Next Generation Fighter (NGF)
Future Combat Air System (FCAS) - France + Germany + Spain -
The Future Combat Air System (FCAS), Europe's largest-ever defense project, was the European air defense system that was set to enter into service in 2040. Germany, France, and Spain were working together. The centerpiece was the New Generation Fighter, a next-generation jet with a human pilot.
In April 2021 Airbus and Dassault Aviation reached a critical deal after weeks of tense discussions over the share of work on the Future Combat Air System. The Franco-German-Spanish fighter deal still faces political uncertainty in a German election year and national differences over technology rights, but was seen as a milestone for Europe's largest defence project.
By November 2025 the €100 billion Future Combat Air System (FCAS) faced a critical "make or break" moment. The proposal to scrap the joint Next Generation Fighter (NGF) and focus only on the networked "Combat Cloud" was a drastic new development being actively considered. It was being floated as a potential "Plan B" to salvage the project's core technological cooperation in the face of a complete stalemate.
The entire program was stalled by a fundamental conflict between its two prime contractors: Dassault Aviation, representing France, and Airbus Defence and Space, representing Germany and Spain. This conflict was not about engineering; it was about industrial policy, intellectual property, and national pride. Dassault, as the designated prime contractor for the fighter jet, insists on having ultimate design authority, fearing a "governance by committee" that plagued past projects. Conversely, Germany was contributing billions and demands a "fair" division of labor and a share of the high-value design "know-how," refusing to let Airbus become a mere subcontractor for French industry. This impasse had completely frozen "Phase 2" of the project, which involves building the actual flying demonstrator.
The "combat cloud only" option was an attempt to find an escape hatch. The FCAS project was never just a jet; it was designed as a "system of systems." The Air Combat Cloud (ACC) was the AI-powered digital network intended to connect the new fighter, unmanned "remote carrier" drones, existing aircraft like the Rafale and Eurofighter, and other assets. This networked component, led by Airbus and Thales, was reportedly progressing much better than the fighter. The new proposal suggests this network was the truly revolutionary part of FCAS.
By scrapping the contentious jet, the logic was that Germany and France could still co-develop the "brain" of the system. They could then plug their own nationally upgraded 4.5-generation jets (the French Rafale F5 and the German Eurofighter) into this shared European network. This would salvage cooperation, avoid a total collapse, and provide a significant capability boost much sooner than the original 2040 timeline.
If the project collapses entirely, both sides were preparing their own fallback options. Germany was reportedly developing a national framework that would focus on the combat cloud and drones, while exploring partnerships with other nations, like Sweden, for a future manned fighter. In France, as you noted, Dassault's CEO had publicly stated, "We can do it alone," implying a purely national program that would be astronomically expensive but would guarantee French industrial sovereignty. In short, the "combat cloud only" option was a last-ditch effort to separate the project's most promising element from its most toxic dispute.
As the "System of Systems", FCAS Future Combat Air System was to connect all components in aerial combat from 2040 - manned and unmanned. The aim was to create a large-scale system that connects the individual systems of the participating countries with the support of artificial intelligence. The heart of every FCAS Future Combat Air System was the NGWS Next generation weapon system that Germany, France and Spain are developing together. It consists of three components: the Next Generation Fighter (NGF), unmanned support aircraft and a Combat Cloud that connects everything together.
Overview and Strategic Context
The Future Combat Air System, known by its French acronym SCAF (Système de Combat Aérien du Futur), represents Europe's most ambitious defense project of the coming decades and stands as the continent's flagship initiative to maintain air superiority well into the mid-21st century. Formally launched in 2017 as a bilateral Franco-German program and expanded in 2019 to include Spain as a full partner, FCAS is designed as a revolutionary "system of systems" that fundamentally reimagines how airpower will be projected and sustained in contested, multi-domain battlespaces. The program aims to field an initial operating capability around 2040, at which point the system will begin replacing France's Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon fleets operated by Germany and Spain.
The strategic imperative driving FCAS stems from growing concerns about European strategic autonomy in an era of intensifying geopolitical competition. The program is explicitly designed to reduce European dependence on foreign military technologies while ensuring that European armed forces possess the capabilities necessary to respond to emerging threats independently. Unlike previous European collaborative aircraft programs that focused primarily on developing a single platform, FCAS represents a paradigm shift toward networked warfare, where manned fighters, unmanned vehicles, sensors, and effectors operate as an integrated whole connected through advanced digital infrastructure. This approach reflects hard-won lessons from conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and elsewhere that have demonstrated the decisive importance of information dominance, sensor fusion, and distributed operations in modern combat.
The scale of FCAS is staggering, with total program costs estimated to exceed 100 billion euros over its lifetime, making it Europe's largest-ever defense undertaking. The program encompasses far more than traditional aircraft development, extending into cutting-edge research in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, advanced materials science, cyber security, hypersonic weapons, and directed energy systems. Beyond its immediate military applications, FCAS is expected to generate substantial technological spillover effects into civilian sectors including commercial aviation, communications infrastructure, autonomous systems, and advanced manufacturing. The program is projected to sustain tens of thousands of highly skilled jobs across participating nations while strengthening Europe's position as a center of advanced technology development and production.
System Architecture and Core Components
Next Generation Weapon System (NGWS)
At the operational heart of FCAS lies the Next Generation Weapon System, which integrates three primary elements into a unified combat capability. The NGWS is designed to operate both autonomously within the FCAS architecture and as a networked component alongside other airborne, naval, land-based, and space-based combat systems operated by European forces and NATO allies. This interoperability requirement represents one of the program's most technically challenging aspects, as the system must seamlessly exchange data and coordinate actions with platforms from multiple nations utilizing different communications protocols, security architectures, and operational doctrines.
New Generation Fighter (NGF)
The centerpiece of the NGWS is the New Generation Fighter, a sixth-generation stealth aircraft that represents a quantum leap beyond current fifth-generation platforms like the F-35 Lightning II and F-22 Raptor. Under the industrial arrangement, Dassault Aviation serves as prime contractor for the NGF development, with Airbus functioning as the main partner. The fighter is being designed from the outset as a multi-role platform capable of air superiority, deep strike, intelligence gathering, and electronic warfare missions. Unlike previous fighter generations that prioritized specific performance parameters like speed or maneuverability, the NGF emphasizes adaptability, persistence, and information dominance as its defining characteristics.
The aircraft's design philosophy centers on what program officials call "informed as one, combat as one" principles. Rather than operating as an independent hunter, the NGF will serve as a quarterback coordinating swarms of unmanned vehicles, processing vast quantities of sensor data, and distributing targeting information across the battlespace in real time. The human pilot's role evolves from directly controlling the aircraft through every maneuver to supervising autonomous systems, making strategic decisions, and validating recommendations generated by artificial intelligence. This represents a fundamental reconceptualization of air combat that acknowledges human cognitive limitations while preserving meaningful human control over the employment of lethal force.
Current specifications envision an aircraft with multispectral low-observable characteristics that go substantially beyond current stealth technologies. The NGF is being designed to minimize its signature across radar, infrared, acoustic, and visual spectrums through a combination of advanced airframe shaping, radar-absorbent materials and coatings, thermal management systems, and active signature control technologies. Performance targets include supersonic cruise capability exceeding Mach 2.5 without afterburner use, extended operational range of 3,500 to 4,000 kilometers, and the ability to operate effectively at altitudes from sea level to well above 60,000 feet. The aircraft will feature an internal weapons bay to preserve its stealthy profile while carrying air-to-air missiles like the Meteor and MICA NG, as well as various stand-off strike weapons. External weapons stations will provide additional capacity when stealth is not required or when the tactical situation permits their use.
The NGF's propulsion system represents one of the program's most critical technological challenges. The European Military Engine Team (EUMET), a joint venture between France's Safran Aircraft Engines and Germany's MTU Aero Engines with participation from Spain's ITP Aero, is developing an entirely new engine specifically for the NGF. France's Chief of Defense Staff, General Fabien Mandon, identified engine development as "the most critical part of future combat aviation today," noting that achieving the required thrust levels demands turbine temperatures exceeding 2,000 Kelvin, some 250 degrees higher than current European engines can sustain. The target engine will produce approximately 11 tonnes of thrust, significantly more powerful than the Rafale's 7.5-tonne M88 engine, to propel an airframe in the 15-tonne class. This represents a 47 percent increase in thrust generation, requiring fundamental advances in materials science, thermal management, and combustion chamber design.
Safran is simultaneously developing the M88 T-REX as an intermediate step, which will power the Rafale F5 standard and serve as a technology demonstrator for FCAS propulsion concepts. The T-REX increases thrust by approximately 20 percent while maintaining the M88's physical dimensions, introducing advanced turbine materials, optimized airflow characteristics, and improved thermal management systems that will inform the final FCAS engine design. However, the leap from T-REX to the full FCAS engine requirement remains substantial. France has launched the ADAMANT research program specifically to develop turbine materials and multilayer coatings capable of surviving the extreme temperatures required for the NGF's performance envelope. This materials research represents cutting-edge metallurgy, as European engineers have not conducted fundamental research on turbine hot sections for over forty years, having instead focused on incremental improvements to existing engine architectures.
The NGF's avionics and sensor suite will provide unprecedented situational awareness through sensor fusion that integrates data from active electronically scanned array radars, distributed aperture systems providing 360-degree coverage, infrared search and track sensors, electronic warfare systems, and data links connecting to remote carriers and other platforms. Artificial intelligence algorithms will process this tsunami of information, identifying threats, recommending tactical maneuvers, and proposing targeting solutions far faster than human operators could accomplish alone. The system is designed around the principle of "meaningful human control," where AI handles routine tasks and rapid responses while the pilot maintains authority over strategic decisions and rules of engagement.
An important design requirement calls for the NGF to be carrier-capable, allowing operation from the French Navy's future aircraft carrier currently in development. This naval compatibility requirement imposes significant design constraints, as the aircraft must withstand the structural loads of catapult launches and arrested landings while incorporating the reinforced landing gear, tailhook, and folding wings necessary for carrier operations. The carrier capability is seen as essential by France, which views nuclear deterrence delivered from aircraft carriers as a cornerstone of its defense posture and insists that the NGF must be capable of delivering the Air-Sol Moyenne Portée Amélioré nuclear standoff missile that equips current Rafale fighters. This requirement has added complexity to the design process and contributed to some of the industrial tensions between partners with differing operational requirements.
Remote Carriers
Remote Carriers represent one of the most innovative and critical elements of the FCAS concept, fundamentally changing the calculus of air combat by generating mass and providing capabilities that would be too dangerous or costly to integrate into manned platforms. These unmanned air vehicles will operate under various levels of autonomy, always remaining under human supervision but capable of executing complex mission profiles with minimal direct intervention. Program officials have repeatedly emphasized that Remote Carriers are not optional accessories but rather essential multipliers that determine the operational effectiveness of the entire NGWS network. Major General Jean-Luc Moritz, the French Air Force FCAS director, stated unequivocally: "We have to generate mass with the remote carriers. They must cost a fraction of the fighter because they will be the risk takers."
The FCAS architecture envisions Remote Carriers in multiple weight classes and variants, each optimized for specific mission sets. MBDA is developing expendable remote carriers with a cruise-missile-like design featuring retractable wings and an embedded engine to minimize radar cross-section. These vehicles, approximately four meters long and weighing around 400 kilograms, are designed to be attritable, meaning they can be risked in situations where losing the platform is acceptable given the mission value. Expendable carriers might penetrate enemy air defenses to create targeting data, conduct electronic attacks against air defense radars, or serve as decoys drawing enemy fire away from manned aircraft. Their relatively low cost compared to manned fighters makes them economically viable even if losses occur frequently during high-intensity operations.
Airbus is leading development of larger, recoverable Remote Carriers that represent more substantial investments and carry more sophisticated sensors and effectors. These reusable platforms might weigh several tons and incorporate significant on-board processing power, advanced electronic warfare suites, and substantial weapons payloads. Unlike expendable carriers, these vehicles would typically remain outside the most dangerous threat environments, using their sensors and standoff weapons to contribute to missions while preserving their ability to return to base and fly again. The Spanish joint venture Satnus, comprising GMV, Sener Aeroespacial, and Tecnobit-Grupo Oesia, is developing the algorithms and software that enable collaborative behavior between expendable and recoverable carriers, allowing them to coordinate their actions and share data effectively.
Remote Carriers will fulfill numerous mission-critical roles within the FCAS architecture. In reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering missions, carriers equipped with advanced sensors can push forward to gather information while the NGF remains outside immediate threat ranges, preserving the expensive manned platform and its irreplaceable pilot. During suppression and destruction of enemy air defense missions, expendable carriers can trigger radar emissions by appearing as threatening targets, allowing friendly forces to locate and attack air defense systems with reduced risk. In electronic warfare roles, carriers equipped with jamming systems can disrupt enemy communications, radar tracking, and weapons guidance while the manned fighter coordinates the broader attack. Perhaps most significantly, carriers can serve as "loyal wingmen" carrying weapons that the NGF can employ without venturing into heavily defended airspace, effectively extending the fighter's magazine depth and combat persistence without the need for external weapons that would compromise its stealth characteristics.
Airbus has demonstrated the technical feasibility of this concept through successful test flights, including the world's first launch and recovery of a Remote Carrier demonstrator from a flying A400M transport aircraft. This capability opens revolutionary tactical possibilities, as transport aircraft operating at standoff ranges could deploy swarms of Remote Carriers that then proceed to their operating areas and link up with manned fighters or execute pre-programmed missions independently. A single A400M might carry and launch between 12 and 50 small Remote Carriers, depending on their size and mission equipment, potentially flooding a battlespace with sensors and effectors that would overwhelm enemy defenses through sheer numbers.
The development of truly autonomous cooperative behavior represents one of the Remote Carrier program's greatest technical challenges. While individual unmanned vehicles have existed for decades, creating systems that can coordinate their actions, share sensor data, adapt to changing tactical situations, and synchronize attacks without constant human direction requires advances in artificial intelligence, communications protocols, and software architecture. These systems must operate reliably in contested electromagnetic environments where jamming and cyber attacks will attempt to disrupt their communications and decision-making processes. They must distinguish friendly aircraft from hostile targets with absolute certainty to prevent fratricidal engagements. They must be capable of operating under degraded conditions when communications links to the NGF or ground controllers are intermittent or severed entirely, yet remain subject to meaningful human control as required by European ethical guidelines and international humanitarian law.
Air Combat Cloud
The Air Combat Cloud represents the digital nervous system that transforms individual platforms into a unified combat capability, and its successful development may prove even more revolutionary than the manned fighter itself. Airbus leads the Combat Cloud pillar with Thales and Indra as principal partners, developing what program officials describe as the "Internet of Military Things." This secure, resilient digital infrastructure will instantaneously capture, share, fuse, and process massive quantities of data from all connected manned and unmanned platforms, transforming raw sensor feeds into actionable intelligence and coordinated battle plans.
At its core, the Combat Cloud functions analogously to smartphone operating systems, but operating at hypersonic speeds in the most hostile electronic warfare environment imaginable. Just as smartphones from different manufacturers can communicate through standardized protocols and share applications through common interfaces, the Combat Cloud provides an open, service-oriented architecture that allows integration of existing platforms like the Eurofighter Typhoon, future systems like the Eurodrone, and capabilities across air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains. Ignacio Rosell, Airbus's Combat Cloud Product Solution Lead, explains: "We have an operating system that allows applications from different parties to be integrated, supported by a communications infrastructure. Our mobile phones could be a fighter aircraft, an unmanned aerial system, a warship, a satellite, or even a soldier on the ground, each integrating different capabilities. Our air combat cloud has the same components—the communications infrastructure, the operating system and the applications that allow them to operate in a collaborative way."
The combat cloud's communications infrastructure must deliver secure, ultra-high-bandwidth connectivity across vast distances in contested environments where adversaries actively attempt to jam signals, intercept transmissions, and inject false data. The system will leverage multiple communications pathways including satellite constellations, line-of-sight data links, mesh networking between platforms, and potentially quantum-encrypted channels for the most sensitive information. Redundancy is built into every aspect, ensuring that the loss of individual nodes or communication paths does not degrade overall network performance catastrophically. The architecture distributes processing power across the network rather than centralizing it, allowing the system to continue functioning even if command nodes are destroyed or communications are degraded.
Artificial intelligence and machine learning form the cognitive layer that extracts meaning from the data torrent flowing through the combat cloud. Modern aircraft and sensor systems generate information at rates far exceeding human cognitive capacity—the NGF and its associated Remote Carriers might produce terabytes of data per second during combat operations. AI algorithms continuously analyze this information, identifying patterns that indicate threats, opportunities, or changes in the tactical situation. The system builds and maintains a common operational picture that all participants can access, automatically fusing data from multiple sensors to create more complete and accurate situational awareness than any individual platform could achieve. When sensor reports conflict or appear anomalous, the AI flags uncertainties for human review rather than making potentially catastrophic assumptions.
The combat cloud's decision support capabilities represent the cutting edge of military AI research. The system can evaluate alternative courses of action against mission objectives, predicting likely outcomes and recommending optimal strategies in seconds. During fast-moving engagements where human reaction times might prove inadequate, the AI can execute pre-authorized responses to immediate threats while simultaneously notifying operators and providing them the option to override automated actions. For example, if a Remote Carrier detects an incoming missile targeting the NGF, the combat cloud might automatically command nearby carriers to position themselves as decoys while simultaneously calculating optimal evasive maneuvers for the manned aircraft, executing these responses within milliseconds while the pilot is still processing what has occurred.
Critically, the Combat Cloud architecture incorporates multiple safeguards to ensure meaningful human control remains paramount. European developers have explicitly rejected "fire-and-forget" approaches where AI systems independently select and engage targets without human authorization. Instead, the FCAS philosophy embraces what program officials call the principle of "responsibility," where humans remain accountable for all uses of force. The AI serves as an advisor and executor of approved strategies, but does not autonomously decide to kill. In situations where operational tempo allows, human operators review and explicitly authorize AI recommendations before execution. When timing is critical, pre-established rules of engagement guide AI responses, but humans retain the ability to veto automated actions. This approach attempts to balance the need for speed and decision superiority against ethical imperatives and legal requirements under international humanitarian law.
The Combat Cloud's development timeline follows an incremental approach designed to deliver useful capabilities to European air forces well before the complete FCAS reaches operational status in 2040. Initial cloud capabilities focusing on enhanced situational awareness were scheduled for deployment in the late 2020s, allowing existing fighter fleets to benefit from improved sensor fusion and data sharing. Intermediate capabilities enabling manned-unmanned teaming will arrive in the early 2030s, with upgraded Eurofighter and Rafale aircraft coordinating with first-generation loyal wingman drones. Only in 2040 does the full vision mature, with the NGF, advanced Remote Carriers, and comprehensive multi-domain integration delivering the complete "system of systems" capability. This phased approach reduces program risk, provides useful capabilities incrementally, and allows lessons learned from each phase to inform subsequent development.
Program Organization and Industrial Structure
Governance and Management
FCAS operates under a complex trilateral governance structure designed to balance national interests, industrial participation, and technical requirements. France's Direction Générale de l'Armement (DGA) serves as the lead procurement agency managing the overall program on behalf of all three partner nations, providing centralized coordination while interfacing with the distributed industrial consortium. This arrangement emerged from lessons learned during earlier European collaborative programs where distributed management created coordination challenges and slowed decision-making. By designating a single lead agency, the partners hoped to streamline program management while maintaining national oversight through trilateral steering committees.
Each partner nation has designated a national industrial coordinator responsible for managing that country's industrial participation and ensuring domestic companies receive appropriate work share. Dassault Aviation coordinates French industry, Airbus handles German participation, and Indra Sistemas coordinates Spanish involvement. These national coordinators work within the seven pillars that structure FCAS technical development, with leadership responsibilities distributed to achieve roughly balanced work allocation among the three nations. This distribution was carefully negotiated to ensure each country perceives equitable participation while assigning leadership to organizations with relevant expertise and capabilities.
The Seven Pillars
The program's technical work is organized into seven pillars, each led by a designated prime contractor with supporting partners. The New Generation Fighter Demonstrator pillar falls under Dassault Aviation's leadership as prime contractor, with Airbus as main partner. This assignment reflects Dassault's extensive experience developing and producing the Mirage and Rafale fighter families, as well as France's insistence that it must maintain sovereignty over combat aircraft development given the Rafale's role in nuclear deterrence. The Remote Carrier and Crewed-Uncrewed Teaming pillar is led by Airbus Germany, recognizing German expertise in autonomous systems and unmanned vehicle development. The Combat Cloud pillar also falls under Airbus leadership, leveraging the company's experience with large-scale networked systems and military communications infrastructure developed for programs like Eurofighter and Eurodrone.
The Engine pillar operates under EUMET, the joint venture between Safran and MTU Aero Engines established specifically for FCAS propulsion development. Safran leads design and integration activities while MTU takes the lead on engine services, with Spain's ITP Aero providing additional support. The Simulation Laboratory pillar is managed by Dassault, building on the company's sophisticated flight simulation and systems integration capabilities developed over decades of fighter aircraft programs. Spain's Indra leads the Sensors pillar, responsible for developing the sophisticated radar, electro-optical, and electronic warfare systems that will provide the NGF's eyes and ears. The Low-Observable Technologies pillar falls to Airbus Spain, which will develop advanced materials, coatings, and design techniques to minimize the aircraft's detectability across multiple spectrums.
Beyond these seven core pillars, the program has established an innovative mechanism using "flex tokens" to engage non-traditional suppliers and emerging technology companies. The first flex tokens have been allocated to explore how smaller companies, startups, and research institutions can contribute capabilities that traditional defense contractors might lack. This approach recognizes that many of the most transformative technologies relevant to FCAS—artificial intelligence, quantum computing, advanced materials, cyber security—are being pioneered outside the traditional defense industrial base. By creating pathways for these organizations to participate, FCAS hopes to access cutting-edge capabilities while expanding Europe's defense technology ecosystem.
Industrial Participation
The FCAS industrial ecosystem encompasses far more than the prime contractors, involving over 144 companies and more than 3,000 engineers as of 2025. This broad participation spans major defense firms, specialized suppliers, technology companies, and research institutions across France, Germany, Spain, and increasingly other European nations. Major participants include MBDA leading expendable Remote Carrier development, Thales contributing sensors and communications systems, Safran providing propulsion and optronics, MTU Aero Engines working on powerplant development, Hensoldt developing radar and electronic warfare systems, Diehl Defence producing mission systems and effectors, and numerous other firms providing everything from advanced materials to software development.
Work distribution among the three core nations has been carefully calibrated to achieve political sustainability while matching capabilities to requirements. France typically receives the largest share given its lead role on the fighter airframe and its larger defense industrial base, but meaningful participation by German and Spanish industries remains essential for maintaining political support in those nations. Spain's inclusion reflects both its significant aerospace industry capabilities and political calculations—as a founding Airbus member state and operator of both Eurofighter and large fleets of transport and tanker aircraft, Spain brings valuable industrial capacity and represents an important European partner. The work share negotiations have proven contentious, with each nation's industries competing for the most valuable and technically sophisticated elements while attempting to minimize their participation in lower-value manufacturing tasks.
Development Phases and Timeline
Historical Background and Early Development
The conceptual foundations of FCAS stretch back to the European Technology Acquisition Programme (ETAP) initiated in 2001 as a multinational collaboration involving Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, and Spain. This early work explored system-of-systems approaches combining manned and unmanned platforms to deliver capabilities beyond what individual nations could achieve alone. The 2010 Lancaster House Treaties between the United Kingdom and France sought to deepen military cooperation, with substantial work during 2012-2014 focusing on unmanned combat air vehicle development. France and the UK conducted studies and test flights of demonstrators including the Dassault Neuron and BAE Systems Taranis, exploring concepts that would eventually inform FCAS.
By 2018, the Anglo-French collaboration had effectively ended, with Britain announcing its separate Tempest program that would eventually evolve into the Global Combat Air Programme with Italy and Japan. Germany and Spain had independently begun discussions with Airbus about developing a new fighter system, leading to the formal FCAS launch. At the 2018 ILA Berlin Air Show, Dassault Aviation and Airbus announced their agreement to cooperate on FCAS development, establishing the foundation for what would become Europe's most ambitious defense program. Spain officially joined in June 2019 after expressing interest in late 2018, expanding the program from a bilateral Franco-German effort to a trilateral European initiative.
Phase 1A - Foundation and Concept Development
Phase 1A, approved by the German Parliament's budget committee in February 2020, represented the formal launch of systematic FCAS development work. Valued at 65 million euros divided equally between France and Germany, this initial phase brought together the core industrial team including Dassault Aviation, Airbus, MTU Aero Engines, Safran, Thales, and MBDA. The primary objectives centered on developing the overall system architecture, conducting early feasibility studies, exploring key technologies, and establishing the industrial framework that would govern subsequent development phases. Spain had not yet fully joined during Phase 1A, leading to later tensions about Spanish industry's role and work share allocations.
Phase 1A established the fundamental FCAS architecture around the three core elements of manned fighter, Remote Carriers, and Combat Cloud. Industrial responsibilities were assigned, with Dassault taking the lead on fighter development, Airbus handling Remote Carriers and Combat Cloud, Safran and MTU launching EUMET for engine work, and specialized firms taking responsibility for sensors, stealth technologies, and simulation. The phase concluded in early 2022, having established the technical and organizational foundations for more intensive development work to follow.
Phase 1B - Demonstrator Development
Phase 1B, formally launched in December 2022 with contracts valued at 3.2 billion euros, represents the current stage of FCAS development as of November 2025. This phase involves substantially expanded scope and funding compared to Phase 1A, with activities focused on developing flying demonstrators for both the manned fighter and Remote Carriers, maturing critical technologies, proving out the Combat Cloud architecture, and conducting extensive ground and flight testing to validate key concepts. The NGF demonstrator is being designed to explore speed, maneuverability, low-observability, and systems integration requirements, using off-the-shelf Safran M88 engines from the Rafale rather than waiting for the new propulsion system to mature.
Under current planning, multiple ground-based demonstrations and laboratory tests precede flight testing. The sensor package will undergo airborne testing aboard a modified Fokker 100 aircraft owned by the French DGA, expected to fly around 2028. This testbed allows extensive evaluation of sensor performance, data processing, and fusion algorithms under realistic operating conditions without waiting for the fighter demonstrator to become available. The NGF demonstrator itself is scheduled for first flight around 2028-2029, representing a critical program milestone that will validate aerodynamic design, propulsion integration, flight control systems, and basic aircraft performance. MBDA's expendable Remote Carrier demonstrator, featuring the cruise-missile-like airframe with retractable wings, will also undergo flight testing during this period to prove out collaborative behaviors and communications protocols.
Belgium formally became a program observer during Phase 1B in June 2023, with plans to transition to full partner status by June 2025. Belgian participation reflects that nation's need to replace its aging F-16 fleet beyond the F-35s already on order, and desire to maintain industrial participation in major European defense programs. As an observer, Belgium gains access to program information and can align its own research activities with FCAS requirements, but does not participate in decision-making or commit funding. Full partnership would bring Belgian financial contributions and industrial participation, potentially opening opportunities for Belgian firms in sensors, communications, or other specialized capabilities. Other nations including Sweden have expressed interest in FCAS, though Sweden is currently focusing on evaluating its long-term fighter needs and has not committed to joining either FCAS or the competing Global Combat Air Programme.
Phase 2 - Production Development
Phase 2, originally planned to launch in mid-2025 with a budget of approximately 4.5 billion euros, represents the transition from concept and demonstrator work to actual production development of operational systems. This phase would run through the end of the decade, involving detailed design of production aircraft, development of production tooling and facilities, extensive flight testing of multiple prototypes, and qualification of all systems and subsystems for operational service. Phase 2 would culminate in the delivery of pre-production aircraft and preparation for full-rate production beginning in the early 2030s to support the target initial operating capability date of 2040.
However, as of November 2025, Phase 2 has encountered significant delays due to ongoing industrial and political disagreements between the partner nations. The expected mid-2025 launch did not occur, and trilateral defense ministerial meetings scheduled to resolve outstanding issues have been repeatedly postponed. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius issued what amounts to an ultimatum in late 2025, stating that a decision must be reached by year-end 2025 or Germany would consider alternatives. The phase transition delay has raised serious questions about whether the 2040 operational date remains achievable and whether the program can survive its current governance crisis.
Current Status and Critical Challenges (November 2025)
Program Crisis and Governance Disputes
FCAS entered a critical period in 2025 characterized by escalating tensions between its industrial partners and growing political pressure for resolution. The fundamental dispute centers on program leadership, work share distribution, intellectual property rights, and decision-making authority, with Dassault Aviation and Airbus holding fundamentally incompatible positions that threaten the program's viability. Dassault CEO Éric Trappier has insisted that successful completion requires recognizing Dassault as the program's "architect" and establishing a clear prime contractor structure similar to what exists on national programs. From this perspective, effective aircraft development demands a single integrated design authority rather than distributed responsibility that creates confusion, delays decisions, and produces compromised designs attempting to satisfy competing requirements.
Airbus and its German supporters reject Dassault's vision, arguing that France is attempting to turn FCAS into a French national program funded by German and Spanish partners but controlled by French companies. German concerns center on ensuring adequate work share for German industry, protecting German intellectual property rights, and maintaining genuine influence over program decisions rather than simply accepting French dictates. The Airbus works council, representing employees at Airbus Defence and Space facilities in Germany, has repeatedly and publicly called for ending the partnership with Dassault, arguing that cooperation has become "counterproductive" and suggesting that alternative partnerships with companies like BAE Systems, Leonardo, or Saab might prove more fruitful. Works council chairman Thomas Pretzl stated in November 2025 that "partnership is based on working together, not against each other," adding that this principle "still stands" and that workers needed "clear-cut arrangements" that only political leaders could provide.
The technical dimensions of these disputes involve fundamental questions about fighter design. France emphasizes the NGF's carrier capability and its role in nuclear deterrence, requirements that impose constraints on aircraft size, weight, and structural design that Germany views as unnecessary and expensive. Germany prioritizes export potential and cost-effectiveness, seeking a more affordable design that could appeal to international customers beyond the three core partners. Spain finds itself caught between these competing visions, seeking to preserve its industrial participation while the program's two larger partners engage in what increasingly resembles a destructive power struggle. These disagreements have prevented finalization of the Phase 2 contracts needed to move beyond demonstrators toward production development, creating schedule slippage that threatens the 2040 operational date.
France's domestic political instability during 2024-2025, marked by repeated government collapses and parliamentary gridlock, has exacerbated the crisis by making sustained policy commitments difficult. German officials have questioned whether France can be a reliable long-term partner given its revolving-door ministries and uncertain fiscal outlook. French officials respond that Germany's bureaucratic decision-making and industrial inflexibility make progress impossible, while pointing out that France has demonstrated commitment through sustained funding even amid domestic political turmoil. Scheduled trilateral defense ministerial meetings to resolve these disputes have been repeatedly postponed, most recently in October 2025, suggesting that finding common ground has become increasingly difficult.
Alternative Scenarios Under Consideration
As the governance crisis deepened through 2025, participants began seriously evaluating alternatives to the current FCAS structure. One radical option reportedly under active consideration involves abandoning the joint New Generation Fighter development entirely while preserving cooperation on the Combat Cloud and Remote Carriers. Under this scenario, France and Germany would each pursue national or alternative multinational fighter programs, but develop shared networking capabilities that would allow their different aircraft to operate together effectively. France might proceed with an enhanced Rafale evolution or an independent sixth-generation design, while Germany could purchase F-35s from the United States, pursue GCAP membership, or develop its own platform possibly in partnership with Sweden or other nations.
This approach finds support among some analysts who note that the Combat Cloud represents FCAS's most genuinely revolutionary element and appears to be progressing better than the contentious fighter development. By focusing on networking rather than platform development, France and Germany could preserve meaningful cooperation while avoiding the irreconcilable disagreements over fighter design authority. The logic suggests that plugging upgraded Rafale F5 and Eurofighter aircraft into a shared European Combat Cloud would deliver significant capability improvements much sooner than waiting until 2040 for an entirely new fighter, while avoiding the industrial conflicts that threaten to derail FCAS entirely. Remote Carriers could be developed collaboratively and operate with any nation's fighters through the shared Combat Cloud, providing the manned-unmanned teaming benefits without requiring a common manned platform.
German fallback planning reportedly includes several pathways if FCAS collapses. One option involves seeking GCAP membership, though this faces obstacles including that program's advanced development stage and questions about how to integrate a fourth major partner into an already complex trilateral arrangement. British, Italian, and Japanese partners might resist German participation fearing that adding another country would replicate the governance problems plaguing FCAS. An alternative involves Germany gaining GCAP observer status, allowing German industry to monitor developments and potentially participate in subsystems without full membership. Germany might also simply purchase GCAP fighters off-the-shelf once production begins, potentially negotiating local assembly if orders reach sufficient scale to justify the investment.
France appears better positioned than Germany to pursue an independent path if FCAS fails. French defense officials have indicated that France possesses the technical capability and industrial capacity to develop a sixth-generation fighter independently, though doing so would be expensive and force difficult budgetary tradeoffs. France's nuclear deterrence requirements create compelling national imperatives for maintaining sovereign combat aircraft capabilities regardless of European cooperation prospects. Dassault has developed and produced multiple fighter generations independently, giving France confidence in its ability to proceed alone if necessary. However, an independent French program would sacrifice the cost-sharing, industrial collaboration, and operational interoperability benefits that motivated FCAS in the first place, while potentially undermining broader European defense integration efforts.
Spain faces perhaps the most difficult position if FCAS collapses. Unlike France and Germany, Spain lacks the industrial capacity or defense budget to pursue a completely independent sixth-generation fighter program. Spanish officials including Indra CEO José Vicente de los Mozos have emphasized that "Europe needs a sixth-generation fighter jet" and FCAS "has to happen," reflecting Spain's limited alternatives. If the Franco-German core fractures, Spain might attempt to salvage a bilateral program with whichever nation proved more accommodating, seek junior partnership in GCAP, or resign itself to becoming a customer for whatever platform another nation develops. The prospect of being relegated from partner to customer status after investing substantially in FCAS would represent a major strategic setback for Spanish defense ambitions.
Recent Political Interventions
The severity of the FCAS crisis has prompted high-level political interventions attempting to preserve the program. In July 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz personally urged their defense ministers to find compromises necessary to keep development on track. These presidential-level engagements reflected recognition that FCAS's failure would damage European defense integration broadly, beyond the immediate program consequences. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius subsequently issued public statements emphasizing that decisions could not be delayed indefinitely, setting a year-end 2025 deadline for resolution. French Defense Minister Nathalie Vautrin, appointed in November 2025 following yet another government reshuffle, acknowledged in her first major interview that resolving "the subject with Germany" around the carrier requirement represented a top priority.
Despite these interventions, French Air Force officials have sought to downplay crisis narratives, insisting that while "there are differences" between partners, reports of imminent collapse are "exaggerated." Brigadier General Philippe Suhr, the French Air Force point man for FCAS, told reporters at the International Fighter Conference in Rome during November 2025: "Don't believe all you are reading. We are still fully committed to this program with our partners and we will do our best to find a solution to move forward because we have to. It is important to deliver in the 2040s." Such statements aim to maintain confidence among the broader industrial ecosystem and prevent the crisis from becoming self-fulfilling as companies hedge their commitments pending resolution of governance disputes. However, the gap between official optimism and the substance of ongoing disagreements remains substantial, leaving outside observers skeptical about near-term resolution prospects.
Comparative Context - Competing Sixth-Generation Programs
Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)
FCAS exists within a competitive global environment where multiple nations are pursuing sixth-generation fighter capabilities simultaneously. The Global Combat Air Programme represents FCAS's most direct European competitor, bringing together the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan in developing a sixth-generation fighter intended to enter service in the 2035-2040 timeframe. GCAP emerged from the UK's Tempest program announced in 2018, which subsequently attracted Italian partnership and then, in December 2022, Japanese participation creating a genuinely global collaboration spanning Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
GCAP and FCAS share numerous similarities, both emphasizing manned-unmanned teaming, advanced sensors, networking capabilities, and artificial intelligence integration. However, important differences distinguish the programs. GCAP appears more narrowly focused on developing a next-generation fighter aircraft rather than FCAS's broader system-of-systems approach encompassing Combat Cloud and Remote Carriers as integral elements from the outset. This potentially more modest scope may facilitate faster progress and simpler governance, as GCAP has avoided some of the organizational conflicts plaguing FCAS. Organizational structures differ as well, with GCAP establishing three industrial consortia divided along national lines, each handling specific elements of development, rather than FCAS's pillar structure attempting to distribute work across national boundaries.
Recent reports suggest GCAP has made substantial progress through 2025 even as FCAS struggled. Italian prime contractor Leonardo reported expectations to have booked over one billion euros in national GCAP contracts by December 2025, indicating robust program activity. The establishment of formal industrial consortia during autumn 2025 marked important organizational milestones that FCAS has not yet achieved for its Phase 2 work. Some observers note that GCAP benefits from including Japan, whose massive defense budgets and advanced technology sector bring resources and capabilities that smaller European nations lack. However, GCAP faces its own challenges coordinating across three nations spanning twelve time zones with different military doctrines, industrial standards, and operational requirements.
Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD)
The United States Air Force's Next Generation Air Dominance program represents the most advanced sixth-generation fighter effort globally, having reportedly already designed, built, and flown at least one prototype demonstrator. In March 2025, the Air Force announced that Boeing had won the NGAD competition with a design designated F-47, marking a major milestone that European programs have not yet approached. NGAD benefits from several advantages including massive development budgets funded by a single national government, integrated industrial base, unified operational requirements, and the technology lead that American aerospace firms maintain in areas like stealth, sensors, and propulsion.
NGAD's approach differs philosophically from FCAS in important respects. While FCAS emphasizes interoperability with existing platforms and European allies, NGAD focuses more narrowly on maximizing performance for U.S. operational needs. The American program has pursued more radical design concepts including potentially optionally-manned aircraft and explored disposable or "attritable" fighters that could be risked in extremely high-threat environments because their relatively low cost makes losses acceptable. This acceptance of platform attrition contrasts with FCAS's emphasis on persistence and pilot survivability, reflecting different strategic circumstances and risk tolerances between the U.S. and European powers.
Chinese and Russian sixth-generation fighter programs remain more opaque but are known to be underway. China has conducted wind tunnel testing of multiple sixth-generation fighter concepts and has stated ambitions to field next-generation capabilities by 2035. Chinese aerospace advances have been rapid, with the J-20 stealth fighter entering service despite many Western predictions of Chinese inability to master stealth technologies. Russia has announced sixth-generation fighter research though its program appears less mature and faces severe funding constraints given economic sanctions and the costs of the Ukraine conflict. Both nations prioritize countering American and European air dominance, ensuring that FCAS will ultimately face sophisticated adversaries if and when it enters service.
Technical Challenges and Innovation
Stealth and Signature Management
Achieving effective signature reduction across multiple spectrums represents one of the NGF's most demanding technical challenges. Current fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 primarily emphasize radar stealth through careful airframe shaping that deflects radar energy away from emitters and radar-absorbent materials that convert electromagnetic energy into heat rather than reflecting it back. The NGF must advance beyond these techniques, incorporating multispectral signature management that simultaneously addresses radar, infrared, acoustic, and visual detection methods. This holistic approach recognizes that future air defense systems will fuse data from multiple sensor types to detect aircraft, requiring comprehensive signature control rather than optimizing for a single detection mode.
Radar stealth continues to evolve with each fighter generation. The NGF will incorporate advanced shaping that deflects radar energy across broader frequency bands than current aircraft, addressing the reality that modern air defense systems employ diverse radar frequencies from long-wavelength early warning radars to millimeter-wave fire control systems. Internal weapons carriage preserves the clean external lines essential for stealth, with weapons bays sized to accommodate European missiles including Meteor, MICA NG, and various air-to-ground munitions. Radar-absorbent structural materials and coatings will be integrated into the airframe from the design stage rather than applied as afterthoughts, providing superior performance with reduced maintenance compared to coating-only approaches used on earlier stealth aircraft.
Infrared signature management presents distinct challenges, as aircraft engines inherently generate enormous heat that can be detected by infrared sensors at substantial ranges. The NGF's design must cool exhaust gases, shield hot engine components from infrared sensors, and manage airframe heating caused by high-speed flight and solar radiation. Advanced nozzle designs may incorporate serpentine exhaust paths that mask hot turbine components from direct view while mixing exhaust gases with cooler bypass air. Thermal management systems will circulate coolant through critical components, radiating waste heat from less-visible aircraft surfaces. Materials science advances allow skin surfaces that either absorb infrared energy or emit it in ways that minimize contrast against background temperatures, complicating thermal targeting.
Active signature control represents an emerging capability where the aircraft adaptively modifies its signature based on threats and tactical situation. Rather than maintaining constant stealth, active systems might temporarily increase electromagnetic emissions to communicate with friendly forces or remotely sense the environment, then return to silent running when threats approach. The aircraft might intentionally become more visible to draw enemy fire toward itself rather than more vulnerable assets, or project false signatures to confuse adversary targeting. These capabilities require sophisticated sensor integration and AI decision support to manage the complex tradeoffs between signature control and operational effectiveness.
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy
Artificial intelligence permeates every aspect of FCAS, from autonomous Remote Carrier operation to sensor data fusion to tactical decision support. The system must process and understand information volumes that would overwhelm human operators, extracting relevant intelligence from the noise and presenting options that human decision-makers can evaluate and authorize. This human-machine teaming represents a fundamental philosophical approach distinguishing FCAS from fully autonomous weapons systems, maintaining human judgment as the ultimate authority while leveraging AI for speed, pattern recognition, and tireless vigilance.
Machine learning algorithms will continuously improve performance through experience, learning to identify threats from subtle signatures, predict adversary behaviors based on tactical patterns, and optimize mission execution based on outcomes. The Combat Cloud architecture allows AI systems aboard different platforms to share learned behaviors, effectively enabling the entire fleet to benefit from any individual aircraft's experiences. This distributed learning accelerates capability development beyond what any single platform could achieve, though it raises questions about verification and validation—how can operators be confident that learned behaviors remain safe and effective as the AI evolves through experience?
Autonomous operation of Remote Carriers represents perhaps the most visible AI application. These vehicles must navigate to designated areas, coordinate their movements to avoid collisions while maintaining tactical formations, search for and identify targets, adapt to changing tactical situations, and execute assigned missions with minimal human direction. The AI must distinguish threatening enemy assets from neutral or friendly contacts with absolute certainty, preventing fratricide while allowing rapid engagement of actual threats. It must operate under degraded communications where instructions from human operators may be delayed or impossible, yet remain subject to meaningful human control as required by international humanitarian law and European ethical guidelines. Developing AI that balances autonomy and control remains an active research challenge without perfect solutions.
Quantum Technologies and Advanced Computing
FCAS technical roadmaps reference quantum computing as a potential revolutionary capability that could transform air combat. Quantum computers exploit quantum mechanical phenomena like superposition and entanglement to perform certain types of calculations exponentially faster than classical computers. For military applications, quantum computing could enable real-time optimization of complex tactical problems involving numerous variables, break current encryption systems that secure adversary communications, or solve sensor fusion challenges that overwhelm traditional processors. Major General Moritz has stated the ambition to "use quantum calculators instead of computers" for data processing within FCAS, though practical quantum computers robust enough for combat aircraft operation remain firmly in the research phase.
Quantum communications represent a nearer-term application, potentially providing communications links that are fundamentally unbreakable through physical laws rather than algorithmic complexity. Quantum key distribution uses entangled photons to establish encryption keys, with any eavesdropping attempt inherently disturbing the quantum states in detectable ways. This could enable secure communications even against adversaries with unlimited computational power and sophisticated cyber attack capabilities. However, implementing quantum communications over the long ranges and high speeds typical of air operations presents formidable technical obstacles that current laboratory demonstrations have not addressed.
Directed Energy Weapons and Advanced Munitions
While the baseline NGF design focuses on conventional weapons including missiles and precision-guided munitions, FCAS technical roadmaps explicitly address integration of directed energy weapons including high-power lasers and high-power microwaves. Laser weapons offer instant speed-of-light engagement with effectively unlimited magazines limited only by available electrical power, potentially revolutionizing air combat by allowing engagement of swarms of enemy drones or missiles that would exhaust conventional munition supplies. However, atmospheric effects including absorption, scattering, and turbulence limit laser effectiveness, particularly through clouds and in humid conditions. Generating laser beams powerful enough to damage hardened targets at tactically relevant ranges requires megawatts of electrical power, far exceeding current fighter aircraft electrical generation capacity. The NGF's design accommodates future installation of directed energy weapons through provisions for high-capacity electrical systems and thermal management, though operational laser armament appears unlikely before FCAS reaches mid-life upgrades decades after initial operational capability.
High-power microwave weapons offer alternative directed energy capabilities, using electromagnetic pulses to disrupt or destroy electronic systems rather than inflicting physical damage through heat. These weapons could disable adversary sensors, communications, and weapons guidance systems without kinetic effects, providing non-lethal or reduced-lethality options in some scenarios. However, protecting friendly systems from fratricide while employing electromagnetic attacks in dense electronic warfare environments presents significant technical and operational challenges.
Operational Concepts and Employment
The System-of-Systems Approach
FCAS operational concepts fundamentally depart from traditional fighter employment by emphasizing distributed operations where individual platforms play roles within an integrated whole rather than operating independently. In this vision, the NGF rarely fights alone but instead coordinates Remote Carriers, processes data from multiple sensors, and serves as a node within the broader Combat Cloud connecting air, land, sea, space, and cyber forces. This system-of-systems approach treats the aircraft as one element within a larger capability rather than as a self-contained weapon system, reflecting lessons from recent conflicts about the decisive importance of networking and information dominance.
A typical FCAS mission might begin with an NGF launching with several Remote Carriers either carried internally or rendezvousing after launch from an A400M transport. As the package approaches the target area, Remote Carriers push forward to gather intelligence while the NGF remains outside the most dangerous threat ranges. Expendable carriers might deliberately trigger enemy radar emissions by appearing as threatening targets, providing intelligence about air defense locations that friendly forces can attack. The NGF processes sensor data from its own systems and all Remote Carriers, fusing this information with intelligence from satellites, ground stations, and other friendly aircraft into a comprehensive tactical picture. The pilot evaluates options presented by AI decision support, selecting targets and authorizing attacks. Remote Carriers carrying weapons move into position to engage from unexpected angles, overwhelming defenses through simultaneous attacks from multiple vectors. If communications degrade, Remote Carriers execute pre-authorized behaviors, continuing their missions even without constant oversight while the NGF adapts its plans based on unfolding events.
This operational concept delivers several advantages over traditional fighter employment. By distributing sensors across multiple platforms, the force can observe the battlespace from many positions simultaneously, defeating countermeasures that might fool individual sensors and providing accurate targeting solutions through triangulation. Remote Carriers absorb defensive fire that might otherwise target the expensive manned fighter, improving pilot survivability while allowing the force to remain effective even after sustaining losses. The NGF's weapons capacity effectively multiplies through Remote Carriers that serve as airborne magazines, allowing sustained combat without returning to base for rearming. Information dominance emerges from the Combat Cloud's ability to fuse data from all sensors and share the resulting intelligence across friendly forces, enabling them to act based on more complete and accurate understanding than adversaries possess.
Multi-Domain Operations
FCAS embraces multi-domain operations as a core concept, recognizing that future conflicts will unfold simultaneously across air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains with victory going to forces that effectively integrate actions across these dimensions. The Combat Cloud architecture explicitly supports coordination with naval vessels, ground-based air defense and strike systems, space-based sensors and communications, and cyber operations. An NGF might coordinate strikes with naval cruise missiles, relay targeting data to ground-based artillery, communicate through military satellite constellations, and support cyber operations that disrupt enemy command and control—all during a single mission.
This integration demands interoperability not just among FCAS platforms but with the broader force structure of European NATO members. The system must exchange data with American F-35s, British Tempest/GCAP aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, AWACS surveillance platforms, and the numerous existing fourth-generation fighters that will remain in service alongside FCAS for decades. Achieving this level of interoperability requires standardized data formats, compatible communications protocols, and shared operational procedures that span multiple nations and military services. The technical challenges are substantial, but the operational payoff—enabling genuinely joint operations where platforms from different nations and services work together seamlessly—justifies the investment.
Deterrence and Strategic Implications
For France, FCAS carries profound strategic implications extending beyond conventional air superiority missions. The NGF must be capable of delivering the Air-Sol Moyenne Portée Amélioré nuclear standoff missile that currently equips Rafale fighters assigned to France's nuclear deterrence mission. France's nuclear doctrine relies on multiple delivery systems including land-based ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and air-delivered weapons, with the airborne component providing flexible options and demonstrating resolve during crises. Maintaining sovereign control over this nuclear capability represents a non-negotiable French requirement that has influenced NGF design and complicated negotiations with Germany and Spain.
More broadly, FCAS represents European strategic autonomy in action—the continent developing advanced military capabilities independent of American or other external providers. This autonomy matters not because Europe expects to fight wars alone, but because dependence on foreign capabilities limits European freedom of action in international relations and defense policy. A Europe that relies entirely on American fighters, for example, must consider American views on how those aircraft can be employed, where they can be sold, and how they can be maintained. Indigenous European capabilities provide leverage in transatlantic relations and ensure that Europe retains options even if American strategic priorities shift in directions that diverge from European interests.
Cost, Financing, and Economic Impact
Program Costs
FCAS represents an extraordinary financial commitment, with total program costs estimated to exceed 100 billion euros across its full development, production, and multi-decade operational life. These costs encompass research and development through operational capability, production of hundreds of fighters and thousands of Remote Carriers, construction of supporting infrastructure, training systems development, sustainment costs over projected 30-40 year service lives, and periodic upgrades to maintain capability against evolving threats. Breaking this down by development phase, Phase 1A consumed 65 million euros for initial concept work, Phase 1B involves 3.2 billion euros for demonstrator development and technology maturation, and Phase 2 is projected at approximately 4.5 billion euros for production development if it proceeds.
These figures represent only development costs, not production expenses that will dwarf development spending. Current estimates suggest unit costs for production NGF aircraft will reach 100-150 million euros each in 2025 currency values, though actual costs will depend on production quantities, configuration decisions, inflation rates, and the inevitable growth that characterizes complex defense programs. If the three core nations and potential additional partners purchase 500-600 fighters over a 20-year production run, total acquisition costs would approach 60-80 billion euros for aircraft alone, before adding Remote Carriers, Combat Cloud infrastructure, support equipment, training systems, and spare parts. Operating and sustainment costs over aircraft service lives could easily equal or exceed acquisition costs, pushing total program costs well above 100 billion euros.
Cost sharing among partners has been carefully negotiated to reflect capability needs, industrial participation, and national budgets. France typically shoulders the largest share given its leading industrial role and largest fighter fleet requirement. Germany and Spain contribute proportionally smaller amounts reflecting their industrial participation and smaller expected procurement quantities. However, these cost-sharing arrangements remain subjects of ongoing negotiation, with each nation attempting to maximize its industrial return while minimizing its financial contribution. Economic uncertainties, particularly in France and Germany, create questions about whether partners can sustain funding commitments across the program's multi-decade timeline.
Economic Benefits and Industrial Considerations
Despite the enormous costs, FCAS offers substantial economic benefits that justify investment from a national industrial policy perspective. The program sustains tens of thousands of high-skilled jobs directly and hundreds of thousands indirectly through supply chains spanning hundreds of companies. These are not merely jobs but specialized positions requiring advanced engineering, scientific, and technical skills that command high wages and generate substantial economic multiplier effects. Aerospace engineers working on FCAS pay taxes, purchase homes, consume goods and services, and support local economies throughout their careers, generating economic value far exceeding their direct compensation.
Technology spillover from military aerospace programs has historically benefited commercial sectors including civil aviation, communications, materials science, and manufacturing. Advanced materials developed for stealth applications might find uses in commercial aircraft reducing weight and improving fuel efficiency. Manufacturing processes pioneered for fighter production could transfer to civil aerospace, automotive, or other industries. Software and AI tools developed for Combat Cloud applications might spawn commercial ventures in autonomous systems, data fusion, or communications. While quantifying these spillover benefits precisely proves difficult, historical experience with programs like Concorde, Airbus, and Eurofighter suggests they are substantial.
Perhaps most importantly, FCAS maintains European industrial capability in military aerospace, preserving skills and facilities that would atrophy if Europe became entirely dependent on American or other foreign fighters. Once lost, this industrial capability would be extraordinarily difficult and expensive to reconstitute, potentially leaving Europe permanently dependent on foreign suppliers for critical defense capabilities. From this perspective, FCAS represents insurance against future strategic shifts where European access to American military technology might be constrained or entirely cut off. The program preserves European options and sovereignty in ways that purely economic analysis might not fully capture.
Export Potential
Export sales represent both a potential revenue source offsetting development costs and a source of contention between partners. France has historically exported fighters successfully, with Rafale sales to Egypt, Qatar, India, Indonesia, Greece, and others generating substantial income while building influence through defense cooperation. French defense planners view export potential as essential for keeping production lines economically viable and spreading development costs across larger production quantities. Germany takes a more restrictive view of defense exports, particularly to nations outside NATO or the EU, creating tensions about how FCAS export policy should be structured. Spain generally aligns with French perspectives on exports as a source of economic benefit and geopolitical influence.
Potential FCAS customers might include European nations that operate current fighters but lack capacity to develop next-generation capabilities independently. Poland, Romania, Greece, and other nations will eventually need to replace aging Soviet-era aircraft or fourth-generation Western fighters, creating potential markets if FCAS offers attractive performance and pricing. Middle Eastern nations with sophisticated air forces and substantial budgets could represent lucrative customers, though Germany's restrictive export policies regarding this region create complications. Asian and Latin American nations might also be interested, though they face competition from American, Chinese, and Russian alternatives. The extent to which export sales materialize depends on FCAS performance, cost, delivery schedules, export policies, and geopolitical factors including relationships between producing and purchasing nations.
Ethical, Legal, and Social Dimensions
Autonomous Weapons and Human Control
FCAS has prompted serious ethical debates about the appropriate role of autonomous systems in warfare, particularly regarding lethal force decisions. The extensive use of AI and autonomy in Remote Carriers and the Combat Cloud raises fundamental questions: Under what circumstances should machines be permitted to select targets and employ force? How can meaningful human control be maintained over systems that operate too fast for humans to supervise in detail? What responsibility do operators bear for actions taken by autonomous systems following their instructions? These questions lack easy answers and have prompted FCAS partners to establish formal ethical review processes.
Germany has been particularly active in addressing these concerns, establishing the AG Technikverantwortung (Working Group on Technology Responsibility) bringing together government officials, military officers, engineers, ethicists, and social scientists to develop frameworks ensuring human responsibility remains paramount. The working group operates under a transparency mandate, publishing its deliberations and recommendations publicly to enable societal oversight and debate. This approach reflects recognition that decisions about autonomous weapons raise issues extending far beyond technical military considerations into fundamental questions about human agency, moral responsibility, and the acceptable limits of delegating decisions about life and death to machines.
FCAS embraces the principle that humans must remain "in the loop" for decisions about employing lethal force, with AI serving in advisory and executive roles but not making independent kill/no-kill determinations. This human-in-the-loop approach attempts to preserve moral agency and legal responsibility while capturing AI's advantages in speed and information processing. However, implementing this principle proves challenging in practice, particularly during fast-moving combat where delays waiting for human authorization could prove fatal. The system incorporates multiple layers: situations where humans actively authorize each action (human in the loop), scenarios where humans supervise AI execution and can intervene (human on the loop), and pre-authorized responses to imminent threats where AI executes with human notification (human informed). Determining which layer applies in specific circumstances requires careful analysis of mission profiles, threat environments, and rules of engagement.
International Humanitarian Law
FCAS must comply with international humanitarian law including the laws of war codified in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. These legal frameworks require that military operations distinguish between combatants and civilians, that attacks be proportional to legitimate military objectives, and that unnecessary suffering be avoided. Applying these principles to autonomous systems presents novel challenges, as AI must make nuanced judgments about whether potential targets are legitimate military objectives, whether civilian casualties would be proportionate to expected military advantage, and whether alternative methods might achieve objectives with less harm.
The technical challenge involves translating legal principles stated in general terms into specific algorithms that AI systems can implement. What sensor signatures indicate a legitimate military target versus a protected civilian object? How should the system weight military advantage against potential civilian harm when assessing proportionality? These judgments require contextual understanding, cultural knowledge, and ethical reasoning that current AI systems struggle to replicate. FCAS developers must demonstrate that autonomous systems will comply with international law as reliably as human operators would, a burden of proof that grows heavier as autonomy increases.
Societal Acceptance and Transparency
Public acceptance of FCAS depends partly on transparency about the program's goals, capabilities, and safeguards. European publics generally support strong defense capabilities but harbor skepticism about advanced weapons systems, particularly those involving AI and autonomy. The program has made significant efforts to engage civil society through public forums, published ethical reviews, and extensive media engagement. However, tensions exist between transparency and security, as detailed information about capabilities might provide adversaries with intelligence about vulnerabilities to exploit.
The political sustainability of a 100-billion-euro program over multiple decades requires continued public support amid competing budgetary priorities for healthcare, education, climate action, and social services. Maintaining this support demands demonstrating that FCAS provides genuine security value, that costs remain under control, that ethical concerns receive serious attention, and that European defense cooperation delivers benefits that national programs could not achieve. The program's current governance crisis threatens this political sustainability by suggesting that European partners cannot effectively cooperate even on programs all parties officially support. Restoring confidence that FCAS represents a viable path forward rather than an expensive exercise in dysfunction may prove as challenging as resolving the technical obstacles to fielding effective sixth-generation air combat capabilities.
Conclusion and Future Outlook
The Future Combat Air System stands at a crossroads in November 2025, representing simultaneously Europe's most ambitious defense program and one of its most endangered collaborative efforts. The technical vision remains compelling: a genuine system-of-systems approach integrating manned fighters, unmanned remote carriers, and advanced networking to deliver capabilities no individual platform could provide alone. The strategic imperative appears clear: Europe needs advanced air combat capabilities to maintain sovereignty, deter adversaries, and preserve freedom of action in an uncertain geopolitical environment. The industrial logic seems sound: spreading development costs across multiple nations while maintaining critical defense technological capacity within Europe. Yet the program teeters on the brink of collapse, threatened by irreconcilable disagreements between partners about governance, work share, and fundamental design priorities.
The coming months will determine whether FCAS survives in its current trilateral form, transforms into something substantially different, or fragments into separate national or alternative multinational programs. German ultimatums demanding resolution by year-end 2025 set artificial deadlines that may force decisions the partners are not yet prepared to make. France's domestic political instability complicates sustained policy commitments while Germany's industrial frustrations have reached levels where major constituencies question whether continuing with French partners remains viable. Spain watches anxiously, recognizing that its interests may prove expendable if the Franco-German core cannot find accommodation.
If FCAS collapses, the consequences extend beyond the immediate program failure. European defense integration would suffer a severe setback, raising questions about whether continental powers can cooperate effectively on major programs despite theoretical commitments to strategic autonomy. Industrial capabilities painstakingly built through decades of collaborative programs risk fragmentation, with companies focusing on national markets or seeking partnerships outside Europe. The technical vision of networked combat operations might stall if nations pursue incompatible approaches to next-generation capabilities, leaving European forces unable to operate as an integrated whole against sophisticated adversaries. Most fundamentally, FCAS failure would validate skeptics who argue that European pretensions to strategic autonomy remain hollow so long as nations prove incapable of transcending narrow interests in pursuit of common goals.
Yet pessimism may prove premature. European defense cooperation has survived numerous crises over decades, with programs like Eurofighter weathering spectacular disagreements before ultimately delivering capable aircraft to multiple air forces. The magnitude of the FCAS investment and the absence of attractive alternatives create powerful incentives for resolution. None of the partners possesses appealing unilateral options—France cannot easily afford an independent program, Germany lacks attractive alternatives to either FCAS or complete dependence on American capabilities, and Spain has essentially no path forward outside some form of European collaboration. These constraints may ultimately force compromises that currently appear politically impossible.
The technical foundations for success exist. Phase 1B work has made genuine progress maturing critical technologies including advanced sensors, stealth materials, propulsion concepts, and Combat Cloud architecture. The industrial ecosystem brings together some of Europe's most capable aerospace firms with deep expertise in fighter development, unmanned systems, networking, and advanced manufacturing. The coming demonstrator flights will provide critical validation of core concepts, potentially building momentum and confidence that could overcome current governance deadlock. If partners can resolve their industrial disputes and commit to pragmatic compromises that allow the program to proceed, FCAS retains potential to fulfill its promise of delivering revolutionary capabilities that position Europe as a global leader in advanced military aviation.
Whether that potential is realized or squandered will be determined not by technical factors—the necessary technologies are achievable—but by political will, institutional flexibility, and the ability of European partners to subordinate narrow national interests to common strategic objectives. The decisions made in the closing weeks of 2025 will determine whether FCAS represents European defense cooperation's finest achievement or its most expensive failure. The stakes could hardly be higher, extending far beyond a single weapons program to encompass fundamental questions about European security, strategic autonomy, and the continent's ability to chart an independent course in an increasingly contested and multipolar world. FCAS's ultimate fate remains uncertain, but its importance as a test case for European ambitions remains beyond dispute.
Sources
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
