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Military


Great War - French Tanks in Action

On April 16, 1917, the French tanks fought their first engagement, taking part in the operations of the Fifth French Army in the attempted penetration on the Chemin des Dames. Eight Schneider companies were employed. In spite of their remaining for a considerable time in front of the infantry these troops could not follow owing to the enemy's heavy machine-gun fire. At nightfall the tank companies were rallied, having sustained serious losses in personnel and matbriel. Bodies of infantry had been specially detailed to escort the tanks and prepare paths for their advance, but their training had been limited and their efforts were ineffectual.

The battle of Malmaison was fought on October 23. Five companies of tanks took part in it under the orders of Colonel Wahl, who had recently been appointed to command the Artillerie d'Assaut with the Sixth Army. This command was the origin of what later became a Tank Brigade Headquarters, which corresponded with a Group Headquarters in the final organisation of the British Tank Corps. In this battle the Schneider company operated with success, but the St. Chamond machines were a failure, only one or two reaching the plateau. On the 25th the St. diamonds were used again. Generally speaking, it was considered that the French heavy tanks had justified their construction, nevertheless many still doubted their utility when the victory of Cambrai, on the British front, dispelled all doubts in the French mind.

The second period now opened and defensive reconnaissances were undertaken along the French front in view of the expected German offensive. In March 1918 all available tanks were concentrated behind the front of the Third French Army as counter-attack troops, and in this capacity took part in the following minor operations, which were chiefly undertaken to recapture features of local tactical importance.

Following the great blow struck at the junction of the British and French Armies in March the German General Staff decided to attack the French on 27 May 1917. It would appear that this attack was at first intended only to secure the heights south of the river Vesle, but that by the 29th, owing to its astonishing initial success, it was decided to push it forward with the ultimate intention of capturing Paris and so ending the war before America could develop her full strength. A council of war was held in the recaptured area at which the Kaiser, Crown Prince, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were present and at which it was decided to exploit the success gained to its utmost. This offensive may be considered to have worn itself out by June 4, on which date the Germans had developed a salient forty kilometres deep on a forty kilometres front. The old capital of France, however, remained in French hands and its occupation denied to the German forces holding the salient a most needed line of supply.

In the action of June 11 the Schneider and St. Chamond tanks reached the zenith of their career. From now onwards, though they continued to be fought, they gradually ceased to be used as units, becoming mixed with Renault machines until finally, in October 1918, the two remaining mixed battalions were armed with British Mark V star tanks; these two battalions, however, never took the field.

On July 15 the Germans launched their final great attack of the war, the blow falling between Chateau-Thierry and Reims. The total number of French tank battalions available at Soissons was seven heavy battalions and nine light ones. The entire French operation was to be based on tanks, which were to be engaged to the last machine. This was the greatest French tank battle fought during the war. On 17 July 1918, the attack was launched at 4.35 a.m. in a slight fog which accentuated its surprise. There was no artillery bombardment. Of the 324 tanks which were concentrated in the Tenth French Army Sector, 225 were engaged on July 18. Of these, 102 became casualties, 62 being put out of action by artillery fire. In personnel the losses were about 25 per cent, of the effectives engaged. During the succeeding days of battle the tank units, attached to the Tenth French Army, had exhausted themselves, having practically fought to the last machine and last man.

This great victory, from a tank point of view, had a stupendous influence on succeeding operations, owing to: the eagerness with which Infantry Commanders now clamoured for tanks, and the speeding up of the formation and training of new tank battalions. From this date on, battalions of Renault tanks became available at the rate of one a week; this resulted in tired battalions being speedily replaced by fresh ones, consequently they were never so completely worn out as was the case in the British Tank Corps, which only received two fresh battalions between August and November 1918, one of which arrived too untrained ever to go into action. Without the assistance of the tank, a deadlock would have re-occurred. From the end of September onwards, operations generally had consisted in following up the enemy all along the line and pressing back his rearguards.

In August the strength of the French Tank Corps was 14,649 all ranks, approximately the strength of an infantry division. During 1918, 3,988 individual tank engagements were fought: 3,140 by Renault, 473 by Schneider, and 375 by St. Chamond tanks. Tanks were employed on 45 of the 120 days which elapsed between July 15 and November 11. In personnel the casualties between these dates were approximately 300 officers and 2,300 other ranks.