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Sardinia Subversive Organizations

The island of Sardinia, which is one of Italy's 20 regions, possesses distinctive and deep-rooted sociological traditions. Sardinian itself is considered to be a separate language rather than a mere Italian dialect. In a population consisting of 1,60,000 inhabitants []as of 1983, approximately two-thirds, regardless of social or economic standing, spoke the language of the island as a matter of custom. Sardinian, nevertheless, was subdivided into three linguistic branches of its own: Campidanese (spoken in southern Sardinia, Cagliari, and Oristano, by at least 550,000 individuals); Lugodorese Barbaricino (spoken by at least 370,000 individuals); and Gallurese (spoken by no more than 60,000 Sardinians).

Of Italy's 20 regions, 5, including Sardinia, enjoyed a special charter as opposed to the ordinary charter of the remaining 15. Special charter status afforded the region a vast degree of autonomy obviously short of sovereignty and independence. This status was not considered sufficient by an articulate minority of the population, which founded a number of independence movements that were usually legal. Since December of 1981, the Sardinian Action Party (Partito Sardo d'Azione-PSd'A), the only local party ever represented in Italy's national Parliament, made the island's independence part of its platform. According to the resolution of the 1981 party congress, the next step following independence would entail federating with Italy or even with other European or Mediterranean states.

Whereas such radical aspirations enjoyed a comparatively limited following, other initiatives e obtained an enthusiastic backing. For example, in April 1981, the Regional Council passed a regional, as opposed to national, law making Sardinian along with Italian one of the two official languages of the Island. Not all five special charter regions had been granted bilingualism prerogatives by the Italian central government. Apart from cultural consideration, it was argued that the recognition of bilingualism would serve as a vehicle for the many Sardinian-speaking shepherds and farmers to have a voice in agrarian reforms.

To the purely sociological and linguistic aspects of the regional problem could be added the economic malaise caused by unemployment and underdevelopment. This combination of cultural and material aspirations helps explain not only extremist tendencies to rebel against the alleged colonial status of the island, but also the frequent merger of separatist goals with Communist-inspired class struggle orientations.

A number of formations claimed responsibility for terrorist actions in Sardinia. Such actions were usually minor ones causing, at worst, damage to governmental property or national concerns (as opposed to local ones) through the detonation of explosives. The only separatist terrorist group that displayed some degree of organization and used both explosives and firearms as a matter of standard procedure was Red Barbagia (Barbagia Rossa). This group made its debut in 1978 with a series of attacks on military and police installations and raids on official archives.

The full political coloration of Red Barbagia and of the other terrOrist organizations operating in Sardinia is difficult to assess, since they frequently combine separatist and Communist aspirations, as their names suggested. In the late 1960's, the millionaire, publisher, and Communist idealogue, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, attempted to organize an armed independence movement in Sardinia by offering to finance a local bandit by the name of Graziano Mesina. Interestingly enough, Feltrinelli's executive officer in the Partisan Action Groups (GAP) was another Sardinian by the name of Giuseppe Saba. Nearly a decade later, the BR, according to extensive evidence including the confessions of red brigadist Antonio Savastu, decided to expand to Sardinia and developed operational and logistical links with Red Barbagia.

Reportedly, Red Barbagia became for some time the BR's proxy for the conduct of terrorist activity on the island. A number of factors account for Sardinia's importance to the BR. The geography of the island makes it a desirable location for stockpiling weapons, and at least one such depot was set up there by the BR. The presence of maximum security prisons inevitably attracted the BR, as captured plans to organize escapes indicate. And, not least, the NATO installations in Sardinia represented lucrative targets.

Besides the support offered to separatist violence by Communist organizations having by far broader aims and local elements obsessed by an urge for independence - Sardinian nationalists who fast in jails, university professors dressed in the local garb who conduct doctoral dissertations discussions in the local language, and witnesses who refuse to testify in Italian before magistrates - revolutionary separatism is potentially nourished by a tradition of rural banditry which specializes in abductions for ransom.

The court record of trials against kidnapers reflected links between Sardinian separatism and common crime. In this connection, it might be noted that Red Barbagia itself had drawn manpower fronm separatist extremists, Communist elements, and Sardinian bandits.