that rational calculations should have led the High Command to abolish airborne forces. Having begun the Second World War with the world’s largest (10 divisions) airborne force, Soviet generals naturally expected paratroopers to contribute substantially to Red Army operations. However, Soviet airborne operations were particularly unsuccessful.
All of the Soviet Union’s three large-scale operations failed catastrophically and the vast majority (75 percent) of participating paratroopers were either killed or wounded. Tragically, these sacrifices were largely in vain as the Viazma and Demiansk operations merely annoyed the German High Command, while the Dnepr operation failed to accomplish even that. When the Medyn disaster is added to these catastrophes, it is easy to comprehend why after 1043 the Soviet leadership imposed a moratorium on airborne operations during the remainder of the war.
Improving the training in the exercises, the paratroopers acquired experience in real battles. In 1939, during the rout of the Japanese on the Khalkhin-Gol River, the 212th Airborne Brigade took part. For shown courage and heroism, 352 paratroopers were awarded orders and medals. In 1939-1940, during the Soviet-Finnish war, along with the rifle units, the 201, 202 and 214th airborne brigades fought.
On the basis of the experience gained in 1940, new staffs of brigades were established in the composition of three combat groups: parachute, planetary and landing landing. Since March 1941, airborne corps of brigade personnel (3 brigades in the corps) began to be formed in the Airborne Forces.
The Red Army was one of the first to pay special attention to the development of airborne forces. On the eve of the war, she had sufficiently strong airborne troops. He was subordinate to the Commander of the Air Force of the Red Army and consisted of five (from the 1st to the 5th) airborne corps located in the Baltic, Western, Kiev special, Kharkiv and Odessa military districts in the west of the Soviet Union, and also the 202nd separate airborne brigade in the Far East.
The Great Patriotic War caught airborne corps, stationed in the Baltics, Belarus and Ukraine, in their formative stages. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the staffing of five corps had been completed, but it was not possible to completely provide them with military equipment. Each airborne corps consisted of three airborne brigades, a landing and landing battalion of light tanks with a three-staff composition of 50 light tanks (later 32% of the squadron, a platoon of powerful radios and a motorcycle platoon with 15 motorcycles.) The airborne brigade consisted of four parachute brigades battalions, artillery batteries (six 76-mm guns and twelve 45-mm anti-tank guns), reconnaissance company (113 bicycles), a mortar company (six 82-mm mortars), an anti-aircraft company (12.7 mm machine-gun) when boiling numbers approximately 3,000. The number of each shell on paper was 10,419 soldiers, tanks 50, 18 and 36 of the field anti-tank guns and 18 mortars.
The personnel made jumps on parachutes of type PD-6, and then PD-41. Small-sized cargoes were dropped in parachute-air soft bags. Heavy equipment was delivered to the assault landing method on special pendants under the fuselages of aircraft. For the landing, the main use was for the bombers TB-3, DB-3 and the passenger aircraft PS-84.
Heavy situation prevailing in the first days of war forced the Soviet command to use these corps in fighting as infantry units. As a result, the advancing Wehrmacht destroyed at the end of September 1941, the majority of the airborne corps of the Red Army. On September 4, 1941 the Administration of the Airborne Forces was transformed into the Administration of the Commander of the Airborne Forces of the Red Army, and the airborne corps were removed from the acting fronts and handed over directly to subordination of the Commander of the Airborne Forces (ATCM).
Still later, in September 1941, the commander-in-chief of the airborne troops was appointed, and the existing Air Defense Forces was reorganized into the Airborne Forces Command Directorate with the submission to him of all the surviving airborne forces. The new commander of the Airborne Forces could only use his troops with the special approval of the Stavka. Shortly thereafter, the formation of special transport aviation forces was started to deliver airborne troops to the landing site.
In early autumn of 1941, the surviving airborne brigades were replenished, while the NCO formed five new airborne corps, bringing the total number to ten. The rate used these new 4th, 5th, and 10th Airborne Corps during its winter offensive of 1941-1942 to conduct airborne operations west of Moscow, during which all three corps suffered heavy losses.
After the winter offensive ended in April 1942, the NKO reorganized the ten airborne corps into eight, and also created five new maneuverable airborne brigades designed for both airborne landing and ground operations. Three of these brigades took part in the unsuccessful attempts of the North-Western Front to defeat the German forces, surrounded in Demyansk in March-April 1942, but also suffered heavy losses.
Large airborne operations for the entire Great Patriotic War were conducted only twice. The first was undertaken at the final stage of the battle near Moscow, when in early 1942 it became possible to encircle large forces of the Wehrmacht in the area of Vyazma. The conditions for widespread use of the VDV were created during the counter-offensive near Moscow. In winter 1942 the Vyaz’ma airborne operation involving the 4th Airborne Corps was held. It was the first in the history of Soviet military art, in which the preparation and disembarkation of such a large landing was carried out in an extremely short period of time, in an extremely difficult operational situation for the offensive of the fronts, in winter, at night, in difficult meteorological conditions, with a very limited number of military transport aircraft. The corps's actions played a positive role in the period of the defeat of the German fascist troops near Moscow.
Among the measures taken for this purpose by the Stavka, it was decided to land in the rear of the Germans in the area of Ozerechnia (35 km south-west of Vyazma) the 4th Airborne Corps (VDK), numbering more than 10,000 soldiers and officers. To accomplish the operation, it was possible to collect only 64 FS-84 and TB-3, which concentrated on advanced airfields about 30 km from the front line. But, even when working "on a short shoulder" this group could transfer paratroopers with all necessary equipment only for 3-4 days. The operation began on the afternoon of 27 January 1942, when 648 paratroopers of the advanced battalion were thrown out. Alas, from the very beginning events began to unfold not according to plan - paratroopers landed at 15-18 km to the south of the designated place and in addition were scattered in a radius of 20-25 km. During the day, 476 people gathered together, and they could not find most of the ammunition and ammunition dropped, including skis.
In the evening of January 28, the airfields, where the landing of the next wave of landing aircraft was going on, were hit hard by Ju-88 and Bf-110. As a result, at least 7 transport aircraft were burnt, and the schedule of flights was disrupted. Nevertheless, that night the airmen dropped another 1,100 paratroopers. Departures for landing were continued for the next 5 days, however, constant enemy air raids forced them to conduct them from the rear airfield, which had its negative impact. In fact, only one landing was successful. It was attended by 27 FS-84, which in the afternoon under the cover of the Pe-3 groupin time delivered to the designated place a few mouths of paratroopers. In total, up to February 2, inclusive, it was possible to deliver 2497 personnel and 34400 kg of cargo. By that time, the operational situation in the area of the operation deteriorated, and further outliers decided to stop. Parts of the 4th VDK, as well as the 1st Cavalry Corps and the 33rd Army, engaged in enemy encirclement, were themselves cut off from the main forces of the Western Front.
When attempts to break through to them in the area of Yukhnov did not yield results, the front commander GK Zhukov again decided to drop the 4th VDK. A total of 72 transport aircraft and a bomber TB-3 were involved. This time the flights were conducted from Moscow airfields, including from Vnukovo, where they worked 20 FS-84. On the night of February 18, they got up and headed for Putkovo (about 25 km south of Vyazma). Unfortunately, only 12 crews were able to carry out the task, which were delivered by 293 skydivers. The others got lost, tk. drive stations at that time for some reason did not work, and in the Putkovo area on the ground there were many bonfires, among which it was too difficult to distinguish the signal ones. The landing of the 4th VDK was carried out until February 24. During this time, 7373 paratroopers and 1524 bales with ammunition, equipment, etc. were thrown out.
The failure of this operation led the command of the ADD and the Airborne Forces to conduct training before the next major landing, which showed the unwillingness of both aviators and paratroopers to similar actions. It took additional training, but while they were going, the need for a landing fell off.
Nine airborne corps were reorganized into guards rifle divisions and sent to the Stalingrad Front in 1942, and the 13th Guards Rifle Division under the command of the paratrooper, Hero of the Soviet Union AI Rodimtsev, was on the most dangerous tracks.
In July 1942, after the Wehrmacht began operations: "Blau" - a large-scale offensive in the steppe regions of Southern Russia, the NCO reorganized the airborne corps and maneuverable airborne brigades into ten guards infantry divisions (from 32nd to 41st infantry divisions) yu) and five rifle brigs; (from the 5th to the 9th). These troops were transferred to the active fronts, fighting in the area of ??Stalingrad. However, at the Stavka the airborne troops continued to be considered as an important factor in modern mobile warfare. Therefore, at the end of August 1942, the NCO received an order from the Supreme Headquarters to begin the formation of eight new airborne corps and five maneuverable airborne brigades in the Moscow Military District, using the same organizational designations as before. When the Red Army began expanding its new winter offensive in late December 1942, these formations were transformed into 10 Guards airborne divisions (from the 1st to the 10th) and sent first to the Northwestern Front, and later to the Kursk region, where again acted as elite ground troops. Thus, on January 1, 1943, the only airborne unit remained deployed in the Far East, the 202nd Airborne Brigade.
In preparation for the summer campaign of 1943 in the Reserve, the STAVKA began to form 20 new Guards airborne brigades: from the 1st to the 7th - in April, and from the 8th to the 20th - in June. When the intensity of fighting increased by the end of the summer, the Stavka transferred the 1st, 3rd and 5th Guards airborne brigades to the Voronezh Front on September 1, and the 4th, 6th and 7th Guards air- landing brigades - to the Southern Front, leaving the remaining 14 Guards airborne brigades in reserve.
In the spring of 1943, seven airborne divisions, which were part of the Steppe Front, were transferred to the Kursk Bulge. In the battles in the area of Prokhorovka Guardsmen of the 9th and 6th Airborne Divisions distinguished themselves, as well as the 13th and 36th Guards Rifle Divisions, transferred from the Stalingrad Front.
The second major landing operation was undertaken in 1943 during the battle for Kiev. On 22 September 1943, the forward units crossed with improvised means seized a small bridgehead near the village of Veliky Bukrin, where, according to intelligence, the enemy did not have a large force. However, the delay in the construction of pontoon crossings prevented the build-up of success. In these conditions, as Marshal Nikolai Skripko, the Marshal of the Air Force, wrote in his memoirs, GH Zhukov, representative of the Stake, and NF Vatutin, commander of the Voronezh Front, decided to throw an airborne assault into the bridgehead consisting of three brigades under the command of General Kapitokhin. To do this, Li-2 was involved from 1st, 53rd and 62nd ADD divisions, as well as parts of the GVF.
They decided to carry out the ejection at night, because the crews had little experience of the day, but did not fly for nearly two years. In addition, there were great difficulties with the fighter cover of such a large-scale operation.
In September 1943, airborne troops were deployed to assist the troops of the Voronezh Front in the crossing of the Dnieper River. Paratroopers with their active actions diverted considerable enemy forces, which, undoubtedly, rendered the Soviet units and formations that had crossed over to serious help in expanding and consolidating the bridgehead.
On the night of September 24 to September 25, preparations for disembarkation were completed. On the left bank opposite the bridgehead, a corridor was laid out from the fires, along which the crew of the Li-2 had to establish the exact direction of the flight. After crossing the line on the right bank of the Dnieper, the planes had to go to the ejection area within 2 minutes. The height of the landing was determined at 600 m, and the speed of the flight was 190-200 km / h. From the maintenance of these parameters depended on the exact landing of paratroopers on selected sites.
On the evening of 24 September, just under 5000 paratroopers were airdropped to seize a bridgehead. Intelligence for the first night's airdrops was not accurate or timely, resulting in the majority of the paratroopers landing in the middle of a German Panzer Corps. The waves of air ships rolling on the right bank came under intense bombardment. Crews began to maneuver, change speed, and some to throw out the assault before the estimated time. The situation was aggravated by the fact that many fighters had to perform their first jump. As a result, the paratroopers were scattered over a large area, and some of them even got to the Dnieper. On the ground, scattered groups of paratroopers had to immediately engage in a brutal battle with fresh enemy forces. The paratroopers were "chewed to pieces" and the remaining airdrops were called off. The landing party suffered heavy losses, and only 10 days later its remains were gathered in the Kanev forest, from where they could establish contact with the headquarters and partisans.
The Soviets subsequently elected not to use airborne forces in anything larger than small tactical operations, sabotage, or co-operation with partisan forces after the fall of 1943 operations through the end of World War II.
Still later, in October 1943, the Stavka lent the 1st 2nd and 11th Guards airborne brigades in October to the 1st Baltic Front and used them to create a temporary junction - the 8th Guards Airborne Corps, which she planned to throw during the November offensive in northern Belarus in the rear of the German troops defending Vitebsk and Polotsk. However, the strong resistance of the Germans and the worsening of weather conditions forced GHQ to cancel this operation.
After that, 20 Guards airborne brigades were kept in the structure of the Red Army until December 1943, when they were transformed into Guards infantry divisions (from 11th to 16th). By the end of 1943, the only airborne brigades in the Red Army were the 3rd and 8th Guards Airborne Brigades in the Stavka Reserve and the 202nd Airborne Brigade in the Far East.
Slightly stronger than their predecessor, the 1941-1942 model, the airborne brigade of 1943 consisted of four parachute battalions, an anti-tank division, an anti-aircraft machine gun company, a reconnaissance and communications company with a total strength of 3,533 men. Each parachute battalion of the brigade consisted of three parachute mouths with nine manual machine guns and three 50mm mortars, an anti-tank company with 27 anti-tank rifles, a machine-gun company with 12 "maxims" machine guns, a sapper company, a sanitary platoon and a communications platoon. The battalion had a total strength of 715 men. For anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense, the brigade had an anti-tank battalion of two batteries of four 45-mm guns each, anti-tank rifles with 18 rifles and anti-aircraft machine guns with 12 DSC guns.
In August 1944, the Airborne Forces formed three airborne corps - 37, 38 and 39, which in October were consolidated into the Independent Guards Airborne Force. In October 1944, the VDV were converted into the Separate Guards Airborne Army, which entered the composition of the Long-Range Aviation. In December 1944 this Army was disbanded, and the Administration of the VDV was created with submission to the Commander of the Airborne Forces. In December 1944, this army was reorganized into the 9th Guards Army, which made a worthy contribution to the liberation of the capital of Austria, Vienna, from the Nazis. The training airborne regiment, the advanced training courses of officers and the aeronautic division remained in the composition of the VDV.
In the course of the Manchurian strategic operation in August 1945, more than 4,000 personnel of rifle units were landed for landing by landing methods, which successfully completed the assigned tasks.
For the mass heroism of paratroopers during the Great Patriotic War, all airborne formations were awarded the title of "Guards". Thousands of soldiers, sergeants and officers of the Airborne Forces were awarded orders and medals, and 296 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Throughout the Second World War, the VDV’s paratroopers had suffered because they lacked easily-deployable and effective anti-armor defensive weaponry. Meanwhile, the war highlighted the importance of armored vehicles for offensive warfare. As a consequence, the VDV concluded that paratroop units needed armored vehicles that could be parachuted behind enemy lines.
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