Russia - Latin America Relations
Russia shared economic and political ties with Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua since the Soviet period. Socialist Nicaragua and the Soviet Union collaborated closely until the collapse of the USSR. A temporary cooling in relations was triggered by the collapse of the USSR and a string of geopolitical changes in the world. But Russia's cooperation with its longstanding Latin American allies has evidently caught its second wind.
In the 18th century, Tsarist Russia had only sporadic contacts with the colonies that Spain had already established in the Western hemisphere. The primary contact was through traders moving south from Alaska along the Pacific coast. It was not until the late 19th century that diplomatic and commercial ties were established, first with Argentina in 1885, followed by Mexico in 1887, and then Uruguay in 1890. The sheer remoteness of Latin America presented a significant barrier to establishing Close relations, and this promoted the view that the region was not strategically significant.
Since the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917, Latin American communist parties became a vital link to the Soviets. The first such party in Latin America was founded in Argentina in 1918, followed by Mexico in 1919, and Uruguay in 1920. By 1930, 13 more countries had established communist parties within the Comintern framework. in 1924, Mexico became the first country in the region to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Uruguay followed in 1926, with several other countries taking the same step shortly thereafter.
The trend toward closer ties with the Soviet Union, however, was adversely affected by the increasing subversive activities of the Latin American communist parties. For this reason, all the countries in the region that had previously established diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, had severed them by 1939.
It was not until the Second World War when the Soviet Union, as a member of the Western Allies, began again to establish diplomatic relations with the nations of Latin America, starting with Colombia in 1941, and reaching a total of 14 countries by the end of 1945. The Cold Wwar had a chilling effect on relations with the region, and by 1953, only Mexico, Argentina, and Uruguay maintained relations with the Soviet Union.
Up until the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, Soviet foreign policy was characterized by limited international contacts, and was restricted essentially to Eastern European client states and to mainland China.
In the following three decades, however, the Soviet Union built a massive national military and economic force capable of projecting power into Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The increased Soviet thrust into the Third World was considered by some to be the result of the Western withdrawal from former colonies, as well as a reaction to their perceived threat of the containment policies of the United States and its allies. In addition to these factors, the changing political climate in strategically located countries throughout the world stimulated a rise in involvement in the region.
The Latin American region became a new target of Soviet efforts. Increased capabilities in power projection and the skillful exploitation of political developments worldwide gave the Soviets new confidence in increasing their involvement. The Soviets viewed power projection as a dynamic application of diverse tools of foreign policy, encompassing not only military forces, but also less visible elements such as: diplomacy and traditional state—to—state activities; military advisers and aid; treaties and legal ties; economic aid; and cultural, media, and educational diplomacy, such as the granting of scholarships for studies in the Soviet Union.
More importantly, Soviet power projection also includeed KGB (Soviet State Security Committee) and GRU (intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff) activities, as well as support for terrorists and pro—Soviet insurgent groups, and the use of what the Soviets called "active measures." This latter category includes disinformation, forgeries, manipulation of the media and mass organizations, the use of foreign communist parties and front organizations, and other political influence operations.
The mid—1960s was a significant period for Soviet involvement in the hemisphere because of two significant events. First, the Cuban revolution established a communist regime just 90 miles off the southern coast of the United States. After initial hesitation, Moscow —— aware of the strategic military and political implications —- fully supported the Cuban revolution in the early 1960s.
Secondly, the rise in Soviet military power allowed the Soviet Union to provide significant military support to any group that might be supportive of Soviet objectives. The demise of Chilean Socialist President Allende in 1973 proved the correctness of Soviet skepticism about the viability of that regime and lent emphasis to the importance of a strong military faction within communist parties to insure the defense of socialist gains. In short, unless the revolutionary regime maintains control over the critical elements of national power, particularly the military, the new regime is likely to fail. The importance of a strong military that supported the principles of a communist government was underscored by the Allende episode in Chile.
With the exception of Bolivia in 1957, Uruguay in the late 19605, and Argentina between 1976 and 1978, overall economic trends and relative political stability in South America were not conducive to repressive governments. Therefore, while not abandoning the support of political ferment and support of contacts with the left, Moscow stressed government- to—government ties, and has engaged in economic aid and trade, as well as actual and proposed arms sales.
The severe economic deprivation and repressive governments in Central America and the Caribbean were generally viewed by the Soviets as fertile conditions for the emergence and growth of leftist revolutionary groups. From the Soviet perspective, these groups could be encouraged, directed, and exploited in the hope of bringing to power a revolutionary regime that would be supportive of Soviet policy. These conditions, as viewed by the Soviets, could bring about at least some Soviet gains. This area became the major regional recipient of Soviet military assistance.
By pursuing defense cooperation with Latin American countries Russia may counterbalance NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. During his February 2015 Latin American tour Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu signed a number of important agreements strengthening military collaboration between Russia and Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua. In Managua, Shoigu signed an agreement allowing Russia's warships to enter Nicaragua's ports and ratified bilateral deals aimed against drug trafficking and organized crime.
The Russian Ministry of Defense is working with its Latin American partners to create a series of logistical support points, but has no plans for the creation of military bases, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said on 15 February 2016. "What we are talking about is helping [Russian] ships on long-distance missions, to provide them with water, provisions, places for their personnel to rest, and naturally, repairs for their ships, if necessary," the minister explained.
Nicaragua, alongside Cuba and Venezuela, voted against a UN resolution to declare Crimea's independence referendum illegitimate.
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