Kenyatta Era Party Politics
The Somali problem in North-Eastern Region was an immediate concern of the new government. Both major parties agreed that the Somali area should not be permitted to secede from Kenya and that the Somali insurgents, called shifta (bandits), should be suppressed. In December 1963, however, the government was defeated in a move to secure the extraordinary majority required in the Senate for the continuance of the state of emergency in North-Eastern Region. KADU refused to go along, claiming that its leaders had not been consulted. The Senate recessed, and the government threatened to continue the emergency without authorization. Instead Kenyatta called a hurried meeting with opposition leaders, the Senate was reconvened, and KADU acceded to the government's request.
In late January 1964 the government faced a new problem in the mutiny of some officers and men of an army battalion. The mutiny, put down with the aid of British troops in Kenya, did not seriously threaten the government but forced it, nonetheless, to make a broad reassessment of the military's role in the new nation. Despite its early 1964 statement of the need for unity, KADU was highly vocal in its opposition to the government. Its fortunes were on the decline, however. Elections were held in North-Eastern Region to fill the vacant Somali seats, and pro-KANU candidates were returned. In a March speech Kenyatta — noting that the membership of the House of Representatives now stood at 105 KANU and 22 KADU — said that the country would soon have only one party. The idea of a one-party system was increasingly mentioned by KANU leaders, with the proviso that the system not be imposed by law but be voluntarily accepted by the opposition members. Moreover, such a one-party system would be distinct, it was argued, from a one-party state imposed by law.
KADU continued to call upon the government to enforce the regionalist features of the Independence Constitution and threatened to take it to court for failing to do so. In August 1964 the government announced its intention to amend the constitution in order to make the country a republic, creating an office of president and abolishing regional autonomy. Kenyatta warned that if the National Assembly would not agree to the amendments, he would go to the people in a referendum.
A heated debate took place on the first amendment dealing with the presidency but, by the time the vote was taken in early November, KADU's strength in the House of Representatives had been whittled away still further by defections, and the proposal carried in that chamber. In the Senate, however, the party still retained more than one-third of the seats. It appeared that the first amendment, which required a 75 percent majority vote there, and the second amendment to abolish regionalism, which required a 90 percent majority vote, would be rejected. Two days before the scheduled vote on the bill to establish a republic, three KADU senators defected to KANU, ensuring the necessary majority. On November 10, before any vote was taken in the Senate, Ngala made a dramatic announcement on the floor of the assembly that KADU had dissolved itself and that its members wished to join KANU. They were welcomed to the government's side, the constitutional amendments were adopted, and the country entered a period of one-party rule.
On the first anniversary of independence, Kenya was proclaimed a republic, remaining within the Commonwealth. Kenyatta became its first president elected, according to the constitutional amendment, by the National Assembly, and Odinga was named his vice president. The cabinet was enlarged and made more representative of various ethnic groups and political opinion in the country. Moi, who had been a leading figure in KADU, received the important position of minister of home affairs.
In early 1965 long-standing disagreements between the generally older, more conservative members of KANU and the party's younger, more radical members on economic and political policies began to surface in struggles for control of local party branches. Formerly, such differences had been smoothed out by Kenyatta behind the scenes or had been kept in hand by the realization that a KANU split could be detrimental to early attainment of independence. At the same time, however, factions also polarized behind Mboya or Odinga, whose rivalry for party influence went back to Legislative Council days. Mboya was favored by moderate elements, and Odinga by those inclined to the left. Charges of foreign influence and of the receipt of foreign funds to promote factional aims were exchanged, although little concrete evidence was ever produced.
Early in 1965 Odinga made a speech in which he said, "Communism is like food to me," a statement taken as significant by many Kenyans and foreign observers alike. He complained that he had been intentionally stripped of all governmental power when he was appointed vice president, and he was increasingly critical of other ministers. The matter came to a head in April 1965 when he accused Mboya and Ngala of being tools of Britain and the United States. Minister of Labour Julius Gikonyo Kiano and others quickly responded and asked Odinga either to stop criticizing them or to resign. Because of Odinga's actions, Kenyatta removed him from a delegation scheduled to attend the 1965 Commonwealth Conference. Relations between Kenyatta and Odinga worsened as the president grew more suspicious of communist influence in Kenyan politics.
In December 1964 Kenyatta had opened a Soviet-financed party training center, the Lumumba Institute, which Odinga had sponsored. The school had Soviet staff members, and leftist elements within KANU were heavily represented in its student body and administration. Radical demands by students and the use of the school by left-oriented legislators to push their views led to criticism in parliament and charges of communism from some. On June 1, 1965, the second anniversary of internal self-government (Madaraka Day), Kenyatta made a major speech denouncing communism and warning of the dangers of communist imperialism. These pressures led the party to close the school in June 1965. In July a group of 27 students who had been trained at the Lumumba Institute entered KANU headquarters in Nairobi and declared all party officers deposed except Kenyatta. They were quickly arrested, and 26 were convicted in September.
The incident increased rumors of an impending coup, rumors that were given credence by statements of various ministers. The rest of the year was characterized by open competition between Odinga and Kenyatta, who followed one another around the country making speeches. Nonetheless, when Kenyatta reshuffled the cabinet in December 1965, Odinga was retained as vice president. His authority to supervise elections, however, was transferred to another minister.
That same winter a number of military coups took place throughout Africa, and there was serious unrest in neighboring Uganda. Recognizing that some of the army takeovers had been directed against dishonest and extravagant politicians, Kenyatta took action against members of the Maize Marketing Board who were involved in irregularities and suspended Ngei, the Kamba leader, from his ministerial duties while corruption charges against him were being investigated.
The government also announced that during 1965 over 100 other officials were tried and convicted of abusing their positions. In order to strengthen his position against the leftists, Kenyatta had Mboya introduce in the National Assembly a motion of confidence in the government. Despite Odinga's protests, the motion, proposed in February 1966, was carried.
The same month the organizing secretary of KANU, John Keen, published an open letter to the president in which he criticized the "appalling" state of the party. He noted that the last delegates' conference had been held in October 1962 and the last secretariat meeting in February 1964. He asserted that the party was heavily in debt and that the staff had not been paid for seven months. He asked that Mboya be relieved of either his ministerial or his party post as secretary general and suggested that a commission of inquiry look into KANU's role in the one-party state. These statements, coming in the wake of other criticisms of the party and Odinga's growing disaffection, persuaded Kenyatta to call a conference of delegates and district officials for March 1966.
On the eve of the conference the government expelled a number of diplomats accredited to Nairobi from communist countries. The press reported that they had been attempting to buy delegates' votes and had been in close touch with Odinga supporters. The party's conservative group was in full control, and Kenyatta, who dominated the conference, was reelected party president. Odinga was removed from his post as party vice president; other party officeholders believed to be radicals were replaced, and new party vice presidents were elected in each province and Nairobi Area. They included two ex-KADU leaders, Ngala and Moi, who were elected vice presidents from their respective provinces. Mboya was reelected secretary general in a contest with Masinde Muliro, the former KADU leader who had lined up with the left wing.
After winning in a preliminary vote for vice president of Central Province, Bildad Kaggia, the prominent Kikuyu leftist and former head of the Lumumba Institute, was defeated by Gichuru. The outcome of the conference was to expel the left from positions of influence and to increase ethnic and geographical representation in the party's major offices.
In April 1966 Odinga resigned as vice president, making a long statement in which he criticized the government on a large number of points. He asserted that it ignored the "common man" and represented foreign interests. His resignation was followed by that of a minister and two assistant ministers. Several labor union officials also resigned from KANU and lined up with Odinga. A total of 30 representatives and senators, including one appointive member, resigned from KANU, and on April 26 the formation of a new party, the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), was announced. Odinga was named president, and Kaggia deputy president.
KANU responded to these events vigorously and issued a series of statements denouncing the dissidents. A plan was devised to expel the Odinga group from the National Assembly. Because this could not be done by a simple vote, it was decided to amend the constitution so that a person who had been elected to the assembly under one label would be required to vacate his seat if he switched to another party. The amendment was directed solely against KPU members; former members of KADU were not affected since members of absorbed or disbanded parties were excluded from the provisions of the amendment. Upon hearing this proposal, 13 KPU members reconsidered and asked for reentry into KANU.
Although KPU had not yet received government registration as a political party, the speaker of the House of Representatives recognized it as an opposition party for purposes of debating the proposal. The amendment was easily passed with the aid of the repentant KPU members — who were subsequently told they would not be reaccepted into KANU — and the KPU seats were declared vacant; by-elections to fill these seats were scheduled for June.
KPU members generally fell into three categories. They included Luo supporters of Odinga; politicans representing local interests usually in more remote areas who felt that KANU and the government had neglected to consider local problems; and the radical element, mostly younger men, who disagreed with KANU policies concerning landownership, education, and what they labeled "capitalist control of the means of production." Most if not all of the radicals had supported Kenyatta, their main complaint being against party leaders at the middle level and their influence on Kenyatta. The break with KANU, however, raised the question of alternative national leadership.
The formation of KPU ended the one-party state but was to have little effect on the course of Kenyan politics. By-elections were set for three two-day periods in June 1966. KPU was handicapped in its campaign by a delay in the official registration of the party. The party was also at a disadvantage because of government control of the radio, and broadcast information on KPU was given the general public only indirectly in connection with the reporting of KANU activities. Press coverage was somewhat better and was generally extensive for larger rallies in city areas.
Although some campaigning by higher KANU party and government officials occurred, KANU candidates by and large were left on their own with little assistance from the central organization. Only one-third of the eligible voters participated. The results, however, were overwhelmingly in support of KANU, which won eight of the 10 Senate seats and 12 of the 19 House seats. One of the seven seats won by KPU went to Odinga by a large majority. Total KPU membership in parliament thus amounted to only nine, of whom six were Luo, two were Kamba, and one was from a minor ethnic group in western Kenya. (In December 1966 the constitution was amended making the National Assembly a unicameral body.)
During the next three years the government took actions that were detrimental to KPU activities in local areas, including the refusal to register party branches and nominations for elections on various technicalities and the detention of more active members under public security regulations.
On July 9, 1969, Mboya was assassinated for motives never fully determined. His killer was a Kikuyu and, although Mboya, a Luo, had been a strong supporter of Kenyatta and KANU, many of the Luo viewed his death as an ethnic affront. Luo-Kikuyu enmity increased rapidly in the next few months. It was capped in October 1969 when KPU was banned, and its principal leaders, including Odinga and the party's other members of parliament, were detained. These actions occurred after a visit by President Kenyatta to Kisumu, during which a large crowd of Luo reportedly menaced his safety and was fired on by security guards. In an explanatory statement the government accused KPU of becoming subversive, intentionally stirring up inter-ethnic strife, and accepting funds from foreign agencies to promote KPU activities. The proscription in effect brought a return to the single- party state.
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