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Project 1065 NUCLEAR-POWERED MISSILE CRUISER

In 1961, the first nuclear surface combat ship, the "Long Beach" cruiser, became part of the US Navy. In the USSR, studies to determine the appearance of such a ship began later - in 1964, but the work was carried out rather carefully, the reason for which was not only the novelty of the project, but also the peculiar views of H. S. Khrushchev on the role and development of our Navy and, in particular, surface ships (especially large).

However, the desire to have an ocean-going ship of unlimited autonomy, capable of independently operating in remote areas of the oceans and seeking and destroying enemy nuclear-powered missile submarines, led to the start of work on Project 1144 Orlan. According to the initial classification, it was a patrol ship, and then a large anti-submarine ship. A two-reactor nuclear power plant was specially created for him, and in addition, on the personal instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, the ship was to be equipped with a reserve organic fuel-fueled power plant.

Designing the "Orlan" was a complex and rather slow process, in addition, the displacement crawled up from the first stages and a great temptation appeared in the choice of weapons. The ship was constantly increasing in size and began to look a little like a patrol ship - its original prototype. The reason was that the Navy, as a customer, did not really know what it really needed, because the concept and reality should coincide, but we almost never had this. Gradually from the defender project 1144turned into a ship, which itself must be protected. As a result, they again returned to the idea of ??a “couple”: one ship is searching for enemy submarines, and the other is protecting it.

So there was Project 1165 "Landing", the second ship with a nuclear power plant, but with powerful anti-aircraft and anti-ship missile weapons. Despite the fact that the project itself was very interesting from a technical point of view, it turned into a kind of “fix idea”, and the ship had a long, but only “paper” life.

With the advent of new weapons ship pr.1165 constantly changed, including in the direction of increasing displacement. First, there were studies with the Malakhit air defense system and the Korshun air defense system, then with the Bazalt and Kvant complexes, then Granite and Fort. Artillery and electronic weapons also changed from variant to variant. In the final project, they decided to dwell on the Granit rocket launcher, developed by the Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering, as the most advanced at that time (after all, it was necessary to defend against the aircraft carrier formations of a potential enemy). True, this complex was developed initially for submarines pr.949, and his missiles had a “wet” start, but due to lack of time they did not begin to remodel the launchers, therefore, later on our surface ships, before launching the missiles, we had to fill the launchers with outboard water, which of course was contrary to common sense.

The final studies on project 1165 were carried out with 32-48 Granit RCCs and 32-64 S-300F missiles. It turned out to be a powerful missile cruiser, armed with besides 130-mm artillery (at that time the development of single-barrel and twin 130-mm universal anti-aircraft guns was already underway). The ship had only shock and anti-aircraft weapons, and anti-submarine missiles or torpedoes were provided only at the very early stages of development. For anti-torpedo protection intended two jet bombing installations.

Time passed, but the lack of a clear and well-thought-out ultimate goal of creating the first atomic surface ship led to the fact that the PLO pr.1144 ship , which had already begun to be classified as a cruiser, began to try on Malakhit, then Basalt, and, ultimately, - "Granite." Moreover, the presence of this anti-ship complex on the ship was not the result of any high operational-tactical considerations, it simply worked out the simple rule that had developed from the previous practice: since a cruiser, then the missile weapon on it should be of the “operational” class, and since it should be the very latest, then Granite is the best option.

It was then that doubts arose about the expediency of the nuclear missile cruiser pr.1165 and he, under the very first plausible excuse, sank into oblivion. At the same time, long-term design “ate” so much money that in order to somehow write off the money spent, a corresponding resolution was issued “combining” the two projects ( 1165 and 1144 ) into one, approved in August 1971. It was “beautifully closed” another technical dead end.