Imperial Japanese Army - Armor / Sensha - In Action
The Japanese army made extensive use of its tanks in the campaigns in China in the 1930s, and it was in these early successes that the Japanese began to develop their own unique style of tank tactics. As Japanese tanks battled in Singapore, Malaya and Burma this Japanese vision became clearer as light tanks were deployed in the jungles of southeastern Asia, where conventional Western tactics dictated that tanks would be useless.
During the Anti-Japanese War, Chinese tanks attacked many times; but the Sino-Japanese tanks had only two confrontations, and the scale was small. After the Japanese army provoked the "Lugouqiao Incident" in 1937, the Japanese tank battalion and independent armored car company were sent to the Chinese battlefield. At that time, because there were almost no tanks in China, Japan’s seemingly light-duty vehicles not only became a siege weapon on the battlefield, but also served as a battlefield liaison, reconnaissance, and support for infantry.
At that time, the Chinese army not only lacked tanks, but also did not possess anti-tank weapons. Even the anti-tank tactics did not understand. Therefore, Japanese tanks had always been arrogant in the battlefields of China, and they performed outstandingly in many subsequent battles. In the battle of Shanghai, the Japanese attacked Shanghai by directly attacking Nanjing, in order to attract and destroy the main force of the Chinese army, thus solving the Chinese problem in one fell swoop. The Japanese army formed a joint fire-killing net with planes, tanks, and warships.
On May 14, 1938, the 14th Division of the Japanese Army forced the Yellow River westward from the vicinity of Jixian County to cut off the Chinese army behind Xuzhou. In the Xuzhou battle, the Japanese army deployed more than 200 tanks on a large scale. Therefore, the Japanese army's Shibuya detachment and the Sakamoto detachment were combined in one place, and they dared to use the strength of a division to oppose the ten divisions of the Chinese army. Moreover, after the two detachments were surrounded, they were able to break through with the tanks, and the Chinese army had to give up the pursuit because of the firepower of the Japanese tanks.
The Xuzhou battle made the Chinese National Government see the necessity of building mechanized troops. Soon the National Government purchased 80 vehicles of nine tons and half-war vehicles from Europe and the United States. In March 1939, the 200th Division and the Honorary 1st Division, the newly edited 22nd Division was reorganized into the 5th Army. After the training of the 5th Army, it became the only mechanized unit in China.
At the Nanchang Battle in March 1939, the 11th Army of the Japanese Army temporarily organized a tank group with a total of 135 tanks to participate in the battle. The Chinese army was seriously lacking anti-tank guns at that time; it relied only on infantry to destroy the number of tanks. At this time, the Fifth Army had not completed training.
In November 1939, the Fifth Army used the advantage of firepower. It won at Kunlunguan Dajie ; killed more than 4,000 Japanese troops (the Japanese military acknowledged the death of more than 2,000 people), and killed the Japanese army's 21st brigade commander Nakamura Masao. But the Fifth Army suffered a total of 17,698 people killed, wounded, missing. It can be described as a tragic victory. Chiang Kai-shek misjudged, the Japanese army was able to send reinforcements and launched counterattacks. After the 5th Army was severely mauled and was removed from the battlefield, there was no powerful force to resist the Japanese attack. On February 3 of the following year, Kunlunguan fell again. After that, there were no big tank battles in the Chinese battlefield.
The first major setback for the Japanese armored corps was the Nomohan campaign in 1939, where the Soviet forces soundly outclassed the Japanese - which lacked a functioning combined-arms system and could not match the heavily tank-supported Soviets. The Japanese refused to acknowledge the importance of armor, and only after the German victories in Poland and France did the Japanese generals finally understand (albeit incorrectly) the importance of tanks.
Nomonhan clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of Japanese tanks. At the conclusion of this conflict considerable reorganization took place within the Japanese Army. The Japanese gave no real attention to mechanized warfare until after their disastrous experience with Russian armored units on the Manchurian border in 1939. Prior to 1939, their armored forces consisted of independent tank regiments and of tank groups comprising three or four tank regiments, a signal unit, and an engineer unit. In the 1939 Soviet-Japanese conflict the Japanese armament, equipment and method of tactics were evaluated as inferior to the Soviets and inappropriate to current operational requirements. The echo of the Red Army victory over the Kwantung Army gained worldwide advantages for the Soviet Union.
After 1939, the Japanese apparently planned the creation of an armored army under an independent command. In pursuance of this new policy, two armored divisions were activated in 1942. An additional armored division was also activated in 1942, but not as a part of the armored army command.
By 1941 the belief among Chinese officers was that if China had enough planes and tanks and guns, it would be a simple matter to defeat the Japanese. At that time, China had in the field some 300 divisions. T.V.Soong, brother-in-law of the Generalissimo, listed requirements on 31 March 1941 for artillery and arsenal materials clearly implied a plan to rearm thirty Chinese divisions. At that time, China had perhaps 200 obsolete tanks, and Soong wanted 360 light tanks and 400 scout cars to replace them. In their requisitions for tanks, the Chinese again revealed ignorance of what was possible for operations in China. Soong asked for the standard U.S. light tank, a 13-ton model. Since it was pointed out repeatedly that this tank could not cross the majority of bridges in China and Burma, Chinese insistence on the 13-ton type until as late as November 1941 typified something that appeared over and over again—Chinese demands for the biggest and newest equipment regardless of availability or practicality. Eventually arrangements were made at London to supply the Chinese with 1,200 Bren gun carriers from British and Canadian production in place of the tanks. And the Chinese had the Boys .55-caliber rifle, a British weapon quite capable of dealing with the thinly-armored Japanese tanks.
The appearance of Japanese tanks in Malaya came as a great surprise to the British, who insisted that tanks could never operate in a jungle and, thus, did not have a single tank in Malaya. As it happened, the Japanese tanks moved easily between the spacious rows of rubber trees with the result that the Japanese speed of movement, their ability to overcome obstacles and their bold use of tanks, came as a complete surprise.
In combat with Allied forces the Japanese utilized light and medium tanks, as well as tankettes, in support of infantry in direct frontal attacks. After the infantry reached their objective the tanks were withdrawn without attempting to exploit the limited gains. In Malaya tanks were brought up wherever the infantry was unable to advance. The tanks normally attempted to force a passage for the infantry by a frontal assault. If this failed, the tanks were sent against the hostile flanks. On occasion, however, Japanese tanks attacked by moving directly down roads with the infantry following in trucks. Unless effective road blocks were prepared by Allied forces, the tanks struck at artillery and other installations as much as 8 to 10 miles in the rear of the main Allied positions. When a road block was encountered, fire from the tanks was used to get around the flanks by infiltration tactics. Only a very few operations have involved Allied tanks directly against Japanese armored vehicles.
Most Japanese tanks had thin armor and so to improve kill ratio of tanks in tank versus tank combat various techniques were evolved. IJA tank commanders exploited contours of terrain. They fired from behind ridges, mounds and gullies. Japanese ambushed an American tank column in the Philippines campaign. Japanese tanks hiding alongside the road engaged the American tanks from flank and rear. Fairly large numbers of M3 Lees, M4 Shermans were destroyed.
Only in 1942 did the Japanese try to create combined-arms formations with tanks, infantry and artillery. Those formation incorrectly used a high ratio of tanks to infantry, which was inadequate as the tanks depend on the infantry for its protection. Japanese Field Service Regulations definitely stressed the point that all arms must be used to enable the infantry to close with the enemy and annihilate him. This indicated that the basic mission of tanks was believed to be direct cooperation with infantry. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that Japanese tank operations consisted of piecemeal tank counter-attacks and defensive siting of tanks as pillboxes in direct contradiction to promulgated doctrine.
In 1942, several infantry divisions had either tank units (strength 750) or infantry group tankette companies (strength 100), and sometimes both types of organization. Most of these units were demobilized by early 1944. In 1943 the Japanese realized their inability to create the armored army as originally planned. This may have been primarily attributable to shipping difficulties and the higher manufacturing priorities of other items such as airplanes. The armored army accordingly was deactivated in November 1943, and its organic divisions were placed under new commands. Nevertheless another armored division was activated in 1944 subsequent to the deactivation of the armored army. The original armored divisions were organized as square (brigaded) divisions. These divisions were triangularized in early 1944, however, and the new division activated that year was triangular.
Japanse doctrine called for their main infantry and tank forces to participate in counterattacks immediately after hostile amphbious forces landed. Such counterattacks, of course require close cooperation and liaison with artillery, not only with that of the infantry units but with artillery under the control of higher commanders as well. This necessary cooperation had not been too well effected, probably in large measure as a result of the disrupting effect of the prelanding bombardment on mental reactions and communication equipment. Tanks, theoretically at least, are held in mobile reserve for counterattack missions at critical times and places, but the practice had fallen short of the theoretical goal because of the inherent weakness of the Japanese tanks vis a vis US antitank guns and because of their piecemeal commitment.
Loss of one island after another before the inexorable advance of Allied naval and land forces, as well as the critical drain on their shipping resources, impelled the Japanese to organize divisions of a new type for island defense. Divisions for this purpose are intended to be largely self-sustaining in their localized defense of a particular island. There were no cavalry, reconnaissance, or tank regiments in the island division. There is a division tank company, however, and a regimental tank unit in the strengthened infantry regiment if the division includes a regiment of that type. Despite its numerical strength, the Kwantung Army lacked quality. Above division level, the Kwantung Army also suffered from a deficiency of weaponry, particularly armor. Tanks carried only 57-mm guns and machine guns. In addition to being outgunned, these tanks had less armor than the Soviet T-34s. In Manchuria, the mobility, firepower, and use of armor and artillery decided the issue. Forward detachments of reinforced tank brigades swept through and around Japanese defensive lines, preempting any systematic defense.
Prior to the Occupation of Japan it was anticipated that the quantities of Japanese general war materiel would be enormous and tentative plans were made to dispose of it. Based on plans and directives from technical agencies and ample experiences in other theaters, the program for the disposition of this materiel was formulated on the premise that large numbers of Japanese service troops and adequate numbers of Japanese military vehicles would be available. However, in many areas of Japan the military forces had been completely demobilized prior to the Occupation.
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