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British Armour Between the Wars

Light tanks
year	mark	GS *	name	tons	gun	built
193_	Mk.I		Vickers	5	7.7mm	10
193_	Mk.II		Vickers	4	7.7mm	66
193_	Mk.III		Vickers	4	7.7mm	42
193_	Mk.IV		Vickers	3	7.7mm	34
193_	Mk.V		Vickers	4	15mm	22
193_	Mk.VI		Vickers	5	pdr	1652
193_	Mk. VII	A17	Tetrarch	8	2pdr	177
193_	Mk. VIII	A25	Harry Hopkins	10	2pdr	100
193_	Mk. E	Type B	Vickers 6 Ton	7	47mm	153
Medium tanks
year	mark	GS *	name	tons	gun	built
193_	Mk.I		Vickers	12	3pdr	140
193_	Mk.II		Vickers	12	3pdr	167
193_			M4 Firefly	30	17pdr	2100
Heavy tanks
year	mark	GS *	name	tons	gun	built
193_		A1E1	Independent	32	47mm	1
193_			TOG I	64	6pdr	1
193_			TOG II	81	17pdr	1
193_	Mark IV	A22	Churchill	41	75mm	7368
193_		A33	Excelsior	40	75mm	2
Cruiser tanks
year	mark	GS *	name	tons	gun	built
193_	MkI	A9		14	2pdr	125
193_	MkII	A10		16	2pdr	175
193_	MkIII	A13		16	2pdr	65
193_	Mk.IV	A13 Mk.II		16	2pdr	655
193_	Mk.V	A13 Mk.III	Covenanter	18	2pdr	1771
193_	Mk VI	A15	Crusader	19	6pdr	5300
193_	Mk.VII	A24	Cavalier	27	6pdr	500
193_	Mk.VIII	A27L	Centaur	27	6pdr	950
193_	Mk.VIII	A27M	Cromwell	27	6pdr	3066
193_		A30	Challenger	32	17pdr	200
193_		A33	Cromwell	41	75mm	2
193_		A34	Comet I	34	77mm	1186
193_		A35	Cromwell	36	75mm	0
193_		A41	Centurion I	62	17pdr	4423
Infantry tanks
year	mark	GS *	name	tons	gun	built
193_	Mark I	A11	Matilda		MG	140
193_	Mark II	A12	Matilda		2pdr	2890
193_	Mark III	A13	Valentine	16	2pdr	65
193_	Mark IV		Valentine	17	6pdr	8275
193_		A38	Valiant	27	57mm	1
193_		A43	Black Prince	49	17pdr	6
Self-propelled guns
year	mark	GS *	name	tons	gun	built
193_	Mk I		Deacon AEC	12	6pdr	175
193_	Mk.I		Archer	15	17pdr	655
193_		A30	Avenger	30	17pdr	230
193_	M10		Achilles	30	17pdr	1100
193_			Sexton	25	25pdr	2150
193_	Mk.I		Bishop	18	25pdr	149
193_		A39	Tortoise	78	94mm	6
NOTES
* General Staff specification see G.Matthews for complete list			cal.303 7.7 mm .30 in 59 cal 15mm .59 in 2pdr 40mm 1.57in 3pdr 44mm 1.73in 6pdr 57mm 2.24in 17pdr 76mm 3.00in 25pdr 88mm 3.46 in

The British Royal Tank Corps was notable exception to the views prevalent after the Great War. Although reduced to only four battalions, it was saved from the postwar fate of the French and American tank units. Its independence and the possession of new tanks, the Vickers Mediums – with mechanical performance greatly in advance of anything previously built – created conditions favorable to further progress.

The independence and the early experiments were only achieved because of a hard struggle by a small band of enthusiasts against an abysmal lack of understanding and prejudice. The most prominent in this group of pioneers was Fuller, but it included others like CPT Basil Liddell Hart and GEN Giffard Martel. Fuller’s own ideas evolved from his “Plan 1919” and were on the lines of formations composed almost entirely of tanks. Their operations were to resemble those of fleets at sea — this “landship” influence, incidentally, being quite strong in all early British tank philosophy. Other arms were at best regarded as subsidiary. Such “all-tank” views, which, of course, corresponded to the tank corps’ natural wishes, exerted a strong influence on the experiments carried out in England in the ‘20s and early ‘30s.

While great stress was placed on developing the advantages of mechanized mobility, striking power tended to be overlooked. This and financial stringency produced a crop of fast, light tanks with very limited combat power. And while the strategic potential of mechanized forces were rightly stressed, the tank’s tactical limitations were glossed over. The result was that instead of being a versatile, dominating arm – as the exponents of the “all-tank” views originally claimed – tank formations developing on those lines became of somewhat limited utility. Suitable perhaps, for the role formerly performed by the cavalry – i.e., that of a complementary mobile arm – but, like the cavalry of the previous 50 or hundred years, incapable of really profitable participation in all stages of the battle.

Tanks from Independent in 1926 until the end of WW II were mostly given 'A-number' General Staff (GS) ordnance designations. Other GS designations included B for tractors and carriers, D for armoured cars and L for light tanks. Before this they had descriptive titles, with a Mark and possibly a name, such as Tank, Medium Mark A 'Whippet' or Tank, Mark I. British tank doctrine split tanks into Light Tanks, used for scouting and reconnaissance roles of light horse cavalry, Cruiser tanks, fast and well armed, meant to act as the heavy cavalry of old, and Infantry tanks, slow and heavy, meant to provide direct support to the infantry.

At the end of the Great War, Britain led the world in tank design, production, and tactics. At the start of World War II, she trailed the world in all categories, and never reached parity with the Germans during the War. Generally speaking, British armored vehicles tended to maximize either mobility or protection. Both the cavalry and the Royal Tank Corps wanted fast, lightly armored, mobile vehicles for reconnaissance and raiding -- the light and medium (or "cruiser") tanks. On the other hand, the "army tank battalions" performing the traditional infantry-support role required extremely heavy armored protection in order to advance successfully against prepared enemy defenses that included antitank guns.

By the late 1920s the standard tanks in use were the Mark I, Mark IA and Mark II light tanks. The average cost of these three marks varied slightly, but, excluding the guns, was approximately £7,700. Apart from these, by 1927 there were some tanks of wartime manufacture which were gradually being replaced as opportunity offered. There were 336 tanks and 158 armored cars in possession of the Department. Some 199 of the tanks are of war design and many of them would require overhaul before they would be fit for active service. Just 16 of the armored cars required complete reconditioning, and 16 tanks and five armored cars were under construction. In 1937 the British resolved to motorize all divisional artillery units and create a division of mechanized and motorized elements. After two years, however, there was little progress toward these goals.

The British Army held a prominent position in the eyes of many American officers in the 1930s. Its mechanized development since the Great War placed it foremost in the field, and its ranks included officers who envisioned a future battlefield radically different from that of the Great War. Chief among them was Col. John F. C. Fuller, whose vision of future warfare forecast the tank as the preeminent weapon. The impression was of the British dramatically modernizing their army through widespread incorporation of motor vehicles.

British armored theorists did not always agree with each other. Basil Liddell Hart, a noted publicist of armor, wanted a true combined arms force with a major role for mechanized infantry. Fuller, Broad, and other officers were more interested in a pure-tank role, in part because they experienced difficulty cooperating with the other arms. G.L.Martel, one of the most innovative theorists and tank designers of the period, was fascinated with the idea of using extremely small armored personnel carriers, capable of transporting one to three men and a machine gun, to assist the infantry in its attacks. Unfortunately, the machine gun carriers designed at Martel's instigation participated in experiments both as reconnaissance vehicles and infantry carriers, and proved inadequate for either function. Not until the eve of World War II did the British develop a reliable machine gun carrier, and even then it was dispersed in small numbers within infantry battalions that attacked on foot.

Despite these differences of opinion, the next step in developing the role of armor was to form an independent mechanized force of division size. This was undertaken as an experiment in 1934, using Col. Percy Hobart's 1st Tank Brigade, a newly formed unit of the type envisaged by Broad, and Maj. Gen. George Lindsay's partially mechanized 7th Infantry Brigade. Unfortunately for the British, personality differences, lack of training, and artificial restrictions from the umpires turned the resulting exercise into a disaster. General Lindsay, one of the few senior officers who was genuinely committed to the development of a combined arms mechanized division, was so discredited by the fiasco that he ceased to have any influence over policy.

Instead, the conservative Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Gen. Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, chose to create a permanent "Mobile Division" by mechanizing large portions of the British cavalry. The Mobile Division authorized in December 1937 consisted of two armored cavalry brigades, each almost entirely mounted in light tanks and armored cars, plus one tank brigade, two mechanized Infantry battalions, and limited amounts of artillery, engineers, and support units. Such a formation was quite appropriate for performing the functions of reconnaissance and security, whether in the empire or on the continent. It did not, however, integrate the different arms at a sufficiently low level to fight in fluid operations as an armored formation against a sophisticated enemy. In most cases, reconnaissance, medium armor, infantry, and artillery were under separate brigade-level commands. with various minor changes, this mobile division became the 1st Armoured Division, which sacrificed itself piecemeal in France in 1940. A second mobile division formed in Egypt, providing the basis for later British operations there.

In the period up to the end of 1938 British armored forces consisted of eight battalions of the Royal Tank Regiment equipped with light tanks, which were armed only with machine guns, obsolescent medium tanks, also armed with machine guns, and two cavalry armored car regiments. This, of course, was during the period of disarmament. The mechanized cavalry and tanks could not coordinate their actions during maneuvers. The Armoured Division’s evolution marked an effort to find a balance of infantry, artillery, armor, antitank, and antiaircraft elements that would be manageable and versatile. The division organizations, however, remained tank-heavy and deficient in their combined-arms ability. The German preparations had already long begun and were being carried out with great thoroughness and on a tremendous scale.