The Fleet Air Arm - Falklands
The Falkland Islands conflict included the first truly naval confrontation since the Pacific conflict in World War II. The Argentine assault on the Falkland Islands occurred on 02 April 1982. Three days later, a British Task Force, including the aircraft carriers HMS INVINCIBLE and HMS HERMES and 1,300 Royal Marines, deployed from Portsmouth, England. The Falklands lie 7,100 miles southwest of the U.K. and over 3,300 miles from Ascension Island, but only 400 miles from the Argentine coast. British troops began a heavy attack against Argentine positions, and on 14 June 1982 Argentine forces surrendered.
Britain executed the exact type of operation that they had previously determined to be both unnecessary and unfeasible. The fact that they were able to succeed was due as much to Argentinean timing as to British military professionalism and capability. Britain was in the process of deactivating or selling 25% of their surface combatants. The aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible were to be sold, the amphibious support ships Fearless and Intrepid were to be scrapped, and numerous other ships were to be paid off or scrapped. The key question is what military options would Britain have had available if Argentina had simply delayed their invasion of the Falklands until after the British had emasculated their fleet?
Under peacetime conditions, the British carriers accommodate only five SEA HARRIERs and 9 to 12 SEA KING antisubmarine helicopters each. HMS HERMES, the largest British carrier, even with an enhanced air group literally jammed on board for the Falklands conflict - carried a very small air group of very limited capabilities: a dozen SEA HARRIERs, half a dozen RAF HARRIERs and half a dozen ASW helicopters. In the Falklands, both carriers had flight decks encumbered by stacks of bombs, missiles, and fuel tanks which could not be fitted into the ships' magazines, thus making them very vulnerable had any Argentine aircraft been able to locate and attack them. The British had to rely totally on the support of the Royal Navy’s two remaining aircraft carriers - the relatively small HMS Hermes, capable of carrying 12 Sea Harriers and 18 helicopters, and the even smaller HMS Invincible, capable of carrying 8 Sea Harriers and 15 helicopters.48 Alone, these 20 Sea Harriers - which numbered fewer than 1/3 the jet aircraft available on a single U.S. Nimitz-class carrier - would be responsible for providing not only air superiority for the naval task force against 223 land-based Argentinean combat jets, but for providing air superiority, air interdiction, and close air support (CAS) for the landing forces as well.
The Argentine Air Force and Navy began air attacks against the British surface naval forces on 1 Nay. During the succeeding six weeks, the Argentines flew about 300 sorties against British surface ships and amphibious landings. Argentine Air Force and Navy pilots performed extremely effectively, demonstrating a high degree of dedication and courage. The repeated success of Argentine aircraft in penetrating British defenses in daylight, and attacking forces afloat and ashore, provides a sound basis on which to draw some lessons. The British fleet lacked adequate fleet air defense in depth, including the essential keystone of Airborne Early Warning and long-range air defense fighters with multiple missile capability. Virtually none of the aircraft which hit the British ships from mainland bases in Argentina could have done so had there been modern, full-sized carrier airwings In the opposing force. A well-rounded complement of aerial surveillance aircraft, interceptors, antisubmarine aircraft and all-weather attack bombers would have made all the difference.
The Sea Harrier/AIM-9L overwhelmed the Argentines in the air. The exchange rate supports this statement: Sea Harriers 24, Argentines 0.4After that first day, 1 May, the Argentines never again attempted to oppose the Harriers in air-to-air combat. But Britain was so busy protecting the HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible aircraft carriers from the Exocet threat that Argentina was able to concentrate on the rest of the fleet and sink 14 other ships with iron bombs. The outer air defense rarely consisted of more than four SEA HARRIERs, each with a short-range intercept radar, carrying only two air-to- air missiles each. Due to the range of the patrol stations from their carrier bases, the SEA HARRIERs were capable of maintaining station for only about 20 minutes. Despite heroic efforts by SEA HARRIER pilots, the British never established anything approaching control over the skies above the Falklands.
U.K. HARRIERs, both Royal Navy and RAF, were surprisingly reliable and versatile during the battle. The 28 SEA HARRIERs deployed to the South Atlantic flew more than 1,200 sorties in 44 days. Their availability was exceptionally high - almost 90%. Fewer than one percent of planned missions were scrubbed because of aircraft unserviceability. The radar and attack weapon control systems in the SEA HARRIER proved to be reliable and versatile but limited in range and capability. In air-to-air combat, SEA HARRIERs destroyed at least 20 Argentine aircraft, 16 of them with U.S.- produced SIDEWINDER missiles. In many engagements the SEA HARRIERs were attacking aircraft which were operating at the extreme limits of their range and could not afford to maneuver if they were to return home safely. Similarly, the SEA HARRIERs had limited time on station and limited air-to-air ordnance loads. They were placed at great disadvantage by the lack of adequate radar-controlled cueing and vectoring for intercepts. Fortunately for the British, the Argentine aircraft actually attempted to attack the SEA HARRIERs only on the first day of the air battle.
During the later stages of the conflict RAF Harrier GR.3 aircraft were also deployed aboard the carrier HERMES to provide a strike capability to support ground operations. During this conflict the Sea Harriers flew 1,100 air defense sorties and the Sea Harriers and Harrier GR.3 aircraft together flew 215 ground attack sorties. In the latter role, the aircraft carried up to three 1,000-pound bombs or other air-to-ground weapons. The performance of both types (RN & RAF) of HARRIERs in air-to-ground action was less than impressive. Together they delivered fewer than 200 general-purpose bombs, including only four laser-guided bombs, and had little effect on the outcome of the land battle. Four SEA HARRIERs and one RAF HARRIER were lost in operational accidents and two SEA HARRIERs and three RAF HARRIERs were lost to enemy action, none in air-to-air combat.
The British operated helicopters from the two aircraft carriers, as well as all destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, and most auxiliary ships. The converted merchant ships served as transports and holding spots for Harriers and helicopters awaiting space aboard the carriers or secure facilities ashore. The British helicopters performed a multitude of important tasks, including missile strikes against small surface ships and a surfaced submarine. Several helicopter crews distinguished themselves in supporting Special Operations, flying at night and in low-visibility conditions, including a blizzard at South Georgia. The ship-based helicopters, including Marine and Army light helicopters and a single RAF CHINOCK, flew more than 10,000 sorties during the conflict.
The British were limited in the landings by the lack of helicopter landing spots on ships. Throughout the operation there was a severe shortage of heavy-lift helicopters, due in part to the destruction of three of the four available Chinook (8-1/2 ton capacity) helicopters when the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR was lost. The aircraft-carrying merchant ship ATLANTIC CONVEYOR burned out after being struck by one or possibly two Exocet missiles. She lacked defensive systems and damage control features and carried a highly flammable cargo including fuel, ammunition and several helicopters.
Helicopters were, without question, a most valuable aviation asset of the British forces. They were used successfully as anti-ship missile platforms, for at-sea replenishment, logistic support, troop lift, equipment lift to the battlefield, command and control, commando raids, and many utility functions. Three of the four heavy lift CHINOOK helicopters were lost on the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, resulting in a severe shortage of mobility for heavy equipment. Since the battle, the U.K. deployed an airborne early warning radar aboard several Sea King helicopters and operated them routinely.
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