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German Aircraft - World War II Production

Different estimates occur because the literature was built over years with different information from national or industrial archives. The question about the exact size of the German armaments production was fully addressed by the data provided by the German Institute for Military History in the monumental publication on the History of the Second World War. The German Institute for Military History provided accurate data across all types of weaponry procured throughout the war.

The Luftwaffe could barely squeeze 1,000 aircraft out of industry for the first production program. Most of that effort consisted of training aircraft to expand the flying base. The "combat" aircraft hardly deserved that characterization. From a January 1933 industrial base of 4,000 workers, the aircraft industry expanded to 16,870 workers in 1934 and to 204,100 workers by the fall of 1938. Beginning in 1936, but with increasing force in 1937, the Luftwaffe transitioned into its second generation of aircraft. The 1936 medium bomber program was meant to serve as an interim measure until a third generation of bombers arrived. However, the long lead-time required for engine development constrained German aircraft design throughout the 1930s. Shortly after Munich, Hitler demanded a fivefold increase in the Luftwaffe by 1942, an impossible goal.

The alibis used by many German officials and industrialists blaming their failure to produce on a multiplicity of models, excessive progam and engineering changes, can be discounted. Their situation in this regard was no more difficult than that which pertained in the United States.

The basic error made by Germany was probably Hitler's failure to increase the aircraft program at the time the Allies began the Combined Bomber Offensive. It is known that accurate information as to the plans and programs for building of aircraft in the United States was available to him, but he and Goering dismissed the figures as false and impossible, and thereby underestimated their eventual requirements to meet Allied attack.

The multiplicity of airplane models has been cited as factor explaining in part the troubles of the German aircraft industry. There is no question that a large number of models was in each successive official program, at least up to the last threee, but it is equally significant that the overwhelming proportion of German aircraft production was in a relatively small number of models. In this last respect Germany probably was in a better position than the United States, where a considerable number of second and third line models were in substantial production. The amount of production effort absorbed by the large number of models which comprised the bulk of the German list, cannot have been large.

There were several conspicuous examples of indecision as to whether a particular model was to be included in the program or not, but this reflected confusion in planning rather than an undesireable number of available models. The failure to develop new and successful models except for the Me 262 in spite of many attempts, was an experience shared by the United States.

The production of Me-109 fighters over the FW-190 was an error. Already from the Battle of Britain it was clear that the Me-109 was marginalized by the British Spitfire. When the US P-47 and P-38 appeared the Me-109 had no chance of success. The fighter policy of the Luftwaffe was catastrophic. The German side had to focus in 3 types of fighters only. These were the FW-190 for day missions, the Me-110 for night missions, and the Me-262 jet fighter which had to be operational at least 18 months earlier. Thus the production of 12 807 Me-109 fighters in 1944 was a classic example of failure at tactical and strategic level. In the bombers case, the He-111 although reliable was inefficient, since it was a medium range design. The production of the Ju-87 Stuka, was a gross error. Another error was the case of the Me-210 fighter. This particular design was originally made in 1938, but mass production started in April 1941. The plane had technical problems and by April 14th 1942 the program was terminated, after the overall development of 158 airplanes (with other 26 in the production line).

1932 36
1933 368
1934 1,968
1935 3,183
1936 5,112 
1937 5,606
1938 5,235 
1939 8,295