Sweden Armén / Swedish Army - History
The Swedish army, though small in comparison with the huge armies of the Continent, has had a history far richer in glorious memories than the majority of other nations. There was an epoch when this army not only ranked highest in the military art of its age, but when, in all branches of the science of war, such as organization, armament, as well as regarding discipline, military efficiency in general, as also strategics and the method of waging war, it was a pattern to other armies: in fact, a pioneer in all branches of military science.
It was at that period when Gustavus II Adolphus - not only the greatest military genius of Sweden, but one of the very ablest generals ever known - inarched victoriously through Europe. Undisciplined mercenaries, who served where they could get the highest pay, were then the only defense that the majority of states could rely upon. The contrary, however, was the case in Sweden - more than half a century in advance of other nations a really national standing army was initiated in time of peace. And discipline did not rest in this army, as among the mercenaries of that time, mainly on a fair allowance of pay, but on principles which are nowadays in civilized countries considered as right, that is on true military obedience, humanity, and the fear of God.
As to understanding the importance of fire-arms, Gustavus Adolphus stood foremost, not onlv with regard to effecting technical improvements (lighter muskets, decreased calibre, paper-cartridges, cartridge-belts, artillery, quick-tiring, etc.), but more especially in respect to the use of the new weapons. Completely abandoning mass-formations - an inheritance from the Middle Ages - the efforts of the Swedish army tended in the direction of thin and moveable battalions, and the cooperation of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. In other words, the first decisive step was taken in the direction of the development that tactical knowledge has ever since followed.
So also with regard to strategics, where the traces of Gustavus Adolphus1 creative spirit are perhaps more evident and profound than in any other part of military science. Instead of the aimless plundering-expeditions and improvised guerilla wars that, for more than a thousand years, characterized warfare, he was the first to reintroduce a system into it, thereby indicating the methods of the art of war for a century to come.
Under the reign of the three great Swedish Kings Charles X, Charles XI, and Charles XII, the system was followed up. The army was still foremost in the military science of its time, one foundation-stone being joined still more firmly to the other in the construction of the army system, and victory followed upon victory. The Swedes, however, were compelled little by little to abandon to others their leading military position in Europe. Sweden was mostly engaged in wars with her northern neighbours and these wars did not, to any considerable extent, affect the interests of Central Europe. Consequently, Swedish military operations no longer attracted the same universal attention as they had previously done.
Doubtless the fame of Charles XII went round Europe, but his contemporaries, fostered in methodical wars of commissariat and fortresses, could not understand the magnificence of his rapid and decisive operations any more than the cavalry of this period, fighting in an antiquated manner, could see the meaning of the bold and powerful dashes of the Swedish horsemen. Many years had to elapse before the daring and plucky charges of the Swedish cavalry were destined to gain any greater recognition in Europe, and the storms of the French Revolution had to pass over a quarter of the world, ere men's eyes were universally opened to the real significance of the tactics introduced by Charles XII.
In Sweden, union and confidence had subsisted between the soldier and the citizen; and hence the desire of military service was so common among all classes of the nation, that sending a man to the army was not, as elsewhere, a punishment.
In 1811, when the peasantry broke out in insurrection against the conscription by ballot, they offered to take arms without exception in the event of war, to submit to be drilled together in time of peace, and to equip themselves at their own charge, provided the obnoxious innovation was abolished; tenders which were wisely accepted on the part of the government.
By the mid-19th Century the military establishment of Sweden was considerably below what a nation constitutionally warlike might be supposed to maintain; but as the aim of the government was to husband the public money, and, if possible, to relieve the country from the pecuniary difficulties entailed upon it by the folly and extravagance of the ex-king, all the departments of the public service had been placed on the most economical footing.
The actual standing army, accordingly, did not exceed 35,000 men of all arms. The militia, however, was more numerous; and, from the peculiar aptitude of the Swedes for military exercises, it exhibited a very soldier-like appearance, though only trained for a few weeks annually. Like the regular army, it is composed both of horse and foot, and must afford a ready resource in the event of war.
The organization of the whole was excellent. The regiments of the line are recruited neither by voluntary enrolment nor by conscription, but by a kind of intermediate system; every landed proprietor furnishing a certain number of soldiers, to each of whom a house and a portion of land are allotted for his maintenance. The Swedes have been long and justly celebrated for their martial qualities; and no modern nation of so small extent has made so conspicuous a figure in history. They are brave, hardy, and naturally heroic men; of superior physical and corresponding moral power; and, as soldiers, equal to any in the world.
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