MiG-25 FOXBAT - In Service
The Mig-25 has been advanced as ‘unsurpassed in the ease of maintenance” and “a masterpiece in standardization.” (Soviet era statistics show that for tactical aircraft, such as the MiG-25PD, the number of elements to be upgraded would generally total 10 to 15 after each 1500 flight hours. At the same time, from 1980 to 1988 flights of MiG-25's were suspended six times and flights were restricted until structural changes were made more than 15 times.
As a result of the surprise attack on June 5, 1967, on Egypt, Syria and Jordan, the Israeli army seized vast lands of the Arab states. The Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip and other territories, including the Golan Heights, were occupied. Israel ignored the demands of the UN Security Council in November 1967 on the withdrawal of troops from all occupied territories and began to feverishly create a powerful defense system in depth with the help of Western countries.
The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Nasser, turned to the Soviet Union for military assistance, and the request was granted. Already at the beginning of 1970, Soviet anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) and fighter units were deployed in Egypt to cover airfields, the Aswan Dam and other important facilities. The arrived advisers from the USSR took part in the development of the operation to liberate the occupied territories. For the successful implementation of these plans, it was necessary to carefully study the defenses created by the Israelis.
This task was assigned to a special reconnaissance aviation group equipped with MiG-25 aircraft. According to the tactical and technical requirements declared for this aircraft, it most fully corresponded to the nature of the solution of the upcoming tasks. However, the aircraft had not yet been put into service, and although the data obtained during the ongoing tests looked very optimistic, the fine-tuning was delayed. In this difficult situation, there was a rare opportunity to test the aircraft in real combat conditions, and they decided to use it.
Test pilot Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Bezhevets was appointed commander of the MiG-25 flight detachment, Major General Georgy Baevsky was appointed senior representative from the Air Force. The task was to organize reconnaissance of military installations in the strictest secrecy, and above all, Israeli airfields on the Sinai Peninsula. There were two MiG-25R, two MiG-25RB, which were equipped with the most advanced reconnaissance equipment at that time, but did not have missile weapons. The first flight was made on October 22, 1970. A positive moment was the unexpectedly high flight altitude - 24 thousand meters, which the aircraft easily gained. The possibilities of technology finally became clear when they learned that the temperature at these heights was about minus 70° C, which is significantly lower than the temperature during military tests near Murmansk (minus 49 ° C).
Only Soviet pilots flew, no failures were observed. None of the scouts were lost. The successful and efficient operation of the MiG-25 in real conditions confirmed their unique capabilities, and it was included in the test program. The creators of the interceptor and the Air Force command received evidence of the reliability and promise of the new aircraft.
Accordingn to G.A.Bayevsky. "With aviation through the twentieth century" [Moscow, 2001] : "Combat sorties for reconnaissance were carried out in the Sinai, where the Israelis created a powerful network of defensive fortifications to a depth of 50 km or more. I was pleasantly surprised by the brilliant quality of the pictures. Strong points, pillboxes, tanks dug into the ground, a network of communications, individual vehicles and groups of people were clearly visible. Electronic intelligence equipment helped to open air defense radar stations, anti-aircraft positions, airfields and other objects on the territory of the Sinai Peninsula, and then Israel. As expected, all attempts by the Israeli Phantom and Mirage fighters, which could not gain the required altitude and take up position for the attack, as well as the Hawk anti-aircraft missile systems, to counter the MiG-25 were in vain. On the indicators of the circular view of the locators, one could observe how the MiG-25s left their pursuers."
In April 1972 the MiG-25 was put into service. The appearance of new fighters sharply reduced the activity of American intelligence officers, who had repeatedly approached the borders of the Soviet Union in the North and the Far East. However, reliability issues pertaining to the complex engines emerged during early use, forcing front line service to be delayed until 1973. Once in operation, the MiG-25 was the same complicated machine as during development and her operations were more-or-less curtailed to protect her touchy engine qualities. The engines, though inherently powerful, only allowed for short spurts of top level thrust to reach the perceived maximum Mach 3 interception speed so pilots were told to limit general usage to about Mach 2.8 to help maximize optimal engine service lives and avoid flameouts.
Maneuverability, range, and close combat potential were extremely limited. Even its tremendous speed was problematic: although the available thrust was sufficient to reach Mach 3.2, a limit of Mach 2.8 had to be imposed to prevent total destruction of the engines. Even Mach 2.8 was difficult to reach without overspeeding the turbines. The limited maneuverability of the Mig-25 was often overstated by Western observers, as under the same high performance parameters, the SR-71 had even more restrictive stress limitations.
NATO had its first detailed look at the MiG-25 when a Soviet pilot defected to Japan with one in September 1976. Soviet Lt. Viktor I. Belenko carried two personal items – a knee-pad notebook with flight data and a military identity document – on his dramatic flight to freedom in a MiG-25 Foxbat fighter from the USSR to Japan in 1976. Born in 1947, Belenko was a fighter pilot with the Soviet Air Defense Forces based at Chuguyevka near the eastern perimeter of the Soviet Union. He became an instant celebrity when he successfully defected to the West by flying his Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25 Foxbat jet fighter across the Sea of Japan to Hakodate, Japan, on 6 September 1976. Western military and civilian experts welcomed the resulting opportunity to get a firsthand look at the aircraft and to debrief its pilot.
The USSR sent two formal protest notes to the Japanese government over the MIG-25 incident and ostentatiously refused to exchange greetings on the 20th anniversary of the normalization of Soviet—Japanese diplomatic relations in October. The Soviets also seized an above-average number of Japanese fishing boats in September and October for alleged violation of Soviet territorial waters. The Soviets were reluctant to carry out threats to retaliate in other economic areas because Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation benefited the USSR as much as it did Japan. The Soviets, moreover, did not want to give China an advantage with new Japanese leaders by prolonged remonstrances over the MIG—25 affair. Concerned about its relations with the Soviet Union, the Japanese Government limited US access to the MiG before it was disassembled and returned to the USSR in 30 crates.
This exposed its 1950s-era radar and other features that dispelled much of the mythology built up by some Western analysts since the first sighting of the 'Foxbat' in 1967. Subsequent analysis revealed a simple-yet-functional design with vacuum-tube electronics, two massive turbojet engines, and sparing use of advanced materials such as titanium.
Since the advent of both atomic weapons and orbiting satellites, electronics designers had to face the issue of how to sustain operation in the presence of damaging radiation to delicate, miniature electrical components. To the surprise of Belenko’s interrogators, they found that most on-board avionics in this advanced aircraft utilized vacuum tube technology, not solid-state electronics. Beyond ruggedness and easy replaceability, such vacuum components were highly radiation hard. That is, they could continue to operate properly even in a high-intensity radiation environment. On the other hand, dated technology such as vacuum tubes and hand wiring cost more.
The aircraft was returned to the USSR, but the US military managed to get acquainted with its secret "stuffing". It was necessary to urgently redo almost all on-board equipment on several hundred MiG-25s. It was decided to modernize these aircraft, and a lot of KB MiG forces were thrown at it.
Belenko, however, stayed in the West. After the US Government granted him asylum, CIA played a central role in organizing months of debriefings. Belenko became an American citizen by an act of Congress when President Jimmy Carter signed a private bill into law. Belenko developed a love for the American West and, after marrying, settled on a ranch in Wyoming. He found common ground with some famous Americans, such as the fighter ace and test pilot Chuck Yeager, with whom he regularly embarked on rugged hiking and fishing expeditions. Belenko cooperated with author John Barron to produce a well-received biography, MiG Pilot, The Final Escape of Lieutenant Belenko, which was published in 1980.
The USSR sold powerful interceptors and reconnaissance aircraft to friendly countries: India, Algeria, Syria, Libya, Iraq, and the pilots of the latter country used the MiG-25 most intensively: both during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and when repelling an attack NATO (1990–1991).
Iraq attempted several interceptor sorties during the opening days of Desert Storm, but reached the same conclusion as had the Syrians over the Bekka Valley, that flying against Western air forces would be suicidal. Coalition forces shot down 41 Iraqi aircraft, 24 with Sparrows and 12 with Sidewinders. An Iraqi MiG-25 may have scored a single aerial kill just before it was shot down.
On account of the interceptor, which was piloted by Lieutenant Zuhair Dawood, the only official loss of American aviation in the air battles of "Desert Storm" is an F / A-18 Super Hornet carrier-based attack aircraft shot down on the first night of the war on January 17, 1991 (its pilot Michael Spicher after that listed as missing). Also on the first day, a dogfight took place between a pair of MiG-25PDs and four US Air Force F-15s. And, although the Americans fired a large number of missiles, they did not achieve a single hit, after which the planes dispersed.
The last of the known incidents with "twenty-fifths" in Russia occurred on July 2, 2003 on the Kola Peninsula. Major Alexander Ryabov was taking off towards the city of Monchegorsk. Suddenly, the temperature of the exhaust gases on one of the engines began to rise sharply. In an effort to prevent a possible fire on the plane, the pilot turned off the engine. However, the thrust dropped sharply, climbing was impossible, and ahead of the take-off course was the city, immediately behind it was a mountain range 700-900 meters high. Ryabov nevertheless managed to take the multi-ton car away from the dwelling, and, only after making sure that no one was in danger, at a height of 80 m he ejected. The moment of full opening of the parachute coincided with the immersion of the pilot in the swamp to the waist. The father and son, who worked in the garage, arrived in time to help and pulled Alexander out, no one was hurt.
The aircraft on exhibit at the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, a MiG-25RB, was found in 2003 by American forces buried in the sand near Al Taqaddum Airbase 250km west of Baghdad during the opening months of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The MiG-25 was buried to prevent its destruction on the ground by coalition aircraft. The aircraft was recovered incomplete--the wings could not be located and the vertical stabilizers were removed for transport.
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