Denmark - Army - Defence Agreement 2010 – 2014
Experiences from deploying Army contingents in international operations show that the Army primarily deploys units of battalion size, to which elements of all the branches of arms of the Army can be assigned: so-called battlegroups. However, so far this fact has not been adequately reflected in the Army’s operational structure, leading to a practice of Army units being broken up and reconfigured from deployment to deployment in connection with international operations.
On this basis, there is agreement that the Army’s operational structure should be focused around the battlegroup level and modified so as to meet the requirements of long-term deployments in international operations. Furthermore, the areas where the present manpower level is too small are to be strengthened, which in turn will enhance the ability to maintain the simultaneous deployment of several contingents in long-term international operations and thus enable the Army to meet the defined level of ambition.
Besides the ability to deploy battlegroups, the Army must maintain an ability at longer notice to deploy a brigade-sized formation. Support units must be modular and capable of being deployed within the framework of battlegroups. The Army maintains a fire-support capability that is designed for deployment in international operations.
The number of main battle tanks is to be reduced. This measure entails that the number of operational Leopard 2 main battle tanks is to be reduced from 57 to approx. 34. The Army’s overall fire-support capability is to be reduced. This entails, for example, the decommissioning of the Army’s present and obsolete long-range, fire-support system: the self-propelled M109 howitzers. The Army’s air-defence capability is to be decommissioned. This measure entails that the Danish Armed Forces’s ability to conduct land-based active defence against aircraft and helicopter threats is eliminated. The control and early warning component, however, is to be preserved and transferred to the Air Force, where it is to be merged with the Air Force’s control and early warning capability. The Army’s anti-tank missile capability is to be decommissioned. This measure entails the abolition of the Army’s long-range, anti-tank missile units.
In 2009 and 2010 the M113G3s used in Afghanistan were upgraded with belly protection, rubber tracks, adjustable seats and other features. This upgrade was standardized and further vehicles has been upgraded in 2011 and 2012. The upgraded vehicles are designated M113G4DK. Some 70 vehicles had been extended approximagtely 66 cm and added an extra road-wheel, M113G4DK Extended.
One of the Army's most highly protected armored personnel carriers [pansrede mandskabsvogne], PMV version G4, was taken out of service to undergo a planned modification program that solved technical problems on the vehicle. For some time this reduced the total fleet of APCs in Army units and therefore affected training and Army contingency capabilities. This meant that the army must necessarily prioritize and reallocate the remaining APCs.
The 60-year-old PMV would be replaced. Bu until the Army took delivery of a new PMV-type to replace the M113 models, the Army worked with PMV M113, G3 and G4 and PMV Piranha. In addition, the army continued to have well protected infantry fighting vehicle CV90.
The Army armored personnel carriers, PMV M113, were produced back in the 1950s and have been continuously updated. The most recent edition was the M113G4. This version was developed from the previous model M113G3 in a number way that accommodated the needs of deployed units in Afghanistan. The upgrade to G4 resulted generally in more space and better protection of the soldiers.
The tests of the upgraded G4 showed that there were problems with individual components that found it hard to cope with the increased load. Therefore asked the Defence Acquisition and Logistics system vendor to develop a complete update package of the undercarriage. There was not at that time a technical and well-proven solution that could solve the problems. Now there is. The Defence was ready to modify the vehicles to the establishment of the Army's new armored personnel carriers.
After the withdrawal of the Army units from Afghanistan, there wasn a shift in the army's education and training pattern, where the army now teach targeted reaction forces at high readiness, including the NATO response Force (NRF)). This resulted in an increased failure rate of PMV G4. The error rate means that it is not possible to keep the PMV G4 operating satisfactorily. There was no prospect that the PMV G4 will be available for the units to training, exercises and preparedness adequately before the modification program is completed.
Ministry of Defence in hardware and Procurement Management Board, in collaboration with the Army Staff [Haerstaben] consequently decided that all PMV G4 would taken out of service in order to be prepared to modify the program. The modification program can be implemented such that the necessary PMV G4 to one reaction battlegroup will be ready by the turn of 2015/2016. as each vehicle is reported ready, they will again flow to Army units.
The Army Staff and the Ministry of Defence in hardware and Procurement Management Board constantly examined all possibilities to implement modification program as soon as possible. PMV G3 replacemetn of G4 modification included all 65 vehicles of the type PMV G4, most of which included in the Army reaction Battle Group, which is on high alert. Army units, until PMV G4 turn accesses after modification program, instead use the less protected PMV G3 and PMV PIRANHA.
Modification program solved among others the problem that the axeles were damaged (bent) during turns. Technical studies showed that PMV M113 G4 is fitted with axeles which did not meet the specified requirements. The material of the axeles was too weak and damaged due to overloading. Technical solutions to reinforce PMV M113 G4 was developed based on extensive tests on the fully loaded vehicle (20 tons). The test was carried out in 2013 and included more than 2,000 kilometers of driving, mainly in the terrain. The technical solution was approved in March 2014 by both the German manufacturer as an external German testing institute.
The modificatgions include: aligning the chassis geometry; installation of new axeles of stronger material; adjusting the brake system (existing brake was approved for 20 tons); installation of newly developed reinforced torsion bars. The technical solution was further controlled in a collaboration between the then Defence Material Service and Army Combat and Ildstøttecenter, and the vehicle was approved in a 20 tons configuration.
The necessary components for the modification program were ordered, but not expected to be able to access in January 2015. This was primarily due to the supplier delivery times for special torsion bars. Since the torsion bars were newly developed, there is a delivery time of 6-7 months. There would be implemented subject to final testing in November 2014 at the Army Combat and Ildstøttecenter prior to the update will be launched.
The high level of preparedness would be maintained, but it will require special consideration by any operational activation of the units in the form of a careful assessment and balancing of the current threat level and operation environment. In addition, it would require less redistribution between Army units to ensure that high priority units can fulfill their mission. This meant that some units that are not on alert or on the way to the emergency, did not have PMV during training in 2015. That was not optimal, but is a necessary priority in order to ensure that the highest priority units had the best possible conditions during their training and emergency period until PMV G4 is modified and delivered.
The protection of the soldiers are part of the operational considerations army's preparedness can be maintained with, among other PMV G3 and PMV PIRANHA during modificeringsprocessen. These vehicles provide soldiers with less protection than PMV G4. Therefore, specific threat assessments in relation to the vehicle protection degree even more so could affect a decision to activate units on alert.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
