The Edwardian Revolution - 1901-1914
Queen Victoria was succeeded by her eldest son, the Prince of Wales, who ascended the throne as Edward VII. In his coronation oath, he expressed his full determination to rule "as a constitutional sovereign in the strictest sense of the word "; and "to work," he said, "as long as there is breath in my body, for the good and amelioration of my people." On August 9, 1902, he was crowned as King of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India, and Sovereign of the Dominion beyond the Seas. On January 1, 1903, at a durbar held in Delhi, he was formally proclaimed Emperor of India. The Victorian Era had ended, and a period of British history, commensurate with the new century and characterized by new problems and new issues, had begun.
The most striking feature of King Edward's reign lay, no doubt, in the remarkable change which took place in Great Britain's foreign policy. In consequence of that change the international political position and importance of this country were greatly altered. Foreign statesmen used to think that London lay outside the main currents of international policy. Bismarck declared that England was no longer an active factor in the affairs of continental Europe, and that he left her out of account in his political calculations. His immediate successors and some non-German statesmen showed by their actions that they shared Bismarck's opinion. England was pretty generally thought to be of secondary importance on the chessboard of European diplomacy. The London embassies were sinecures where second-rate diplomats grew grey in attending to routine work.
Since 1901 Great Britain's political influence has mightily increased, and London occupies now a position in the political world comparable with that which Berlin occupied at the time when Bismarck was at the zenith of his power. Since 1901 London has risen from political obscurity to pre-eminence. It has become the meeting-place of monarchs, and it is as much the political centre of Europe and the diplomatic capital of the world as it was in the time of Chatham and of Pitt. History, which used to be made at Vienna, at St. Petersburg, or at Constantinople, is now being made at London. The London embassy has become the most important embassy of foreign States.
To the majority of Englishmen international politics were 'foreign affairs.' In the words of Lord Beaconsfield, "the very phrase "Foreign Affairs" makes an Englishman convinced that they are subjects with which he has no concern." Englishmen grew up nourished on party politics, and party politics continued to be their daily bread to the end of their lives. Foreign politics lay out of the beaten track of party politics, and therefore did not attract the general attention which they deserved. Besides, owing to the British party system, which brought successful orators and political wire-pullers to the front, and which gave the highest positions in the Government, not to administrative and executive ability, but to debating skill and party influence, statesmen were, as a rule, eminent party politicians who had neither felt the need nor had the leisure to study foreign affairs with the thoroughness which is required for diplomacy.
Other kings before Edward had essayed the rule of peacemaker and failed because the peace they sought was a purely selfish one. With Edward it was different. He loved peace for the sake of peace; for the benefit of humanity. He shrank from the horrors of war, not because he lacked martial spirit, but that he realized to the full what conflict meant to mankind in general. That a monarch of his disposition was in position to command peace, to even enforce it when necessary by a show of power, was a blessing to humanity the world over.
Edward VII.'s first trip on the continent in 1903 after his accession to the throne, in defiance of a custom of eighty years' standing, bore excellent fruit diplomatically. During his tour he had interviews with the Kings of Portugal and Italy and President Loubet of France. It was because of this tour and the return visits paid in England by foreign potentates that he gained the title by popular acclamation of "Edward the Peacemaker."
In 1905 he made a Mediterranean tour, in the course of which he visited Algiers and Corsica. On his homeward way he visited his favorite city of Paris, being received with extraordinary enthusiasm, and following closely as it did on Emperor William's speech at Tangier on March 31, challenging that portion of the Anglo-French agreement dealing with Morocco, had an international significance. The visit of the British fleet to Brest, and the return visit of the French fleet to Portsmouth in July and August, 1905, were marked by numerous fetes and great cordiality. The success of the proceedings at the latter place were largely due to the King's personal efforts, and emphasized the Anglo-French entente cordiale.
The negotiations which had so long been proceeding between the French and British Governments were concluded, a good understanding having been arrived at with respect to all the questions of long standing, colonial and other, that had been pending between the two nations. Nothing seemed to have augured so well for the maintenance of peace between Great Britain and her neighbors as the good feeling engendered by the attitude and actions of Edward VII, and the response which these have evoked on the part of other countries. The entente cordiale was a very substantial factor in the world.
The Russo-Japanese war of 1904 had left Russia militarily, financially, and morally exhausted. The country was in revolt, all bonds of discipline had been dissolved, the army had become dispirited and unreliable, there was mutiny in the fleet. Towards the end of the war Russia could not have given any effective assistance to France had the latter been attacked. The balance of power in Europe had temporarily disappeared. The danger arose that Germany might feel tempted to make use of her opportunity by taking another slice of France and make the re-establishment of the balance of power impossible. The Morocco crisis, which broke out immediately after Russia's great defeat, showed that Germany had at all events the desire to profit from the breakdown of the balance of power. Very likely England's support saved France from a disastrous war.
An Anglo-French Entente could not possibly endure if England should remain opposed or hostile to France's ally, a fact which led to a complete reversal of England's policy towards Russia and of Russia's policy towards England at the end of the Russo-Japanese War. Russian and British diplomats effected a reconciliation and rapprochement between the two Powers, notwithstanding the century-old hostility and distrust which had prevailed between them. The improvement in Anglo-Russian relations and the subsequent entente found its formal expression in the Anglo-Russian agreements regarding Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet which were signed on 31 August 1907, and the entente was sealed by the subsequent meeting of the two monarchs at Reval. Many well-meaning Englishmen opposed the Anglo-Russian entente, the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreements, and the King's visit to Reval because they were dissatisfied with the internal state of Russia and the character of its government.
The Conservatives, in the face of the general hostility caused by the Boer War, had given up the tradition of splendid isolation. The Entente Cordiale had been signed with France. King Edward and Lord Lansdowne had already committed Great Britain to the anti-German block in European politics. Sir Edward could not easily have backed out of this engagement. He was not even free to tell his own people of the "secret annex" by which he found himself bound. And the Entente with Russia was the logical and necessary outgrowth of the understanding with France.
The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 was, like the Entente Cordiale, on which it was modeled, eminently pacific in its wording. It was a colonial agreement by which Britain and Russia liquidated their outstanding quarrels in Asia. Both gave up claims which they had formerly said they would fight to maintain. Europe was not mentioned in the published text. It was not necessary to do so. The amiable arrangement of these subsidiary colonial disputes allowed Britain and France and Russia to form a group which could counterbalance the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. It was hard to determine whether the intent of this arrangement was offensive or defensive. The point is hardly worth discussing. Both groups suspected the other of malignant designs, and each took measures of defense that appeared offensive to the other.
Through the conclusion of the Triple Entente with France and Russia, Britain need no longer simultaneously look after the defence of Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, after the defence of Central Africa, the Mediterranean, and the North Sea. Britain was able to concentrate her naval forces in home waters. British naval budgets would be much heavier were Britain compelled still to assert naval supremacy at the same time in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea. The entente enabled Britain to save many millions on naval expenditure. They have enabled Britain to save many more millions on barren Asiatic and African expeditions designed to checkmate the advance of France and Russia.
Great Britain's relations with Germany were in grave doubt until Edward VII made his now famous visit to Kaiser Wilhelm at Wilhelmshohe. His meeting with Emperor William at Wilhelmshohe on August 14,1907, was followed by a relaxing of the tension in European affairs which had been causing grave anxiety up to that time. As in this and the Seinemunde meeting, on the next day, August 15th, another source of international disturbance was lessened in importance when King Edward met Emperor Francis Joseph at Ischl, and his ministers reached a conclusion regarding reform in Macedonia and the attitude to be taken towards Turkey in the matter.
Up to then the war cloud was dark and heavy. Rumors of an impending conflict were given credence by the haste with which both nations augmented their naval forces. It is altogether probable that King Edward, had he consulted his personal feelings alone, would not have been averse to a clash with Germany. It has been said, on good authority, that Edward had never forgiven the Kaiser for the latter's rude treatment of his mother, who was King Edward's sister, and was ready for a tussle at arms with the German ruler.
Lord Salisbury always had German leanings, but under Edward's influence the German empire felt that it had been isolated and that the strength of the triple allianee had been sapped. It did not know how far the agreements between England and his powerful neighbors, France and Russia, really went, and it felt that it had been maneuvered out of the prominent position it once held in European affairs.
The great increase of the German fleet was taken by England, rightly or wrongly, as evidence of the belief that a conflict between the two great empires was unavoidable.
The best construction that can be put on the British policy of ententes — and it seems to be the most probable — is that its object was to marshal a force which the Triple Alliance would be afraid to attack. This is certainly the way the Liberals — and they were in power — understood the matter. Sir Edward and his colleagues of the British cabinet were not secretly planning an armed aggression against the Germanic group. The nation certainly was not. But the Germans, not without plausible reasons, feared attack. If the British intentions were as pacific as claimed, it was poor diplomacy to allow them to be so thoroughly misunderstood. Telling the truth is only half the job; it is necessary to tell it convincingly. Sir Edward failed to be convincing.
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