Lithuania - China Relations
Few countries have dared to challenge China like Lithuania. Vilnius left an economic forum with Beijing, advised people to throw away Chinese smartphones and opened ties with Taiwan. China downgraded diplomatic ties with Lithuania and stopped issuing visas there in protest at Vilnius’s decision to allow Taiwan to open a representative office under its own name. China banned Lithuanian products from entering the Chinese market amid growing tensions. EU Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis warned 24 December 2021 that a Chinese blockade of Lithuania’s exports over a dispute about Taiwan was increasingly affecting firms from other EU countries. “Apparently Chinese customs is not processing goods from other EU countries if they contain parts from Lithuania.”
The first contacts between the two countries were mentioned in written sources as early as 1795. It is believed that Lithuanians reached the territory of China after the 1864 uprising took place. China recognized Lithuania's independence in 1923, but relations with the country ended at the beginning of the Soviet occupation. All contacts were already indirect, as citizens no longer had freedom of choice. China has not supported the Baltic struggle for independence. However, after Lithuania's declaration of independence, relations were restored as soon as possible, fearing that Taiwan would establish diplomatic relations earlier and China tried to strengthen its position abroad.
By 2005 China had a large and growing diplomatic representation in Lithuania. The Chinese mission in Lithuania increased from four to fourteen officials since 2000, and was now the third largest embassy in town after Russia and the United States. Since Lithuania's EU and NATO accession, Lithuania occupied a "higher drawer of interest" for China. Chinese diplomats had regular but infrequent contact with the MFA. A few predictable exceptions aside, the Chinese diplomats were at a loss for topics of discussion with their Lithuanian counterparts and did not even engage vigorously on the topics that should arguably matter most. Lithuania had similar trouble finding themes for discussion with China.
The surge of Chinese exports to other parts of Europe, however, played a part in the dramatic decline in sales of Lithuanian products to EU countries. This was most notable in Lithuania's textile industry, in which up to 30,000 jobs may be lost due to competition from China, according to the Association of Lithuanian Textile Enterprises. China's growing economic importance will affect Lithuania, but, for many, China is too distant and exotic to cause concern.
Less than 1% of Lithuania’s exports go to China. Lithuania Exports to China was US$357.76 Million during 2020, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. Lithuania exports goods such as cereals, wood and furniture to China and imports $US1.4 billion worth of products.
Lithuania's commercial relationship with China entailed some of the same costs and benefits that feature in other bilateral trade relationship with China. Consumers benefit from the inflow of cheap, well-made goods, but the imports and competition in third markets threaten jobs in some sectors, especially in light manufacturing. Lithuanian consumers benefit from a rapidly expanding selection of affordable made-in-China goods in local stores. The lower prices also help to keep local inflation in check despite growing consumer demand.
On 18 November 2021, Lithuania, in disregard of China’s strong protest and repeated representations, allowed the Taiwan authorities to set up a “Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania”. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated "This act openly creates the false impression of “one China, one Taiwan” in the world, renounces the political commitment made by Lithuania in the communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, undermines China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and grossly interferes in China’s internal affairs. The Chinese side expresses its strong indignation and protest against this move, and decides to downgrade its diplomatic relations with Lithuania to the chargé d’affaires level."
The building at the heart of the 2021 confrontation is a rather inconspicuous office block in the Lithuanian capital. Behind its shiny glass facade you can find law firms, consultancies and other companies. But, at the end of November 2021, new tenants moved into 16b J. Jasinskio Street in Vilnius — and that was when the trouble really started. It's the Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania — and that has unleashed a furious response more than 6,500 km further east in Beijing.
China regards Taiwan as a breakaway province and views any diplomatic relationship with Taiwan as an attack on its One China policy. That's why, of late, it has been putting more and more pressure on countries to break off their ties with Taiwan. There are few countries left in the world that represent Taiwan under its official name. And those that dare to do so tend to be small and of little economic significance: the Marshall Islands, for example, Guatemala, St. Lucia and Eswatini, the African state formerly known as Swaziland.
But tiny Lithuania is an EU member state. It permitted Taiwan to open its first de facto embassy on European soil for 18 years, since 2003 in Bratislava, which was a year before Slovakia joined the EU along with Lithuania and many other neighboring countries. From Lithuania’s perspective, however, it has never officially committed itself to an interpretation of “One China” that would exclude such an initiative. Indeed, the move would indicate neither the establishment of “official relations” nor “engaging in official contacts” with Taiwan.
This is not the first time that Lithuania has shown China the cold shoulder. In 2019 Lithuanian intelligence agencies explicitly named China as a national security threat. Thus, Lithuania’s subsequent decision to review its relationship with China had a local rationale, although the largely coinciding shift in the EuroAtlantic political, economic and security community made the review much easier to validate.
China confirmed such allegations in the eyes of many by employing its “united front work” and “wolf warrior diplomacy”, which together produced the 23 August 2019 incident, which was the first time that pro-Beijing demonstrators, notably including Chinese diplomats, expressed themselves openly in any of the Baltic States. A rally supporting Hong Kong protests and Tibet in Vilnius was met by a smaller but aggressive group of Chinese protesters. A verbal clash and minor scuffles ensued in what was the first time Lithuania experienced China's increasingly assertive efforts to use its diaspora to further Beijing's interests. Members of the diplomatic staff did take part: the Chinese ambassador himself, the defence attaché, his deputy and the second secretary of the embassy.
Lithuania had good relations with the Tibetan government in exile. The Dalai Lama, the leader of the Tibetan state, was the first in the world to congratulate Lithuania on regaining its independence. This leader visited Lithuania on an official visit in 1991 and met with President Landsbergis. And there have been four such visits. This is particularly outrageous for the Chinese side, which does not recognize the Tibetan government.On 11 September 2013, in disregard of China's opposition, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite insisted on meeting Dalai in a so-called "private capacity". Such move negatively affected the bilateral ties. China lodged strong representations over the issue.
Lithuania has also issued a resolution that Beijing will certainly dislike - condemning China's treatment of the Muslim Uighur minority . China has been accused of committing crimes against humanity and outright genocide. And that’s not all. Following the change of government and the election of a new foreign minister, Lithuania urged the United Nations to investigate China's activities in Uighur camps in the Xinjiang region.
In September 2021, the Lithuanian defense ministry officially advised consumers not to buy Chinese smartphones — and suggested that people who had already bought these cellphones should throw them away. The national cybersecurity body had found that the phones contained a censorship feature that could be activated at any time. Lithuania also plans to expand its 5G telecommunications network without the participation of any Chinese companies — for "safety reasons." And at the beginning of 2020 it became the only country, so far, to leave the so-called 17+1 China – Central and Eastern European Countries economic cooperation forum between China and many central and eastern European countries.
"We believe that the economic relations established with democratic states are more sustainable and long-lasting, they are more based on the principle of the rule of law, therefore they are more in line with Lithuania's interests," Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis told reporters in mid-November 2021. Beijing was increasingly incensed by the approach being taken in Vilnius. At the end of November 2021, the Global Times — the English-language mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party — expressed its fury at the audacity of a country with a "population [that] is not even as large as that of Chaoyang district in Beijing." It added that Lithuania was "just a mouse, or even a flea, under the feet of a fighting elephant."
And the elephant swiftly retaliated. At the end of November 2021, China downgraded diplomatic relations with the tiny Baltic state, permanently recalling its own ambassador from Vilnius and declaring his Lithuanian counterpart persona non grata.
"The tone in Chinese state media was very sharp," according to Kai-Olaf Lang, specialist for Baltic affairs at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). "Lithuania perceived that accordingly." But, he says, it left the government feeling that it had taken the right course regarding Taiwan. "The line is: We cannot give in now," according to Lang.
Unlike many other states, Lithuania does not have to worry about its economic interests in its foreign policy towards China. Lang believes that Vilnius can afford to act like this because only 1.1% of Lithuania's exports in 2020 went to China. And even though the proportion of Chinese imports over the same period was slightly higher, Lang says that this is "nothing that would plunge the country into more major problems."
Lithuania’s dispute with China escalated after local media reported that goods from some of its companies were barred from entering Chinese ports. Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis described the move as “unannounced sanctions” on 03 December 2021 and said Lithuania will seek assistance from the European Commission next week to solve the issue. It’s “unprecedented when one EU member state is being partially sanctioned,” he said. some of the Baltic nation’s forestry and furniture goods were being held up at ports after Lithuania was deleted from China’s electronic customs declarations system from 01 December 2021. This meant they could not clear cargoes destined for China, while exporters trying to send goods to Lithuania were in the same boat. Outside wartime conditions, full trade bans are extraordinarily rare. This delisting is – de facto – the most serious trade sanction the PRC can apply. It has never done this before. The ban, which was never confirmed by the Chinese authorities, was reportedly lifted after just four days following pressure from the European Union.
In addition, Lithuanians are particularly skeptical when it comes to communist regimes because of their own history. In 1990, Lithuania was the first country to actively declare its independence from the Soviet Union, successfully opposing the much mightier Moscow. The SWP expert says that freedom, democracy and human rights have been values that politicians in Lithuania have been strongly advocating ever since. According to Kai-Olaf Lang, that trend has become more pronounced since autumn 2020 when there was a change of government in Vilnius. This came at the height of pro-democratic protests against Alexander Lukashenko in neighboring Belarus.
"Many Lithuanians were reminded of their own fight for freedom," says Lang. The new center-right government also agreed in their coalition treaty that they would "actively oppose every violation of human rights and democratic liberties and defend all those who are fighting for freedom in the world — from Belarus to Taiwan." In the intervening period, the country has offered refuge to many politically persecuted dissidents from its southeastern neighbor, including Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskay.
Lithuania's relations with Beijing, Minsk and Moscow are traditionally tense. The country's insurance policy in terms of national security is its alliance with the United States via its NATO membership, for instance. While Washington has its problems with the foreign policy adopted towards China or Russia by other European countries, the Baltics expert says that Lithuania has shown itself to be "a loyal partner of the United States by trying to push back against Russia, while, at the same time, signaling to Washington: "We are going in the same direction when it comes to containing China," says Lang.
Knowing the US has its back, Lithuania is pushing for a stricter, common European policy towards China. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis said earlier this year that it was time to drop the 17+1 format in favor of the "much more efficient 27+1," calling for unity among the 27 EU member states when it came to relations with China. "The EU is strongest when all 27 member states act together along with EU institutions," he said. The escalation of tensions between Vilnius and Beijing does seem to be stirring some movement within the European Union with respect to this one point at least. "The EU is ready to stand up against all types of political pressure and coercive measures applied against any member state," said the EU's foreign policy chief Josep Borrell on December 8, in a warning to Beijing.
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