Short Range Surface-to-Air Missile (SR-SAM) [Iron Dome]
South Korea hopes to develop a solution to improve its defense systems and has been examining the option of the Israeli "Iron Dome" since 2017. "We are talking about a system capable of defending the capital and handling a mass of 200 or 300 rockets," Channel 12 reported 11 August 2020, citing a source from the South Korean Foreign Ministry. The ministry added that an "Iron Dome" type missile interception system will enter service in 2030, thoguh as of mid-2020 this new Short Range Surface-to-Air Missile (SR-SAM) system did not have an official designation.
In June 2013, the joint chiefs questioned the viability of an Iron Dome system, which is currently defending Israel. The system is an inadequate mode of defense, they said at the time. The South Korean military had preferred the Korean Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missile system to defend against North Korean artillery via counter-battery fire.
The military is developing its own interception system to combat North Korea's long-range artillery similar to Israel's Iron Dome, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 16 October 2017. In a report to the National Assembly audit, the JCS said the Agency for Defense Development has been working to develop core technology to "hit to kill" the North's projectiles. "We plan to deploy the system as a countermeasure against the North making possible multiple strikes on South Korea's key state and military facilities," the JCS said in the report.
The development came amid concerns that South Korea does not have sufficient weapons to deal with artillery attacks targeting Seoul and the nearby metropolitan area. The military considered purchasing Israel's Iron Dome to fend off North Korean threats, but concluded the system was not suitable for use in Korea for various reasons, such as cost effectiveness and the country's mountainous terrain. "The Iron Dome is a defense system suitable to defend sporadic rocket strikes from irregular warfare forces such as the Hamas group. It is not designed to handle North Korea's attacks using long-range artillery," it said.
The North has diverse types of rocket systems including self-propelled howitzers and rocket launchers that can put Seoul within range, and longer-range 300 millimeter-caliber rockets that can reach Pyeongtaek in Gyeonggi Province where U.S. Forces Korea's major base is located. Pyongyang has some 14,100 artillery pieces including 5,500 multiple rocket launchers, according to Seoul's defense white paper issued in 2016.
The category of long-range artillery, which includes North Korean multiple-launch rocket systems and 170mm self-propelled artillery, drew attention as a key form of conventional firepower at the time of North Korea’s threats to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” While the military has worked to establish a Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, it is designed to intercept ballistic missiles such as the Scud and is ineffective against long-range artillery.
US-based Rand Corporation predicted that a surprise attack by North Korea using conventional artillery alone could result in over 130,000 casualties in Seoul within one hour. An MND official explained, “The long-range artillery interception system could be force-integrated by the late 2020s to early 2030s.”
South Korea's joint chiefs of staff are considering an Iron Dome missile defense system to guard against potential long-range projectiles from North Korea -- refuting past judgments that the system would be inadequate to defend Seoul. At a parliamentary audit on Friday, the joint chiefs said there are plans to conduct research into the system, local newspaper Segye Ilbo reported 12 October 2018. "We are pursuing a weapons system suitable for our operational environment in order to minimize the damage from [potential] North Korea artillery attacks," the joint chiefs said. "In March, we authorized a plan to pursue a new interceptor system."
The system uses a synchronized network of low cost search and track radars that detect and track targets and provide sufficient data to generate an up-to-date theater air picture. The data is used to allocate the system resources and the interceptors to the targets and plan the engagement. The radars track new and engaged targets and measure the interceptors as well.
Using range triangulation with the range measurements of the synchronized radars, accurate positions of the targets and the interceptors are obtained, enabling interception based on remote sensing. This, in turn, reduces the cost of the interceptors that receive their guidance commands from the ground and need no on-board seeker to reach their target. The position measurements are used to calculate corrective maneuvers required to overcome errors and bring the interceptor close to the target. The maneuver commands are transmitted to the interceptors using uplink communication channel. The interceptors are equipped with kill mechanisms designed to destroy the targets warheads in order to minimize damage on the ground.
Communication to the interceptors is done, when possible, through a single transmitter. The transmitted data contains guidance commands to all the interceptors in the air. Each interceptor must decipher its own commands. To this end, every interceptor must be identified (i.e. “colored”) such that the identification code is known to both BMC and interceptor. Several coloring methods are possible, including coloring the interceptor in the air immediately after its launch and coloring during the pre-launch process.
The target and interceptor data obtained from the radars is processed by guidance algorithms that determine maneuvering commands to the interceptors. These commands are transmitted via an uplink channel and upon execution correct the interceptor trajectory and bring it within a small radius from the target. The interceptor kill mechanism is designed to achieve target warhead destruction.
The surface-to-air missile is designed with particular emphasis on low-cost. In addition to the fact that no on-board seeker is required in the interceptors, further reduction in the cost of the projectile is achieved by using the communication receiver also as a roll sensor, thus obviating the need for other on-board sensors. Another cost saving factor results from similar geometric conditions during the end-game when intercepting ballistic targets. This simplifies the design of the interceptor kill mechanism. In the maneuvering projectile case, the typical interception geometry is head-on, due to its limited effective range. A simple proximity fuse and a standard type of high explosive fragmentation war-head provide high probability of kill.
The Ministry of National Defense established the '21~'25 mid-term defense plan 10 August 2020. The South Korean military has announced it will seek to develop an air defense system similar to Israel's Iron Dome, that can intercept short-range enemy missiles from the air. Rockets launched from Palestine's Gaza Strip explodes in mid air. It's shot down by an intercepting missile fired from Israel's Iron Dome missile defense system.
There has been discussions in South Korea on introducing a similar system to fend off North Korean artillery threats directed at the South's capital region. Now the military has officially announced it will independently develop a Korean version of Iron Dome. Development will begin as early as next year, aiming for deployment by 2030. South Korea didn't have the means to intercept North Korea's long range artillery. The Iron Dome can make up for this shortfall, while also serving as a final defense if KAMD (Korea Air & Missile Defense system) were to fail.
"When we talk about South Korea's missile defense system, it usually refers to one targeting North Korea's Scud-type or stronger missiles, whereas this new interceptor system will focus on protecting the capital area against the North's long-range artillery such as its 240-mm or 300-mm multiple rocket launchers," a ministry official said. The actual deployment of the Korean version of Israel's Iron Dome air defense system is expected to be put into force in the late 2020s or early 2030s, officials said.
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