Italy - Right Wing Subversion - Dynamics
Individuals active in rightist terrorist organizations most often shared a backgound of militancy in the Italian Social Movenent (MSI - ltaly's most conservative party enjoying parlimentary representation in the 1960s), in the MSI's youth organization (FdG), or in neo-Fascist organizations without any ties to the MSI.
Those who deserted the MSI or the FdG to join terrorist organizations generally did so because of disillusionment with the party's insufficient rightist stance and its limited role within the political scene. Still others are expelled for disciplinary reasons. Although the MSI was frequently termed neo-Fascist, its leaders endeavored to dispell this image, whose pejorative connotation in post-World War II Italian political parlance predated the outburst of terrorism in the late 1960's.
Other rightist terrorists come directly from petty-crime circles. In many cases, however, the family background of rightist extremists includes at least one parent who was in a learned profession.
Except for its considerably smaller size, assessing the numerical strength of the terrorist right was no easier than an analogous evaluation of its leftist counterpart. The acting chairman of the Intelligence and Security Executive Committee, Francesco Mazzola, stated that the neo-Fascist formations "do not have at their disposal an actual organization. They are spontaneous aggregations of small extremist groups that frequently operate extemporaneously and suddenly."
It was a well established fact that neo-FasList extremists were concentrated primarily in Rome, in Sicily (particularly in Catania), and, to a lesser degree, in Milan. Nothing comparable to the structure of the leftist terrorist organizations emerged fron, the study of the neo-Fascist component.
This can be attributed at least in part to the fact that no terrorist band of the right had ever matched the numerical consistency of the major organizations of the left and to the absence of a rightist equivelent of the Autonomy. The court record of the trials against rightist extremists shows that, more often than not, the same individuals tend to revolve around the various neo-Fascist organizations, the most dangerous of which merely discard old names for new ones or simultaneously operate under several names. For example, New Order became Black Order, which in term gave life to the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR). The latter also carried out terrorist attacks under the name of Popular Revolutionary Movement (MRP).
The targeting methodology of the neo-Fascisl terrorist groups was neither as far-ranging nor as selective as that of their Communist counterpurt. Rightist terrorist practices of the late 19HO's and early to mid 1970's were conventionally termed "blind," because of a propensity at that time for the indiscriminate use of explosive devices even in public places and on public conveyances. These actions, perpetrated by such groups as the Armed Revolutionary Movement, the Mussolini Action Squads, and Black Order, were not always followed by responsibility claims. Accounts generally attribute the unclaimed massacres of Milan, Brescia. and S. Benedetto di Val di Sambro to the right.
The purpose behind blind attacks was to create panic and, according to many commentators, to cause the adoption of strong measures by the government. including the intervention of the presumably conservative military establishment. In connection with this so-called strategy of tension, accusations and indictments for attempting to stage a coup d'etat were repeatedly brought against political, military, and intelligence figures, as well as private citizens. Except for the conviction of minor elements - primarily private citizens whose potential for undertaking a coup d'etat was highly questionable - no judicial or parliamentary findings established governmental, military. police, or intelligence involvement at either the planning or execution levels.
Since the late 1970's, the rightist targeting practices generally conformed to the leftist model by becoming more selective in their objectives. by expanding on the use of firearms, and by claiming responsibility for their actions more routinely. However, the types of targets, especially the human ones, remained comparatively few: lower ranking members of law enforcement agencies, magistrates involved in terrorism-of-the-right investigations, individuals branded as traitors to the cause, and, Qf course, traditional leftist adversaries.
The new approach basically coincided with the appearance on the scene of the NAR, whose modus operandi included ambush attacks and raids perpetrated with firearms and occasionally with grenaeies, under their own name, and the detonation of explosives principally against governmental buildings under the name of the MRP. The unexpected and unclaimed bombing, in August of 1980, of the Bologna Railroad Station with the attendant massacre of ordinary citizens was blamed on the right. It remained to be proven that this was in fact a neo-Fascist action; but, should conclusive evidence emerge, its perpetration would be indicative of an isolated return to blind targeting, since no similar terrorist crimes had since been committed by the right.
Terrorists of neo-Fascist inspiration began to emulate leftist practices in the prison environment by executing traitors or otherwise creating ferment among inmates. At no time, instead, had any neo-Fascist terrorist group been able to stage a political kidnaping. The only two known instances of rightist abductions were fund-raising ventures. One was carried out by the Revolutionary Action Movement, while the other was commissioned by rightist extremists and perpetrated by common criminals. Neither was accompanied by a responsibility claim. Moreover, both terrorist right and left traditionally resorted to various types of nonpolitical crimes tor procurement considerations; however, neo-Fascist elements appeared more prone to use the proceeds to improve their life style rather than to enhance the cause.
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