Hizballah Drones
A drone launched by Hezbollah killed four Israeli soldiers at a military base south of Haifa on 13 October 2024, the largest single death toll inflicted by the militant group on Israeli soil since the country's military incursion into Lebanon at the start of the month. While the Israeli military far exceeds Hezbollah’s capabilities and resources, could drone warfare be a chink in Israel’s armour? For Hezbollah, such inroads mark a “psychological win” that serves to serve to “terrorise” the Israeli population, said Jean-Loup Samaan, Middle East expert at the Paris-based l'Institut Montaigne think tank. As such, he said, “these attacks are likely to continue”.
on October 13, the group claimed responsibility for a shock attack in Israel that killed four soldiers and wounded 60 people when a drone hit a military base in Binyamina, around 40km south of the city of Haifa in northern Israel. It was the deadliest Hezbollah strike on Israeli soil since the conflict between the two escalated with an Israeli ground incursion in early October. Israeli military chief Herzi Halevi described the attack as “difficult and painful”.
The drone entered Israeli territory flying over the sea from Lebanon and was monitored for some time by the Israeli military before disappearing from radar, according to Nicholas Blanford, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Middle East Programs, in an interview with Lebanon’s L’Orient-Le Jour newspaper. The Israeli military later confirmed that the drone used was a Sayyad 107, an Iranian model that is now manufactured in Lebanon. It has a range of 100km and can be programmed to change direction and altitude frequently, making it very hard to track.
The fact that Hezbollah is equipped with this kind of device means it “still capable of surprising Israel from time to time”, said Pierre Razoux, academic director of the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies. Drones can be deployed once a diversion has been created, Razoux said. Hezbollah can launch rockets – most of which are blocked by Israel’s Iron Dome system – followed by drones flying in on complex routes at low altitudes. Hezbollah said in a statement on the attack that it had fired dozens of missiles at targets in the Israeli cities of Nahariya and Acre while simultaneously sending drones into different zones “with the intention of distracting Israeli defence systems”. Israel’s Iron Dome had intercepted thousands of rockets since it was put in place in 2011.
As is well known, the SNR and the detection range could be enhanced significantly by increasing the power aperture product. The peak transmitted power and the antenna aperture (power aperture product) are important factors that impact the SNR. Electronic agile radars have managed energy based on dwell time and have used look back for quick track initiation. In all these cases, the desired result is to enhance the radar capability using the same resources by better matching it to the dynamically changing environment. The track initiation criteria is simple - if uncorrelated detections occur over scans in a nearly straight line, a track is initiated. Whenever a tar- get enters a radar air space, its signal is usually quite weak. Even though the probability of detection is low, occasionally it can be detected but not often enough to be confirmed as a target. However, at least in a low target density environment, a weak target can be tracked after it is confirmed as a real target. To maintain track integrity, new measurements must be correctly associated with existing tracks. This becomes increasingly dif?cult with high target density and many measurements from false detections.
The challenge is not in comparing the capabilities of Hezbollah’s drone weapon with those of Israel, but in the clear acceleration of Hezbollah’s reliance on drones, and their development to a level even faster than the Israelis expected. Hezbollah has focused on developing drones in specific ranges, for example importing and developing more accurate cameras and sensors over time. Hezbollah currently possesses accurate optical cameras and infrared cameras, which has enabled it to conduct more accurate surveillance and collect high-resolution intelligence, which is of paramount importance for monitoring enemy movements and identifying targets.
Reconnaissance Drones
In 2006, perhaps no one imagined that in June and July 2024, Hezbollah would be able to penetrate the Israeli interior, and then publish relatively long video clips that included a precise survey of military areas in northern Israel (the first video), and aerial reconnaissance footage of intelligence bases, command headquarters, and camps in the occupied Syrian Golan (the second clip). The party said that the video clip was filmed by its drones that were able to “bypass the enemy’s air defense systems, and returned without its means being able to detect them,” and the scenes that appeared in the first and second videos included sensitive Israeli sites.
The first flight of Hezbollah drones into Israeli airspace for reconnaissance purposes in November 2004, which surprised Israeli intelligence at the time. The Mersad-1 flew over the Western Galilee during the day for about 20 minutes, then returned to Lebanon before the Israeli Air Force could intercept it. At the time, Hezbollah announced that the Mersad could reach any depth inside Israel with 40-50 kilograms of explosives. The second flight was a short incursion of about 25 kilometers in April 2005 with the same drone, which evaded Israeli radar and returned to Lebanon before Israeli fighter jets could intercept it. This was followed by a third mission in August 2006 during the Lebanon War, but this time it was not just reconnaissance, but Ababil attack drones into Israel, each carrying 40-50 kilograms of explosives.
At that time, the drones coming from Lebanon were small, moving relatively slowly, and traveling at a low altitude, and therefore were difficult to detect by radar. Low altitude limits detection, because the closer you get to the ground the more radio clutter there is due to human activity and environmental conditions.
The next appearance of a Hezbollah drone in October 2012 was a stunning surprise. The Hezbollah drones traveled south from Lebanon over the Mediterranean, traveled 50 kilometers into the Negev (more than 200 kilometers in total), and penetrated a point near the town of Dimona, the site of Israel’s nuclear weapons complex. There, it was shot down by Israeli aircraft, but an examination of the wreckage revealed that the drone may have transmitted images of the nuclear research center.
Hezbollah has deployed a variety of drones to conduct surveillance operations. Since the maximum range of these drones is unknown, the group likely uses commercial quadcopter drones, as well as other small drones capable of video recording and intelligence gathering. These drones have been used to fly over Israeli military bases in the Galilee and the Golan Heights.
The Hoopoe drone that carried out these two operations has 8 engines, and each wing has 3 propellers. Its maximum speed is 70 km/h, and it has the ability to take off and land vertically without the need for a runway. It is an electric aircraft that does not include a thermal or acoustic signature. It is about 150 cm long, and its wingspan is 190 cm, which reduces the radar's ability to detect it, especially since it has a weak sound and stealth capabilities. The Hoopoe can fly for between one hour and 90 minutes, for a distance of 30 km.
In addition, Hezbollah has been able to possess drones with high-quality communications systems, which allows for real-time data transfer to Hezbollah command centers. Consequently, striking the drone after it is discovered does not prevent data transfer. This capability is also vital for making timely decisions, especially with coordinated strikes, which we will discuss shortly. Hezbollah has also made several modifications to increase its operational range, allowing it to reach deep into occupied territory. This involves improvements to the drones’ fuel efficiency and aerodynamics. By improving battery life and fuel storage, Hezbollah’s drones can now stay in the air for extended periods, conducting extended surveillance missions or waiting for the right moment to strike. In addition, some of Hezbollah's newer drones are designed to have a lower radar cross-section, making them harder to detect by Israeli radar systems, enhancing their ability to remain in Israeli airspace for extended periods, as was evident in the case of the Hoopoe.
"Kamikaze Drones"
The concept of using drones as a kamikaze weapon is relatively new. Iran and Hezbollah initially used them for surveillance before turning them into a cruise missile-like weapon. These types of aircraft are called "loitering munitions" because they are "munitions" that can fly and "loiter" over a target, unlike cruise missiles.
Marsad-1 and Marsad-2 - The Mersad family of drones is based on the Iranian Ababil and Mohajer drones. The Ababil and Mohajer are part of larger families of Iranian drones. Hezbollah has acquired these types of drones for decades and has improved them for its own use. The Mersad can carry up to 40 kilograms of munitions and has a range of about 120 kilometers. The Mersad-1 is based on the Ababil-T drone developed by Iran. The Mersad-2, used by Hezbollah, looks like a small twin-tailed drone and is modeled after the Iranian Mohajer-4 drone.
Ababil - The Ababil drones have undergone many changes and improvements by the Iranians. One of these drones is 6 meters long with longer wings at the back and shorter wings at the front and a propeller at the end of the fuselage, and it is launched from the back of a truck. Hezbollah's Mersad drone and the Houthi Qasef drone both appear to be copies of the Ababil-T.
The Shahed-136 is Iran's main export model of the kamikaze drone, weighing about 200 kilograms. It has a wingspan of 2.5 meters and a length of about 3.5 meters. This model has become the “backbone” or powerful weapon that Iran and its allies possess to “spread terror,” as Frantzman put it. The Shahed drone can be transported in a shipping container and is easy to launch. It has a delta-wing design similar to a large aircraft, with an engine in the back and a warhead in the front. Its relatively simple design and ease of transport make it ideal for groups like Hezbollah.
According to reports from the Israeli Alma Research Center, Hezbollah is likely to have acquired other drones as part of its arsenal of 2,000 drones. The center believes that Hezbollah possesses additional advanced models such as the Muhajir, Shahid, Samed, KAS-04, Karrar, and Saeqeh.
The Israeli newspaper "Israel Today" reported that the "Karrar drone is an Iranian-made drone" based on the technology of the American "Stryker" drone, which is jet-powered and combines the capabilities of suicide attacks, dropping bombs, and even launching air-to-air missiles against aircraft, and it has a relatively long range.
Hezbollah also likely has a 200-kilometer-range drone, according to CNN, that has a strange appearance and basically consists of a single large wing several meters long with a short fuselage. Hezbollah has another drone, the Shahed-129, which could have a range of up to 2,000 kilometers. Originally developed by the Iranians, this drone is a copy of the Israeli Hermes 450, the backbone of the Israeli drone fleet.
But Frantzman points out that Hezbollah’s drones don’t necessarily have all of these capabilities, and its drones are unlikely to be able to fly in circles and “loiter” because there’s unlikely to be someone directing them. The Lebanese party’s drones are believed to be pre-programmed with a specific flight path and destination. The Houthis and Iraqi factions have obtained different types of these one-way attack drones.
Offensive Capabilities
In addition to surveillance capabilities, Hezbollah is focusing on arming its drones with explosives, turning them into suicide drones that can be directed towards a target and detonate upon impact, causing massive damage. The newer drones have improved guidance systems, allowing for more precise strikes on specific targets, which is especially useful in asymmetric warfare, in which Hezbollah aims to inflict the greatest possible losses on Israel at the least possible cost.
Hezbollah currently has a variety of drones, including the Mersad-1 (with a range of 200 kilometers) and the Ayoub (a derivative of the Iranian Shahed-129 with a range of over 1,600 kilometers). Hezbollah also has suicide drones that it has used in successive attacks on Israel, and launching a large number of them would likely overwhelm the capabilities of the Iron Dome. Hezbollah appears to be approaching that point, with the Israeli Alma Research Center estimating in 2021 that Hezbollah possesses over 2,000 multi-role drones. According to the report, Hezbollah had 200 drones in 2013; with Iranian help, Hezbollah has significantly increased its fleet, either by using Iranian drones directly, launching new versions inspired by them, or developing drone technology internally.
Israel, on the other hand, appears to have been ill-prepared for this acceleration. For example, in May 2024, Hezbollah launched one of its deepest strikes on Israel, directly hitting one of the Israeli Air Force’s most important surveillance systems. Commenting on this, Fabian Hinz, a research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said that Hezbollah’s ability to use drones is a threat that must be taken seriously. While Israel has built air defense systems, including the Iron Dome, to protect against Hezbollah’s arsenal of rockets and missiles, there has been less focus on the threat of drones.
The attack demonstrated improved accuracy and the ability to evade Israeli air defenses, said a report by the Institute for National Security Studies, an independent research center affiliated with Tel Aviv University. Since the fighting began in October 2023, Hezbollah has used drones more to bypass Israeli air defense systems and strike its military positions along the border, as well as deep inside Israel.
The Israeli Institute for Security Studies confirmed that Hezbollah had begun using drones that can launch missiles and others that collect information, amid Israeli fears that the party will increasingly use drones that the air defense system cannot confront. In this context, fears are growing in Israel of a swarm of these drones being suddenly launched, which would facilitate the penetration of Israel’s defensive capabilities.
But Hezbollah does not use drones alone in its major strikes, but rather combines them with missiles. Diversifying its aerial offensive products is a primary goal for Hezbollah, and represents a distinctive feature of its military program, which is the focus on joint operations. This tactic was indeed used in the latest strike, as the party reported that its attacks included strikes with various types of missiles and drones. This tactic has been observed in more than one operation, including the operations that followed the Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7.
Combined arms operations are a combat method that seeks to integrate different combat arms to achieve mutual complementary effects, whereby combined arms strike the opponent with several arms at the same time. For example, drones can be used to attack air defense radars in the early stages of a major attack. Here, other air defense capabilities will be shifted to repelling the drone attack, but they will be followed by ballistic missile strikes and others with guided cruise missiles (Hezbollah already has versions of both), so the defenses will not be able to repel them all, especially with the difference in the tactics of each of them.
The drones themselves usually operate in tactical swarms that can disperse the capabilities of air defense systems and exceed their ability to repel, disrupt communications and logistics. For example, in a war scenario, a team of drones will destroy air defense systems and pave the way for a series of other drones to penetrate enemy territory, while a third group of drones will conduct reconnaissance and study the strike.
In a 2022 study, James Rogers, a professor of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark, explains that these joint attacks aim to overcome the opponent’s defenses in a tactically and technically sophisticated manner. Rogers points out that if these attacks can be stopped now, at some point, with more advanced drones falling into the hands of parties like the Houthis, and their ability to reproduce them or invent new ones, it will be very difficult (if not impossible) to counter these attacks.
This is precisely one of the main reasons that Hezbollah has focused on drone warfare from the beginning. The opportunity to develop it is completely open with the increasing availability of commercial drone technology, GPS systems, drone deployment control applications, and adjustable frequency transceivers. This opens the door to importing and developing technology, which is relatively cheap and easy to obtain, and which is increasingly challenging the air superiority of fighter aircraft (in an asymmetric war against an army that is superior in numbers and equipment).
For groups like Hezbollah, the goal of investing in drones is different from the capabilities of traditional armies. The latter invest in drones as part of their air force, the top of which is fighter jets. As for the Houthis, drones are the top of their air force, and therefore they are working to develop it in every possible way and use it in the most effective ways.
Rogers explains in his study that this is only the first step, as day after day the flexibility of drone systems and their ability to be automated will increase, meaning that they will become independent and able to operate completely or almost completely independently of the human control unit. Rogers believes that by 2040, groups such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and others will be able to automate their drones, given the potential development of artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms, which in turn opens the door to the stage of “full-spectrum drone threats,” meaning that the drones possessed by such groups will not only be airborne, but also ground and seaborne.
Planners on several fronts, such as Hezbollah, are aware of this, and each of them uses the available technology and tools, whether through local innovation or import from friends, to make the most of the drone weapon, knowing that its path to development is completely open.
