From Titolescu to Antonescu
Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, Romania's foreign policy had been decidedly anti-German. In 1920 and 1921, Romania had joined with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to form the Little Entente, agreeing to work against a possible Habsburg restoration and oppose German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian efforts to seek treaty revisions. France had backed the agreement because it hemmed in Germany along its eastern frontiers, and the three Little Entente nations had signed bilateral treaties with France between 1924 and 1927. In February 1934, Romania had joined Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece to form the Balkan Entente, a mutual-defense arrangement intended to contain Bulgaria's territorial ambitions.
Romania's economy boomed during the interwar period. The government raised revenue by heavy taxation of the agricultural sector and, after years of Liberal Party hesitation, began admitting foreign capital to finance new electric plants, mines, textile mills, foundries, oil wells, roads, and rail lines. Despite the industrial boom, however, Romania remained primarily an agricultural country. In 1929, when the New York Stock Exchange crashed, world grain prices collapsed, and Romania plunged into an agricultural crisis. Thousands of peasant landholders fell into arrears, and the government enacted price supports and voted a moratorium on agricultural debts to ease their plight. In 1931 Europe suffered a financial crisis, and the flow of foreign capital into Romania dried up. Worse yet, the new industries could not absorb all the peasants who left their villages in search of work resulting in high unemployment. When recovery began in 1934, the government used domestic capital to fund new industries, including arms manufacturing, to pull out of the agricultural slump. The depression slowed capacity growth, but industrial production actually increased 26 percent between 1931 and 1938, a period when practically all the world's developed countries were suffering declines.
In the early 1930s the Iron Guard, a political cult consisting of malcontents, unemployed university graduates, thugs, and anti-Semites, began attracting followers with calls for war against Jews and communists. Peasants flocked to the Iron Guard's ranks, seeking scapegoats for their misery during the agrarian crisis, and the Iron Guard soon became the Balkans' largest fascist party. Corneilu Zelea Codreanu, the Iron Guard's leader who once used his bare hands to kill Iasi's police chief, dubbed himself Capitanul, a title analogous to Adolf Hitler's Der Führer and Benito Mussolini's Il Duce. Codreanu's henchmen marched through Romania's streets in boots and green shirts with small bags of Romanian soil dangling from their necks. Codreanu goaded the Iron Guards to kill his political opponents, and during "purification" ceremonies Guard members drew lots to choose assassins.
After an Iron Guard assassinated Premier Ion Duca of the National Liberal Party in 1933, Romania's governments turned over in rapid succession, exacerbating general discontent. Iron Guards battled their opponents in the streets, and railroad workers went on strike. The government violently suppressed the strikers and imprisoned Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and other Communists who would later rise to the country's most powerful offices.
By the mid-1930s, support for Romania's traditional pro-French policy waned, and right-wing forces clamored for closer relations with Nazi Germany; at the same time League of Nations-imposed trade sanctions against Italy were costing the Balkan countries dearly. Germany seized the opportunity to strengthen its economic influence in the region; it paid a premium for agricultural products and soon accounted for about half of Romania's total imports and exports. In spite of almost complete occupation by the Central Powers in the Great War, Rumania was indebted to Versailles for her re-creation, which was effected partially even at the expense of her one-time Eastern ally. An anti-Semitic tendency existed in this post-war country, which was torn asunder by dynastic squabbles and innumerable party fights. But in spite of repeated efforts this tendency had never risen above the limitations of a club, because of solely scientific doctrinaire leadership. What was lacking was the guiding leadership of a political personality.
By the late 1930s Nazi Germany was able to apply enormous military and economic leverage on Bucharest. After manifold grouping trials the Nazis believed to have found such a personality - the former Minister, and poet, Octavian Goga. It was not difficult to convince this poet, pervaded by instinctive inspiration, that a Greater Rumania, though it had to be created in opposition to Vienna, could be maintained only together with Berlin. Nor was it difficult to create in him the desire to link the fate of Rumania with the future of the National Socialist German Reich in good time. By bringing continuing influence to bear, the Germans succeeded in inducing Octavian Goga as well as Professor Cuza to amalgamate the parties under their leadership on an Anti-Semitic basis. Thus they could carry on with united strength the struggle for Rumania's renascence internally, and her affiliation [Anschluss] with Germany externally. Through the German's initiative both parties, which had heretofore been known by distinct names, were merged as the National-Christian Party, under Goga's leadership and with Cuza as Honorary President. The attempts concurrently undertaken by the Germans to amalgamate this Party with the much more youthful, but energetic Iron Guard movement were initially frustrated by the apparently insurmountable personal incompatibility of Cuza and Codreanu. At any rate these attempts led to the secret establishment of good personal relations between Goga and the mystic-fanciful Codreanu.
In the course of the years after his return, the king had succeeded in becoming the country's decisive factor through crafty tactics in dealing with the dominant political parties. Had the Germans also succeeded in merging the National-Christian Party with Codreanu, Rumania would have obtained sharply anti-Semitic leadership based on strong mass support. Such leadership could have attained its aims even against the will of the king. However, surviving rivalries between the country's anti-Semitic trends later enabled the king to use them separately for his plan, in order to destroy them as far as possible.
The struggle for re-orientation of Rumania's foreign policy was taken up by Goga with bold elan. He had earlier succeeded in upsetting the position of Foreign Minister Titulescu, the agent of Franco, of the Geneva League of Nations and of the Little Entente. Titulescu was later overthrown. Among the numerous, not very significant splinter partiles, the "Young Liberals", founded by George Bratianu, supported Goga's campaign, without joining the anti-Semitic trend. The Rumanian front of Vaida Voevod, wobbling to and fro among all camps, adopted a similar position for some time.
Through intermediaries, the Germans maintained constant contact with both tendencies, just like it constantly consulted with Goga, about tactics to be followed. The whole struggle was accelerated by Soviet Russia's increasing pressure in the Bessarabian question, and by the process of political rapprochement with Moscow, which was supported by Paris and Prague. Following a long period of recurring political trials involving scandal and graft, Rumania's internal struggle for the future make-up of the country had been aggravated hy the coming to the front of the Christian-Nationalist Party and of the Iron Guard. This struggle was being fought with increasing bitterness. The king's attitude towards the national movement was procrastinating and underhanded.
The movement was agreeable to him for eliminating the two parties which, by tradition, took turns in the government. But he intended to prevent the unequivocal victory of anti-Semitic and racial [Voelkisch] principles, influenced by growing Nationalism, in the country. That is why the Nationalists' foreign policy, secretly projected by Germany, did not fit into his plans. Because he was in possession of the police and of the army, he remained the decisive factor in the country. After repeated postponement of the elections, which were legally due, the king decided to hold an election. The decision was based on a very reliable report of his then Prime Minister Taterescu.
Taterescu was convinced that the Liberal Party would again receive 40% of all votes, through the machinations customary in Fomia. However, after a bitter election campaign the Liberal Party suffered painful defeat. The opposition National Movement had achieved indisputable victory in spite of all chicanery and machinations by their opponents. The Iron Guard received about 16% of the total vote, the National-Christian Party Goga-Cuza about ll%, the government party about 35%. The rest of the votes were scattered.
After some vacillation and hesitancy, the king appointed Goga Prime Minister on 21 December 1937 with a binding promise that Parliament would be dismissed and new elections held within the legally prescribed time limit. Goga believed the promise given by the king. But the king was only attempting to gain time. When the National Liberals were voted out of office, King Carol handed the government to a far-right coalition that soon barred Jews from the civil service and army and forbade them to buy property and practice certain professions.
Thus a second government on racial and anti-Semitic foundations had appeared in Europe, in a country in which such an event had been considered completely impossible. The government immediately made known its intention to proceed against Jewish predominance in the country and declared repeatedly that it would have to subject Rumania's previous foreign policy to re-examination and reform. In the meantime the opposition did not lose time. Passions were inflamed and became increasingly more envenomed. It looked like a hot and bloody election campaign. The prospects of Goga's Christian-Nationalist Party pointed to a big victory with sure certainty, especially since, with the Bureau's cooperation he had on the sly made a secret agreement with Codreanu. To be sure, Goga did not act on the German's advice to immediately develop his party cadres, to expand his party machine all over the country and to permeate the police and gendarmerie. Goga postponed the execution of organizational reform, which he also intended, until after the election. He considered himself to be under obligation to the king not to undertake anything until the electoral decisions had been rendered, but to take steps all the more incisively after legally attaining the majority.
In innumerable interviews the opposition must have succeeded in convincing the king that an electoral victory of Goga would react most acutely against the king himself. In that case he would no longer be able to get rid of the ghosts he had callled in; if Goga attained a two-thirds majority, he, the king, would be Goga's captive. These expostulations, plus the pressure of the French and British Ministers, led to a change in the king's attitude, assuming that this change had not already been anticipated by him at the time of Goga's appointment. The king decided to prevent the elections. Goga resisted. Thereupon the king offered Goga the formation of an authoritarian government, i.e., a government created solely by virtue of royal sovereignty. That meant a coup d'etat. Goga declined. Thereupon the king informed Goga that he would accept the cabinet's resignation, which, however, had not even been offered to him. Goga realized too late that the strength at his disposal was entirely inadequate to thwart the king's plans. He resigned.
But the course once embarked upon forced even the king to pay heed to the mood that had been created in the country. Also, a return to the disrupted foreign-policy ties was no longer possible. Although an authoritarian system had been built up, Rumania found herself without her former backing. The French security system had been ruptured and could not be re-established, if only in view of Yugoslavia's attitude in the South-East, where relations established by other German agencies had simultaneousIy loosened the cohesiveness of the Little Entente. That, at any rate, was the Goga government's success.
Continuing turmoil and foreign condemnation of the government's virulent anti-Semitism drove Carol in April 1938 to suspend the 1923 constitution, proclaim a royal dictatorship, and impose rigid censorship and tight police surveillance. In his last great speech to the Rumania Academy, shortly before his death, Goga welcomed Austria's affiliation with Germany, and affirmed for the last time his belief in adherence to new Greater German Reich and to Fascist Italy, a belief he had struggled for.
Now the king's war of extermination against the Iron Guard began. Codreanu was arrested with his closest collaborators, to face a specially convoked court-martial. Sole basis for the prosecution was an alleged communication from Codreanu to the Fuehrer, which was proved lo be a forgery, and a telegram addressed to the Fuehrer. On the basis of these "records" he was sentenced to ten years hard labor. In vain did the Germans attempt to bring about an intervention of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in this episode, which diminished the whole prestige of the German Reich. It did not prevail against the official agencies, which condemned the entire project of the Germans in Rumania, because the official German delegation expected their sole salvation from the attitude of the king and his creatures. Logically, the acceptance without dissent of this challenge was interpreted in Bucharest as granting carte blanche. Carol's tolerance for the Iron Guard's violence wore thin, and on April 19 the police arrested and imprisoned Codreanu and other Iron Guard leaders and cracked down on the rank and file. In November police gunned down Codreanu and thirteen Iron Guards, alleging that they were attempting to escape custody. Codreanu was shot with his closest collaborators for establishment of the first personal contact between the King and the Fuehrer.
This appeared to doom the Iron Guard, too, Goga's party, deprived of his leadership, was submerged into insignificance. Eut Goga left behind a personal heir, who is now Marshal Antonescu. Against tie king's wish, Goga had appointed this politically in- significant provincial general, with whom the king was on bad terms, as his Minister of War. At first, completely pro French in outlook, Antonescu gradually adopted a different view under Goga's influence. After Goga's resignation, Antonscu still remained in the king's cabinet at Goga's wish. He also maintained continued relations with the Iron Guard. The possibility of eliminating the king was at hand and was exploited. Antonescu was executor of the heritage bequeathed to him by Goga, who had led him from political insignificance into the political arena. Thereby a change to Germany's liking had become possible in Rumania.
The Little Entente had been weakened in 1937, when Yugoslavia signed a bilateral pact with Bulgaria, and Hitler gutted it altogether in September 1938, when he duped Britain and France into signing the Munich Agreement, which allowed Germany to annex Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland. After Munich, Romania and Yugoslavia had no choice but appease Hitler. On March 23, 1939, Romania and Germany signed a ten-year scheme for Romanian economic development that allowed Germany to exploit the country's natural resources.
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