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Iran Security Doctrine

By mid-2020, IRGC was in command of the legislature, the judiciary, the intelligence and security apparatus as well as the economy and financial institutions. The supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has appointed hard core IRGC members as heads of each power centre and tasked them with the full implementation of 'Phase Two' of the Revolution. The doctrine, compiled after the killing of Gen. Soleimani, called for “a push towards defeating the enemy, the US,” and for “extensive sacrifice to preserve the ruling order.” Arguing in several right-wing publications, IRGC strategists are asking for a more confrontational approach towards the US. They recommend shifting closer towards Russia and China and strengthening the 25-year Cooperation Agreement with China which extends military and economic cooperation.

The decision on major issues is not made by one person, or a particular group; no body and no institution, in real world, has such authority. Second, Iran’s deacons on key issues are made through consensus. Iran’s defense and security policies and decision-making are articulated by and developed in a composite of complex processes. A number of formal institutions, informal networks, personal relationships, and individual initiatives play a role in the formation of Iranian policy. From the outside, it may seem very chaotic and it is often difficult for outsiders to know who makes what decisions and how. However, the output of the system is consensually based.

While the consensually driven process provides policy stability, it nevertheless makes reaching decisions more difficult and arduous. On major national security decision, while the elites have been too eager to factionalize and politicize the issues including relations with the US, but at the end great decisions are made through consensus. A consensus that is borne out of a painstaking process of giveand-take, public and private maneuvering, and at the end a “democratic’ process in its own context, within a maze of incredibly complex labyrinth of interest groups and factions. The conservatives have significant power, but their rhetoric is both checked by their own sense of reality and serious challenge within their own ranks, and by the reformers.

Former deputy for foreign policy affairs at Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Hossein Mousavian, suggested 09 November 2024 that the Israeli aggression on Gaza and Lebanon portended a long-term regional war between Tehran and Tel Aviv that could lead to a change in the Islamic Republic's national security doctrine and the political landscape in the region. In an article titled “The Impact of Trump’s Victory on Iran’s National Security Strategy” in the Persian-language Etemad newspaper, Mousavian wrote that Israel’s devastating wars in Gaza and Lebanon, along with the cycle of confrontations between Tehran and Israel, have pushed the Middle East toward explosion and increased the chances of a comprehensive regional confrontation.

In his opinion, US President-elect Donald Trump is returning to the White House while Iran is on the verge of changing its national security doctrine for the third time since the victory of its revolution in 1979, explaining that there are developments that have led it to make fundamental changes in its doctrine.

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) was a turning point in Tehran’s national security doctrine, according to Mousavian. The “young” Islamic Republic was subjected to international sanctions at the time, while Iraq , “the party that used chemical weapons,” enjoyed regional and international support, as he put it. The developments of this war prompted Tehran to adopt a strategy of "self-sufficiency in the defense field" and give priority to military industries, including ballistic missiles, in addition to moving towards strengthening deterrence outside the borders. The experiences his country gained during the 8-year war, along with the Western sanctions and pressures aimed at changing the regime in Tehran, led it to support the resistance factions in Lebanon, Gaza and Yemen in an effort to strengthen its strategic depth.

The second change in Iran's national security strategy came in response to former US President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018, despite Tehran's commitment to all of its commitments in it. Tehran responded to the return of US sanctions and the imposition of a new package on it by strengthening its nuclear program, raising the level of uranium enrichment, and adopting a policy of moving towards the Eastern powers, until it completed its membership in some international organizations such as Shanghai and BRICS .

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's position on negotiating with the United States following its withdrawal from the nuclear deal, adopted a "no war, no negotiations" policy toward Washington and Western powers over the past few years. Four months after Trump's withdrawal from the agreement, Khamenei confirmed that "there will be no war or negotiations with the United States because of its failure to abide by its commitments," adding, "Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that we will hold negotiations with America, they will not be with the current administration."

Mousavian believes that in light of the ongoing Israeli aggression with a green light from Washington and NATO on Lebanon and Gaza, and Israel’s persistence in carrying out assassinations against leaders of Hezbollah , the Islamic Resistance Movement ( Hamas ), and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard , the ground has become ready for Tehran to change its national security doctrine based on the following six elements:

1. NATO has become an enemy: In light of the alliance providing Israel with all kinds of weapons to attack both Gaza and Lebanon on the one hand, and its demand for Tehran to exercise restraint on the other hand, Iran sees its alignment with the aggressor as an enemy.
2. The issue of nuclear deterrence: Opinion polls show that 70% of Iranians support their country becoming a nuclear power under the threat of direct military action by Israel and NATO.
3. Strengthening the capabilities of the resistance axis: After the Israeli assassinations and the security influence in the security services affiliated with Iran and its allies in the resistance axis, reforms and restructuring of the security and administrative services are likely during the next stage.
4. Alliance with Eastern Powers: NATO’s military support for Israel may push Tehran to form a long-term military alliance with Eastern powers based on its current cooperation with Beijing and Moscow.
5. Access to modern air systems: Despite Tehran’s achievements in its missile program, it needs to enhance its defensive capabilities to confront Israeli missiles and American F-35 fighters , and this may be achieved by obtaining Russian Sukhoi 35 fighters and S-400 systems .
6. Changing the previous “no war, no negotiations” strategy to a “war and peace” strategy: Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed that his country does not want to escalate tensions and war, but it does not fear it and that it is prepared for all possibilities. Thus, Tehran will be ready for war, just as it is ready for peace.

Mousavian believes that the continuation of the Israeli aggression threatens to lead to the outbreak of a comprehensive regional war in which Washington, Israel and Iran may be the biggest losers. He sees diplomacy as the only option to prevent the region from slipping into a phase in which it is difficult to contain tension. He presents a four-step vision that would enable Trump to put an end to the cycle of tension in the Middle East, as follows: