Kamov V-80 - Design
The rationale for the concept of a single-seat helicopter in general terms was as follows. To reduce the likelihood of a combat helicopter being hit by enemy air defense systems, access to the target area is carried out at extremely low altitudes (5-50 m). The experience of using the Mi-24 showed that only the pilot acts at this stage, since the navigator-operator at such a height practically cannot navigate. After reaching the target area in order to detect and attack it, the pilot is forced to gain altitude: for an attack from a line of 4 km, the flight height above the flat terrain should be at least 35-70 m, and above the hilly - 100-245 m. can help the navigator-operator in the search for targets, if he does not have an independent sighting system.
Kamovtsy believed that subject to the automation of search and tracking of targets, the performance by one crew member of the functions of a pilot and navigator-operator is fundamentally possible and should not be associated with excessive psychological and physical stress. It should be noted that Kamovtsy proposed to automate combat processes on a helicopter in 1977, based on their own unique experience in creating such systems on helicopters intended for the fleet. Already on the Ka-25 and Ka-27 automation was provided for the search for a submarine located at a depth of several hundred meters, solving helicopter problems and organizing group work of helicopters with automatic exchange of information about the enemy, etc. Reducing the crew would not only allow a significant gain in the mass of the helicopter, but also in the long term reduce the cost of training the flight crew, reduce losses in a combat situation, i.e. to achieve great savings on the maintenance of army aviation.
The concept of a single-seat combat helicopter began to gradually emerge, although opinions on the number of crew members were far from unambiguous. The search for technical solutions ended with the creation of semi-natural modeling stands at GosNIIAS and TsNIITM, on which elements of the future complex were worked out. On the basis of the serial Ka-29, a flying laboratory was built with an imitation of a single cockpit. By the time the project was submitted, the test results confirmed the possibility of creating a single-seat combat helicopter. Thus, doubts about the reality of the proposed solution have disappeared.
In this case, the General Designer S.V.Mikheev rightly noted: “It is not necessary to prove that one pilot works better than two, it is not necessary to prove the unprovable. But if the pilot on our helicopter copes with what two will have to do on a competing helicopter, this will be a victory.” So, one pilot in a combat helicopter is the second postulate that underlies the new plan.
The development of a single sighting, flight and navigation complex (PrPNK) for a single-seat helicopter was done by the Leningrad Research and Production Association Elektroavtomatika, who had extensive experience in creating complexes of functionally connected equipment for long-range and front-line aircraft.
One of the ways to reduce combat losses is the implementation of the "long arm" principle, i.e. equipping the aircraft with weapons whose range is greater than that of a potential enemy’s air defense systems. As the main armament of the V-80, the 9A4172 Whirlwind anti-tank guided missile, created by the Tula Instrument Design Bureau, was adopted. A distinctive feature of the missile was the laser-beam guidance system, previously implemented in the Kastet, Bastion, Reflex, Sheksna and Svir anti-tank missile systems of the ground forces (the missiles for them were developed by the same design bureau under the guidance of member Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences A.G. Shipunova). The missile launch range exceeded the radius of destruction of foreign Chapparel, Roland and Rapir air defense systems.
The laser-beam guidance system in combination with an automatic target tracking system guaranteed high firing accuracy, practically independent of range. The radiation power of the laser-beam control system, an order of magnitude lower than the threshold power of operation of foreign laser warning systems, ensured high secrecy of use. The Whirlwind has contact and non-contact fuses, which in combination with a powerful cumulative-fragmentation warhead made it possible to use a missile to destroy both armored vehicles and low-maneuverable air targets. an order of magnitude lower than the threshold response power of foreign laser warning systems, ensured high secrecy of use. The Whirlwind has contact and non-contact fuses, which in combination with a powerful cumulative-fragmentation warhead made it possible to use a missile to destroy both armored vehicles and low-maneuverable air targets. an order of magnitude lower than the threshold response power of foreign laser warning systems, ensured high secrecy of use. The Whirlwind has contact and non-contact fuses, which in combination with a powerful cumulative-fragmentation warhead made it possible to use a missile to destroy both armored vehicles and low-maneuverable air targets.
The development of an aiming system capable of solving the tasks of tracking the target and guiding missiles without the participation of a pilot was entrusted to the Zenit mechanical plant in Krasnogorsk. This enterprise had vast experience in creating aiming systems, in particular, it was at Zenit that the Rainbow control equipment was developed for ATGMs Phalanga and Sturm. The Shkval automatic television sighting system was created simultaneously in two versions: for the Su-25T attack plane and the V-80 combat helicopter.
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