Great War Aéronavale (French Navy Air Force)
Little had been done by the navies of the world to develop naval aeronautics prior to the war. France had been concentrating her efforts in developing the army branch of the air service, but had done very little in naval aeronautics, outside of the few experiments made at San Raphael. In fact, when the war started, naval aeronautics was in a period of experimentation. Until then most navy people, trained to face the crushing force of the elements, looked at the frail aeroplane askance and asked for the supreme test, seaworthiness, before admitting it as a naval auxiliary. Without seaworthiness they could not see any use for the aeroplane, and accordingly postponed the organization of naval aeronautics.
When it became necessary to build up a system of protection against submarines, the warring nations pressed into service thousands of small vessels, destroyers, trawlers, and submarine chasers, and as fast as they could obtain them they put into service seaplanes and dirigibles, to cooperate with the ships in locating and capturing and destroying hostile submarines; and convoying ships, protecting them from submarine attacks.
The first report of an attack on submarines by an aircraft was issued by the German Admiralty on May 4, 1915. It stated that on May 3 a German naval dirigible fought several British submarines in the North Sea and dropped bombs on them, sinking one. The submarines, the report stated, fired on the dirigible without success.
On May 31, 1915, the German Admiralty announced the sinking of a Russian submarine by bombs dropped by German naval aviators near Gotland. On July 1, 1915, the following despatch from Rome told of the sinking of the Austrian submarine U-ll in the Adriatic by a French aviator:
The Minister of Marine states the action took place on Thursday. The U-ll was lying lazily on the surface and apparently failed to notice the aviator as he circled overhead. With a sudden swoop the aeroplane shot downward to within forty-five feet of the submarine's deck. By this time it was too late for the underseas craft to submerge. Three bombs were dropped, all of which struck the submarine near the turret and exploded. The submarine sank almost instantly and did not reappear, although wreckage was afterwards found about the scene. The U-ll was one of the newest of the Austrian submersibles and displaced about 860 tons. She is supposed to have had aboard a crew of twenty-five men.
A later report stated that this submarine was destroyed by French Naval Sub-Lieutenant Rouillet of the French seaplane squadron, operating in the Adriatic with the Italian naval forces. Many other submarines were also captured or destroyed through the cooperation of aircraft. The policy has been to capture the submarines whenever possible.
The method employed by both the dirigibles and the seaplanes is similar. Hundreds of these aircraft are employed to cooperate with destroyers, trawlers, and submarine chasers in capturing or destroying hostile submarines and searching coasts for submarine bases. The usual evidence of the submarine's presence is the wake of the periscope. This wake cannot easily be seen from ships, but can always be clearly seen from aeroplanes. For one thing, the aviator is not troubled by the refraction of the rays of light, which interfere with the vision of the person on a ship. For another thing, the aviator, flying at a height of from 1000 to 5000 feet, has a range of vision of many miles, and the whitish wake of the periscope is clearly visible against the dark surface of the waters, even in cases where the sea is fairly rough and white caps are showing.
The French system of patrol against U-boats, including the employment of seaplanes from possibly hundreds of seaplane stations, were described briefly on May 26, 1917, in the public session of the Chamber of Deputies, by Admiral Lacaze, the Minister of Marine, who gave an interesting outline of the means of defense France had adopted against the undersea boats. "I see no reason why I should not speak of these methods in public," said Admiral Lacaze. "It would be childish to think they are unknown to the enemy. They consist of a system of patrol boats, of arming merchantmen with guns, and fitting them with wireless; of seaplanes, nets, mines, smoke-raising devices, and drag-nets.
"We have organized seaplane posts all around the coasts, so that the zone of action of each post joins that of its neighbor on either side. By October all merchantmen and patrollers were fitted with wireless and all merchantmen supplied with guns of as heavy caliber as possible, for which measures have been drawn up even beyond what was thought possible."
In France the war incentive to seaplane progress was lacking. France has mainly used the small boat seaplane for coast defence, and patrol for submarines. Up to the end of 1918 sufficiently high-powered engines were lacking for sea-going craft; the Hispano-Suiza 200-H.P. being in most general use.
The French, throughout the war, were forced to curtail their naval activity to give their magnificent army proper support, but nevertheless they emerged full of experience and information. Notwithstanding handicaps the French navy is provided with three passable seaplane carriers. Their original ship of this type, the Foudre, has been modernized to the highest possible degree and is now capable of carrying seaplanes with the fleet. The former merchant ship, Campinas, has been reconstructed, and now carries from six to ten seaplanes. Also, the French have taken over the Russian seaplane carrier, Almaz, which carries four seaplanes. There was much talk in French naval circles of converting the new fast-armored cruiser, Jules Michelet, into an aircraft carrier. This decision would seem to be a good one for the Michelet, while a fine and comparatively new ship is of a class that is almost worthless, and she possesses the size and speed that are requisite to an aircraft carrier.
The airplane was effective, almost from the first, as an antisubmarine weapon. During the entire war most of the planes were operated from coastal bases; but it was obvious from the beginning of hostilities that all types of planes must go to sea in search of the enemy's real fighting force—the battle fleet. As naval air tactics developed it was proved that the principal use of aircraft was to spot gunfire in an engagement.
The development of the French aerial wing was hampered by the ill-will and incurable dislike for innovations of antiquated admirals, and the fact speaks for itself that, whereas by 1921 the French army counted scores of flying generals, and among the most eminent, the Marine Francaise was still waiting for her first “ amiral-aviateur,” a rather bad sign at a time when maritime efiiciency depended to so great an extent on aerial supremacy, especially in narrow Mediterranean waters.
The French “aviation navale,” first in date in the naval arena but badly handicapped by incompetence at the head, was getting none too soon in shape when are considered the strides accomplished by the Italian and British naval flying squadrons. The lessons of the fiasco of the trans-Mediterranean group-flight organized by Admiral Ronarch had not been lost. Improvisation, impossible at sea, is, if anything, still more impossible in the air. Success to be attained requires robust and reliable machines together with a thoroughly-trained and numerous personnel, desiderata that can only be the result of constant practice and of careful fostering by the Rue Royale authorities.
In addition to the Béarn and to the 800-ton porte-avions of the Bapaume class, all battleships and cruisers are gradually to be fitted to carry small "avions de chasse, d’éclairage et d'observation du Air," very satisfactory installations having been worked out, while heavy “avions autonomes de bombardement.” too large and cumbrous for transportation on board, would operate from basis being prepared in Corsica and on the North African sea border.
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