P.I.Baranov - 1924-31 - Commander of the Red Army Air Force
From December 1924 to June 1931 Baranov was commander of the Red Army air force. “I know this is a difficult thing, but our air fleet will be the first in the world,” said P.I.Barnov. When in 1924 he headed the country's air force, only the most incorrigible optimists believed in the second part of the sentence. The certificate of the state of aviation, which Baranov prepared for the country's leadership in 1925, cites the following figures: in 1916, the plants of Tsarist Russia produced 1,769 airplanes and 666 aircraft engines. Then a continuous recession began, which reached the bottom in 1922, when only 43 aircraft and 8 engines were taken from industry.
At small airfields one could only find battered foreign airplanes of various designs. The difficulty lay not only in the weakness of the production base, but also in the stagnation of views and the ignorance of leadership. The question of the priority development of aviation in the 1920s was quite controversial, although in 1921 the book by the Italian military theorist Giulio Douhet, “Dominance in the Air”, was published. In it, he argued that the war can only be won by air strikes. Even Drummond Hey frightened American readers with the ghost of a mighty red air fleet: "For Russia, it will become what the British navy has been for our entire lives for centuries."
But M.V. Frunze, for example, did not consider the role of the air force in a future war decisive. In his opinion, the theory of Douhet reflected relations in the bourgeois world, where capitalists, fearing the armed masses, insured themselves with the help of technology. The experience of the civil war clearly confirmed that it was not machines, but people who decided the outcome of the battle. And the Red Army, in alliance with the world proletariat, will crush any enemy.
But what to say, even if he headed the Soviet Air Force before AV Baranov, Petrov-Sergeev (killed along with Baranov in a plane crash on September 5, 1933) published a book entitled “Strategy and Tactics of the Red Air Fleet”, in which he criticized the leadership of the Air Force for the luxury of the current state of the country to have the Red Army headquarters Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. That is, Baranov, whom the author ironically called "something like an air minister." The author, with proletarian aplomb, argued that since “there is no air strategy,” and “aviation specialization cannot be afforded for the Red Army, not sufficiently saturated with machine guns, artillery, automobiles, etc., size - an unnecessary thing"!
Baranov did not write propaganda books and did not enter into strategic disputes of a global scale. He started small: his focus in the first stages turned out to be guidance in parts of the elementary order. In the report on the results of his first inspection trip he wrote: “There is a disorder in the barracks, there is no bedding, the case is not glued to laundry and the bath, the boiler is also a little hungry, the Red Army booklet is not on hand, and if there is, it does not contain all records of boots , a scraper, a handkerchief, a rifle, an overcoat, etc. On the Red Army men, they wear an unmarked outfit ... ”
In aviation, Baranov was not just a commissar, or, in modern terms, an effective manager, he tried to get into the essence of the matter, to the very depths. He did not become a pilot, but, still being an assistant to the Chief of the Air Force, he successfully graduated from a higher school of observers and pilots, and in 1925, during a business trip to the Leningrad Military Technical School, he completed a short-term course of aviation mechanics. And every day, the head of the air force and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR found an hour or two hours to disassemble and assemble M-5 engines in an oily overalls.
As for his leadership style, the attention of Peter Baranov to trifles was noted: discipline in parts, order in the barracks. He did not remember the steep personnel changes or cleanings. On the contrary, today, after the expiration of time, his decisions appear to be strategically adjusted and surprisingly far-sighted. It was he who retained Valery Chkalov for the aviation “air hooligan”, who in 1928 was convicted for another feat with damage to the aircraft for a year and put in the Bryansk correctional home. Baranov, through Mikhail Kalinin, achieved the release of Chkalov and his transfer to the post of test pilot.
He consistently fought with revolutionary excesses. For example, a certain Association of Proletarian Musicians launched a campaign to ban the song “All Higher”. Proletarian musicians heard a foxtrot in it. Baranov categorically rejected this comparison as idiocy, and the song became the Soviet anthem of aviators, popular to this day.
Airborne Forces are associated with Peter Ionovich. It is believed that the idea of airborne assault troops belonged to M.N. Tukhachevsky. In fact, initially in 1928, Tukhachevsky had in mind only the landing with the landing of aircraft or gliders in the rear of the enemy. At that time, no one thought about parachutes for this purpose - they were used only to rescue the pilots in an emergency, and each jump was an extraordinary event. The first forced parachute jump in the Air Force on June 23, 1927, was accomplished by the famous Soviet pilot Mikhail Gromov during the testing of the I-1 plane on a corkscrew. This event was so significant that the pilot received a special badge "Silk Caterpillar" from the American company Irving, the manufacturer of the parachute. The enthusiast of the wider use of parachutes in aviation was the commander of the RKKA Air Force L.G. Minov. In 1928, he outlined his thoughts to Baranov, and he sent him to the United States to study the parachute case.
Returning July 26, 1930 L.G. Minov performed a demonstration jump at the airfield in Voronezh before the participants of the training camp of the Air Force of the Moscow Military District. Baranov immediately gave him a new assignment: “It would be very good if it would have been possible in the course of the Voronezh exercise to demonstrate the release of a group of armed paratroopers for sabotage actions on the enemy’s territory.” The group was prepared as soon as possible, and on August 2, 1930, with two Farman-Goliath airplanes made a demonstration landing of 12 paratroopers. Since then, August 2 is considered the birthday of the Airborne Forces.
In addition to underestimating the role of aviation in the country, there was another dangerous tendency - to purchase aircraft abroad, without wasting time and energy on its own developments. Baranov had a reasonable position here, rightly believing that all means are good for the fastest strengthening of the Red Air Fleet. He personally went abroad several times for the purchase of aviation technologies. By the way, the nature of these trips partly reflected the relict position in which Soviet aviation was located in the 1920s. What can I say, if the commander-in-chief of the USSR Air Force went abroad not just as a private person, but illegally, under a foreign name. At the same time, in the host countries they knew perfectly well who they were dealing with. For example, in France, the Minister of Aviation arrived with a “bouquet of red roses” in civilian clothes. A curious case occurred in 1929 when entering the United States. The customs official wanted to leave suspicious Russians for a week-long quarantine. However, when Baranov, in response to a question about the purpose of the visit, announced the amount for which he intended to purchase engineering products in the USA, permission to go to the American coast was received instantly.
The position of Baranov in relation to the use of foreign technology is perfectly illustrated by the episode that occurred at Stalin’s dacha in August 1933, when he became familiar with a narrow circle of top state leaders. At such informal "parties", along with the game of small towns, important state issues were resolved. In particular, at that time it was about the absence of a powerful aircraft air-cooled engine. At the suggestion of Baranov, in order to solve this problem as soon as possible, it was decided to purchase a foreign license. With all this, Baranov always believed that the country should be able to do the planes herself. On the second day after his appointment to the post of Chief of the Air Force, he went to the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI), where A.N. Tupolev gave him a tour. Since then, Baranov has become a regular guest at TsAGI.
Peter Ionovich played a major role in the creation of the Central Institute of Aviation Motors (CIAM).
The emergence of CIAM was preceded by rather dramatic events. The initiative to create the institute was made by 19 prominent aviation specialists who, on August 13, 1930, wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the VKP (b) with a copy to Voroshilov and Baranov. The idea with the letter was risky, because it was, in fact, an open criticism of the actions of the Soviet government. The need for direct appeal to the leadership was caused by the following circumstances. At the initiative of an energetic group of young designers of the aviation department of the US, future luminaries of the domestic engine-building - V.Ya. Klimova, A.A. Mikulina, A.D. Charomsky, V.A. Dobrynina and others, in the Moscow area of Lefortovo, construction began on a pilot plant for aircraft engines. However, the leadership of NAMI took a narrow departmental position.
The letter spoke directly about this: “For all the time in the Union, various organizations have designed more than 40 aircraft engines: 30 of them were put into production, about 15 were built, but none of them was on the planes. Our prototype construction was extremely fruitless. Now, when the plant is built and basically ready to eliminate the breakthroughs, it is transferred to VATO. Thus, our aviation engine building loses the base it has just created. ”
But writing a letter is half the battle. It was necessary also to deliver it to the addressee. This was taken up by the former commissar and future designer of diesel aircraft and tank engines A.D. Charomsky. He was Baranov's fellow soldier and achieved a personal meeting with him. The head of the Air Force took an active part in the important issue for the aviation industry, put his visa on the letter and even singled out the R-5 plane so that Charomsky could immediately fly to Sochi, where the top leadership of the country was on vacation. Arriving in Sochi, Charomsky reported to Voroshilov, and after Stalin considered the proposals set out in the letter, a telegram was sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) With appropriate instructions. On December 3, 1930, following the report of Peter Baranov “On the progress of the pilot construction on aircraft and motors”, the USSR Air Forces Association decided to establish an Experimental Aviation Engine Institute in Lefortovo.
There are other dates that, thanks to Baranov, today are honored in aviation history, although they are not always associated with his name. An important role he played in the fate of the design teams of A.N. Tupolev and S.V. Ilyushin. In the early 1930s, when "pest control" was intensified in the country in connection with the so-called “industrial party” affair, Tupolev also fell under suspicion because of his noble origin. He was actually removed from the management of the design department of TsAGI, the leading - if not the only at that time - serious organization for the development of aircraft in the country.
It was an intrigue built on the opposition of Tupolev and Ilyushin, in which the interests of the NKVD were affected. It was necessary to act extremely cautiously, and P.I.Baranov with his vast administrative experience and endurance succeeded. It all ended well and on January 13, 1933, an order was issued signed by Baranov for the separation of the TsKB TsAGI and the organization of the Central Design Bureau of an experimental aircraft construction of light aircraft.
The creation of heavy airplanes for various purposes was entrusted to the TsAGI SS CO under the direction of A.N. Tupolev. January 13 is the day when A.N. Tupolev returned to the leadership of the team he created; it is quite possible to call the second birthday of the Tupolev Design Bureau (founded October 22, 1922). The same day became the official birthday of the OKB S.V. Ilyushin. Such an order suited all parties. But the best monument to Baranov was the Day of the Air Fleet of the USSR, which was first celebrated on August 18, 1933. The contribution to this holiday of Peter Ionovich was marked by the presentation of the country's highest award, the Order of Lenin.
Baranov’s transition into the aviation industry from the post of Chief of the Air Force in 1931 was accomplished in a rather unexpected way. In mid-July 1931, a review of aviation technology was organized at the Central Aerodrome for the country's top leadership. Stalin arrived and immediately went to the planes, puffing on a cigarette. When several steps remained before the parking, the commander of the Air Force Scientific Research Institute A.A. Turzhansky stopped the head of state: “Excuse me, please, Iosif Vissarionovich, but maybe you are smoking here? It was said loudly, so that the whole retinue heard. Stalin silently threw a cigarette and carefully put it out with the sole of his boot.
The mood of the leader clearly deteriorated. Approaching the I-5, he abruptly asked: “Is there radio on airplanes?” Turzhansky replied that he did not. “Why not?” Stalin demanded an explanation. Baranov, who was present there on duty, tried to tell that the experiments on installing radio on fighters had just begun, but did not satisfy the head of state. He grew grim.
Of particular interest was the experimental model of the newest Tupolev TB-3 bomber. Here Stalin showed discontent: “Why are the test periods delayed?” After that, the leader wanted to see a new aircraft in flight. Meanwhile, MM Gromov, who had raised TB-3 into the air, was in the hospital with an ulcer, and none of the pilots who were present on this plane had yet flown.
“What are we going to do? The government has arrived, and we cannot show the most interesting aircraft in flight? Will we sign our helplessness?” Baranov asked Turzhansky, and he suggested that two pilots who were flying on TB-1 be put at the helm. Despite the objections and even the protests of the other commanders, Baranov ordered them to do so.
And here Stalin unexpectedly declared: “Why don't I fly on this bomber?” At the same time, only a few days ago, after the death of the RKKA deputy chief of staff, V.K. Triandofillova, it was decided not to let responsible officials use air transport without special permission from the Central Committee. Stalin, knowing perfectly well about this, continued to persist: “Why can't I, comrade air force chief?”
To tell the leader that something was forbidden to him was very dangerous, so Baranov had to go to the trick: “You can, Joseph Vissarionovich, if want it. But there is an order: you first need to check the new aircraft in the air, and then take the passengers on board.”
“Is that so? Well, I will wait if it is necessary for order,” Stalin replied.
The pilots received orders to fly around the airfield for at least 40 minutes. To prevent the head of state from getting bored, Alexander Anisimov and Valery Chkalov climbed I-4 and I-5 into the sky. They started such a fascinating air battle that time flew by. When TB-3 landed, Stalin was reminded that they were waiting for him elsewhere. “Why did I obey you? Why did you scare me? ” Stalin complained, looking at Baranov. The leader ordered to reward the pilots and left without saying goodbye to the commander-in-chief of the Air Force.
A week after this incident, there was a sharp turn in Baranov’s career: G.K. Ordzhonikidze informed him that he was fired from the Air Force and transferred to lead the country's aviation industry.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
