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RSA Hawk Lead-In Fighter Trainer (LIFT)

The South African Air Force (SAAF) Hawk Mark 120 Lead In Fighter Trainer (LIFT) aircraft is a derivative of the BAE SYSTEMS Mark 100 Hawk series, designed and built by BAE SYSTEMS of the United Kingdom since the mid-1990s. The engine, powering the Hawk LIFT is a Rolls Royce/Turbomeca Adour Mark 951 engine, which is a newly developed upgrade from the Adour 871, with South Africa as the launch customer. The aircraft has a newly developed local Avionics Suite by Advanced Technlogies Engineering (ATE). Local Industry has been involved in various elements of the Engineering, Training and Support deliverables.

During the early 1990s the SAAF had a 3-tier fighter training philosophy. The three tiers consisted of the Pilatus PC7 Mk II Astra (Astra) trainer, the Impala Mk I and Mk II (Impala) fighter trainer, the Cheetah C and D (Cheetah) fighters and the Mirage F1AZ (Mirage). The SAAF strategy for the long-term replacement of its air combat capability was proposed in the early nineties. This strategy made provision for an advanced fighter trainer (AFT) and a medium fighter to be acquired in the future. The SAAF fighter program that was started included two programs, namely Project Ukhozi [the trainer] and Project Kambro [the fighter].

	Aircraft		Score May 1996
	SAAB	JAS39 Gripen	0.899
	Sukhoi	S55	0.887
	Sukhoi	S54	0.884
	Lockheed	F-16	0.859
	Aermacchi	AMX-T	0.788
	Dassault	Alphajet	0.766
	CASA	ATX	0.763
	MiG	AT	0.703
	Aero Vodochody	L159	0.693
	Yakovlev	Yak 130	0.682
	CATIC/PAC	K-8	0.668
	FMA	IA 63 PAMPA	0.648
	Aermacchi	MB339FD	0.647
	AIDC	AT-3	0.631
	BAE	Hawk 100	0.623
		IAR 99	0.553
		Impala	0.335

Project Ukhozi was established to satisfy trainer requirements and it focused on the replacement of 94 Impala aircraft with 48 aircraft. The project was aimed at acquiring the AFT. The Minister of Defence approved the AFT Staff Target (ST) No 2/94 on 18 October 1994, as first acquisition requirement, and the DCC [Defense Command Council] approved the Staff Requirement (SR) on 4 October 1995. The constitution of the UCC [Ukhozi Control Council] was approved on 3 November 1995 and its main aim was to determine the overall program strategy, to approve the evaluation process and to make major milestone decisions. According to the SR, the AFT aircraft had to have the capacity to carry out successfully a wide spectrum of jet conversions, advanced fighter training and combat missions. The training philosophy for the AFT aircraft assumed that the Astra trainer would be fully operational by 1997 and the Cheetah would remain in place until the fleet is replaced in approximately 2012. This implied a future SAAF fighter force design of a front line squadron, completed by the light fighter squadron and combat flying school.

A Request For Information (RFI) was forwarded to 30 suppliers from which 23 aircraft proposals and four service proposals were received. The responses were evaluated in accordance with an AFT proposed value system. Values were allocated to the following aspects: airframe performance, onboard systems; avionics systems; supportability systems; acquisition cost index and operating/support cost index. The result of the evaluation left the following nine contenders that were further investigated by visiting each supplier. After visits to the suppliers, which took place during September and October 1996, an interim project study report, dated February 1997, was compiled. The results were presented to the DCC in March 1997, and were then referred to the AASB [Armaments Acquisition Steering Board].

Type	Comments
RFP contenders - March 1997
AMX-T	In production, multi-role, growth path.
AT2000	Potential for wide-band performance at reasonable cost. Best opportunity for industry participation. High programme risk.
L159	Balanced performance and systems at reasonable cost. Good logistic support. SAAF might be only user outside Czech Republic.
Yak/AEM-130	Balanced all-round performance for multi-role. Re-engine option. Feasible only if acquired by Russian Federation.
Mar 1997 Contenders removed from the short list
Hawk 100	High cost. Does not satisfy SAAF operational requirement.
JAS 39 Gripen	Unaffordable.
MB339FD	Low performance cannot satisfy user requirement.
MiG-AT	High development and production risk.
S-54	Insufficient / incomplete information provided.

During January 1997, the British Government tabled a package proposal for the supply of armaments to South Africa. This included, inter alia, the replacement of the Impala with the Hawk jet trainer or a combination of the Hawk and the Gripen fighter via British Aerospace (BAe). In response, the chairperson of the UCC, after careful scrutiny of the proposal, indicated in July 1997, that it was evident that this advanced training system could be acquired far more cost-effectively outside the British Package Proposal of the Hawk 100. However, the SAAF would include this requirement in the RSA/UK SDP only in the event of it being politically obliged to accept the training system on offer. The operational shortcomings of the training system on offer could be overcome at an affordable cost in terms of acquisition as well as life-cycle support. According to the chairperson, the aircraft systems on offer in the British proposal did not comply with the defined operational and logistical requirements of either the fighter or fighter trainer replacement programs.

In this instance, the acceptance of the Hawk would have been based on the interim lease of a limited number of Hawk 100 only until an agreed number of Gripens had been delivered and the Astra training system had been adapted to address the new training gap. In July 1997 the President was advised by DoD and the SANDF of the reasons why the British proposal was not acceptable. At that stage the Chief of the SAAF was concerned that, although the acquisition process for Ukhozi had followed the normal path and had not taken into account the MoD package offer made by the British Government, the wrong impression might be created if the RFP were issued without the inclusion of the Gripen aircraft. It was decided that the normal process for Ukhozi would go ahead as planned and that it would be reconsidered once greater clarity was obtained on the British MoD offer and the Defence Review completed.

Due to budget cuts in 1997, the acquisition process of Project Ukhozi could not continue within the proposed timescales. There were insufficient funds on the approved Force Design Steering Committee (FDSC) plan to initiate Project Ukhozi before the year 2000, at the earliest. A decision was made by the UCC on 17 March 1997, to recommend to the AASB that the project be delayed by 12 months. SAAF Operations Council considered the budgetary implications of both Projects Ukhozi and Kambro. These implications were R5,2 billion for Project Ukhozi [the trainer] and R8 billion for Project Kambro [the fighter]. This was considered to be unaffordable. The SAAF Command Council therefore decided on 7 July 1997, that Project Ukhozi had to redefine its SR to that of an advanced light fighter aircraft (ALFA) concept that would meet the requirements of both Project Ukhozi and Project Kambro.

This effectively meant a change from a 3-tier to a 2-tier fighter strategy. The 2-tier fighter strategy would include the Astra that would be used for basic fighter orientation training. This would be followed by jet conversion, operational conversion and operations on the ALFA. The project team experienced the dilemma that it subsequently became clear that another type of aircraft would be required as an interim trainer between the Astra and the ALFA. The SAAF Command Council then concluded that a 3-tier system, incorporating both the ALFA and a lead in fighter trainer (LIFT), was essential to satisfy the requirements of the SAAF in relation to fighter training and fighter consolidation in a cost-effective manner. This presentation was very important in the sense that it marked a turning point in the SAAF strategy.

Aircraft	Military value	Life-cycle cost (US$m)	Cost effectiveness
S211A	61	474,6	12,9
MB339FD	69	544,1	12,7
PC-TT	57	448,8	12,7
T6-A	57	471,4	12,1
L59	63	599,7	10,5
L139	54	526,1	10,3
Hawk 100	82	979,0	8,3
L159	72	902,1	8,0
Yak 130	71	969,3	7,3
AMX	71	985,8	7,2
MiG AT	69	1009,2	6,8
K8	27	430,2	6,3
CASA 101	31	636,6	4,9

Project Winchester involves the acquisition of a fleet of 24 dual-seat LIFT aircraft including 1 Flight Test Aircraft (FTA). The total acquisition cost required for 24 LIFT aircraft was expected to be in the order of R2,2 billion (?98 Rand value, i.e. US$1=R5.10). The operating cost for 24 aircraft flying 4 000 hours per year at an estimated R15 000 per flying hour was estimated to be approximately R70 million per year. The total acquisition cost for both ALFA and LIFT at this stage amounted to R13,2 billion. Eight months prior to this, projects Ukhozi and Kambro amounting to R13,2 billion were cancelled due to unaffordability.

The cost-effectiveness of the aircraft on offer was calculated by dividing the military value by the life-cycle cost. On 30 April 1998, a special UCC meeting was held to present the evaluation results of the replies to the LIFT RFI. The meeting decided that the short list should be determined on the military value only. on 30 April 1998. The project team short-listed six aircraft for consideration and further recommendation. The AAC supported their recommendations that both the MiG AT and AMX-TT be removed. This left four aircraft on the RFO list, i.e. the Hawk, Yak 130, L159 and MB339FD. Without cost considerations the selection process was biased towards the higher performance category aircraft [eg, the Hawk 100]. These aircraft are, however, also significantly more expensive to acquire, operate and maintain. Therefore, unless additional funding could be found to support the acquisition of a more superior aircraft, the SAAF would have to take cognisance of budgetary constraints in the selection process. The delivery schedule for the Yak 130 did not meet the mandatory requirements by at least three years. As this was unacceptable, on 29 June 1998 the Yak 130 was excluded from any further consideration. Although the MB339FD was still the preferred option under the costed and non-costed option in terms of the military performance index, the Hawk was placed in an advantageous position under the non-costed option for the total evaluation.

An Armaments Acquisition Steering Board [AASB] meeting held on 16 July 1998 decided the MB339FD be procured in accordance with the preference of SAAF within its envisaged fighter training system. The Secretary for Defence remarked on 21 August 1998 that the cost of the Hawk would be twice that of the MB339FD, for an increase in performance of approximately 15%. Hence the recommendation of the AASB that the cheaper option be selected. Hawk - a dual role aircraft with both pilot training and a limited operational use capability - was more expensive because it has operational capabilities not offered by the MB339FD.

This decision to recommend the Hawk was based on national strategic considerations for the future survival of the defense aviation sector and the best teaming-up arrangements offered by the respective bidders. Strategically important industrial participation programs offered with the best advantage to the state and local industries were also a determining factor.

It was contended by Government that the nature of the structure of the acquisition process was such that any corruption in the awarding of the tenders would have had to infiltrate effectively up to ministerial level, which was theoretically impossible. It is alleged that BAE paid bribes of £115 million (R1.5 billion) to secure its warplane contracts. The bribes were paid by a BAE front company styled Red Diamond Trading Company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands to various individuals, including the late former Defense Minister Joe Modise’s assistant, Fana Hlongwane. It is also said that additional bribes of R30 million were laundered by BAE via two Swedish trade unions, ostensibly to fund an industrial training school, but actually to bribe South African parliamentarians to support the arms deal. Investigations into BAE bribes to secure its South African contracts have been squelched by both the British and South African governments.