• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Moldova - Russian Relations

An employee of the Russian Embassy in Moldova was declared persona non grana, reported the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 01 August 2024. The country's authorities received information and evidence that the Russian diplomat carried out actions on its territory that were incompatible with diplomatic status, Chisinau explained. Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov was summoned to the Foreign Ministry in Chisinau. According to him, the matter concerns an assistant military attaché who must leave the country "within a certain time."

On 31 July 2024, the Moldovan Prosecutor's Office for Combating Corruption and Special Cases reported the arrest of an employee of the Parliament Secretariat and a border police officer. The parliamentary employee is suspected of treason for collecting and passing information to a foreign embassy employee since 2023 that could be used against the interests of Moldova, while the border police officer is suspected of plotting against Moldova for the sake of gain. The prosecutor's office does not specify which country's embassy is being discussed. At the same time, Moldovan media indicate that both officials met with an employee of the Russian embassy in Chisinau and, for a monetary reward, passed on information to him.

Oligarch Ilan Shor, sentenced in absentia to 15 years in prison in Moldova for bank fraud, held the third congress of primary and territorial organizations of his supporters in a month in Moscow on 17 April 2024. Members of the Shor party, banned in Moldova, aim to prevent Moldova's European integration and turn the country toward the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The oligarch promises to continue holding meetings in the Russian capital, where his supporters from Moldova can fly or come by bus. Ilan Shor fled Moldova in 2019 and hid in Israel for more than four years. But now, according to the General Police Inspectorate, he has been living permanently in Moscow since February 25. Russia had previously refused to extradite him to Chisinau, despite an extradition treaty for those who have committed crimes. The politician revealed his goal - to do everything to prevent Moldova from joining the EU and NATO. He sees the country's future in "productive interaction with Russia, the CIS and the EAEU."

The US on 10 March 2023 accused Russia of trying to destabilise the ex-Soviet republic of Moldova, including through the use of street protests, with the goal of eventually bringing in a pro-Moscow government. "We believe Russia is pursuing options to weaken the Moldovan government, probably with the eventual goal of seeing a more Russia-friendly administration," National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told reporters. Moldova's government is seeking closer ties to Western institutions and is close to the pro-Western government of neighboring Ukraine, which has been battling a Russian invasion for more than a year.

Moldova’s president outlined 14 February 2023 what she described as a plot by Moscow to overthrow her country's government using external saboteurs, put the nation "at the disposal of Russia” and derail its aspirations to one day join the European Union. President Maia Sandu's briefing came a week after neighboring Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky said his country had intercepted plans by Russian secret services to destroy Moldova, claims that were later confirmed by Moldovan intelligence officials.

Sandu said Russia's strategy included plans to attack state buildings in Moldova in order to "overthrow the constitutional order, to change the legitimate power from (Moldova's capital) Chisinau to an illegitimate one". Since Russia invaded Ukraine nearly a year ago, Moldova, a former Soviet republic of about 2.6 million people, had sought to forge closer ties with its Western partners. Last June, it was granted EU candidate status, the same day as Ukraine.

Moldovan prosecutors and security officials will probe the alleged funding of pro-Moscow politicians by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) intelligence service, aimed at undermining Chisinau’s pro-Western government. The Moldovan General Prosecutor’s Office and the Intelligence and Security Service, SIS, announced on November 1, 2022 that they will initiate investigations into interference by Russian intelligence in the country’s domestic politics.

Law enforcement organisations will probe alleged illegal financial support and expertise provided by Russian FSB officers and political experts to pro-Russian political parties in Moldova. “More precisely, it is about the alleged channelling of significant sums of money offered by the Russian FSB to support some Moldovan politicians and create a partnership to overthrow the pro-Western regime and reorient Moldova towards Russia,” said the General Prosecutor’s Office.

The probe was announced after, on October 28, the US announced sanctions against Ilan Shor, a Moldovan oligarch and politician who fled to Israel after allegedly being involved in the ‘grand theft’ of $1 billion between 2012 and 2014, and Vladimir Plahotniuc, as well as against several other people suspected of interference on behalf of Russia or of corruption which is undermining the rule of law and promoting Russian interests in the country.

Russia and Moldova have a complex relationship that encompasses political, economic, and security aspects. One of the major factors shaping Russia's relationship with Moldova is the Transnistrian conflict. Transnistria is a breakaway region in Moldova that declared independence in 1990. Russia has been historically involved in the conflict, providing political, economic, and military support to Transnistria. It maintains peacekeeping troops in the region as part of the Joint Control Commission, alongside Moldova and Transnistria. Russia has advocated for a federal solution that would grant Transnistria autonomous status within Moldova.

Moldova's political landscape has witnessed shifts in orientation between pro-European and pro-Russian forces. Russia has expressed concerns about Moldova's aspirations for European integration, particularly its pursuit of closer ties with the European Union. However, Russia has also engaged with Moldova on various political fronts, including through diplomatic channels and high-level visits. Moldova remains an important economic partner for Russia. It is a significant market for Russian exports and a source of remittances from Moldovan workers in Russia. Economic ties include trade, energy, investments, and cooperation in sectors such as agriculture and industry.

Intrinsically, Moldova was possibly of little interest to Moscow, but the presence of an ethnic Russian minority in Moldova altered Moscow's perspective. Moldova's ethnic Russians found the prospect of Moldova's reunification with Romania alarming, because it would alter their status from that of a large and politically powerful force to that of a small and politically powerless minority. Moldova was geographically important to both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union because it formed part of the border of both. In this way, it formed a barrier between Russia itself (in both cases, the ruling entity) and the outside world.

Liberal candidate Maia Sandu has been announced as the winner of Moldova’s November 2020 presidential election. While she had been critical of relations with Russia in the past, her country’s foreign policy may not dramatically change. Sergey Markov of the Institute of Political Studies said that Sandu is “the political enemy of Russia.” He claimed that, as minister of education, she “spoke in favor of replacing the Russian language with as much English as possible. [And] she always criticized Russia at the earliest opportunity.” Markov also claimed that Sandu supports the “acquisition of Moldova by Romania.”

Some Russian experts have been quick to reject the idea that Sandu’s victory will mean a significant change in Moldova’s approach to its allies. Andrey Suzdaltsev, Deputy Dean of the International Affairs Faculty at Moscow’s prestigious Higher School of Economics, told the RIA Novosti news agency that the Kremlin shouldn’t “be upset about Sandu’s victory in the elections. She is a very practical person and will try to preserve and develop the achievements that Chi?inau and Moscow already have.” He added that “the situation in Moldova is now more or less stable – her political grouping has learned hard lessons from the crises that previously split the country. I think they have [a desire to] preserve stability and a good attitude towards Russia.”

Speaking to RT, Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-chief of the journal Russia in Global Affairs, said that “nothing will change fundamentally in Moldova,” but that it’s “positive that power will change hands calmly and in a civilized way.” He added “But, in general, the fate of the country is unenviable when the decisive word belongs to those who have left and are unlikely to return.” Voters from Moldova’s diaspora, voting by absentee ballot, overwhelmingly supported Sandu in the first round, giving her around 70 per cent of the overseas vote. For them, Lukyanov explained, “the choice between East and West is literal – where they choose to go and live and earn money.”

During the 1991 August coup d'état in Moscow, commanders of the Soviet Union's Southwestern Theater of Military Operations tried to impose a state of emergency in Moldova, but they were overruled by the Moldovan government, which declared its support for Russian president Boris N. Yeltsin. On August 27, 1991, following the coup's collapse, Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union. In October, Moldova began to organize its own armed forces. The Soviet Union was falling apart quickly, and Moldova had to rely on itself to prevent the spread of violence from the "Dnestr Republic" to the rest of the country. The December elections of Stepan Topal and Igor' Smirnov as presidents of their respective "republics," and the official dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the year, led to increased tensions in Moldova.

Along with Ukraine and Turkmenistan, Moldova refused to sign a January 1993 agreement that would have strengthened political and economic integration among CIS members. It thus embarked upon a difficult course of independence, maneuvering between Russia and Romania, both of which have strong interests in the region, and each of which is more powerful than the young republic. It was only in April 1994 that the new Parliament finally approved Moldova's membership in the CIS and signed a CIS charter on economic union.

New parliamentary elections were held in Moldova on February 27, 1994. Although the election was described by international observers as free and fair, authorities in Transnistria refused to allow balloting there and made efforts to discourage the inhabitants from participating. Only some 7,500 inhabitants voted at specially established precincts in right-bank Moldova.

The new Parliament, with its Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova majority, did not face the same gridlock that characterized the old Parliament with its majority of Popular Front hard-line nationalists: legislation was passed, and changes were made. President Snegur signed the Partnership for Peace agreement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in March 1994, and in April Parliament approved Moldova's membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS--see Glossary) and in a CIS charter on economic union. On July 28, Parliament ratified a new constitution, which went into effect August 27, 1994, and provided substantial autonomy to Transnistria and to Gagauzia.

Russia and Moldova signed an agreement in October 1994 on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria, but the Russian government balked at ratifying it, and another stalemate ensued. Although the cease-fire was still in effect at the beginning of 1995 and further negotiations were to include the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations, there was little hope for progress in the near future toward settling the dispute and getting the Russian troops to leave.

In 1995, the country became the first former Soviet republic admitted to the Council of Europe. In addition to its membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace, Moldova also belongs to the United Nations, the OSCE, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Moldova is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In 1998, Moldova contributed to the founding of GUAM, a regional cooperative agreement made up of Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan, in addition to Moldova. Although the agreement initially included a declaration of mutual defense, Moldova since declared its disinterest in participating in any GUAM-based mutual defense initiative. Moldova was involved in information exchange, trade and transportation, border control, and energy projects issues within this regional agreement [in 2006, the organization's members voted to change the name to the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development -- GUAM].

After Moldova made a strategic decision to strengthen ties with the West in 2003, Russia's relationship with Moldova quickly moved from brotherly to adversarial. Despite Russia's efforts to separate the bilateral ties from disagreements over Transnistria, it was impossible to hide the clear linkage.

In 2005, Russia enacted a ban on Moldovan agricultural products and in 2006, it banned imports of Moldovan wines. Although Russian President Putin announced an end to the wine ban in November 2006, actual resumption of wine exports came a year later. The wine ban was particularly painful because, prior to the ban, Moldovan wines accounted for one-third of the country's exports and 80% of wine exports went to Russia. Some Moldovan wineries have been successful in finding new, alternative markets for their products.

Russia and Moldova began negotiating a package in secret after the reconciliation in August 2006 between Presidents Putin and Voronin. The package included the status of Transnistria within a neutral Moldova, the modalities of governance and peacekeeping, and assurances that Transnistrian privatization of enterprises to Russian interests would not be reversed. Once agreed, Russia would have proposed the package as its own, getting the credit for making peace. In January 2007, Russia stopped negotiating.

The Russians would indeed like to resolve Transnistria -- if it means getting the credit, showing the West by analogy that its role in Georgia is justified, keeping Moldova "neutral," retaining a Russian presence that will keep Ukraine's and Romania's influence to a minimum, and preserving Russian business interests. If that cannot be achieved, or if the Russians do not trust Romania to live up to his end of the bargain, the status quo is preferable.

Following 19 months of disruption by the Russian wine ban, Moldovan wine exports were up three-fold in the first quarter of 2008 compared with 2007. Exports to Ukraine and Belarus, which increased substantially in 2007, continue to grow. Preferential trade access granted by the EU provides opportunities for new markets, albeit extremely competitive ones. Despite the damage caused by Russia's politically motivated bans, some Moldovan wine producers have quickly returned to the Russian market. EU trade preferences would allow some Moldovan wines to be price competitive on European markets; however, quality remains a concern.

Russia's relationship with Moldova revolved around two issues -- development of economic ties and resolution of the Transnistria conflict. By 2008 Russia was particularly concerned about "guarantees" that Moldova would keep its neutrality vis-a-vis NATO. Given Ukraine's announced intent to seek a NATO Membership Action Plan at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Russian sensitivities about Moldova's stance on eventual NATO membership were heightened. At that time the Russians did not have a problem with Moldova eventually seeking EU membership.

In the aftermath of the April 2009 Moldovan parliamentary elections the losing side alleged fraud. In Moldova, the fraud allegations - at least partially substantiated by foreign observers - triggered massive political protests that turned violent in the capital, Chisinau, and resulted in the destruction of the parliament building and the presidential palace. Russia's position was that the demonstrators after the 05 April 2009 Moldova elections constituted a thwarted "color revolution". Referring to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Deputy Valeriy Rushkin (CPRF) called the unrest "another project of the orange pest," while United Russia's Vladimir Pekhtin compared the riots he said had been caused by an "external influence" to the color revolutions, which he charged aimed to "weaken Russia's influence" and ensure that "no pro-Russian states remained around Russia."

Within months Russia was coming to terms with the fact that Moldova for the first time since 2001 would not be governed by the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), the party the GOR had unofficially supported in the April 5 and July 29 elections in that country. Some experts believed Moscow became disillusioned with Moldovan President Voronin after the Communists' inability, despite Russian support, to win the April 5 elections.

Adjusting to the new realities in Moldova after the July 29 repeat elections, Nezavisimaya Gazeta said Russia signaled it would work with all parties in the new Moldovan Government when Russian Ambassador to Moldova Valery Kuzmin met August 6 with Liberal Party of Moldova leaders Dorin Chirtoaca and Michael Gimpu. The newspaper described the meeting as "the first time in the history of Russian-Moldovan relations" that the GOR spoke with a Moldovan "non-majority" party. In return, Nezavisimaya Gazeta argued that the Russian-speaking population in Moldova and Moldovan guest workers in Russia, along with Russia's energy resources, demand for imports from Moldova, and role in the Transnistria conflict forced the Moldovan election winners to engage with Russia.

Moscow would only have "limited goodwill" for the liberals' plans for a more pro-Western Moldova, and Moscow's goodwill would end if the new government attempted to lead Moldova into NATO. Russia lost its dream of a pro-Russian Moldova, and was now left only with a pro-Russian Transnistria.

On October 31, 2009 Moldova signed an agreement with Moscow backing Russian membership in the World Trade Organization after Russia promised to resolve an agricultural dispute. Moldova had threatened to block Russian WTO membership after Russia barred Moldovan wine exports in March 2009. Moldova called the move a political reaction to its efforts to establish better ties with the West.

The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and EU autonomous trade preferences were incentives for further market diversification. As part of talks for an Association Agreement with the EU started on January 12, 2010, Moldova sought to establish a deep and comprehensive free trade area with the EU. In 2010, Russia again took measures to restrict Moldovan wine, fruit, and vegetable exports -- ostensibly due to food safety concerns. Some easing of these restrictions was reported in September 2011.

By 2013 Moscow and Brussels were in an east-west tug of war over the future of a big part of the former Soviet Union. Nowhere was this clearer than in Moldova. In September 2013 Russia suddenly banned all imports of Moldovan wines. One week later, Russian President Vladimir Putin lashed out at Moldova during his annual Valdai meeting with European and American experts: “Where will Moldova sell its wine? In France? I’m sure the French will not let them sell a single bottle of Moldovan wine in their country.... It’s just as impossible in Italy,” he continued. “Let’s see what will happen if they try. Wine producers will dump out all the crates, destroy everything, and pour it all into ditches.”

Kirill I, the Russian Orthodox Patriarch, flew from Moscow to Moldova and Ukraine. He urged Orthodox faithful to look East, to Russia. Then, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin flew to Moldova and threatened to cut off gas supplies this winter. He said: “I hope you don’t freeze.” Rogozin also threatened to deport Moldovan migrant workers from Russia. About one quarter of Moldova’s 3.5 million people work outside the country, many of them in Russia. Rogozin said on Moldovan TV: “If the majority of your migrant workers work in Russia, where are they going to go? Hello, people!”

Moldova’s government will fight for the return of Moldovan wines to Russian shops, Prime Minister Iurie Leanca said 27 October 2013. “We do not want to lose the Russian market, we will do everything possible for our excellent wines to reach Russian consumers,” Leanca said on the Echo Moskvy radio Saturday, adding that Russia accounts for a “considerable” share of Moldova’s wine exports, up to 29 percent. Russia banned Moldovan wine and brandy imports in September over "quality" concerns. The ban came ahead of the expected signing of a landmark agreement between the European Union and Chisinau in November. Russia also imposed trade restrictions on Roshen, a major candy maker from Moldova’s neighbor Ukraine, which also sought to sign a similar deal with the EU during the Eastern partnership summit in Vilnius, Lithuania.

Relations with the Russian Federation remain troubled because of the presence of Russian forces in the separatist Transnistria region, restrictions on Moldovan exports to Russia, and reassessments of Moldova's history during the Soviet period. Russia wanted "another Kaliningrad" in Transnistria, and had dodged its responsibility for solving the conflict. The history issue is seen in terms of Moldova's decades-long "suffering from Russia's interest": war, collectivization, deportations, and refusal to admit what actually happened in the 1940s.