Moldova - Politics 2025
Parliamentary elections in Moldova were scheduled for 28 September 2025. The outcome of this pivotal poll will determine whether the country remains on its pro-European path or veers back into Russia's sphere of influence. Wedged between Romania and Ukraine, governance of the country has throughout history alternated between a number of rulers, including Romania and Russia, leaving deep social divisions that still persist to this day. With Russian troops still stationed in Moldova's separatist region of Transnistria and an election scheduled for the end of September, Moldova's balancing act between East and West is more apparent now than ever before.
Moldova's ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) is looking into strategies to keep their hold on power should they secure fewer than half of the mandates in the parliamentary elections. The Patriotic electoral bloc — uniting Socialists, Communists, Heart of Moldova and Future of Moldova — will seek coalition talks with all parties except the ruling Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), former president Igor Dodon told Sputnik.
“We are realists. We understand that the next parliament may have no majority. Then we will sit at the table with all parties except PAS — no negotiations, no coalitions, no joint votes for a minority government. We categorically reject such scenarios,” Dodon said. He stressed the bloc is ready to work with other opposition parties to form a majority, noting that its four leaders had signed a public pledge not to cooperate with PAS and invited others to do the same. Dodon also criticized the Moldovan authorities for what he called repressive measures against dissent: criminal cases against opposition figures, restrictions on protests around election time, attempts to block candidates’ registration, and the 2023 closure of 13 TV channels and dozens of websites, including Sputnik Moldova.
About three-quarters of the 2.9 million people who live in the Republic of Moldova (including Transnistria) are Moldovan. The largest national minority is the Ukrainians, followed by Gagauz, Russians, Bulgarians and Roma. There are also a small number of Poles and Germans. People in Moldova speak a Romanian dialect. It's phonetically slightly different from standard Romanian but uses the same grammar and vocabulary with some regional variations. Because the spoken language is virtually identical to Romanian, Moldovan is not considered a separate language. Nevertheless, for over 30 years, there was a politically motivated dispute about what the official language of the country should be called.
Gagauzia is an autonomous territory in the Republic of Moldova. In the early 1990s, the region of Gagauzia made a push for independence, which ended when the Moldovan government granted it extensive autonomy in 1994. The Gagauz are a Turkic, Orthodox Christian ethnic group. The Gagauz language is not spoken by everyone in the region. Unlike the rest of Moldova, where Romanian is the main language, many people here speak Russian and consume Russian-language media — a consequence of the process of Russification during the Soviet period. Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, people here are largely pro-Russian.
While most people in the region of Gagauzia say that they stand for a neutral Moldova, pro-Russian parties continue to dominate the political system there, and many want to maintain close ties with the Russian Federation. However, many educated young people here see Moldova's future in the European Union, which has in recent years invested in the region, building roads, water systems and preschools. They argue that the EU provides an opportunity to modernize both the country and the Gagauz region, while at the same time preserving and respecting the Gagauz identity.
For decades, the Kremlin used Russian gas exports to Moldova and the arbitrary blocking of agricultural imports from Moldova to Russia to keep the Republic of Moldova on a pro-Russian line. Russia has in recent years stepped up its hybrid and propaganda war via pro-Russian parties in Moldova and politicians like Ilan Shor. Just how successful this strategy is was illustrated by the extremely close result of Moldova's EU referendum last fall.
It is extremely difficult to predict who will win in this confrontation - pro-European or pro-Russian forces. In the fall of 2024, in the presidential elections, the pro-Western Maia Sandu managed to stay in office and continue European integration reforms - however, diaspora voters became key in this, and according to the results of the vote inside the country, Sandu did not win. At the same time, Moldova is a parliamentary republic and key decisions, in particular on the foreign policy, are made by deputies. Currently, Sandu's party "Action and Solidarity" (PAS) has a majority in parliament. Recent polls do not predict such successes for PAS. And it is not excluded that a significant number of undecided voters may support pro-Russian forcesThey drew conclusions from the presidential election and actively worked with the electorate abroad.
Analysts at the Stockholm Center for East European Studies do not rule out that under pro-Russian rule, Moldova could become a staging ground for Russia's hybrid attacks against Ukraine. But even if this does not happen, Moldova is unlikely to continue transiting Ukrainian grain and facilitating the supply of weapons. The public understood what worries Moldovans in these elections, what chances the country has to maintain its pro-European course, and the consequences of the elections for Ukraine.
"September 28 will be our test, a mirror in which our face will be reflected, and then we will see who we are - the people or the cattle." This phrase by the Minister of Labor and Social Protection, Alexei Buzu of the PAS party, was caught on video on September 7. The result is a wave of hate from representatives of other political forces running in the elections. Buzu claimed that the phrase was taken out of context, but competitors have already interpreted it as dividing Moldovans into "sorts" - those who support PAS, in fact the only openly pro-European party in these elections - and the "cattle" who vote for pro-Russian forces. In the end, the minister had to apologize for his words, but the episode showed the level of tension in the country on the eve of the elections.
The Moldovan Central Election Commission registered 25 parties and several independent candidates to participate in the parliamentary elections. But the main struggle will be between two political forces — the Action and Solidarity party (PAS), represented by President Maia Sandu, which seeks to continue Moldova's European integration course, and the Patriotic Bloc — a united pro-Russian opposition. It includes the Socialist Party of ex-President Igor Dodon, the Heart of Moldova party of former head of state Gagauz Autonomy of Irina Vlah, the Future of Moldova party of Vasile Tarlev, as well as the Communist Party of another ex-president, Vladimir Voronin.
It is likely that votes from another pro-Russian force, the Victory bloc created in Moscow, will also flow into the Patriotic Bloc.". The Moldovan Central Election Commission did not allow him to participate in the elections. The authorities explained this decision by the fact that "Victory" is directly related to the oligarch Ilan Shor, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison in Moldova and who currently lives in Russia. "Reasonable suspicions" were also raised by the "Victory" congress in Moscow in July of this year. At it, Shor declared : "the only salvation" for Moldova is "an alliance with the Russian Federation." In addition, Shor then announced that the first number on the "Victory" electoral list would be the head of the Moldovan autonomy of Gagauzia, Evgenia Hutsul - and she was recently sentenced to 7 years in prison in the case of illegal financing of the "Shor" party.
Ukrainian political analyst and campaign specialist Ruslan Rokhov had been working a lot in Moldova recently. He assured Suspilne that Shor's influence has affected at least one political force registered by the Central Election Commission. This is the "Great Moldova" party (Moldova Mare) , led by Victoria Furtune, a former Shor's henchman. According to the party's pre-election website, it "advocates for a radical change in the country's development course: ensuring neutrality, strengthening traditional values, building a socially just society, and industrializing the country." "The basis of the "Great Moldova" electorate is the so-called "Shor's electoral network" - voters who regularly receive money from Ilon Shor for loyalty. As a result, the party can easily get about 10 percent of the vote," Rokhov notes. Victoria Furtune did not choose this name for her party by chance. In neighboring Romania, there is a nationalist party România Mare, and this phrase also refers to the period between the two world wars, when Romania had the largest land area in its history. Furtune also mentions territories, writes European Truth: for example, she stated that Budjak , a historical region in the south of Odessa region, should be annexed to Moldova . Among the participants in the election race with the greatest potential, it is also worth mentioning the "Alternative" bloc. One of its main faces is Oleksandr Stoyanoglou, a former prosecutor general and former presidential candidate from the Socialist Party in last year's elections. "The bloc also includes Ion Ceban , a former socialist responsible for the propaganda and promotion of the "Russian world" in Moldova, who is currently the mayor of the capital. Also - former spokesman for communist President Voronin Mark Tkachuk and Ion Chicu - former Prime Minister," says Rokhov. As Oleksiy Tulbure, a Moldovan political scientist and historian, as well as the former permanent representative of Moldova to the UN and the Council of Europe, notes in a conversation with Sospilny, "participants of the "Alternative" bloc were at certain periods openly pro-Russian politicians or part of pro-Russian parties." Tulbure also advises paying attention to "Our Party" led by Renato Usati, the former mayor of the city of Bal?i, the second largest in Moldova. "There is a very charismatic leader, but the party itself is poorly organized, its program is unsystematic, they are for everything good and against everything bad, they can change their orientations. They are not openly pro-Russian, but not pro-European either. And now "Our Party" can enter parliament for the first time," says Tulbure.
"In 2021, I thought that the elections in four years would be about how to better modernize the country, how we can overcome the path to full integration with the EU. Because in 2021, perhaps for the first time in the history of Moldovan elections, the party of the current government (PAS) moved away from geopolitical rhetoric and talked about corruption, jobs, education, medicine - about problems that interested everyone and concerned everyone," recalls Oleksiy Tulbure. "But [further progress] did not work out - and now we are divided again. We again have an irreconcilable confrontation over where Moldova will move after the elections - will it continue the European path or return to a "strategic partnership" with the Russian Federation, as pro-Russian forces phrase it."
The turning point for Moldova's European integration was Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the diplomat says: synchronously with Kyiv, in June 2022, the country received the status of a candidate for accession to the European Union. Moreover, in recent months, discussions have been ongoing on whether to give Moldova the opportunity to open the first negotiation cluster earlier than Ukraine - despite the fact that until now the countries have been moving towards the EU synchronously. One of Brussels' motivations was that another step on the path to the EU could stimulate the pro-European camp in the parliamentary elections in Moldova - that is, the electorate of the PAS party.
Although the idea of European integration is central, promoted byPAS and what distinguishes the party from other political forces in Moldova, voters also have a lot of complaints about PAS now. According to the study by "Ukrainian Prism", the ruling party currently has significant problems with expanding its influence. Mariana Lucreteanu, a former member of parliament and state secretary at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Moldova, admitted in one of her interviews : for PAS, reaching all groups of the population is a problematic task. In particular, due to the language barrier and the weak presence of Russian-speaking politicians in the party. This complicates communication with part of the electorate, in particular from the Northand in Gagauzia.
According to preliminary polls, there will almost certainly be a coalition government in Moldova after the September elections: PAS will most likely not get a majority. Ruslan Rokhov explains the loss of support for PAS by the fact that in recent years it was the party in power and the Moldovan voter is ready to blame all the mistakes and shortcomings on them. "The party in power, like any political force, makes some mistakes. But when you don't have a coalition format, no one will point them out to you. No one can influence the fact that these mistakes are corrected at the time of developing the draft decision. Accordingly, the large number of mistakes and the unwillingness to admit them, the sharp rejection of constructive criticism led to the fact that many pro-European voters who said that "it's so wrong" branded PAS as Russian agents. During the election campaign, one of the ministers of the current government went further, actually calling all those who would not vote for the ruling party in the elections cattle," says Rokhov.
Oleksiy Tulbure adds that the Russian-Ukrainian war has also significantly divided Moldovan politics and society: "Despite the fact that Moldova is an open, democratic country with access to any source of information, we paradoxically have many who support Putin and what he is doing in Ukraine. And the ruling party and Maia Sandu in particular have stopped working on consolidating Moldovan society. Many of those who support Putin — including ethnic groups like the Gagauz — are excluded from the main processes taking place in our country, few people talk to them. And therefore they become easy prey for various manipulators and propagandists," Tulbure notes.
Russia’s attempts to interfere in elections are not new to Moldova. For example, the previous presidential elections and the referendum on supporting the country’s pro-European course, which took place simultaneously, were marked by an unprecedented level of violations. In particular, large-scale direct vote-buying, paid protests and cyberattacks were recorded. According to various estimates, Russia spent about 200 million euros to influence the election results. This time, according to Sandu, Russia decided to further expand its influence on the elections and in particular on the diaspora abroad, which forms the basis of the pro-European electorate, and in the presidential elections it actually had the decisive votes that brought victory to the incumbent president.
Investigators from the leading Moldovan newspaper Ziarul de Garda found out that on the eve of these parliamentary elections, activists from the banned "Victory" bloc of Ilan Shor created an entire army of bots to spread Russian propaganda on TikTok and Facebook. This is a well-organized network, coordinated through secret chats and Telegram channels. They became active immediately after last year's presidential election. The "communication activists" were first trained online for several months, and then put to work - along with approved manuals with Russian narratives. The most diligent workers were paid directly from Moscow.
Marianna Prysiazhnyuk, an analyst at the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and coordinator of the Delta-24 project on the Ukraine-Moldova-Romania region, has long been investigating Russian influence in the elections in Moldova. She says that the main "secret to success" of the Russians in this regard is that they clearly segment the audience in the country they will work with and localize the messages they spread. "For example, regarding Shor's "grid": they got a map of Moldova, looked at each settlement, each district - everything was divided so that local leaders would attract other participants to these centers for money. This is how Shor managed to build a community. These people feel in touch with exactly the meanings that Russia "sends" through this network," says Prysiazhnyuk.
According to her, Russia skillfully works with people's prejudices - and fuels them with money. Trigger topics are "LGBTQ+, the European course, migration - complex abstract things that are very easy to explain away some real problems. For example, if a school is closed somewhere - they say that Europe lured away teachers," - explains Prysyazhnyuk. Ruslan Rokhov adds: pro-Russian narratives are generally best perceived by the socially vulnerable population. The relevant parties say that they will restore normal relations with the Russian Federation - and Moldova will receive cheap electricity and gas, as before. For older people who are nostalgic for the USSR, these theses may also resonate for ideological reasons, says Rokhov.
It is noteworthy that one of the segments of the Moldovan population that mostly supports pro-Russian forces in the elections is ethnic Ukrainians, who live compactly in the northern regions of the country or in Transnistria. As Oleksiy Tulbure emphasizes, these are people who have completely lost their Ukrainian identity. "They are rather Soviet people, oriented towards Russia, who have consumed information from Kremlin TV channels and sources for many years. Pro-Kremlin parties have worked with them for decades. Pro-European ones rarely got there and pursued an unsuccessful, unconvincing policy," he explains.
According to various estimates, about 40% of voters in Moldova have not yet decided who they will vote for on September 28 — and it is they who will determine the results of the elections. Ruslan Rokhov notes: in such conditions, a large proportion of voters will decide already at the polling station, having picked up the ballot in their hands.
"The key problem is that only the ruling party or pro-Russian projects have real resources. That's the whole alternative: if you are not pro-Russian and do not represent the ruling party, you have practically no resources [for an election campaign]. And all these small pro-European, pro-Moldovan political parties of various spectrums do not have the money to reach the voter. If voters do not actively seek information and try to figure out who to vote for, with a high probability some of them will simply not go to vote," explains Rokhov.
What are the most likely scenarios for these elections? The first option is a victory for pro-Russian forces. " Then a government that is not very friendly to Ukraine will appear in its rear. The Kremlin will celebrate a diplomatic and political victory. This may also bring Ukraine specific logistical problems," warns Oleksiy Tulbure. In addition, the victory of the pro-Russian bloc will mean a serious political crisis for Moldova.
According to Moldovan law, after the parliamentary elections, the president consults with the political parties that won and nominates a prime minister. But after the changes in 2017, says Tulbure, the president is not obliged to approve a candidate with a parliamentary majority, but nominates whoever he generally wants. It is unlikely that this will be a pro-Russian candidate. Parliament will obviously not support this. "If Sandu is not approved by the prime minister twice, we go to early presidential elections. But, as a rule, those who provoke early elections immediately after parliamentary elections receive fewer votes. That is, Maia Sandu and PAS will lose," the expert said.
The second scenario is if Maia Sandu's party is still able to win a majority. Then, as after the 2021 elections, it will remain the party in power - however, this option is very unlikely. And the third option - PAS receives the most votes, but not enough to independently form a majority. A coalition will have to be formed. "Of all the parties that have a chance of getting into parliament, only Action and Solidarity is openly pro-European. Its intention is to form a coalition with Renato Usati from Our Party. But, in my opinion, the most likely outcome in such a scenario will still be a political crisis or non-recognition of the results due to various circumstances and repeat elections in six months," says Ruslan Rokhov.
Marianna Prysiajniuk also considers such a coalition scenario to be the most likely. "Although Usatiy is constantly trying to distance himself from such an alliance, historically he has already demonstrated his flexibility. He takes care of the so-called "ambiguous electorate" and especially the youth. In the first presidential elections, when Maia Sandu came to power, it happened thanks to him. Usatiy then took third place and called on his voters to vote against Dodon. He did not call for voting for Maia, but in fact, with this gesture, he brought her to power," she adds.
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