French Navy - 1890s
France and the great maritime powers following Aube's example fitted out every summer a certain number of vessels which they have added to the permanent squadrons with a view to studying the problems of warfare upon the high seas. These experiments, moreover, have brought into active service for two or three weeks of each year the vessels of the second line held in reserve in the arsenals and also have brought their officers and crews into the evolutions of the squadrons. This all constitutes an excellent exercise for the personnel as well as trial for the material and machinery of the fleet. In these two points lie, perhaps.the principal good gained thus far by these maneuvers. But the general experience and knowledge gained by them is also considerable.
From the maneuvers in the Mediterranean in June 1891, the following lessons were deduced : The necessity of better methods of lighting ; the urgency of immediately constituting a fleet of cruisers ; the positive condemnation of little cruisers ; the almost exclusive limitation of the action of torpedo boats to coast defenses ; the uncertainty of the efficaciousness of the automatic submarine torpedoes and the necessity of making decisive experiments regarding the electric mines necessary to fire them ; the maintenance in a state of equipment as complete as possible of the boats of the second line and the forming of divisions of homogeneous reserves ; and the ability to increase at need the speed of the great war vessels.
Maritime inscription put at the disposition of the navy, from their eighteenth to their fiftieth year of age, all men residing along the seacoast. Fishermen for generations back, the inscribed men enter upon their duties already familiar with the dangers of the sea. In return for their services these marines have the free monopoly of the coast navigation, of the fisheries, and to a certain extent of the ownership of the products of the sea. At the end of twenty-five years they draw a pension. In times of peace they are held for duty for a period of seven years, after which they pass into the reserve corps and can be called upon for work only by a decree of mobilization.
The multiplicity of machinery with which it is necessary to furnish war vessels made a demand for specialists to operate it. Some of these callings were easily learned by any one, such as that of the top-man, the gunner, the helmsman ; others, such as that of the mechanician and the torpilleur demand a certain instruction which cannot always be obtained among the population of the coasts. In order to insure the recruiting of these specialists the navy admited of the voluntary enlistment for a period of from five to nine years, of young men of the interior who prefer the navy to the army, attracted by the advantages offered in the practice of these specialties for the sake of which they enlist.
These volunteer marines who leave the service at the end of their period of engagement complete the ten years which they owe to the active army in the reserve corps of the fleet and are held to respond to the call for the twenty-eight days of the naval maneuvers. At the end of the ten years they cease to be a part of the marine service and are ranked with the territorial army.
The navy of France was the second in the world, coming next to that of England, though far behind it. Her colonial aspirations made a large navy imperative for France. The Naval Defence Act, passed by the British Parliament in 1889, stimulated France to great exertions. In 1891 France entered upon an elaborate program of naval construction, which, however, it soon abandoned. In 1891 three first-class battleships were commenced - the Charles Marlel, Carnot, and Amiral Jaureguiberry. A return was made to the lozenge-wise disposition of the heavy guns which had been abandoned in the Brennus. The armament consisted of two 30-centimeter guns, one fore and one aft, and one 27-centimeter gun on either beam. The open barbette was abandoned and the turret adopted. An auxiliary armament of eight 14-centimetre quick-firers was carried; in the Jaureguiberry the quick-firers were placed in pairs in four lightly armored turrets ; on the other two each weapon has a separate armored turret and ammunition hoist. Thus the guns were well separated, and all in armored positions. The plating carried was thick on the heavy gun positions and water-line, where it varied between 17-3/4 and 10 inches. There was an end-to-end belt of this stout armor. Above this again was a belt of 4-inch armor about 4 feet deep, running from end to end, but carried up forward and aft in the line of the bow and stern waves. The small turrets all had 4-inch armor. There can be no doubt that these were extremely fine and powerful ships, carrying as they do over 4,000 tons of armor, but they exposed a very large unarmoured surface. Their speed was eighteen knots.
Of closely similar design were the Bouvet and Massena, in which the weight of 4,160 tons of armor was carried. The St. Louts, Charlemagne, and Gaulois, however, were widely different. In them a return was made to the fore and-aft system of mounting heavy guns, and the lozenge is abandoned. Four 30-centimetre guns were carried forward and aft, mounted in pairs in two turrets behind 15-3/4 inches of armor. Eight 14-centimetre quick-firers were mounted on the main deck, four on each side, behind 3-inch hardened steel. Two more were on the upper deck, protected only by shields, while on the hurricane deck six 10-centimeter quick-firers were carried. There was an end-to-end water-line belt 15-3/4 inches thick amidships, tapering to the ends, and over this again a 3-3/4-inch belt. The armor-decks were two in number ; one 3 inches thick at the upper level of the thick belt, the other 1-1/2 inches thick at its lower level. This gave these ships great protection against both ram and gun, as the belt was so strongly supported that it could scarcely be crushed in. The axial fire was very powerful. Six 14-centimeter, four 10-centimeter, and two 3O-centimetre guns fire ahead or astern; on the broadside four 30-centimeter, five 14-centimeter, and three 10-centimeter. The guns carried were of enormous length and had very high muzzle velocities. The three ships and the Massena all had the triple screw, which added to their manoeuvring power if not to their speed.
The Jena and two sister ships were similar in design to the St. Louis. The Jena carried a different auxiliary armament - eight 16-centimeter and four 10-centimetre quick-firers - had more coal, and higher speed.
From a list of forty-four French ships of 1898, it was possible to arrange the ships, first, according to the number of their funnels, including those which have them disposed athwartships. In this way there are three columns, which can be subdivided according to the number of masts, and further subdivision can be introduced according to the number of fighting tops on the foremast. If the vessel is approaching end on, the tops on the mainmast would possibly be obscured by the funnels. Under fighting- top subdivisions there would be remaining no group containing more than three ships.
In the Jemmapes class the French coast-service vessel drew closely to the sea-going battleship. The Jemmapes and Valmy were of the Caiman pattern, with a 34-centimeter 70-ton gun fore and aft in closed turrets. Amidships was a high superstructure, at the angles of which were mounted four lo-centimetre guns. These were excellent little ships, very well armed, handy, fast. Even better were the Bouvines and Trehouart, in which there was a high freeboard forward ; in them the 34-centimeter guns were replaced by weapons of 30 centimetres, and the number of 10-centimetre quick-firers wes increased to eight. The speed was also raised.
An improved ship of the Jemmapes class, the Henri IV, was laid down in 1897.
The Dupuy de Lome was followed by a group of four similar but smaller cruisers. These had a wide belt of 3-inch steel, and 3-inch hardened-steel turrets containing their armament - six 14-centimetre and two 19-centimetre guns. As in the Dupuy de Lome, the axial fire was very powerful. The speed was to be nineteen knots. In the Latouche-Treville the turrets and ammunition hoists were operated by electricity. A fifth, a slightly larger and faster cruiser, the Pothuau, succeeded, and the type was further developed in the Jeanne d' Arc and the cruisers of the Extraordinary Program.
To unarmored cruisers France had given great attention towards the end of the 19th Century. Of the large first-class cruisers similar in design to the English Blakes and Edgars, France had as of 1897 few constructed, but several were in hand. In second-class cruisers she began with the Ajax, and the admirable Isly, Alger, and Jean Bart, which were fast and powerful vessels. In all her modern cruisers she aimed at two things, speed and powerful axial fire. Ton for ton her cruisers were more heavily armed, than those of England. The best known types are the Alger, Davout, and Pascal. The first carried four 16-centimeter and six 14-centimetre guns; the second six 16-centimetre quick-firers and four of 10 centimetres ; the last four 16-centimeter and ten 10-centimetre quick-firers. In smaller cruisers of the third class were the Condor and Forbin types, which were better suited for scouting than for fighting. They were by no means strong ships, and were too small to be of much use at sea.
In the construction of torpedo gunboats France led the way with her eight vessels of the Bombe class, which proved too weak for severe work at sea. The Leger and Levrier, which followed, were larger, but larger still were the three fine vessels, Casabianca, Cassini, D'Iberville. The latter, which had been tested on the measured mile and at sea, is probably faster than any of Britain's many torpedo gunboats; indeed she was perhaps the fastest torpedo gunboat in Europe in the late 1890s.
With torpedo-boats France was very well supplied. From the first her sailors attached great importance to torpedo warfare, and they were certainly second to none, whether in practical knowledge of their craft, or in the numerical strength of which they dispose. The French torpedo-boats fell into three classes as of 1897. In the first were fifty-five large sea-going boats, over 125 feet in length. These might be able to accompany a squadron to sea even in the rough waters of the Atlantic. They regularly cruised with the French ironclads, but had not seldom, in bad weather, to make for port. Next came 173 boats of limited sea-going quality, some not good for much work at sea even in fine weather, others little inferior to the true sea-going craft. Finally, there were fourteen boats which are less than 86 feet in length, and which could be used only for harbor defence or attack. One had a hull of aluminium alloy, and did twenty-and-a-half knots on the measured mile. In her newest boats France had obtained very high speeds. Thus the sea-going Chevalier, on the measured mile, accomplished 27.2 knots. The Forlan surpassed the Sokul's record of thirty knots.
Of submarine boats France had four as of 1897 - the Goubet, Gymnote, Gustave Zede, and Morse. The first two were of little serious value : the last two are larger, but perhaps not much better. The Zede had a cigar-shaped hull, 131 feet long. Her displacement was 266 tons, and she carried a crew of eight men. Her motive force was electricity, stored in accumulators. The fumes from these have proved a source of great annoyance to her crew, and there have been extraordinary explosions on board when they were being charged. During her trials she descended forty and sixty feet, and moved about below the surface at a rate of six or eight knots, launching torpedoes. As, however, it was impossible to see at this depth she was a vessel of very doubtful value. The Morse was very similar to her in design.
The Gustave Zede of the 1890s had little in common, except its hull, with the Gustave Zede of a decade and more earlier. It proved, indeed, so disappointing in its earlier trials, that M. Romazzotti ceased all work on it for a time, and turned his attention to another boat of his designing, the Morse, begun in 1893. But the fact is that some ten years elapsed without any substantial progress being made. This period of hesitancy was due, perhaps, as much to the sudden indifference of the French Admiralty as to any lack of inventiveness on the part of the engineers. The Ministers of Marine who succeeded one another in the Rue Royale were of conservative tendencies. They regarded submarine boats as a fond delusion, and refused to encourage experiments doomed, as they believed, to failure.
The year 1896 was the decisive date in the history of the French submarine flotilla was that of the advent to power of M. Lockroy. One of the first acts of the new Minister, who was the ardent champion of the ideas on naval matters of Admiral Aube, was to open an official competition for designs of submarine boats. Prizes were offered not. only for approved plans of complete boats, but also for inventions bearing on subsidiary details. Forty projects were submitted to the technical committee appointed to act as jury. The committee granted several awards, and on its recommendation the Admiralty, definitely convinced at last of the utility of submarine boats, decided to turn to practical account a certain number of the inventions brqught before its notice by the competition.
It was resolved, ior example, to experiment with an apparatus, for firing torpedoes planned by M. Drzewiecki, and a petroleum motor invented by M. Forest. These, however, were minor matters. Far more important was the authorisation accorded M. Romazzotti to proceed on the new lines he had suggested with the construction of the Morse, begun in 1893. Nor was this all. The competition obtained recognition for the labours of M. Lauboeuf, a private marine engineer, who submitted a design for a submarine boat which was thought to be of great promise. Its construction was ordered, and the result was the Narval. The plans of another private engineer, M. Maugas, were also approved, and the Farfadet was commenced at Rochcfort on the lines he had laid down.
The general results of the competition were of no less importance. Its effect was to quicken to a remarkable extent, and in every particular, the activity of the French Admiralty in connection with submarine boats. Every possible encouragement was given to those engaged on the construction of the boats, careful attention was paid to suggestions, from whatever quarter they came, the official experts were invited to strain their inventive faculties to the utmost, and the most strenuous efforts were made to cope with the practical difficulties that were bound to be presented in abundance by the building of so novel a type of vessel.
Finally a change of Ministry ceased henceforth to involve any risk of a cessation of this notable activity. Admiral Besnard, though reputed to belong to the old school, carried on the work begun by M. Lockroy, who, when he was in office for the second time, was able to gauge the considerable progress that had been achieved in his absence. M. de Lanessan followed in the footsteps of M. Lockroy, with the result that France by 1900 was on the eve of possessing a veritable flotilla of submarine boats.
During the discussion of the naval estimates in February 1898 in the Chamber of Deputies, A.J. de Kerjégu, Republican and the Chairman [reporter] of the Naval Committee, replying to criticisms of the navy, contended that French ships were quite equal to those of foreign navies. The committee proposed that an iron-clad, three cruisers, and eleven torpedo boats be commenced in 1898. Vice Admiral Besnard, the Minister of Marine said the Government's naval program had made the Mediterranean a French gulf. It was intended to build ironclads for extra-European waters, with an extensive sphere of action, and a larger number of small armored cruisers. The Government, he added, was actively pursuing experiments with submarine boats, and the improvements in the initial velocity of the artillery were making it the best in the world. The Admiral admitted that accidents to French were more frequent than in other navies.
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