Development of the Modern Armed Forces
Moroccans, particularly the Berber tribes, have a long-standing international reputation for martial prowess. This tradition has been suggested as one of the attractions that prompted French interest in Morocco in the early twentieth century. Having already experienced satisfaction with their use of Algerian troops, the French viewed Morocco as a ready source of soldiers with which to bolster their own military strength at home and thus better equip themselves to deal with an increasingly militaristic Germany.
For its part, the Moroccan government did not object to the establishment of a protectorate in 1912. Before the period of the protectorate, the traditional authority of the sultans had been backed by military contingents from jaysh tribes that performed military service in exchange for land and tax concessions. The system, however, was not without a certain element of uncertainty. The sultan was never really sure of the loyalty of his forces inasmuch as their direct allegiance was to the individual qaids (tribal governors). It has been suggested that this questionable loyalty was one of the reasons the sultan had looked with favor on the establishment of the protectorate—an arrangement in which his security was assured by the French and Spanish.
After occupying various Moroccan power centers beginning in 1907, the French began to augment their own forces with Moroccan recruits, which they organized into four elements: tirailleurs, goums, maghzanis, and partisans. In addition, a traditional military element known as the Sharifian Guard was retained as a royal bodyguard to the sultan; the guards duties, however, were primarily ceremonial. Separately, special irregular forces were recruited by and operated under the authority of the senior qaids. Pay for those maghzanis assigned to the rear areas and for the partisans was included each year in the protectorate budget. All of the other Moroccan forces were paid from funds included in the French military budget.
The tirailleurs were the regular soldiers, and their role was strictly military. Although used for domestic pacification operations as the occasion warranted, these regulars, some of whom rose to high rank, were primarily liable for service abroad and served with courage and distinction in such divergent spots as France, the Levant, and Indochina. As integral elements of the French army, the tirailleurs produced many officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), who were trained in French military schools.
Other elements of the early Moroccan security forces served the French pacification effort in political as well as military roles. The mission of the goums was to strengthen the irregular troops of the senior qaids by exhibiting greater discipline and training and using machine guns and other modern weapons. A goum consisted of roughly 160 men and several French NCOs; they were organized variously as cavalry and infantry units, providing their own horses and food. Goumiers (members of the goums) served as their own recruiters, and one authority described them as "the best propagandists for the French cause and indefatigable missionaries of civilization." Between periods of active pacification operations, the goums served as a gendarmerie, maintaining peace and order in the tribal areas.
The maghzanis were assigned to the rural sections of the protectorate. Composed of 25 to 30 men, each unit was recruited by the local French authorities from among the most prominent and influential local families to serve as bodyguards and messengers. Others consisted of people the local French administrators wished to keep under close surveillance. The maghzanis lived with their families and were not subject to military discipline. During their service they were often entrusted with missions demanding intelligence and responsibility, and many eventually served as qaids. The partisans were the local forces of the remote rear areas, recruited by the quids for special missions and demobilized when the operations were completed. Often recruited from among the traditional jaysh tribes and dominated by Berbers, they were customarily invited by the French to serve as the vanguard of rear area advances, spurred on by the promise of excitement, looting, and the satisfaction of continuing old blood feuds with neighboring tribes. The partisans were usually chosen for their physical strength and knowledge of the local terrain.
It has been estimated that approximately 40,000 Moroccan tirailleurs served in France during World War I and suffered heavy casualties. In World War II before the French collapsed under the onslaught of Hitler's forces, Moroccan troops again fought against the Germans in Europe. Their tenacity and military prowess earned the Moroccans the respect of the German high command, and as part of the occupation agreement with Germany. France was forced to deactivate the Moroccan goums.
Although formal dissolution was achieved at least on paper, the goumiers simply disappeared into the Moroccan mountains, where they operated clandestinely as guerrilla bands and retained meager stocks of weapons. Eventually, after the Allied liberation they were re-equipped, and approximately 12,000 goumiers aided in the fight against Axis forces in Tunisia. By the end of World War II some 300,000 Moroccans had fought with the Allies in the North African campaigns, the invasion of Italy, and the liberation of France.
Money sent home by Moroccan troops during World War II, together with the pensions paid to former soldiers, had a beneficial effect on the economy of many rural areas of their homeland. Moreover, the French protectorate authorities gave assistance to the veterans in obtaining employment and loans and aided in the care of war widows and orphans. The immediate demobilization of about 45,000 veterans of World War II was carefully undertaken. In 1954 it was estimated that some 126,000 former soldiers of all ages were living as civilians in Morocco, mainly in the rural tribal areas that had served traditionally as sources of recruits for the French army.
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