• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

French Navy - 1897 - Budget Estimates

At the close of 1896 further uneasiness was excited in England by the decision of Russia, Germany and France, to strengthen their respective navies. In France, MM. Lockroy, de Kerjegu, and Deloncle were clamoring for a larger fleet, and, in particular, for vessels which shall be able to prey upon commerce, for coaling stations, for improved mobilisation and organisation. M. Lockroy had abandoned his project of spending an extra £8,000,000 on the Navy, but he was assured by the Minister of Marine that the Government was considering an increased programme of construction.

Two budgets for 1897 were presented to the National Assembly by the minister of marine, the second after the withdrawal of the first one. The report of the committee charged to examine the first budget was given in the name of M. J. de Kerjegu. The total sum asked for was 258,082,273 francs ($49,809.878.68), of which 79,790,231 francs ($15,400,672.58) was for new construction, which was smaller than the amount for any year that has been voted since 1892 ; but at the same time it was stated in the report that a powerful, well-organized navy has never been more necessary to France than now.

The belligerent in the wars of the future, as well as in the wars of the past, that has at its disposal a naval force sufficient to make it impossible for the enemy's ships to keep the sea, possesses a considerable factor of success in the general war. Historical examples were cited to prove the influence of superior navies on the results of various wars, the latest instance of which was the efforts of the Cuban insurgents to achieve the independence of the island from Spain, for, the report said, without a sufficient navy Spain might have to give up her efforts to maintain her dominion over the island. Furthermore, the report said the nations surrounding France had been making unremitting efforts for twenty-five years to build up powerful navies at the cost of the heaviest sacrifices, and it is shown that while the other naval powers of Europe have been increasing year by year for several years their appropriations for new construction, France has been giving less.

A comparison was made between the fleets of the possible enemies in tbe Mediterranean and north seas and her own Mediterranean and northern fleets, which are shown to be so separated geographically as to be out of supporting distance of each other, at least during the earlier stages of a war, and in which comparison the French fleets did not show up very well. Following this were tables showing the total tonnage armored and unarmored, under construction by the principal European nations on October 1, 1896. These give the triple alliance 150,000 tons, while France scarcely had 130,000; Russia had 115,000 tons, but England 355,000, and then the report makes a statement of considerable importance as showing the view of the committee as to the proper naval policy of France. It is given as follows :

"These comparisons suffice to demonstrate that we have not the fleet our policy requires, that which would permit us to sustain with advantage a contest with the triple alliance, and also to facilitate the regulation of difficulties that might be engendered between England and ourselves by the prolonging of certain misunderstandings or the clashing of our interests, so often in contact all over the world."

The report admits that it was out of the question to think of creating fleets as powerful as those of England, yet it is contrary to the genius of the French people to make only a passive defense, so a means was sought for carrying on an active vital warfare, and a saying of the great privateer Duguay-Trouin more than a hundred and fifty years ago is quoted was being as true to-day as then : "If we have war with England instead of rousing ourselves to fight battles on the sea, which are infinitely costly to France, and where the English will oftenest have the superiority of numbers, it would be more useful for the service of the King aud more ruinous to our enemies if we had forty or fifty vessels of from seventy-four to fifty guns in the port of Brest, that could be sent out in squadrons, following the advice that we would have of their enterprises and convoys, to chase and overtake them."

It was further stated that the war against commerce, the sole possible against England, would be equally efficacious against Germany, whose merchant-marine tonnage is more than 1,300,000.

Following, the committee state their opinion as to the character of the ship-building program France ought to undertake, viz : To get as many units as possible, reducing the tonnage of the ships in order not to exaggerate the financial sacrifices of the nation. They must be fast ships, but with speeds that survive the trials and that can be counted upon in service, and they must be ships with large radii of action.

In order to create this fleet as quickly as possible, a financial effort was necessary, but the importance of it would be considerably lessened if reforms be not made in the administration of the navy. It is stated that this administration, and particularly that of the arsenals, had not kept pace with the advancement in matériel, and the charge was made that at the central administration there was an absence of cohesion between the directions which did not try sufficiently to keep up the entente necessary for unity of action. Moreover, six grand commissions in their multiplicity paralyzed the authority of the commandment, relax the execution of orders, and disperse the responsibility of the decisions.

After the withdrawal of this estimate, the minister of marine presented another.

The debates on the Naval Budget, which took place in December 1896, opened with speeches based on criticism upon the allegations made by M. Delcassé. M. Camille Pelletan, a former "Reporter" of the Naval Budget, opened a general attack upon the administration of the Navy. He was warmly supported by M. Edouard Lockroy, Minister of Marine in the Bourgeois Government, by M. Abel, by M. Kerjégu, "Reporter" of the Budget, and by other speakers. M. Lockroy, declaring that the need for a large expenditure was imperative, moved an addition to the Estimates of 200,000,000 frs.

The report by M. de Kerjegu showed that as a naval power France was inferior not only to Great Britain but also to the Triple Alliance as far as the Mediterranean is concerned. In the North Sea the German naval forces were far more than a match for the northern fleet of France. But some comfort was derivable from the rapid growth of Russia's naval power.

The Government put up Admiral Besnard, Minister of Marine, to reply. As an answer to the very precise charges made, the Admiral's speech cannot be said to have been effective, though possibly the Minister may have had good reasons for not caring to follow his critics with great minuteness. The contribution of the President of the Council (M. Mélinej was not particularly happy, and consisted in charging the Opposition with factious and unpatriotic motives. But this charge, it would seem, can hardly be maintained in view of the fact that the Government, while dividing the House against M. Lockroy's amendment, and defeating him by the substantial majority of 262, did eventually promise in the most formal terms that the additional sum demanded should be spent, and indeed exceeded.

The Naval discussion of December 1896 was exceptional, and seemed destined to be the starting point of a very marked advance in French Naval policy. The general impression created by a careful perusal of the whole of the reports is that the case of the Reformers was in the main established. There seemed to be no doubt that during the last two years there had been a pause in the activity of the French Admiralty, and that, in view of the strenuous efforts made by other countries, France had to some extent lost the undoubted Naval preponderance among the Continental Powers which she claimed, and possessed, a few years ago.

Neither M. Pelletan nor M. Lockroy was content with the view that all that was needed is more activity in the dockyards, and a more rapid construction of additional ships. On the contrary, they agreed in insisting upon the fact that the errors and faults of the existing system of Naval administration were so grave that no additions to the Fleet can add greatly to its efficiency, unless they be accompanied by an entire reorganisation of the Admiralty in all its departments. The principal speakers in the main debate were M. Camille Pelletan, and M. Edouard Lockroy, and these gentlemen, both of whom appear to have devoted much attention to their subject, were effectively seconded by M. Kerjégu, the "Reporter" of the Budget Commission, by M. Abel, and others.

1) France had fallen behind the other Great Powers in her rate of Naval development. The fact is undeniable, but it was due far more to the increased energy displayed by other Powers than to any real falling off in the French Constructive Department. The net decrease in the Naval Estimates during 1897, amounting to £267,000, was negligable, and the additions to the French Fleet which are contemplated even in the unamended program for 1897 present a very formidable aggregate of ships, including no less than ten battleships, nine first-class cruisers, and many smaller vessels.

2) There was too great a diversity of types. This was undoubtedly a fact. The British Admiralty had to contend with the same difficulty. The Minister of Marine promised a reform, but pointed out that its full application can only be expected when large numbers of ships are built at the same time, and that the constructive resources of France did not offer the same opportunities for simultaneous construction as did those of England.

3) Plans for ships were too often modified. This was also a true charge, but the evil, as the Minister was able to show, had been exaggerated ; for instance, the excess of weight on the Carnot, a ship which was greatly criticised, was only 100 tons. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the number of cases in which ships have been altered during construction with disadvantageous results, or altered after completion in order to rectify patent errors, is considerable. M. Pelletan refered to the Amiral Bandin, Formidable, Hoche, Caiman, Brennus, Furieux, Indomptable, Terrible, and others, as proving his contention. Those who know the history of British belted cruisers, and of several British ironclads, will readily believe that the French Navy was not altogether free from an inconvenience from which the British so often suffered ; they will at the same time, refuse to attach an exaggerated importance to these miscalculations.

4) The average speed was too low. - There was probably sufficient warrant for this statement, though it is made in far too general terms. It should be noted that vessels of very high speed were contemplated in the program already agreed to.

5) Protection against high explosives was wanting. - On this point M. Lockroy dwelled with great insistence, and he pointed to the Magnificent class of ships, not only as marking "an absolutely new departure in ironclad construction," but as a proof that England was preparing to meet the new methods of attack, and is herself amply provided with the new type of shell. This last conclusion, it may be remarked, was not very clearly deduciblc from the premises. With regard to the whole question, it may be said that light armoured protection is a feature of all new battleships, and that older British types were no better provided than their French contemporaries.

6) The coal capacity was inadequate. - This generally speaking is true, but is not material as long as the French policy of Naval concentration in home waters was adhered to. The recall of the Isly and Alger from the China station tended to show that the policy is not to be abandoned.

7) The condition of the French Naval boilers was deplorable. This was a matter upon which only very detailed expert evidence would be of value. There did not seem any reason to believe that the average condition of French boilers was worse than that of boilers in other Navies, but as M. Lockroy constantly spoke of "revelations" made to the Committee which he dare not repeat in public, he may have evidence on this point which he did not produce.

8) The number of preventible accidents is excessive, and betrayed bad management. - To those who know the frequency with which accidents take place on board ships of war, especially in the experimental stages, this charge would only carry conviction if it were supported by even stronger evidence than that which M. Pelletan and M. Lockroy produce. At the same time, it must he admitted that the French Navy did seem to have had at least its share of bad luck during the last few years.

9) The cost of building is unnecessarily high. - That construction in France was more costly than in England, or even than in Germany, seemed certain. That the causes are to a certain extent preventible by better management seemed very probable. But, as the element of cost would not be allowed to interfere with the program which a popular Ministry may recommend, this point did not seem very material to some other observers.

10) The administration of the Dockyards was faulty, the system of account keeping and stock checking was thoroughly unsound, the routine work was unnecessarily complicated, and there was loo much red tape. - On all these points the critics spoke with great conviction, and they undoubtedly made out an exceedingly strong case. " Hard cases make bad law," and it would perhaps be unfair to take some of the droll examples quoted by M. Pelletan, as fair specimens of Admiralty and Dockyard procedure ; but, if there be no contra to M. Pelletan's description of the system of stock-keeping in the French Navy, it was inevitable that immense confusion must arise. Articles taken into stock are apparently accounted for, not numerically, nor by a description of their qualities and purposes, but bv their official value. For instance, here is an account of a transaction which M. Pelletan declares to be representative. A purchase of 10,000 hectolitres of grain is made for one of the Dockyards. It never occured to the Accountant Department to enter the item on the stock account as 10,000 hectolitres of grain ; that was entirely forbidden by the system. The value and not the amount must be entered. The grain cost 17 frs. per hectolitre, but it must not be supposed that the entry made is 170,000 frs. The official price for grain on that particular day, as inscribed in the office, was 20 frs. per hectolitre ; it was therefore as 200,000 francs worth of grain that the article is entered.

M. Lockroy complained of much more serious errors in the administration of the Dockyards than those indicated by the instances just referred to. Both in his speech and in his book he prefered an elaborate indictment against the confusion of functions and responsibilities which exists at the various Ports ; and he showed by arguments and examples, which go far to produce conviction, that the Service suffered in time of peace, and was likely to suffer far more in time of war, as the result of these mistakes. "You must," says M. Lockroy, "absolutely separate the three great services which compose the Navy - the Fleet (L'Armée Navale), the constructive branch, and the accountant branch. Until you have done this you will obtain no result."

11) The personnel is admirable, but the promotion is too slow and the average age of officers is consequently too high. - No one who had any knowledge whatever of the French Navy would dispute the truth of the first proposition. Indeed, it was probable that the maritime inscripts, of whom many were fishermen, and of whom all were sea-faring men, were better "seamen," in the true sense of the word, than British blue-jackets. On the other hand, the slowness of promotion was an evil not confined to the French Navy, but it was true that the average age of officers of all grades is higher than in other Services.

12) The immobilisation of maritime inscripts when not embarked in time of war is a great loss of power, - This must clearly he the case. The army is not allowed to take the surplus inscripts ; the ships do not require them all. It was therefore recommended that the men of the Inscription Maritime should man the coast defences, and thus set free a number of soldiers equal to an Army Corps. 13) The secrets of the French Admiralty are not sufficiently well guarded. - Were it not that nearly every speaker dwelt with great insistence on this point it would hardly be worth mentioning. "Secrets" in the Navies of the world had scarcely any existence. All that it was material for one Power to know of the armaments of another was known, or can be known ; but the French idea that someone was betraying them was too deeply seated to be easily eradicated.

14) The inherent conservatism of the French Navy is detrimental to efficiency, and led to grave abuses. - On this point, also the critics were agreed, and enforce their arguments with much elaboration. It was not easy, however, for an outsider to judge how far zeal for democratic institutions may have borne its part in prompting the criticisms of members of the Left. That there is a compensating advantage for this dangerous conservatism is highly probable, and Englishmen who have had the pleasure of becoming acquainted with French Naval officers will probably regard the existence of a strong French "Navy tradition" as being of inestimable value to the Service as a fighting arm.

The condition of the French Navy, though not justifying alarmist views, was such as to necessitate immediate reforms in administration and large additions to matériel, especially in the form of sea-going ships. "The adminstration of the Navy is the most detestable that can be imagined," so says M. Pelletan. "We hold these fears to be exaggerated, these judgments too severe, but there is much requiring amendment," say the Budget Commission through the mouth of M. Kerjegu. The Government, speaking through the Minister of Marine, admitted the substantial truth of the indictment, and deliberately pledged itself to immediate and strenuous action, though, with an odd inconsistency, M. Meline, apparently from mere force of habit, denounces the critics whose motion he practically accepts as mere factious politicians.

Ten millions sterling was to be voted in addition to the ordinary Naval Estimates. How the money is to be applied was not certain, but some matters were already settled. The Channel Squadron was to be strengthened, so was the Mediterranean Fleet ; new torpedo boats were to be built ; swift cruisers, outstripping the latest British vessels, were to be multiplied ; submarine boats were to be constructed.

Supremacy over the Triple Alliance was the first, but not the ultimate object. "No country is better situated than France for the purpose of destroying English commerce and bringing England to her knees. We must be prepared for the Triple Alliance, but not less for a successful struggle with England. The English coast defence is notoriously weak ; British commerce should be our objective in war." Such were the sentiments to be found throughout the discussion and in the memorandum of the Budget Commission. "We must have la marine de notre politique," says M. Kerjegu, and "notre politique" may mean war with England. And indeed, M. Kerjegu, who, it must be remembered, was the Reporter of the Commission, was very explicit on this point ; so explicit, indeed, that he left no doubt whatever as to his meaning.

"It is well to he prepared for the Triple Alliance, but it is better still to be on a position of equality with England. It seems a natural course to inquire what should be the composition of our Fleet if we have to fight England. The constant fear of England for her commerce furnishes the most certain indication of the path which we ought to follow. There is indeed no Power which, thanks to its geographical situation, can more easily and more surely injure the commercial power of Great Britain than France. It will perhaps be objected, that whatever line we adopt, England will follow in our footsteps, will catch us up, and will pass us. It may be so, but we have faith in the characteristic facu1ty of the French genius and of her inventive power, in assuring us a lead over our adversaries. For fifty years past, France has been first in the field with composite ships, ironclads;, and with sea-going cruisers of high speed. The mastery which she knew how to attain during many years, I am not justified in believing is to become the privilege of any other nation. And we persist in regarding if now and always as belonging to us."

One British observer suggested that it was no exaggeration to say that if France were to lose the whole of her sea-going merchant navy on the first day of a war, and the whole of her Colonies on the second, she would, as a nation, be positively richer, and have more money to spend on the third day. The gigantic subsidies required to maintain a diminishing Mercantile Marine would be saved. The Colonial Budget, with its yearly deficit, would cease to be a drain upon French resources. Tonking and Annam would no longer be administered for the benefit of foreign traders at the cost of the French Exchequer. "To England, on the other hand, the loss of her Colonies and her commerce would mean extinction as a nation. It may be asked why Englishmen are always to regard French Naval preparations as a direct threat against this country. The answer is a simple one. The threat is made openly, deliberately, and often in terms so offensive, that, if they were used in this country of France, we should have been on the brink of war, if not over the edge, long ago. Englishmen are thick-skinned, dull, it may be, and hard words break no bones ; but a man who has a loaded pistol presented at his head is either too much of a philosopher, or too little of a man, if he pretend not to notice it. All French Naval preparations, by the almost universal testimony of French Naval writers, are, and must be, made with the object of conducting a successful predatory war against England."