French Armor - 1934 - de Gaulle Independent Armor
Just as the French Army was cautiously moving forward in the area of mechanization, its development was almost aborted by the writings of Charles de Gaulle. In 1934, Lieutenant Colonel de Gaulle published "Towards the Professional Army". This call for a 100,000-man armored army was based heavily on Estienne's work. De Gaulle's book was hardly innovative in terms of doctrine and organization in that it envisioned a pure armor brigade operating in Linear formation, followed by a motorized infantry force for mopping-up operations. The real problem was political.
Charles de Gaulle advocated in his book Vers L'Armée de métier (Toward a Professional Army) the formation of independent armored units. He advocated a professional army that was also mechanized with shock troops. In a nation that was extremely pacifistic and dedicated to the doctrine of the citizen soldier, de Gaulle was advocating an aggressive, professional standing army of technicians. His "instrument of repressive and preventive maneuver" might well be used to start an offensive war with Germany or to support a military coup d'etat in republican France. De Gaulle's sensational book not only jeopardized the more gradual efforts of Weygand, but also set extremely high standards for what constituted an armored division. Paul Reynaud presented these ideas to the political authorities of the time. They felt that it was anti-republican as it was viewed these forces would be offensive in nature. Pétain struck him off the promotion lists in 1936 for this.
Because French tanks were divided into infantry tanks and cavalry tanks, and the French army's demand for a full-scale offensive was extremely low, the main strategic purpose was to rely on the Magino line to implement defensive counterattacks, so the development of French armored tactics has taken two different directions. This may be related to the fact that the average age of French generals was 70 years old, but most of them have participated in the Great War. After all, the price paid by France in the Great War was too high.
The main tactical task of the French infantry tank was to assist each other with infantry within a 50-kilometer battlefield to attack the enemy's permanent fortifications, and rely on its heavy armor to approach the enemy's strong firepower point and then destroy it. This tactical application mainly originated from the First World War. Because the French army lost too much force in the blind attack, the French army believed that it could no longer withstand such high losses after the end of the first war. Infantry tanks could be like The mobile bunker also provides cover for the infantry and reduces the casualty rate.
The task of the cavalry tank was just like its name, acknowledging the role similar to that of the cavalry, relying on its speed to intersect the enemy's offensive forces within a battlefield range of 100 kilometers to 150 kilometers, and ultimately annihilate the enemy's offensive forces. These two tank tactics used by the French army are based on not leaving the Maginot line too far, so most of the infantry tanks in the infantry division below are not equipped with radios. This can be regarded as a drawback, but considering The French army will not leave the line of defense too far, it seems that the problem was not big.
De Gaulle was the first French young officer who advocated the use of light and medium tanks to form armored divisions. De Gaulle believes that tanks need to balance armor and speed. The route of infantry tanks and cavalry tanks was not desirable. Instead, tanks should be divided into light, medium and heavy types. Light tanks constitute auxiliary combat reconnaissance and support infantry forces. Medium Tanks are sharp knives for mobile operations, and heavy tanks are hammers that give the enemy a heavy blow. The flexible use of these three tanks can expand the scope of the battle and effectively divide the enemy into annihilation.
At the same time, de Gaulle believed that it was not advisable for armored forces to rely solely on fortresses to implement defense. Tanks should be an offensive force. They are the overlords on the ground when they have enough infantry to follow and have air cover. Under joint operations, aviation will focus on attacking high-value strategic targets on the ground, and ground mechanized units will encircle the enemy on a large scale with the assistance of motorized infantry. This was bound to be an important development direction for future mechanized combat strategies and tactics.
Unfortunately, the French high-level officials were not cold about De Gaulle's advice. The stubborn old generals insisted on using infantry tanks and cavalry tanks to strengthen the defense of the Maginot Line and local counterattacks. Although the French tanks are now moving towards a balanced direction of armored firepower and speed, the French army has only formed three armored divisions for training and reorganization. The tactical purpose was not to attack forward, but to intercept and possibly break through. The Maginot line and the German armored forces in the direction of Belgium. However, the training of the French army attracted the attention of Guderian, the founder of German armored tactics. Until 1939, Guderian had been using the French armored division as a model to improve German tactics.
