Spain - Army History - 1898
As in practically all the countries of continental Europe, Spain's army was raised by conscription, 80,000 recruits being levied annually. Their term of service is twelve years — three in the line, three in the first reserve, six in the second reserve. The full force of the army was nominally 1,083,595 men, but this is on paper only, as nothing like that number could be equipped for service. The standing army is stated at 128,183 on a peace footing, 183,972 on a war footing.
The constitution of the Spanish Monarchy vested the supreme command of the land and naval forces in the King, but, as in most of the other constitutional monarchies, the ministry was responsible for the royal acts, and the law specifically put into the hands of the minister of war, who was always a general officer, the organization and government of the army and all the military services. In the administration and direction of the army and the military services the minister is assisted by the war ministry and the various central dependencies. The latter were mostly independent of the war ministry, and were directly subordinate to the minister himself. The staffs of the Spanish army may be divided into the general staff (estado mayor-general), the staff corps (cuerpo de estado mayor), and the aids-de camp (ayudantes de campo and ayudantes de órdenes).
As of 1898 Spain had a population of 17,560,000. Census returns showed that a very large proportion of the inhabitants of Spain were illiterate. Nearly 12,000,000 in the kingdom can neither read nor write. According to tbe latest published statistics on hand the number of young men who, in the year 1894, attained the age of liability to military service was 141,061. There were, however, numerous canses of exclusion from the military service, among which are physical defects or disease, insufficient stature, membership in certain religions orders engaged in public instruction, labor in certain mines, penal sentences of various degrees, etc. Exemptions applied only to service in the active army, and were, for the most part, connected with the support of families. Exemption from active service was also purchasable, the amount to be paid varying from $300 to $400, depending on the time when the purchase money is paid.
Substitutions and changes of numbers were allowed, but only between brothers. Volunteers were also admitted to the army. Volunteers without bounty might enlist at any time, uuless express orders were given to the contrary. Volunteers with a right to bounty were admitted to replace those men who had purchased their exemption, the bounty for the colonial troops being double that tor the peninsular army. The time of enlistment for volunteers was four years, but men serving with the colors might volunteer to reenlist for one, two, three, or four years, the restriction being that they must not have passed the age of 45 at the expiration of the reenlistment.
Of the available youths of the class of 1894 (40,500) about 0.23 per cent of the whole population, or 28 per cent of the class, were drawn for the active army. The remainder of the able-bodied youths of the class, those who have purchased their exemption and those who have furnished substitutes, together with the "condicionales" and those who bave been exempted from active service for family reasons, were posted to the "deposito," which corresponds nearly to the Ersatz Reserve. The "condicionales" were those who were only temporarily excluded from service on account of temporary physical disability or stature very slightly below the minimum. These youths were subject to reexamination up to the end of the third year.
In 1898, the territory of the Peninsula was divided into 8 military regions, to each of which an army corps was assigned. The Balearic Isles and the Canary Isles formed two captain-generalcies, each commanded by a lieutenant-general. The fortress of Ceuta, with its dependencies, and that of Melilla, with its own, and the camp of Gibraltar formed three general commanderies, under generals of division, who were directly subordinate to the war minister. The army corps and the military regions corresponding thereto were commanded by captain-generals or lieutenant-generals, who were styled general in chief or commander in chief of their respective corps, according to the grade they held, and captain-general of the military region.
The army corps is composed of one or two or three mixed divisions (divisions of all arms), and two corps have a cavalry division apiece. To the headquarters of each corps are attached a number of units, not depending on any of the divisions, such as cavalry brigades, rifle brigades, regiments of sappers and miners or other engineer troops, and battalions of fortress artillery. There are usually a few units stationed in each army corps region that do not belong to the corps.
The divisions, of which there were 15 organized and 1 to be organized, consisted in time of peace of 2 brigades of 2 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment of cavalry, 1 regiment of iield artillery, 1 company of troops of the military administration, and 1 company of sanitary troops. One division had, exceptionally, a whole brigade of cavalry.
The infantry is equipped with the Mauser, a good modern rifle that is also used by the German and other armies. It is of German make, a magazine rifle of small calibre and great range and power, using smokeless powder, and shooting five bullets without reloading. The infantry of the permanent army of the Peninsula was organized into 112 regiments, of which 56 are active and 56 reserve, and 20 battalions of riiles grouped into 10 half brigades. Each active regiment of the line consists of 2 battalions of 4 companies each. There were, in addition, 1 African infantry regiments of 2 battalions of 4 companies each, 2 infantry regiments in the Balearic Islands of 2 battalions of 4 companies, 2 riile battalions in the Canaries, and 1 disciplinary battalion; in all, 147 active battalions. To these must be added four independent companies for service in peace establishments and in the Canaries. The regiment consisted of 49 officers, including 2 surgeons, 1 chaplain, and the chief musician, and 776 men.
The cavalry of the Peninsular army was composed of 8 regiments of lancers, 14 regiments of chasseurs, 2 of hussars, and a squadron of the royal escort, each regiment consisting of 4 squadrons; in all, 113 squadrons. There were, in addition, 1 squadron of chasseurs in the Balearic Islands and another at Melilla.
Except in the First Corps, where an artillery brigade was organized for instructional purposes, the field artillery was not organized into brigades in time of peace. The regiments were distributed with tolerable nniformity at the rate of 1 regiment to each mixed division, though in some cases the regiments assigned to certain divisions were found to be detached and serving in the territory of another army corps. The fortress artillery is organized into the same number of battalions and companies in time of peace and war, is distributed in the various commands according to the necessities of defense, and is subordinate to the same anthorities as the field artillery.
In time of peace the engineer troops were grouped by regiments and battalions. There was 1 regiment with the First Corps, and 1 battalion with every other corps. There were, besides, other engineer battalions stationed in some of the corps regions without forming part of the corps. In the First Corps region, the corps regiment of sappers and miners, with the telegraph battalion and the railway battalion, which were stationed in the corps region, formed a brigade of engineer troops for instructional purposes, under a brigadier-general of engineers.
Colonial possession involve a colonial army. Financially the colonial troops are under the ministry of "affairs over the sea" (ultramar); in other respects, under the war and naval ministries, respectively. Since the supplemental laws (July 19, 1889) made to the fundamental laws of the army, the colonial troops of Spain have been merged into one with those of the Peninsula. They remain, however, separated from it, inasmuch as they were permanently colonial.
Puerto Rico was under a captain-general and is administered like Cuba. The permanent army of Puerto Rico consisted of 4 battalions of rifles of 4 companies each, 1 battalion of fortress artillery of 5 companies, 1 section of cavalry, 1 section of artillery workmen, the sanitary brigade, and 1 "tercio" of the guardia civil. There are, moreover, representatives of the administration, and the general staff of the army and of the engineer staff, besides several corps of volunteers, organized in a manner similar to those of Cuba. Total effective of the permanent army for 1894-95 was 213 ollicers and 3,630 men.
The district of the Philippine Islands was under a captain-general, who also commands the Caroline and Marianne islands, and is divided into several military governments, of which Manila was the most important. There were 7 regiments of infantry of 1 battalion of 6 companies each, 1 disciplinary battalion, 1 squadron of cavalry, 1 regiment of artillery of 2 battalions, each of 1 mountain and 5 fortress companies, 1 company of marine artillery, 1 company of artillery workmen, 1 battalion of engineers, 1 sanitary brigade, 3 "tercios' of the civil guard, and 3 companies ofcarabineros (customs guard). Total effective was 864 officers and 19,238 men.
The regular forces operating in Cuba were of two classes: First, the permanent army of Cuba; and, second, the expeditionary forces. An attempted revolution had been in progress in that island since early in 1895. The Spanish government sent over a large army under Marshal Campos to put down this insurrection. Campos, however, failed to subdue the insurgents, who had declared independence, and had set up a government in the eastern provinces of the island. Spain recalled Marshal Campos and placed the army under command of Captain General Weyler, an experienced and distinguished officer. From the first, the course of Weyler and his army was barbarous and brutal in the extreme.
Of the morale of the Spanish soldiers, their ill success in Cuba had created an unfavorable opinion. They were described them as not lacking in courage, but undisciplined, undrilled, and badly officered — criticisms that agree with those made by Wellington during the Peninsular war. They were wretched marksmen, never doing target practice, and so careless in action that they seldom raised their rifles to the shoulder, finding it easier to fire with the butt held under the arm [that is to say, they anticipated the assault rifle, designed for such usage]. They spoiled their weapons by ignorant misuse, knocking off the sight, for instance, because they complained that it tore their clothes.
The strength of Spain's garrison in Cuba at the outbreak of the war is not known with anything like exactitude. According to Mr. Springer, US vice-consul at Havana, official records showed that since February 1895, Spain had despatched 237,000 men across the Atlantic; a few of these had been killed in action, many thousands had died of disease, many more thousands had been invalided home. Consul-General Lee testified before the US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee that there were probably 97,000 or 98,000 Spanish troops then in the island, of whom only about 55,000 were capable of bearing arms. This may be far too low an estimate; the figures given by General Miles — 150,000 men with 183 guns — may be much nearer the truth. At the end of the war, after some 23,000 troops had left Santiago, the American commissioners in Cuba — Admiral Sampson and Generals Wade and Butler — reported that there were in the island about 118,000 Spanish regulars, 21,000 volunteers on duty, and 52,000 volunteers armed but not on duty.
Spain's one point of advantage — on paper, at least — had been the fact that she had the greater number of trained soldiers. The issue of the conflict depended on the command of the sea, and her navy was weaker than her adversary's, though the tremendous inferiority it was to display under the guns of Dewey and Sampson was not apparent at the outset of the war. Despite a pledge by Madrid to defend Cuba "to the last peseta," the Spanish army surrendered after a few weeks of hostilities against an American expeditionary force.
The suddenness and the totality of Spain's defeat as well as the country's realization of its lack of European support during the war with the United States (only Germany had offered diplomatic backing) threw Spain into despair. The disaster called forth an intellectual reevaluation of Spain's position in the world by the so-called "Generation of 1898," who confronted Spaniards with the propositions that Spain had long since ceased to be a country of consequence, that its society was archaic, and that its institutions were outworn and incapable of moving into the twentieth century. These words were painful for the proud nation.
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