Iran - World War III.2
Iran is conducting a “second front” with the West in the Middle East through its proxy forces. The Yemenis are showing the US that their warships are vulnerable, as are their drones and cables. This, as the Western media like to say, is a signal to Washington that there is no need to cross the “red line” in Ukraine - “we can repeat it.” And the US is not crossing it.
The era of US leadership has passed and cooperation between Russia and Iran in the development of a multipolar world will contribute to improving global security, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated 05 August 2024 at a meeting with Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu in Tehran, Iran. "Russia is among the countries that support the Iranian nation in difficult times,” Pezeshkian said. “The development of relations with this strategic partner is one of the priorities of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he added. “It is necessary to accelerate the implementation of the agreements concluded between the two countries."
Washington and Kyiv accused Tehran of supplying Moscow with drones that were used in deadly attacks across Ukraine – allegations Iran has denied. In October 2022, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Iranian personnel were “directly engaged on the ground” in Crimea to help train Russian forces on the use of drones. Iranian military equipment in the form of kamikaze drones helped the Russian Federation during the most difficult period of hostilities - when it was not available in the Russian Armed Forces, but was already used in huge quantities by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Iran clearly knows that Russia will always support it in the UN Security Council in its confrontation with Israel. Iran, the Russian Federation built a nuclear power plant in Bushehr - Iran has become a nuclear power, and, as they say, is not far from creating its own nuclear shield.
Yuri Lyamin, expert on the army and military-industrial complex of Iran noted in December 2023 that during the SVO, it became clear that the Iranian military-industrial complex was in many ways more prepared for such a war than the military-industrial complex of a number of other countries. The development of the Iranian military-industrial complex in recent decades has been largely determined by the lessons learned from the eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s and the threat of war with superior forces of the United States and American allies in the region. Therefore, unlike many other countries, Iran has never forgotten that a major war can begin at any moment, this war can be very long and one can only fully rely on one's own forces against much richer opponents.
Thus, the Iranian military-industrial complex identified a number of priority areas to which the main resources are directed, such as all kinds of missile systems, rocket artillery, UAVs, air defense systems, the production of various artillery and engineering ammunition, torpedoes and sea mines, etc. At the same time, an important factor for most of the products of the Iranian military-industrial complex is the possibility of its mass and relatively inexpensive production. Often, more expensive and complex weapons can be created on the edge of technologies available to the Iranian military-industrial complex and at the same time their much cheaper and simpler analogues, where various components available in large quantities on the world market of civilian products and their Iranian copies can be used.
Basically, speaking about Iranian defense products, there is a certain "popular list". Indeed, the range of UAVs and missile systems produced by Iran is very wide and they offer systems of various ranges and power for export. We will not dwell separately on those systems that everyone and their dog has been writing about for a long time. This goes without saying.
Iran has many other interesting weapons, but less well-known. Among the relatively new, but already serially produced and offered for export missile systems, one can highlight the Fath-360 family of missile systems standing at the junction between large-caliber MLRS and OTRK, a classic representative of which can be called a complex that is offered for export under the name BM-120 and has a range of up to 120 km. The BM-120 launcher carries 6 guided missiles in transport and launch containers, and missiles with three types of warheads - high-explosive, fragmentation and penetrating - are offered for export. Iran also produces the 333 mm Fajr-5 MLRS with unguided and guided rockets Fajr-5C, as well as a guided version of the 122 mm rockets.
A very interesting means of direct infantry support in Iran are the universalLaunchers on the chassis of army SUVs for 107-mm Fajr-1, 240-mm Falagh-1 and 333-mm Falagh-2 rockets. Falagh-1 and Falagh-2 are heavy rockets developed in Iran based on the experience of the Iran-Iraq war with a range of up to 10-11 km and a powerful warhead designed to destroy enemy fortifications and urban development. Moreover, in 2022, a guided version of the 333-mm Falagh-2 rocket was presented for high-precision destruction of such targets, which has a maximum range of up to 11 km and a warhead weighing 110 kg.
Or as another example, the Iranian military-industrial complex is now producing and offering for export a new generation of ATGMs of the Almas family, which are an analogue of the Israeli ATGMs of the Spike family. The combined control system allows both launches on the "fire and forget" principle and retargeting the missile after launch, etc. The range of the light portable version of the ATGM - Almas-1 is up to 4 km. There are heavier missiles for installation on UAVs.
Iran realizes that it is no match for the United States of America and its allies, but it seeks to expand its influence so that it can gain the necessary equality in international relations. According to the popular description, she prefers to “boil the frog in cold water instead of putting it in a boiling pot.” Iran seeks to be a strong regional state that represents the premier economic, scientific, and technical center in Southwest Asia (including Iran's regional neighborhood in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East regions).
Therefore, starting in 1989, its frantic effort to export the revolution will subside and be replaced by preserving its gains. That is, working more with the logic of the nation-state. Iran today defines itself as a Persian nation-state with a Twelver Shiite doctrine, and is maneuvering within the squares of the international system to expand its presence by adopting the theory of “asymmetric warfare.”
It is not feasible to accumulate a conventional force from a regular army that is required to confront and defeat the armies of opponents, as this is a process that requires a lot of time, resources and allies, and carries with it great possibilities of loss, especially since the Iranians have in their memory a regular war that lasted for 8 years with Iraq, in which they accumulated a lot of experience.
All this early and violent experience of the young revolution made it quickly learn that revolutionary slogans are suitable for attracting followers and mobilizing the masses, but they will not always address the huge difference between the balance of power, especially if the project is based on revitalizing a minority group for which the danger of its extinction will be an inherent concern.
Therefore, Iran will later avoid any possibilities of a zero-sum war, and therefore the task of accumulating power will then serve to avoid war, and to achieve goals at the lowest costs and far from its territory, presenting itself as a strong party with which an understanding can be reached at a time when it can harm lightly. By the way, combining rationality with a touch of rebellion against the international system is a game that the Iranians have mastered. They have a suit for every arena and every context. The most dangerous thing about accumulating deterrence power is that you are deterred by the fear of losing it.
In more than one official statement, Iran expressed its blessing for the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, which was launched by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) against Israel. The most prominent of these statements was what was stated by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei , but at the same time he denied the existence of any connection to Tehran. This is what Iranian officials have continued to repeat.
Contrary to what was published by the Wall Street Journal, which stated that Iranian security officials directly helped plan the flood attack, the United States went on to say that it does not have any evidence indicating that Iran is complicit in the attack. This is what US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken expressed by saying, “Iran and Hamas have a long relationship... Hamas would not have become this way without the support it received for many years from Iran,” but he added, “We have not yet seen evidence that Iran specifically managed this attack.” Or was she behind him?
America has no information to implicate Iran or even an intention to involve it in a regional war. It has enough concerns; The Chinese challenge is knocking on the doors of global hegemony and is about to be opened to it. On the other hand, the Iranians have no desire to get involved in a wide and direct war with the major powers, and their eyes are on the American aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, which came sailing in the eastern Mediterranean to impose deterrence, and they are fully aware that they came to deter them, in addition to this. About dozens of American bases spread across our Arab countries, keen to intervene if Iran violates the established rules of engagement.
But what must be realized is that the goal of avoiding war, if it is exaggerated, may become its most important cause, and history tells us that when British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned to his homeland after concluding the “Munich” Treaty with Hitler, and announced the achievement of “peace in our time,” he had already Hitler encouraged his attack.
Iran is aware of this, and therefore it does not want to appear weak, as the next target may be its arm in southern Lebanon and the front of its war. A report by the Israeli Channel 12 stated, last Saturday evening, December 23, that behind-the-scenes negotiations are being conducted by several countries with the aim of... Removing Hezbollah forces from the Israeli-Lebanese border.
The most prominent points discussed, according to the Israeli channel’s report, are: pushing Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River, introducing an international force into the Shebaa Farms areas and north of the village of Ghajar, and accepting the appointment of a new president for Lebanon and a new commander of the Lebanese army. The Iranian axis moved from all its locations in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, according to limited rules of engagement that do not lead to uncalculated escalation. At the same time, he sent a message about the “unity of the squares” and their simultaneous movement in defense of each other.
These limited steps, especially on the northern Lebanese front and in Yemen, created some feeling that the Palestinian resistance would not be left alone. However, these steps - despite their importance in the absence of others - did not reach the point in which they would deter "Israel" or curb its aggression against the Gaza Strip.
The speech by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah removed the ambiguity - which was useful - about the party’s position, setting specific rules to reassure everyone - except for the resistance in Gaza - that war is far away. Thus, the high human cost in the Gaza Strip was not an incentive for the “axis” to develop its method of intervention, as the number of martyrs exceeded 25 thousand.
Thus, Iran turned its calculated intervention into a message box for several parties. On the one hand, it continued to express the limits of its axis and influence and move in harmony, and at the same time it proved to the international system that it is a party that enjoys the rationality of modern states and offers balanced calculations over adventures. On the other hand, Hezbollah occupied part of the Israeli army on the northern front, evacuated many Israeli settlements in northern occupied Palestine, and besieged Israel in the Red Sea.
The Houthi interventions allowed it to bypass its territorial waters and reach the Indian coast, increasing its ability to deter other opponents. Thus, it laid out many papers that could be negotiated later, and then sent a message of censure to the resistance in Gaza for being the only one to decide the battle. The "Al-Aqsa Flood" battle was not carried out by Iran, nor was it in its style, despite the fact that statements a year before the operation had indicated the necessity of an operation of this kind and pledged serious intervention if it took place.
In an interview conducted in August 2022 and published on the Al-Murshid website, the head of the Revolutionary Guard, Hussein Salami, said, “The Palestinians are ready today for ground war, and Israel’s greatest weakness is ground war, and fighting with missiles is not the main point in the conflict, and they They know that the lands must be liberated with ground forces, and the outcome of the battle will be determined when the struggle is on the ground, and the brave, experienced sons of Hezbollah and Palestine will move on the ground in one military formation.”
Contrary to what is rumored that the Al-Aqsa Flood operation came at an appropriate time for the Iranians, as it disrupted the upcoming process of normalization, it also disrupted some recovery in the process of Iranian-American understanding. Two months before the flood, it seemed that the Iranians were on the verge of breaking the deadlock that prevailed in the understandings with Washington. The agreement to free the five prisoners and free $6 billion for Iran, which had been frozen in South Korea, represented a new hope for the Iranians in dismantling the economic blockade imposed on them.
During the same period, Iranian oil exports witnessed high production levels, according to Kpler, a provider of oil shipment flow data. According to the company itself, Iranian exports exceeded 1.5 million barrels per day in May 2023, which is their highest monthly level since 2018, the year in which President Donald Trump canceled the nuclear agreement.
Experts say that this comes within America's desire to avoid rising oil prices ahead of the US elections, but it also indicates a desire to revive understandings with the Iranians. Recently, Hezbollah agreed to demarcate the maritime borders with Israel, which are the stolen shares of Palestine, and under the supervision of the American envoy of Israeli origin, Amos Hockstein, the demarcation and understanding process is taking place, which was preceded by a verbal escalation. The party is also experiencing a local environment on the verge of collapse, and it will not risk displacing its incubator in circumstances like these.
The “liberation of Jerusalem” speech formed one of the ideological components of the Iranian revolution and after it the state’s stabilization phase. This position was the basis of Khomeini’s criticism of the Shah’s rule. The position on the Palestine issue is considered a necessary credential for anyone who raises the slogan of resistance in the general conscience of the Arab and Islamic peoples. In addition to that, Israel is also Iran's real regional competitor. Israel presents itself as the guardian of the Gulf states from the Iranian threat, and the advanced base for the West in limiting Iranian influence, while Iran presents itself as the guardian of the flame of resistance and the owner of a serious project in confronting Israeli influence, but nevertheless it avoids a direct clash with it, and prefers to besiege its expansion. And preoccupation with supporting Palestinian factions.
Early and since the Iranian revolution, the relationship between Iran and the Palestinian resistance began through the PLO, and Hamas later built on that. In 1990, the movement was invited to attend a conference in Tehran to support the first uprising, and in 1991, it opened an office in Tehran, but the actual development in the relationship began after 2006, that is, after the movement’s victory in the elections, and what that meant for Iran, such as Other forces, including the presence and public support for Hamas.
After the outbreak of the revolution in Syria in 2011, the relationship suffered a serious cooling, after Hamas decided to leave Syria and stand by the revolution against the regime, which was supported by Iran. Iran saw Hamas' position as a departure from the "axis", but it also demonstrated that the movement was not an arm affiliated with the Iranian project, but rather enjoyed equality in dealing with it as an ally with its own interests and calculations.
These years of apathy did not last long. After 2014 and the setback of the Arab revolutions, the relationship between Iran and Hamas returned to its vitality. With the outbreak of the “ Devouring Storm ” battle, which the resistance fought in response to the Israeli occupation’s aggression against Gaza, it appeared that the resistance’s capabilities are constantly developing, which means it is entering into paths of local manufacturing, without complete dependence on Iranian support, which is evident during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle this year.
Hamas sought to restore relations with Iran. Because it is the only country that extended a supportive hand to it with money, weapons, and expertise, while the siege was imposed on it from various Arab and Islamic countries, especially its neighbors. In one of the interviews with Osama Hamdan, a member of the political bureau of Hamas and its representative in Lebanon, he answered when asked about the relationship with Iran: “Yes, we receive support from Iran, and the fault is that others do not provide support... That whoever supports the Palestinians becomes condemned, and whoever accepts support from the Palestinians becomes condemned.” Convicted, this is the last wonder of the world. Convicted is one who does not support the cause.”
However, this support and acceptance did not mean for Hamas a dissolution of the Iranian project and its alliances, as the movement continued to take a distance that would qualify it to take a position in support of the right of peoples to be liberated from tyranny, and at the same time focus on defending its society for which it is responsible without interfering in the conflicts of the region.
This was stated by officials in the movement, as Osama Hamdan said in his article entitled “International Relations of the Hamas Movement”: “The movement has always been keen on the independence of its decisions despite its affiliation to the nation, and it has rejected subordination in any of its political relations, and the movement has always refused to be under the wing of A party or team, regardless of the state of harmony, consensus, and good relations. The movement also refused to build any form of relations on the basis of its political exploitation or its performance in favor of agendas that may conflict with its principles, or with the interests of the nation, or with a general human interest.
As for Khaled Al-Qadoumi, Hamas’ representative in Tehran, he said: “The Iranians have never stipulated any conditions of their own in exchange for supporting Hamas, and Iran knows that if they had stipulated, Hamas would not have accepted that.” Regarding the position of the Hamas movement within the Iranian defense system and whether it is part of it, the Revolutionary Guard answered the question of the researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, Fatima Al-Sammadi: “Our decision is to defend Hamas, and if the battle with Iran occurs, it is certain that Hezbollah will participate and the Popular Mobilization Forces will participate, as well as supporters.” God and the Zainabiyoun, and it is a defensive strategy that we have built.”
The Guard continues his answer, “As for Hamas, it is enough for it to fight Israel, and it is not required to fight on behalf of Iran if we are attacked. The only battle that Hamas is expected to fight is the war with Israel in the Palestinian arena and to liberate the occupied Palestinian territories, not in any other arena.” There is only one enemy, which is Israel."
In fact, these answers on the part of the Guard and the movement, as much as they emphasize the movement’s independence from the Iranian project and place the alliance between them within the framework of the strategic alliance based on the unity of the enemy, they place the movement in a lower degree of importance for the Iranian project, which helps explain the discipline of the movement. Rules of engagement in the Axis’ intervention in the confrontation.
It is true that an open regional battle is a goal that no one seeks, but expanding the clash to the point that pressures Israel, threatens it, and pushes it to curb its aggression, is a matter that can still be achieved, and although that carries a real adventure, this is what distinguishes military confrontations, and it is what the ally pays for. Yes, his ally in times of crisis.
Iran provided assistance to Assad with 70,000 fighters, and mobilized thousands in Iraq to confront the “Islamic State” organization. This is the actual meaning of “unity of the battlefields,” as it has two meanings: the real, which we saw in Syria and Iraq, and the symbolic, representative, which we witnessed in The relationship with the resistance in Gaza.
It is useful to know the way Iran thinks, to understand the nature of its project, and to follow the development of its expansion, especially the exceptional role played by the “Quds Force” from the time of its founding to be a body parallel to the army and capable of performing external roles, through the fall of Iraq. The golden moment that contributed to the expansion of his influence, leading to the exceptional plan of 2011, which represented an opportunity to expand influence in Syria and Yemen and strengthen the relationship with various arenas.
The emergence of the Revolutionary Guard and the “Quds Force” goes back to the beginning of the Iranian Revolution’s experience, and the mission was primarily to confront internal challenges. The army was not trusted by the revolution due to its connection to the previous era, and the importance of forming a committee for asymmetric wars was raised early, especially after the Kurdistan War and the Iran-Iraq War.
By 1989, the Quds Force was the merger of several Iranian organizations, carrying out similar tasks within the framework of reorganizing the armed forces, and Ahmed Vahidi assumed leadership of the Corps during the period between 1989 and 1998.
The idea of establishing a body for external special operations or for training militias and external intervention was not something new to the security traditions of the pre-revolutionary Iranian state. Rather, it was an approach that fell within several trends that the Iranian revolution inherited and developed as a continuation of the traditions of the nation-state since the 1960s, especially support for external militias. Examples of this include: Iran’s support for the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq (1961-1974), participation in the suppression of the Dhofar Revolution in Oman (1972-1979), and others.
Opposition to the presence of foreign powers militarily in the Gulf region constituted a long-standing determinant of the Iranian state, in addition to the development of nuclear and missile programs that began before the revolution. These are all basic determinants of the state in Iran that preceded the Khomeini revolution , and their continuity was maintained after the revolution, as Iranian affairs experts see.
It is useful to realize this for the battle of continuity that modern nation-states face, regardless of the nature of the rulers’ propaganda and ideology, although this ideology, of course, has its central and important role.
The first major opportunity for the Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon was evident in 1982, when officers of the Revolutionary Guards were working hard to establish Hezbollah, and in cooperation with Imad Mughniyeh, they established the Special Security Service, which is the wing of Hezbollah responsible for coordination with the Quds Force. The device that will carry out many operations against the American embassy and American and French military barracks. This reflects the Guard's readiness to constantly invest in opportunities and its high readiness to take advantage of chaos.
Iran severed diplomatic relations with America in 1980, after taking American diplomats in Tehran hostage. However, starting on September 11, the Iranians showed cooperation with the Americans in striking their common enemy, the Taliban. Ryan Crocker, a senior State Department official, was not surprised to find that Soleimani was flexible in coordinating with them. “You don't go through eight years of brutal war without being somewhat pragmatic,” he said.
According to Dexter Filkins, author of the article “The Shadow General” in the American “New Yorker” magazine, cooperation between the two countries continued during the first phase of the war. At one point, Iran's chief negotiator handed Crocker a map detailing Taliban troop movements: “Here's our advice: Hit them here first, then hit them here…” “Can I take notes?” Crocker asked, surprised. “You can keep the map,” the negotiator replied. This form of coordination reflected Iran's ability to challenge the international system, to come to an understanding with it if interests coincide, and even to talk to the "Great Satan" if necessary.
But the “Great Satan” in January 2002, at the hands of President George W. Bush, placed Iran on an equal footing with what he called the “axis of evil” countries. This was a disappointment to the Iranians, and thus closed the door on the secret communications that witnessed the beginning of the war on Afghanistan.
Qassem Soleimani assumed command of the Corps between 1998 and 2020, and contributed to its qualitative shift. He was seen in Syria, Iraq, and everywhere he needed his presence. During his tenure, the Legion was no longer just an organization for secret operations, but rather made it a popular mobilization force capable of attracting broad, non-religious groups united by Shiite identity or self-interested desire, so that they owed loyalty or interest to the central project in Iran.
The Legion has become a dominant force that manages crises, intervenes in them, and participates in the political process as well. These networks are linked to its charismatic and proactive personality, which succeeded in exploiting opportunities and capabilities and mastered the use of soft and hard forces in their appropriate places, mixed with revolutionary ideological discourse, but accompanied by a pragmatic sense that operates within... Rules of national politics. We must always remember that pragmatism does not mean abandoning principles as is rumored, but rather here it means adhering to principles but with other tools.
Soleimani was able to build a comprehensive structure for the Corps in Afghanistan, Africa, Central Asia, Iraq, Lebanon, Latin America, and the Arabian Peninsula, and established nearly 20 training camps in Iran, in addition to camps in Lebanon, and finally in Sudan, and created a logistical network specialized in managing secret weapons shipments at the international level.
According to the author of the “Shadow General” article, “The Legion has become an organization of extraordinary reach, with branches focusing on intelligence, finance, politics, sabotage, and special operations. With a base in the former US Embassy compound in Tehran, the force has between ten and twenty thousand members, divided between fighters and those who train and supervise foreign assets.
During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Iranians learned the two most important lessons in their national security theory: 1- The necessary awareness of the nature of the future and its irregular warfare. 2- The urgent desire for a weak Iraq to be a gateway to expansion in the region. This is something that is agreed upon among the various Iranian political factions.
For Iran, the war with Iraq was the beginning of a three-decade project to build a Persian Shiite zone of influence extending across Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean, challenging Western influence and its Arab regimes, and any Sunni Arab component that is on its way to being formed or in the process of assuming power.
On March 19, 2003, American cruise missiles were irreversibly destroying the gate to Iraq, the gate whose breaking would later lead to the start of the era of Iranian expansion. In three weeks, the regime that had exhausted Iran in the eight-year war was over. The Iranians were watching this with concern, and in order to avoid a high wave of American anger, on May 4, 2003, they presented a memorandum and road map to the Americans, through the Swiss Ambassador Tim Goldman in Tehran, in which Iran agreed to complete transparency regarding its nuclear program, and to stop its support for Hamas. And take measures that lead to the disarmament of Hezbollah.
In return, the Iranians wanted the United States to stop trying to change their political system, hand over members of the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran, and recognize Iran's "legitimate security interests in the region." They wanted a statement that Iran was not part of the “axis of evil,” according to what the ambassador said in an interview with David Crist, author of the book “The Twilight War.”
It is unknown whether Iran was serious about this initiative or whether it was a diplomatic method for preoccupation and making the major powers feel that they could reach an agreement with them. America sent Crocker to Baghdad to organize an emerging government called the "Iraqi Governing Council." At the time when the Iraqi resistance began, which was concentrated in the Sunni areas, the US army focused most of its attention on combating the Sunni insurgency, and avoiding provoking Iran and its militias as much as possible.
Iraqi politicians who agreed to work with the occupation always consulted with Soleimani, and the two men, Crocker and Soleimani, agreed, indirectly, on potential Shiite candidates. Crocker points out that “the formation of the Governing Council was essentially a negotiation between Tehran and Washington.” Iran wanted America's victory over Iraq, but it did not want it to be a victory that would pose a threat to it and would lose its opportunity to influence the neighboring country. Starting in 2004, Iranian mines and the “Mahdi Army” - the Shiite militias affiliated with Muqtada al-Sadr - were inflicting losses on the Americans, unlike the “Badr Brigade”, which devoted itself to a revenge campaign against the Baathists.
These two policies formed the essence of Iranian intervention: 1- De-Baathification and the Sunni presence with it, which will later be expressed in the “de-Baathification” law during the Maliki period and will be expanded to include all potential Sunni rivals, and 2- Understanding with the Americans at times, and harming them at times. Other.
In early 2008, David Petraeus, the commander of US forces, was listening to Soleimani’s message, which read: “Dear General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qasem Soleimani, control Iran’s policy with regard to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan.” Indeed, the ambassador in Baghdad is a member of the Quds Force, and the person who will replace him is a member of the Quds Force as well.
By 2011, Iran had tightened its control over Iraq and built a comprehensive political and military force there, in front of the eyes of approximately 200,000 American soldiers. Although the ruling regime in Iran has constantly tried to show flexibility, and sometimes compatibility, with the international system, as in the Second Gulf War (1990-1991) and the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the nuclear issue, support for the resistance, and the position on “Israel” remained. Disputed.
This is in addition to the Americans’ desire to limit Iranian expansion, not eliminate it, as the Iranian threat guarantees the Gulf’s continued need for America. Starting in 2007, the Revolutionary Guard and the Quds Force were placed on terrorist lists, and the relationship with America continued to vary according to the residents of the White House, between economic sanctions and containment through understandings.
In the midst of all this, Iran demonstrated and demonstrated to the international system that it is a strong and frightening regional party, but at the same time one can reach an understanding with it. Iran would not allow the bridge between it and Hezbollah to fall, as Soleimani was personally supervising the management of the battle to save Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The battle of Qusayr (the city that is the entrance to the Bekaa, Hezbollah's stronghold), marked the most prominent beginning of this intervention.
By May 2014, the “Popular Army,” consisting of Iranian-backed militias, with a strength of seventy thousand fighters, arrived in Syria, according to what a Revolutionary Guard official said. Iran found the fall of the Assad regime a strategic threat to its project, and a blow to Hezbollah’s supply line. Its advanced spear threatens Israel.
The Iranians and their allies fought for many years to prevent the fall of the Assad regime, just as they moved to establish the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq to prevent the fall of the Iraqi regime. The rapid collapse of the Iraqi army in Mosul in front of ISIS fighters on June 10, 2014, constituted a source of real danger to Shiite control in Iraq, so Al-Sistani, the highest Shiite authority, issued the fatwa “Sufficient Jihad”, following which the Popular Mobilization Forces were formed.
In Yemen, the Houthis , who received Iranian training and arming, were able to control the capital, Sanaa. At the end of 2014, Iran sought to develop its network of influence, threaten the southern Saudi depth, and position itself in the waterways of the Gulf.
This scale of going into military options and defending the borders of influence gives a strong impression of Iran’s seriousness in building its network of influence in the region, and it does not hesitate to intervene with all its might when the issue relates to the interest of its project, and estimating the size of the intervention depends on the size of the interest resulting from saving the ally and the nature of his affiliation. Its ideological and nature of the opponent it faces, its political expansion cannot be separated from its Shiite component, and its ability to stimulate a sense of danger among the Arab Shiite minority and link their interests to the interests of its project.
“Shiism” has been Iran’s means of expanding, but it is also one of its goals. In fact, misunderstanding will remain in our political consciousness as long as we inherit secular analytical tools that view beliefs only as tools that work in the service of national rational interests. However, there is a degree of Overlapping makes it impossible to distinguish between what is self-interested and what is religious as separate fields. Doctrine is sufficient to arrange interests, and interests cannot be built upon except by taking into account the doctrine that provided them with their legitimacy.
In this way, the Persian component of the Iranian state can be understood. The component that dictates to the state its foundations and view of security, and also inherits its culture. It is not surprising that the glorification of the memory of Cyrus began during the era of Ahmadinejad, who is known for his adherence to the Shiite component of politics. In conclusion, Iran, like any nation-state, invests all its internal resources to make it elements of power, and then it is no longer possible to distinguish between tools and goals when they are organized in one direction.
It can be said that there is a strategic partnership that unites the Iranian axis with Hamas, and it is even part of it, in the political sense, but it differs with it in the doctrinal component, and is independent of it in political and military decisions, which is what the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle revealed, and it does not agree with it in its projects in the region. This was revealed at the moment of leaving Syria, regardless of the exaggerated statements that were issued later.
All of this makes Hamas occupy a lower rank within the slogan of “unity of the arenas,” compared to the other arenas: Syria and Lebanon, as these are projects that are organically, ideologically, and interests-related to the Iranian project, regardless of their degrees of independence and ability to move and take initiative. The event is still taking place, and it is not possible to say with certainty how it will develop, but in its current form it is sufficient to imagine the form and nature of the alliance.
What is important to realize is that the alliance between Hamas and Iran comes in the absence of any other Arab or Muslim support in the military and political issue. On the contrary, many Arab regimes conspire against the Palestinian resistance and hope to eliminate it. Once again, the Iranian project is expanding in every area in which it can expand, exploiting and developing opportunities.
The Iranian ambassador to the United Nations categorically refuted the accusation of Iran’s involvement in the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In a letter to President of the UN Security Council Yamazaki Kazuyuki on 01 Mrch 2024, Saeed Iravani categorically rejected the “unfounded allegations leveled against the Islamic Republic of Iran in the joint statements delivered by the Permanent Representative and the Foreign Minister of Ukraine.”
The Iranian envoy said Ukraine has “erroneously claimed Iran was providing military support to the Russian Federation in the Ukraine crisis, in contravention of UNSC Resolution 2231.”
“The Islamic Republic of Iran has constantly taken a stance of impartiality since the outset of the Ukraine conflict and this principled position remains unchanged. Furthermore, Iran has consistently advocated for peace and the immediate cessation of hostilities in Ukraine and continues to do so,” Iravani underlined.
“Therefore, any claim regarding Iran’s involvement in the sale, export, or transfer of arms in contravention of its international obligations and UNSC Resolution 2231 is completely unfounded and categorically rejected. Iran once more reaffirms its unwavering commitment to adhering to international humanitarian law,” he stated.
“I would also like to take this opportunity to reject the identical allegation and inappropriate reference made against my country in a joint statement delivered by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in connection with the Security Council briefing on 10 January 2024 under the agenda item entitled ‘Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine’,” the ambassador added.
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