Czech Republic - Russia Relations
The Czech Republic announced 17 April 2021 that it was expelling 18 Russian diplomats identified as spies over a huge ammunition depot explosion in 2014. Prime Minister Andrej Babis said the Czech intelligence agencies had provided evidence about the involvement of Russian military agents in the massive explosion that killed two people. He said the Czech Republic, as a sovereign state, had to react to those findings. “There is well-grounded suspicion about the involvement of officers of the Russian intelligence service GRU, unit 29155, in the explosion of ammunitions depot in the Vrbetice area,” Babis said. Interior Minister Jan Hamacek, who is also serving as the foreign minister, said the Russian embassy staffers were clearly identified as Russian military spies. “Eighteen employees of the Russian embassy must leave our republic within 48 hours,” Hamacek told reporters.
In Russia, the Interfax news agency cited Vladimir Dzhabarov, first deputy head of the upper house’s international affairs committee, as saying Prague’s claims that Russian intelligence officers were involved in the explosion were absurd.
Russia may not have been behind the 2014 blast at a Czech ammunition depot, Czech President Milos Zeman said in a televised address 25 April 2021. He said there were two working theories of how the 2014 blast at the private ammunition depot happened: one involving Russian sabotage, the other involving an accident due to the mishandling of explosives. "I take both of these theories seriously and I wish for them to be thoroughly investigated," he said. Zeman is widely seen as having close links to the Russian government and was hosted by President Vladimir Putin in Sochi in 2017. He has been in the largely ceremonial role since 2013. After his address, Czech opposition politicians accused him of engaging in disinformation, and criticized him for casting doubt on the work of the secret services.
The Czech Republic’s internal spat over the 2014 ammunition depot explosions showed no signs of calming down, with President Milos Zeman refusing to accept Prague’s security service's conclusions that Russia is to blame. The dispute became so intense that both the country's Prime Minister Andrej Babis and Minister of Justice Marie Benesova have gone on the attack against Zeman. In October and December 2014, explosions took place at arms depots in Vrbetice, killing two people. Last month, Czech First Deputy Prime Minister Jan Hamacek revealed that the country's authorities believe they know the identities of two men supposedly responsible for the explosions, and both allegedly work for Russian military intelligence.
From 1948 until 1989, the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia followed that of the Soviet Union. Since independence, the Czechs have made integration into Western institutions their chief foreign policy objective. The Czechs have a multi-faceted relationship with Russia which varies according to the issue, as well as the fora involved (whether NATO, the EU, or on a bilateral basis). Many in this region retain deeply-rooted suspicions of Russian aims. Yet this is not a view shared by all Czechs, some of whom simply view Russia with a level of ambivalence and skepticism (with which they treat all superpowers). When it comes to security issues, almost all Czech politicians, except for the unrepentant Communists, continue to view NATO and (to a lesser extent) EU membership as their first line of defense and/or collective action. Many Czechs also pay close attention to the country's (and Europe's) reliance on Russian energy supplies.
Conservative Civic Democrats (ODS) governments defined Czech foreign policy from 1989-97 as a "return to Europe," focusing specifically on NATO and EU accession. Historical suspicion of Russia drove many of the government's policies and projects, including the construction of the Ingolstadt-Kralupy-Litvinov (IKL) pipeline in 1994, designed to reduce Czech dependence on Russian oil. The Social Democrat (CSSD)-led left-of-center governments that ruled between 1998 and 2006, however, generally muted their criticisms of Russia and sought to expand bilateral trade ties. For example, in 2000, CSSD Prime Minister Milos Zeman (1998-2002) negotiated with Russian President Putin agreements on visa free travel to Russia and the resolution of Soviet-era debts. With the formation in January 2007 of Mirek Topolanek,s new ODS-led government, the Czechs have moved to counter what the government perceives as a gathering Russian threat by deepening its security partnership with Washington.
The Czech Republic is dependent on Russia for roughly 70 percent of its gas, 65 percent of its oil, and (starting in 2010) 100 percent of its nuclear fuel. Thanks to the construction of the Ingolstadt-Kralupy-Litvinov (IKL) pipeline in 1994, the Czechs were able to weather disruptions to the flow of Russian crude oil - ostensibly for technical reasons - following the July 2008 signing of the U.S.-Czech Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. These disruptions lasted through December. Similarly, connection to the German gas network and the highest gas reserves in the EU per capita, allowed the Czech Republic to survive Russia's January 2009 cut off of gas to Europe via Ukraine.
Despite strained political relationship, trade and investment between the Czech Republic and Russia continue to expand. All Czech political parties recognize the vast potential of the Russian market.
In the Czech Republic the left-of-center Social Democrats (CSSD) is one of largest parties in the country, and their views of Russia are typically less security-oriented and more focused on the positive benefits of economic engagement with Russia. CSSD's opposition to missile defense came not from conviction, but from political expediency. Polls consistently showed two-thirds of Czechs oppose the radar, although the intensity of Czech opposition was low.
Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek and his right-of-center government viewed missile defense (MD) as a natural next step in the security partnership with the US. Since the United States officially presented the MD proposal to the Czech Republic in January 2007, the Czech government had been unwavering in its support, despite significant public opposition driven largely by the Czech historical experience and concerns about foreign troop presence on the Czech territory. Russian threats and intransigence with regard to MD in many ways reinforced the Czech government's determination to proceed with the project. The freezing of the US Missile Defense deployment plan was seen by many as a clear symbol of US disengagement from this region.
In its policy statement approved in February 2014, the new center-left government promised to bring the Czech Republic back to the EU mainstream, reaffirm its commitment to EU integration and take a more active part in shaping the EU’s future. The previous government suffered from a cold war between the foreign minister and the prime minister and from a cold war between the foreign minister and the president. Czech President and Honorary ODS Chairman, Vaclav Klaus, was outspoken in defense of Russia.
In a statement issued 29 August 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said "The Czech Republic considers the incursion of the armed forces of the Russian Federation into the territory of eastern and southeastern Ukraine a fundamental threat to peace and stability of all of Europe. The steps taken by the Russian Federation are in direct contradiction not only with the basic rules of international law but also with the recent assurances given by President Putin at the Minsk summit about his willingness to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis in eastern Ukraine."
The Czech government took a more reserved stance on a new wave of EU sanctions against Russia. Prime Minister Sobotka said he would object to some of them in order to protect Czech machinery producers. Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka criticized the anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States, speaking 12 September 2014 at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Social Democratic Party, which is leading the country's ruling three-party coalition. "I'm convinced that the escalation of economic sanctions is not a solution. Surely, they will worsen the economic situation in Russia, but it will not affect Russia's political stance on Ukraine," Sobotka said.
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