Project 6300 RNoN Skjold-class corvette - Program
The project involves the acquisition of a series of five vessels in Skjoldklassen and updating of the prototype KNM Skjold, which was developed in "Project 6081 - New MTB Structure -development phase ", so there are a total of six vessels. The vessels are built in plastic composite 47.5m long, 13.5m wide and weighs 273 tons. They have a maximum speed of 60 knots. The project also includes procurement of weapon systems for all vessels, training and training systems, documentation and spare parts. The contract was signed on November 30, 2003 with the Skjold Prime Consortium (SPC), which consisted of
- Umoe Mandal, with responsibility for hull and machinery - 54% of contract amount
- Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace (KDA), with responsibility for weapon systems - 20% of contract sum
- DCNS (France), with responsibility for command, control and information systems -26% of contract amount
The total cost frame for the project was in 2003 at 4,675 billion. The contract price at this time was about 3.6 billion. The cost frame as of 2010 was 5,412 billion. In addition, the costs associated with equipping the vessels with New Sea Missiles (NSM) were estimated at approximately 2 billion, so the total cost of the acquisition was estimated at around NOK 7 billion (price level 2010).
The project has delivered six vessels with a performance, functionality and quality that satisfied all the performance targets set for delivery. Under the conditions provided start-up of the contract negotiations in 2001 was considered the serial production of the vessels as cost efficiently implemented. But in perspective of being a continuation of the development of Skjold and a part of the main project to develop and acquire new missile launchers, cost effectiveness is estimated to be lower. It is estimated that the project overall, could have cost savings of around one billion kroner if the investment decision had been postponed to 2003.
The delivery of the vessels was significant delayed in relation to the contractual delivery dates. The main reason for this was underestimation of uncertainty related to the new propulsion solution of the series-produced vessels in relation to the pilot vessel.
For Umoe, the contract was 2 billion krónur and meant an employment rate at the highest was about 400 people. Due to the major delays and the resulting daily fines earnings were limited and eventually with significant losses. For Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace (KDA), the contract was worth approximately 800 million. Between 10 and 30 people worked in connection with the project. It was not possible for Umoe to sell this type of vessel to anyone other than Norway's Navy, but it had been selling Surface Effect Ship (SES) technology and engineering services, even though this has been quite limited. Nor did the KDA succeed in exporting the weapon systems they developed for ships together with French DCNS.
For Umoe is the main effect was that thanks to the project, the company survived, but the delays and the daily payments meant that earnings were limited and eventually posed significant losses. Umoe is an important business in Mandal with positive ripples for the municipality and the region. It is estimated that the effect of the ring effects of the project constituted a factor of between 3 and 4 man-years per workplace, which means that at the time Skjold project mostly employed 400 persons, the employment effect of this was between 1,200 and 1,600 jobs. The project meant a lot for supplier companies in the area, especially engineering services and construction, as well as suppliers of engineering services and production equipment.
By 2011, all five new frigates had been delivered and declared operational. Compared with old frigates they constitute a significant increase in capacity within the full range of tasks but also in the NATO context, they considered very useful and forward-looking. In relation to war role they still good capacity against submarines. With the introduction of new anti-ship missiles (NSM) will also have good capacity against surface targets. With its Sea Sparrow missiles, they also have a good self-protection against aircraft.
In relation to both the peace, crisis and war have our frigates a major advantage in that they have a large and advanced operating rooms with the capacity to lead operations at sea and to control air operations over their area of operations.
With the introduction of new helicopters their capabilities was further enhanced, both against submarines, but not least in relation to monitoring and information gathering in both peace and crisis. The training is very efficient using their own fitness. Before the vessels are considered fully operational, the level tested in collaboration with the Royal Navy (Flag Officer Sea Training - FOST).
The new Norwegian frigates repeatedly participated in international operations and they have also been the platform for Notger under management of such operations.
Although it has been a challenge to recruiting and retaining key personnel, within frigate force there is still a plan to maintain and retain all five frigates int eh force structure. The Navy envisaged that three vessels at any one time is fully staffed, two of which at any time are operative. In addition, it was envisaged to staff a fourth frigate at short notice if it should prove necessary.
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