Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
In its development up to the revolution of 1917, bolshevism followed Leninist theories and endowed the party leaders with dictatorial power. In 1904, long before the revolution, young Leon Trotsky, then a violent opponent of Lenin, had complained in a pamphlet, Our Political Aims, that in Lenin's scheme: ". . . the party organization takes the place of the party, the Central Committee replaces the party organization and finally the "dictator" replaces the Central Committee." After the successful Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the party's Central Committee did indeed become the new government, while Lenin, the supreme leader of the party, took on the stature of a dictator.
The "Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)" was the outgrowth of an extreme radical fraction of the "Russian Social Democrat Workmen's Party" founded in 1897. The split took place in 1903 at a congress held abroad at which the radical delegates were in the majority. For this reason this fraction came to be known as the Bolsheviks, which meant simply those of the majority, that is, the majority at this particular congress. Until the summer of 1917 the official title of this fraction was "Russian Social-Democrat Workmen's Party (Bolsheviks)." At that time the leaders of this group, now organized as a distinct party, were already discussing the formal adoption of the name "Communist" (Lenin, "First Letter on Tactics," May, 1917). They continued, however, to use the name "Bolshevik," by which they had come popularly to be known abroad as well as in Russia.
In official documents and writings the term "Bolshevik" was used as late as July, 1918 (Official Stenographic Report, with tables, of Fifth All-Russian Congress). Since about that date there was a tendency to substitute the word "Communist" in official documents and writings, though the word "Bolshevik" has generally been added in parentheses as indicated above. (See Call to Third or Communist International, "Certain Aspects of the Bolshevist Movement in Russia.") During the revolution of 1905 the Bolsheviks represented the radical minority in the workmen's councils of that period. The Russian word for council is "soviet." They opposed bitterly the more moderate fraction of the Russian Social Democrats, the Mensheviks.
The Social-Democrats as a party boycotted the elections to the first Duma in 1906, but individual Social-Democrats were elected to this first Russian parliament, particularly from the Caucasus. During 1906 the Mensheviks secured the majority in the party councils and Russian Social-Democrats participated more actively in the elections to the second Duma, securing a large number of seats. The explanation given for the dissolution of the second Duma was its refusal to unseat 55 Social Democratic members whom the government charged with revolutionary conspiracy. There was, nevertheless, a small group of Social-Democrats in both the third and fourth Dumas. Among these there were members who, though not specifically elected as such, were generally recognized as adherents of the Bolshevist fraction of the party. It was, for example, these individual Bolshevist members within the Social-Democratic group of the fourth Duma that came out in public condemnation of the war at the special session of the Duma called in August 1914.
Before the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and other socialist groups were distinct political entities with fundamental disagreements on party structure, revolutionary strategy, and their ideal socialist society. The Bolsheviks and Mensheviks originated from the same Marxist party, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), but split in 1903 over contrasting visions for achieving socialism in Russia. The Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), meanwhile, were not Marxists and drew their support from a different segment of Russian society. Anarchists formed a smaller but ideologically distinct movement that rejected the fundamental premise of a state altogether.
The Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, believed in a tightly-controlled, centralized "vanguard party" of committed, professional revolutionaries. They argued that the working class could not achieve a socialist consciousness on its own and needed the party to lead it. This disciplined, conspiratorial model was seen as a necessity for operating in the oppressive climate of Tsarist Russia. In contrast, the Mensheviks, led by Julius Martov, favored a broader, more inclusive party that welcomed a wider range of members and allowed for more open debate. They aimed to build a mass political movement similar to Western European social democratic parties, seeing it as more democratic.
Regarding their path to revolution, the Bolsheviks were radical and impatient, believing that a violent, immediate overthrow of the capitalist system was necessary to establish a "dictatorship of the proletariat". They opposed cooperation with liberal bourgeois parties, viewing them as enemies of the working class. The Mensheviks, in contrast, believed that Russia was not yet economically developed enough for a socialist revolution. According to Orthodox Marxist theory, Russia first needed to go through a period of bourgeois-led capitalism and democracy, during which the working class could grow and prepare for the eventual socialist revolution. The Mensheviks therefore advocated working with liberal parties to achieve this initial bourgeois revolution.
The Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) focused primarily on the interests of Russia's vast peasant population, not the urban proletariat like the Marxists. Their ideology was a blend of Marxist, anarchist, and traditional populist ideas, centered on "agrarian socialism". The SRs advocated for the socialization of land and its redistribution to peasant communes, reflecting the peasants' desire for land reform. While they also engaged in parliamentary politics, many within the SR movement embraced terrorism as a tactic, targeting Tsarist officials. Following the February Revolution, the party split, with the more moderate Right SRs supporting the Provisional Government, while the Left SRs aligned more closely with the Bolsheviks.
Finally, the anarchists in Russia fundamentally disagreed with the other socialist groups over the role of the state. While the Bolsheviks sought to seize state power to establish a new dictatorship, anarchists rejected all forms of state authority as inherently oppressive. They believed that a revolution should be a spontaneous, bottom-up action by the masses, rather than led by a centralized party. After the revolution, they envisioned a bottom-up federation of workers' councils (soviets) to manage society, which ultimately put them at odds with the Bolsheviks' consolidation of power.
In the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, organized during the first days of the revolution of 1917, party alignment at the beginning was not particularly emphasized. Very shortly, however, particularly after Lenin's arrival, a sharp differentiation took place, and the Bolsheviks, as a separate party, became the most energetic and compact, though minority, group in the Petrograd Soviet.
In the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets the Bolsheviks had a minority and therefore a minority on the first AllRussian Central Executive Committee of Soviets elected by that Congress. During the summer of 1917 frequent conflict developed between the Petrograd Soviet and the AllRussian Central Executive Committee, for the former was more radical than the latter, containing a larger percentage of Bolsheviks. By September, 1917, the Bolsheviks had obtained a clear majority in the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky being elected its president.
Against the wish of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Petrograd Soviet sent out a call for a Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which was announced for November 7. It was on the eve of the opening of this Congress that the Bolsheviks executed their coup d'etat. In this Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Bolsheviks had a majority. In view of the refusal of the more moderate Socialist parties, particularly the Mensheviks, to accept the Bolshevist coup d'etat, the Central Executive Committee selected by the second Congress was composed largely of Bolsheviks, as was the first Council of People's Commissaries, although a few Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were given places on the Executive Committee and on the Council.
At the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets of July, 1918, the Bolsheviks had a majority, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries having about 30 per cent of the total membership and other parties being represented in very small numbers. It was at this Congress that Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Right and Center, and the Mensheviks-all anti-Bolshevist but Socialist parties - were excluded from the Central Executive Committee and all local Soviets were urged to do the same.
The Sixth All-Russian Congress, held in November, 1918, showed an overwhelming majority for the Bolsheviks; in fact, one can say that they were the only party really represented, having 900 (including 71 sympathizers) out of 914 members (Summary of Stenographic Report). In the Seventh Congress, held more than 13 months later, in December, 1919, the Bolsheviks were equally dominant, having 970 out of 1,002 members.
The Bolsheviks had been less completely in control of local Soviets. However, an analysis made by the Bolsheviks themselves shows the gradual elimination of all other parties, and particularly of so-called non-party members, the explanation being given that the latter were formally joining the Communist Party. There were frequent references to "sympathizers with communists" or "candidates for communists." These official Bolshevist figures also indicate that the percentage of Communists or Bolsheviks increased as one went up the scale of Soviet institutions. There were more Bolshevists in the provincial executive committees and provincial congresses than in the district and cantonal executive committees and congresses. A detailed analysis of the composition of the Petrograd Soviet which was elected in July, 1919, and statistics on the elections of last December also show the elimination of other parties and even of socalled non-party members.
From such accounts as have been found in Bolshevist newspapers it appears that in the first stage the elections are by acclamation, at meetings held in factories, barracks, or executive departments and on party lists presented to the meeting. Delegates to higher units would seem to be elected in proportion to party strength. But even so, the party with a bare majority increased its majority as the elections pass through the various grades. A report on the first sitting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, as published in the official Izvestia, gave a list of the members, all of whom were prominent Communists. In local Soviets, as for example that of Petrograd, on December 31, 1919, similarly, the Communists had complete control.
The All-Russian Conference of Representatives of the Provincial Committees of the RCP(b) in October 1920 adopted a resolution on the unified structure of the apparatus, on the concentration of power in the party committees and their secretariats. V.I. Lenin justified the replacement of the dictatorship of the proletariat with the "dictatorship of the party" on behalf of the class. Lenin used the term "oligarchy" because the entire party is incapable of actually ruling. Power is wielded by "more or less stable groups of the most authoritative, influential, and experienced" politicians. Lenin argued that "the proletarian policy of the party is determined not by its composition, but by the enormous, undivided authority of that tiny layer that can be called the old party guard".
According to Lenin, the working class is incapable of real power. At the Second All-Russian Congress of Miners on January 23, 1921, Lenin asserted: "Does every worker know how to govern a state? Practical people know that this is a fairy tale... We haven't even eradicated illiteracy. We know how workers, connected to the peasantry, succumb to unproletarian slogans. Who among the workers governed? A few thousand for all of Russia, and that's all".
The 10th Congress of the RCP(b) in March 1921 adopted a resolution "On Party Unity" [9, a 632-634, 541-542]. Forced discipline was ensured, and legal opposition was banned under penalty of expulsion from the party. Real power passed from the Central Committee of the RCP(b) to narrower, indirectly elected bodies: the Political and Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and the General Secretary of the Central Committee. The decisions of the 10th Congress became the basis for the ideological and organizational dominance of the Leninist group.
An important aspect in the development of the Bolshevik elite of the 1920s was the social composition of both the entire ruling party and its apparatus. Statistics on the party's composition testify to the social type and channels of mobility of the elite and its selectorate groups. The proportion of workers by origin among all members of the RCP(b) between 1917 and 1921 decreased from 60.2 to 37.3%; those from the peasantry increased from 7 to 32.1%; and former employees remained stable (32.2 and 30.6%).
Based on their degree of power, three distinct groups of Bolsheviks in the 1920s can be identified. First, the "rank-and-file party members"—the bulk of the RCP(b) membership, those who executed directives and formed the apparatus's personnel reserve. Second, the lower and middle-level managers (the bureaucracy). Third, a thin layer of professional managers who actually made policy in the country (the elite).
Two trends conflicted in the motives for recruiting the elite: high business and political demands on newcomers (in the early 1920s) and, on the contrary, the accelerated promotion of the poorly educated strata along class lines in 1924-1929. Periodic purges compensated for the recruitment errors and cut out the ideologically alien and passive. The results of the purge, contrary to the intentions of "laborizing" the party, revealed the persistent predominance of bureaucracy. The influx of illiterate recruits continued, encouraged by decisions of party fora. The gap between the generations of "old Bolsheviks" and those promoted widened.
The revolutionary elite of the early years of the NEP was being replaced by the conservative elite of Stalin's time. The new cohorts were less experienced and illiterate than the "underground" members, but closer to the social structure. They received their "political baptism" in the mid-1920s, when the party had already come under the strict control of the nomenklatura. The "promoted" members began to define the new face of the ruling elite by the beginning of collectivization, and this had an impact on the outcome of the intra-party struggle.
The Politburo sessions of October 11 and 12, 1938, which were devoted to the publication of the Short Course of the History of the Ail-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), took place at a time when the official end of the Great Terror lay one month ahead. The party had already been purged from top to bottom as a new and younger party leadership replaced the Old Bolsheviks who had perished in the purges. The Short Course was written by and approved by a committee of the Central Committee, but Stalin was its principal author. Between 1938 and 1953, over 42 million copies of the Short Course were issued, in 301 printings and 67 languages.
Stalin only wrote one chapter of Short Course, but he edited the full text five times. The Short Course was regarded throughout the communist world as the most authoritative source on Soviet Marxism until de-Stalinization began in 1956. Stalin's revision of party history after the Great Terror of the 1930s included his reorientation of propaganda towards the Soviet intelligentsia. A new "party history" was born along with a "renewed" party that reemerged after the Great Terror. Stalin used depersonalized history to blot out the memory of other Old Bolsheviks as a convenient foundation for his own "cult of personality."
By discarding the Bolshevik name – which occurred in the autumn of 1952 – Stalin intended to demonstrate an assertive move away from the symbolism of heroic Leninism.
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