Tribes Under Saddam
After the Baath Party came to power in 1968 they were opposed to tribal society and wanted not only to abolish the tribal names, reflecting the Ottoman style of naming people, but also to do away with these tribal structures altogether. However, the developments in the Middle East were not allowing them to reach their aim.
Following the 1968 Baathist coup, close family, clan, and tribal ties bound Iraq's ruling Sunni elite. Most notable in this regard was the emergence of Tikritis Sunni Arabs from the town of Tikrit northwest of Baghdad related to President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr. Saddam Hussein, a key leader behind the scenes, was a Tikriti and a relative of al Bakr. Since the mid-1970s, the Baathist regime's efforts to overcome Iraqi divisions and bring the various ethnic and religious communities under effective central control have included military campaigns against the Shia and Kurds, social and economic incentives, and the attempted creation of a unifying national ideology.
The Iraq government was a family enterprise. It was run by family members, tribal members, second cousins, their sons, their nephews. It is a tribal system that runs the country and family relations is the most sure to loyalty, in the system and a guarantor of having no coups, no assassinations from with. Anyone who was Tikriti was easily understood to be affiliated with the Baath regime and the state. Anyone who had a problem with a Tikriti would not receive proper protection from the state as he would in any other country. Individuals in disagreement with a Tikriti in Iraq certainly face severe retributions, and even death. Alternatively, if one was having a problem with the Barzani family in Northern Iraq or the Halabchei family heading the Islamic Movement, one will be persecuted, regardless of one's identity or political perspective.
Rather than eliminate the tribal sheik as a socio-political power, Saddam Hussein bought their loyalty. Throughout the 1990s, Baghdad explicitly encouraged the reconstruction of clans and tribal extended families where they existed. Tribal customs began to permeate the state's legal system. The tribal roots of Baath Party leaders were emphasized. Tribal honor has motivated foreign policy decisions. By moving his family and tribe to the capital city and making them its rulers, Saddam Hussein himself acted in classical tribal fashion.
The government also encouraged the manufacture of new "tribal" groups based on economic ties. These new "tribal" entities are predominantly based in the cities. Instead of the traditional guest houses, the leaders - who were in most cases middle class professionals - rented apartments to serve as centers of tribal social life. Some functions remain the same, however. The new tribes maintain order and settle disputes among their members and between members and other clans. Because of the corruption of state law enforcement agencies and courts, many Iraqis approached powerful and influential tribes to settle disputes or provide protection. This appeal for protection is taken as a measure of the strength and importance of the tribe to which the person appeals. Tribes therefore were careful to observe the custom.
For the impoverished tribes, military and government service was a respectable and profitable livelihood as well as a vehicle for upward mobility. Saddam Hussein also rewarded the villages of loyal tribesmen by providing roads, electricity, and water systems. Cooperating tribal leaders could rely on the government to provide jobs and perks to their members. In contrast, punishment for uncooperative sheiks ranged from the denial of jobs and perks to death. In the Kurdish regions, a policy of replacing uncooperative chiefs and splitting tribes was the key to the government's interaction with the rural Kurds during the 1980s. Tribal chiefs appointed by the regime mediated between the government and their communities, and fought against Kurdish nationalists represented by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
Because of a weakened economy and the severely reduced ability of the state to provide social services, many Iraqis increasingly turned to their tribes for support. The renewed alliance between state and tribe created a new symbiosis: the state advances the favored tribes and the favored tribes protect the state. In the late 1980s, this state-tribe alliance became official. The regime has continued to portray tribes as a symbol of patriotism, broadcasting popular forms of tribal war poetry and stressing tribal values. It has facilitated the re-establishment of tribal councils to supervise economic activities, resolve conflicts, and police the region. It also has armed the more loyal tribes throughout the country. The success of the regime's tribal policy was demonstrated when several Shia tribes remained on the sidelines or supported the regime during the 1991 uprising.
According to Judith Yaphe, "Baghdad through the 1990s encouraged the reconstruction of clans and tribal extended families where they existed. In other areas, the government al lowed the manufacture of new "tribal" groups based on economic ties or greed. Where the initiative was weak, Baghdad apparently encouraged prominent citizens to take the initiative or permitted non-leading families to manufacture an entity in order to gain power and wealth.... This has created a new symbiosis: the state advances the favored tribes and the favored tribes protect the state. The state benefits from its absorption of the tribes and the tribes use the state to enrich themselves."
After 1990 there were quite a high number of honor crimes in Iraq, which according to Iraqi law were not punishable. In Sulaymaniyah one woman's nose was cut in order to set an example. She was accused of having an immoral relationship which, however, was not proven. If a woman transgressed a social norm, e.g. by being with a man without marriage or eloping from her husband without permission of the family, the tribal law prescribes capital punishment for this behaviour. This punishment is tolerable according to the Iraqi criminal code. It should give the families the right to instruct their children ethically with the methods they choose, be it punishment at home, be it not letting their children attend a specific school. The result is a circle of social relations at home, with the brothers having superiority to the sisters and the father having superiority to the rest of the family. This pattern is reflected at district as well as government level.
Emphasizing the tribal structures as a ruling aspect was quite important as the Iraqi security system is under the umbrella of the National Security Council. The Council was headed by the President and conveneed in the presidential palace. When Saddam Hussein was not there, his son-in-law Ali Hassan Majid took over this function. Lately the ruling family leaders, i.e. Saddam Hussein and his brothers and half-brothers, met and decided that his son Qusay should replace him in all meetings or ceremonies where he is not present due to illness or other reasons. This provision is another indication that the tribal life was firmly incorporated in the daily decision-making process in Iraq. The same applies to the KDP where it has already been decided who is going to replace Massud Barzani, should anything happen to him. They are working on this individual to promote him like a prince.
In a passport one would usually find three names: the name of the person, the name of their father, the name of the grandfather. However, the actual surname, which is the indication of the tribe or region one belongs to, was not written in the passport. The Iraqi government came up with this deliberate policy in order to not identify the area or tribe a person comes from for security reasons. This practice was partly a protection for the individual. If somebody is e.g. called a Tikriti, it is easy to know that they are part of the ruling family which may expose them to particular security risks.
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