Israel - Russia Relations
It is no longer possible to view any measures taken by Russia in the Middle East in isolation from the war in Ukraine and Moscow’s military relations with Tehran. The Soviet Union recognized the State of Israel upon its declaration of independence in 1948. The Six Day War led to the severing of diplomatic and trade relations between the two countries, which were resumed 25 years later, in 1991, with the dissolution of the USSR. After the resumption of relations, the two countries signed agreements in many fields, including trade and health. Reciprocal visits by senior leaders included the 2012 visit to Israel by President Putin.
The position of an arbiter gave Russia both political leverage in the region and international prestige and for this reason, it would very much like to preserve the status quo of Israeli-Iranian tensions without open conflict.
By 2023 the Russian-Iranian relationship had reached levels of coordination and alliance, causing Israeli analysts to talk about confronting “an axis that includes Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and many other countries.” The crystallization of a new Russian vision for alliances against the backdrop of the worsening conflict with the West meant that Moscow gradually began to lose interest in establishing difficult balances such as those it had established since the arrival of its military forces in Syria.
The direct Russian involvement in the Syrian war in 2015 inaugurated a new, complex and very thorny phase in Russia-Israel relations. On the one hand, Russian circles continued to bet on “friendly” Tel Aviv to play an important role in easing Western pressures and reducing sanctions. But on the other hand, Russia has become a "neighbor" of Israel after consolidating its presence on the Mediterranean Sea and spreading its military bases on the territory of Syria, which carries a set of complications related primarily to the close relationship between Moscow and Tehran, and the fact that Russia now has direct interests in the Middle East region. It cannot be ignored in any political or military move.
It is true that Moscow and Tel Aviv had succeeded over the years, thanks to the close personal relations between Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in arranging understandings that guarantee the interests of both parties, the most prominent title of which was that Tel Aviv does not obstruct Russia’s movements in the region, in exchange for Moscow turning a blind eye to Israel’s directed steps to protect its interests and security requirements, such as air attacks against sites in Syria.
But relations faced major challenges more than once, including the difference in Russian and Israeli visions regarding the Iranian position in Syria, and scenarios for a final solution to the crisis in this country.
Relations entered a new turn after the 2022 outbreak of war in Ukraine, resulting in the largest and most violent shock in the history of relations, especially with the Israeli side’s tendency to direct unprecedented criticism at Moscow, which was accompanied by practical action to support Ukraine, represented by supplying it with some limited arms shipments and humanitarian aid. Broadly, as well as through the transfer of hundreds of trainers and special unit men who, according to reports, helped Kiev confront attacks by drones and other Russian or Iranian-made military technologies.
The delicate balance that Moscow had established for years in relations between Tel Aviv on the one hand and Tehran on the other had suffered a major crack. Strengthening the Russian-Iranian alliance represented the most prominent challenge facing the attempt to repair relations with Israel. Russian experts said that Israel has expanded its activities within the framework of providing Kiev with intelligence information to combat Iranian drones, and has begun considering providing it with advanced missile systems to confront air attacks.
Over a million Russian-speakers are in Israel as a human bridge between the two countries. The contributions are so immense: in government, as is evident, in every field of life. The presence of Jews from the former Soviet Union, Russian speakers, has changed Israel in ways that are profound and have helped secure Israel's future.
Russia and Israel have strong economic and cultural ties, given the significant population of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union. In 2019, Russian-Israeli trade reached $5bn, bringing Israel into the cohort of Russia’s main trade partners in the region.
Russia needs close coordination with Israel, which plays a significant role in determining security and political arrangements in the Levant (especially through its alliance with the US), to secure its positions in Syria. The stability of a Russian-backed regime in Damascus is contingent on Israel’s cooperation.
While not trusting Russian intentions toward Iran and Syria, the Israelis do see some utility in top-level Russian expressions of commitment to the security and well-being of Israel and especially the roughly two million Israelis who either emigrated from the former Soviet Union or were born in Israel to Soviet emigrant parents.
PM Netanyahu’s remarked at Russia Day celebration in Jerusalem, 14 June 2018, "We never forget the sacrifice of the Russian people and the Red Army in the defeat of the Nazi monster. We know that this was a decisive point in history, and we believe that it should be honored, as we honor it in the great monument that was erected in Netanya, in Israel, to commemorate this courage and the truth. We also know that 400,000, maybe more, Jews fought in the Russian army, in the Red Army.... This is why this year we decided to make Victory Day a national holiday in Israel."
On 23 January 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin travelled to Israel to attend the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp by Soviet forces. This was only his third official trip to the country since he became president in 2001 (he previously visited in 2005 and 2012). Just a week later, on January 30, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu travelled to Moscow to meet the Russian president. This was the fourth trip of the prime minister to Russia over the past year alone. He visited Putin ahead of the Israeli elections in April and September, hoping to boost his electoral chances.
By 2009 stopping the delivery of S-300 surface to air missiles to Iran remained a top Israeli objective and featured prominently in Liberman's discussions. Despite several high-level Israeli interventions, including during the visit to Moscow of former PM Olmert shortly before he left office, the Israeli sense was that the Russians intended to go ahead with delivery of the S-300s. In response to Liberman's comments on the destabilizing effect of the S-300s, the Russian response was that the S-300s are "only destabilizing if you are planning to attack Iran." The Israeli assessment is that fulfilling the contract for the sale of the S-300s is a matter of prestige to Russia. It may also be associated in the Russians' thinking with competition with the U.S. in that the Russians believe the S-300 to be superior to comparable U.S. systems.
Russia has been striking a balancing act between Israel and Iran in the region. By 2015, the Kremlin managed to make Iran and Israel accept the fact that Moscow is not going to choose between them while being equally ready to develop cooperation with both.
This policy has been repeatedly challenged by events surrounding the Syrian civil war, where Israel and Iran have come into direct confrontation. In the spring of 2018, Moscow managed to negotiate an informal agreement between the two countries which largely kept the Iranians and their proxies away from the Syrian-Israeli border in exchange for a halt to Israeli air raids against Iranian positions that did not threaten Israeli security directly.
Since then, the agreement had been violated by both sides repeatedly, but Russia has continued to put pressure on Iran and Israel to de-escalate. The Kremlin has threatened to leave the Iranian forces and proxies without Russian air support and warned Israel that if it continued its aggressive air raids against the Iranians beyond southern Syria, it will supply Damascus with additional air defence systems (S-300, TOR-M1 and etc).
When Russia launched its direct military intervention in Syria in September 2015, Israel welcomed it because it saw it as a way to contain Iran. The two countries reached a mutual understanding not to cross each other’s red lines. While Moscow conceded that Iranian proximity to Israeli borders may be undesirable as it could drag Israel into the Syrian war, Tel Aviv acknowledged the security of the Assad regime was not to be compromised.
On 17 September 2018, an incident involving Israeli F-16 jets resulted in the downing of a Russian reconnaissance plane, killing all 15 of its crew members. The Russian defence ministry accused Israel of being responsible for the tragic incident, saying that the Israeli fighter jets used the Russian aircraft as a shield when the Syrian air defence system started firing at them. It also claimed that Tel Aviv gave a one-minute warning before launching the operation and did not specify that it was going after a target in Latakia province, which is home to Russia’s Hmeimim airbase.
The Israeli government rejected the accusations and even sent a defence delegation to Russia to provide clarification. Its efforts, however, do not seem to have pacified the Russian defence ministry, which on September 24 announced that it was going to deploy a modern S-300 system to Syria. This could curb Israel’s ability to launch air operations in Syria and exacerbate further the already strained Russian-Israeli relations.
Israeli media reported 16 March 2024 that Israeli Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz summoned Moscow's ambassador to Tel Aviv, Anatoly Viktorov, to "reprimand" him, after a series of statements made by Russian officials against Israel. Israeli Channel 13 said that Katz summoned Moscow's ambassador to Israel to "reprimand" him at the Foreign Ministry headquarters in Jerusalem.
The channel indicated that the reason was a series of statements made by senior officials in Moscow against Israel. The Israeli channel added that Tel Aviv "also wants to rebuke the Russian ambassador, because his country does not call for the release of prisoners detained in Gaza," as it put it. There was no immediate comment from the Israeli or Russian authorities on what the Israeli channel reported.
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