2. And the Lord said unto Gideon, The people that are with thee are
too many for me to give the Midianites into their hands,
lest Israel vaunt themselves against me, saying, Mine own hand hath saved me.
3 Now therefore go to, proclaim in the ears of the people, saying,
Whosoever is fearful and afraid, let him return and depart early from mount Gilead.
And there returned of the people twenty and two thousand; and there remained ten thousand.
4 And the Lord said unto Gideon, The people are yet too many;
bring them down unto the water, and I will try them for thee there: and it shall be, that
of whom I say unto thee, This shall go with thee, the same shall go with thee; and
of whomsoever I say unto thee, This shall not go with thee, the same shall not go.
5 So he brought down the people unto the water: and the Lord said unto Gideon,
Every one that lappeth of the water with his tongue, as a dog lappeth, him shalt thou set by himself;
likewise every one that boweth down upon his knees to drink.
6 And the number of them that lapped, putting their hand to their mouth,
were three hundred men:
but all the rest of the people bowed down upon their knees to drink water.
7 And the Lord said unto Gideon, By the three hundred men that lapped
will I save you, and deliver the Midianites into thine hand: and
let all the other people go every man unto his place.
Judges 7 King James Version (KJV)
Military Personnel
Israel can never hope to match its potential enemies in terms of manpower. It is not a member of any military alliance; on the other hand, it has not asked and will not ask for foreign troops to come to its rescue. Conscription has become deeply ingrained over the years. Not to have served in the IDF has in the past been regarded as a disgrace; moreover it has been a real impediment to future civilian careers.
In a country where the law obliges the general to enlist in the army, a country where military service is an honorable and significant part of the Israeli identity, of course all the exceptions will receive different treatment. Every person who fulfilled his duty and served the state for a period of his life will expect that the other will also fulfill his duty. And when this does not happen, an inequality is created that leads to anger and disgust on the part of those who did fulfill their duty.
Since service in the country is compulsory service, the majority of the population does serve in the IDF - and usually do not look favorably on people who have not served in the army illegally. Officially, a person cannot be discriminated against in a workplace for not having served in the army, but it is quite possible that his employers will be more suspicious of him and will refrain from giving him authority. A person who has not enlisted in the army may be considered by many to be a rebel, or as someone who cannot be trusted to do a job he is not interested in doing.
Although the mandatory service lasts between two and three years, it is a significant part of Israeliness, and it absolutely affects the life of each Israeli at least in the early 20s, if not for a longer period of time. And how does it all start? At the age of 16, excited and stressed, all young Israelis arrive at the first order, the first introductory conversation with the army. Most of the time, the conversation ends with 'peace' and all that needs to be done is wait for the Kabbalah and DPR scores that will determine the continuation of the relationship with the IDF.
The fact that every Israeli boy and girl arrives at the recruitment office in the 11th grade area allows the army to at least try to capture the most talented - which makes the personnel in the IDF so diverse and high-quality, regularly, permanently and in the reserves.
Military service in Israel was mandatory, beginning at age eighteen, for male and female citizens and resident aliens. Conscription extended to all able-bodied persons, called to the flag as they reach the age of 18 - three years for males and two for females. The length of compulsory military service has varied according to IDF personnel needs. In 1988 male conscripts served three years and females twenty months.
New immigrants, if younger than eighteen years of age upon arrival, were subject to the same terms of conscription when they reached eighteen. Male immigrants aged nineteen to twenty-three served for progressively reduced periods, and those twenty-four or older were conscripted for only 120 days. Female immigrants over the age of nineteen were exempted from compulsory service. Immigrants who had served in the armed forces of their countries of origin had the length of their compulsory service in Israel reduced. New immigrants are not inducted during their first year in the country, unless they waive the deferment - which many of them do. Military service of newcomers, side by side with old-timers, has proved to be a powerful instrument for successful integration.
Exemptions for Jewish males were rare, and about 90 percent of the approximately 30,000 men who reached age eighteen each year were drafted. Several hundred ultra-Orthodox students studying at religious schools, yeshivot (sing., yeshiva) followed a special four-year program combining studies and military duty. The Ministry of Defense estimated, however, that in 1988 about 20,000 of the most rigidly Orthodox yeshiva students, who felt little allegiance to Zionism and the Israeli state, were escaping the draft through an endless series of deferments. From a strictly military point of view, their value to the IDF would be limited because of restrictions on the jobs they would be able or willing to perform. Although the military served kosher food and adhered to laws of the Jewish sabbath and holidays, secular soldiers were lax in their observance.
An academic reserve enabled students to earn a bachelor's degree before service, usually in a specialized capacity, following basic training; such students reported for reserve duty during summer vacations. Conscientious objectors were not excused from service, although an effort was made to find a noncombatant role for them. The minimum physical and educational standards for induction were very low to insure that a maximum number of Jewish males performed some form of service in the IDF. Conscripts were screened on the basis of careful medical and psychological tests. Those with better education and physical condition were more likely to be assigned to combat units. Sons and brothers of soldiers who had died in service were not accepted for service in combat units unless a parental waiver was obtained.
Several elite units were composed exclusively of volunteers. They included air force pilots, paratroops, the submarine service, naval commandos, and certain army reconnaissance units. Because of the large number of candidates, these units were able to impose their own demanding selection procedures. The air force enjoyed first priority, enabling it to select for its pilot candidates the prime volunteers of each conscript class. Conscripts also could express preferences for service in one of the regular combat units. The Golani Infantry Brigade, which had acquired an image as a gallant frontline force in the 1973 and 1982 conflicts, and the armored corps were among the preferred regular units.
Standards for admission to the IDF were considerably higher for women, and exemptions were given much more freely. Only about 50 percent of the approximately 30,000 females eligible annually were inducted. Nearly 20 percent of eligible women were exempted for "religious reasons"; nearly 10 percent because they were married; and most of the remaining 20 percent were rejected as not meeting minimum educational standards (eighth grade during the 1980s).
A law passed in 1978 made exemptions for women on religious grounds automatic upon the signing of a simple declaration attesting to the observance of orthodox religious practices. This legislation raised considerable controversy, and IDF officials feared that the exemption could be abused by any nonreligious woman who did not wish to serve and thus further exacerbate the already strained personnel resources of the IDF. Women exempted on religious grounds were legally obliged to fulfill a period of alternative service doing social or educational work assigned to them. In practice, however, women performed such service only on a voluntary basis. Female conscripts served in the Women's Army Corps, commonly known by its Hebrew acronym, Chen. After a five-week period of basic training, women served as clerks, drivers, welfare workers, nurses, radio operators, flight controllers, ordnance personnel, and course instructors. Women had not engaged in direct combat since the War of Independence.
A survey in November 2021 by the Democracy Institute showed that despite the absolute consensus in Israel's political leadership regarding the "people's army", the public is no longer there. Although the IDF received widespread support in the most important section, operational capability: about eight out of ten Israelis give the army a very good to excellent grade. But among those who answered the survey, the majority wanted a different, professional army. This is about 47 percent of Israelis. About 42 percent asked to remain with the People's Army, and mandatory service, and 11 percent answered that they did not know. Rightists and leftists argue about everything, but they want the abolition of the People's Army in exactly the same proportion. The shrinking center still clings to Israel's traditional narrative.
This is also expressed in ages. 55+ year olds wholeheartedly support mandatory service. Most 35-54 year olds want a professional army. And the young people? They are ready to get rid of the People's Army model tomorrow morning.
In March 2023 the State Comptroller published data on the recruitment rate for the IDF. Most of the headlines that dealt with the report pointed to the ("not surprising") decrease in the percentage of recruits. The rate of non-recruitment in the 2021 cycle (candidates for recruitment, excluding the Arab sector) was 31% among men and 45% among women - an increase of 3.5% among men and 2.5% among women compared to 2016. But of those 31.4% born in 2003 who did not enlist in 2021, compared to 28% who did not enlist among those born in 1998 (2016 recruitment), 17.6% did not enlist due to considerations of Torah study, compared to 13.7% 5 years ago - almost the entire change. The populist headlines about youth who don't want to enlist are not only harmful, they are also incorrect and at best help those who choose not to get under the stretcher, under the false pretense that "they don't enlist in Tel Aviv either."
March 2024 data from the Ministry of Finance shed light on the enormous cost differences of the various alternatives for increasing the IDF's manpower. A study carried out by the Chief Economist Division examined the difference between the economic cost of a month in reserve service versus a month in regular service and found that it is a difference of NIS 21,000 Go for a man and 11 thousand shekels for a woman.
The exam is relevant against the background of the need for the defense system to increase the number of servants against the background of the changes in the security reality following the October 7 war. At the beginning of the month it was reported that the IDF needs an immediate addition of approximately 7,000 soldiers and female soldiers. According to this number, filling the need with reserve soldiers will cost about NIS 150 million a month or about NIS 1.75 billion a year more than filling the need with regular service soldiers. of a gap of 5,000 soldiers, this is a gap of 105 million shekels a month and 1.26 billion shekels a year.
In the bottom line, the calculation shows that filling the shortage of personnel in the IDF by increasing the number of servants in regular service is cheaper and more profitable for the economy than by recruiting reserves.
The division's investigation focused on the cost differences between recruiting non-Orthodox Jews only. The examination found that the economic cost of a month of service for a non-Orthodox Jewish man in regular service is NIS 27,000, while the cost of a month in reserve service would be NIS 48,000 for him. According to estimates, the economic cost of enlisting an ultra-Orthodox man for regular service will be lower - which makes the gap between his enlistment and the cost of enlisting a non-Orthodox Jew for a reserve month even higher.
For non-Jewish women, this is a cost of NIS 21,000 per month for regular service and NIS 32,000 for reserve service.
The estimate of the economic cost focused on four channels of influence: loss of labor inputs to the economy - that is, when a person does not come to work; loss of seniority; influence on the spouse; and the price of postponing academic studies which is significant for regular servants.
According to the Chief Economist's Division, the large differences between the cost of a month in regular service compared to a month in reserve service is mainly due to the significant wage differences between workers of these ages. Also, since in the older age group of the reserve servants there is a high rate of parenting young children and since the wages of the spouses are higher, the impact on the spouses is also more significant compared to regular servants.
The Treasury stated that the economic cost resulting from future impact due to delay in studies and loss of experience in the labor market is higher for the regular servants. However, even after weighing this cost, the total economic cost for reserve servants is significantly higher than regular servants for both men and women.
The Treasury even referred to the possible effect of raising the exemption age from reserve service from age 40 to age 45. According to the chief economist's calculations, the economic cost in the 40-45 age group is particularly high, especially among men who make up the large majority among reserve servants. For this reason, raising the age of release from reserves could "lead to a disproportionate increase in the economic cost to the economy compared to the increase planned during the reserve days".
According to a study carried out by Dr. Sashon Hadad's team at INSS, given the current personnel situation of the IDF, starting in 2025, the defense system will be required to double the number of reserve days per year from 2 million to 4 million. This number could later decrease to 4 million if 2 more regular divisions are established.
The reserve service law memorandum proposed to double the maximum number of reserve days from an average of 18 days per year to 42 days for a soldier who is not an officer in a non-command position and from 23 days a year to 48 days for a soldier who is not an officer in a command position.
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