MiG-21 FISHBED in Action
As a basic rule, the Soviets considered Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI), especially in supersonic flight, essential to effective use of the MiG-21. The desired intercept method is an undetected approach to the rear hemisphere. The fighter is vectored at about a 20 degree angle from the rear of the target so that visual detection may take place through the glass on the side of the canopy. Then, the fighter approaches the target at a closing rate of about 50 to 100 knots. The pilot then gets a missile lock-on, turns on the range-only radar, and launches the missile at the appropriate range. According to the Soviets, if an intercept is attempted on counter headings, an engagement through visual detection is nearly impossible. If GCI is used, the controller will compute a lead distance (5 to 15 nautical miles) for the aircraft to start a turn which will roll the MiG-21 out on the tail of the target.
When attacking a maneuvering target, the Soviets first recommend use of the infrared (IR) missile. They train their crews to overlead the target, then reduce G loading to permissible launch parameters. To effectively perform this technique, the Soviets state that at least 1.5 nautical mile separation is required in order to launch the missile. If a missile attack cannot be accomplished, the cannon may be used. A normal pursuit curve is used when attacking a maneuvering target. The desired firing range is under 2,000 feet, but firing can be expected against the F-105 as far out as 3,300 feet.
At low altitudes, a missile attack is first attempted. However, the maximum missile launch range of one nautical mile is a handicap, especially against a maneuvering target. Cannon fire is accomplished using a normal pursuit curve starting from 1 nautical mile out to the side and about 5,000 feet above the target. A small positive lead is used during the first part of the pursuit curve in order to prevent getting below the target. Because of the speed limitations of the MiG-21 at low altitude, the destruction of clean [no external ordnance or fuel tanks] F-105 aircraft is difficult, if such aircraft resort to high speed afterburner flight.
The North Vietnamese added the newer and more capable MiG-21 to its existing fleet of MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters in late 1966. The maneuvering capability advantage of the MiG-21 is highlighted in its defensive tactics against the F-105. If normal acceleration can first gain the MiG separation, this technique will be used followed by a vector to a position advantage. Secondly, a climbing high G turn is recommended if a speed surplus exists; a diving high G turn, for a low speed position. This high G turn was considered by the Soviets to be the MiG-21's best defense against the missiles or guns of the F-105.
Target size determines the detection lobe size by increasing or decreasing the visual image size and, hence, the detection range. A head-on aircraft is much harder to see than one with a side or belly view because it is smaller. A MIG-21 has a head-on projected area of about 40 squarefeet and an estimated visual detection range of 2.5 nautical miles. In a sideview, the projected area increases to about 300 square feet, with an estimated detection range of 6 nautical miles. This increase in the visual image size enables detection to occur at a greater range.
In the spring of 1966 the North Vietnamese Air Force (VPAF) began flying the MiG-21. As evidence of the improvement in air defense, reconnaissance photographs revealed an upgrade in the quality of NVNAF equipment with the introduction of modified MIG-21 D or F models, With the resolve to use the MIG against US operations, a greater reliance was noted on the use of air-to-air missiles. The first loss to an AAM, an F-105 strike aircraft, occurred on 14 December 1966.
Operating from five airfields, Phuc Yen, Kep, Hanoi/Gia Lam, Haiphong/ Kien-An, and Hoa Lac, the MIGs enjoyed a certain degree of immunity while on the ground. The political restriction barring strike forces from hitting enemy airfields was to exist until 23 April 1967.
The MIG weapons system had now become more than a potential threat as increased NVNAF activity began to compromise strike missions and affect the security of the strike force. MIG confrontations necessitated the jettisoning of ordnance as strike flights were forced into defense maneuvers.
MIG-17s covered low altitudes because of their high maneuverability and the MIG-21s covered the high altitudes. From the higher altitudes, the MIG-21 could begin an intercept from a combat air patrol position by executing a normal or slight descending turn, followed by a dive to the target altitude, or, with good weather conditions only, by performing a split "S". A missile attack is attempted first, followed by cannon fire. The attack is begun by using a normal pursuit curve starting from one NM out to the side and about 5,000 feet above the target.
The steady increase of MIG aircraft flying activities, beginning late in 1966, represented a threat to strike flights which had to be contained. Operation BOLO, conducted on 2 January 1967, challenged MIG activity and resulted in downing seven MIG-21s -- nearly half of Hanoi's force -- without a single US loss.
Because MIG attacks in the last quarter of 1966 had forced many strike flights to jettison bomb loads before reaching their target, and later model MIG-21s had the capability of carrying radar-guided or heat-seeking missiles, they had become a real threat as well as harassment factor to U.S. fighters. Accordingly, Operation BOLO was conceived, planned, and executed for two primary reasons: first, the recognized future threat of MIG aircraft, and second, the political restrictions which prevented strike flights from hitting enemy airfields and destroying planes on the ground. The overall objective of the operation was to destroy the NVN airborne forces.
Operation BOLO was the first offensive fighter sweep of the Vietnamese conflict. An F-4C force was configured to look like an F-105 strike force, and n flew a similar mission profile. The MIGs soon fell into this elaborate trap and seven MIG-21s were downed in12 minutes with no U.S. losses. Prevailing weather conditions and communications difficulties prevented even greater success. Although the MIG-21 losses on 2 January represented nearly half of Hanoi's total force of this type, the NVNAF had the capability to assemble MIG-21s which were stored in crates at Phuc Yen.
Use of the MIG as an integral part of the total NVN air defense system became an important consideration of operational strategy by 1967. The threat of counterair activity had become a reality, and U.S. fighter pilots would be called upon to drive that threat from the sky for the preservation of strike aircraft.
Until 23 April 1967, the MIGs had a relative freedom of operation in that their home bases had never been struck. Further, in Route Packages, 5 and 6, where MIG activity is most intense, SAMs, AAA/AW had also been concentrated. While operating in this hostile environment, US forces were a considerable distance from their home base. No other air war had exposed US aircrews to AAA, SAMs and MIGs in the same airspace simultaneously.
To more thoroughly understand the role played by the MIGs in this environment, it is necessary to analyze the coordination of the other types of air defenses, the radars they employ as well as the aircraft itself. North Vietnam had a collection of old and new Soviet-supplied electronic equipment, and established an extensive radar network which permits their counterair weapons systems to complement each other. Whenever U.S, pilots are in this environment, they must be aware of the everpresent dangers.
Soviet doctrine placed the MIG force out in front of the SAMs, but the NVNAF chose to combine these two defenses. Before the introduction of the QRC-160 pods in 1967, U.S. strike aircraft were operating at altitudes of about 4,000 feet because of the SAM threat, thus being vulnerable to single-pass, diving attacks by the gun-armed MIG. (After a short learning period after the introduction of the QRC-160 pods, the ingress altitudes were higher. Korat aircraft, for example, operated at 15,000 to 17,000 feet, Takhli aircraft began increasing altitude at a slower rate, starting generally 6,500 feet above ground and increasing gradually until June 1967, when they were operating at from 8,000 to 12,000 feet.
The MiG-21 quickly proved to be a worthy opponent of the USAF's F-4 Phantom. Even so, between April 26, 1965, and Jan. 8, 1973, USAF F-4s and B-52s downed 68 MiG-21s. The MiG-21 had two limitations that F-105 pilots capitalized on in aerial combat during the Vietnam War. The first was the visibility restriction of the MiG-21. Aft restrictions made defense against or even acquisition of a 6 o'clock (directly behind) difficult. Forward visibility was restricted by an internally mounted bullet proof glass, sight combining glass and glare shield. Vision is reduced to the extreme that targets normally acquired at 10 miles are not seen until within five miles.
The second limitation was the MiG-21's speed restriction. Below 12,000 feet, the engine driven fuel pumps could not keep up the fuel requirements in full afterburner, thus limiting the MiG-21 to 595 knots indicated airspeed from sea level to 16,000 feet. Like the MiG-17, the MiG-21 had a relatively low wing loading when compared to the F-105 and enjoyed the same 2G advantage for a given airspeed as the MiG-17. Extremely heavy control forces are encountered above 500 knots indicated airspeed.
Flying an F-4D with the famous 555th ("Triple Nickel") Tactical Fighter Squadron, in 1972 Steve Ritchie became the only Air Force jet ace of the Vietnam War by downing a MiG-21 on May 10, another on May 31, two on July 8 and his last on Aug. 28. After completing 339 combat missions totaling more than 800 flying hours, Ritchie returned as one of the most highly decorated pilots of the war, having received the Air Force Cross, four Silver Stars, 10 Distinguished Flying Crosses and 25 Air Medals.
On December 12, 1971, at the height of the India-Pakistan war, one of the most awaited events in aviation history took place. Two MiG-21 fighters of the Indian Air Force’s No.47 squadron, providing air patrol to sensitive installations in western India, intercepted a couple of Pakistan Air Force F-104 Starfighters approaching the city of Jamnagar. The MiGs drew first blood – while one Starfighter managed to flee in the direction of Pakistan, the other one was shot down over the Gulf of Kutch.
During the war the MiG-21s played a crucial role in giving the IAF air superiority that played a huge part in India’s victory. Military analyst Edward Coggins writes in Wings That Stay On: The Role of Fighter Aircraft in War that by the time the hostilities came to an end, the IAF MiG-21s had claimed four PAF F-104s, two PAF F6, one PAF North American F-86 Sabre and one PAF Lockheed C-130 Hercules. The Russian fighter had clearly won the much anticipated air combat between the MiG-21 and the F-104.
Tom Cooper writes in Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 Units in Combat: “Because of the formidable performance of the MiG-21s several nations, including Iraq, approached India for MiG-21 pilot training. By the early 1970s, more than 120 Iraqi pilots were being trained by the Indian Air Force.”
On 27 February 2019, Pakistani and Indian jets clashed in the skies above Kashmir. The Indian Air Force shot down a Pakistani fighter plane and lost one of its own aircraft and pilots in the clash. A senior Indian Air Force officer claimed the downed Pakistani jet was an F-16 taken down by an Indian MiG-21 with an R-73 short-range missile. The downing of a relatively modern F-16 fighter by an Indian Air Force MiG-21, which first took to the skies in 1959, might be a surprising takedown given the disparity in technology of the planes. And several media outlets have run with the David-and-Goliath angle of an ancient Soviet jet taking out a relatively modern American-made F-16.
Lynette Nusbacher, a strategist and former British intelligence officer, told RFE/RL that such a shoot-down is certainly possible "if the right missile or round hits [an F-16], it doesn't matter what platform the missile or round comes comes from." But Nusbacher said there was not enough open-source evidence available to say whether an F-16 had indeed been shot down.
India’s account of the dogfight was heavily disputed by Pakistan. Islamabad claimed to have shot down not one but two Indian fighters, and denied losing any of its aircraft. It denied using F-16s in the dogfight as well. Pakistan, which initially claimed shooting down two Indian fighter jets before reducing the score to one, denies losing any aircraft. It also said it didn’t use US-made F-16s in the mission. According to some reports, doing this would have violated the end-user agreement with the United States. Washington is currently investigating, if such a violation happened.
MiG-21 is a third-generation supersonic jet fighter and interceptor aircraft, which was introduced into the Soviet military in 1959. The F-16 is a fourth-generation supersonic multirole fighter, which entered service with the US Air Force almost two decades later. Obviously, the F-16 has much more advanced characteristics, including the combat radius of 547 km, compared to 370 km of MiG-21. However, the MiG-21-93 ‘Bison’ used by the Indian Air Force is a largely modernized version of the aircraft. Its ‘Spear’ radar system allows tracking down incoming enemy aircraft at a distance of up to about 60 kilometers in the front and up to 30 kilometers in the rear. It can track eight targets at the same time, with the quick search and automatic capture of visually observed targets in close combat mode concluding with the use of guided missiles or cannon. MiG-21 Bison boasts medium-range R-77 air-to-air self-guided missiles as part of its arsenal. They have a range of 110 kilometers and can reach the speed of 4250 km/h, while carrying a 22-kilogram warhead.
So MiG-21-93 could’ve well shot down an F-16. And could’ve done it easily. Besides, the best plane is the one with the best pilot inside. The rest is details.
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