Republic of Cyprus - Politics
Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided de facto into the government-controlled two-thirds of the island and the Turkish Cypriot-administered one-third. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has continued to be the only internationally recognized authority; in practice, its authority extends only to the government-controlled area.
The 1960 Cypriot constitution provided for a presidential system of government with independent executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as a complex system of checks and balances, including a weighted power-sharing ratio designed to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. The executive, for example, was headed by a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president, elected by their respective communities for 5-year terms, and each possessing a right of veto over certain types of legislation and executive decisions. The Greek Cypriot-controlled Republic of Cyprus retains most elements of the presidential system of government expressed in the constitution, although it has cited the Turkish Cypriots' "withdrawal from government" and the "law of necessity" to enact structural changes that allow "effective governance."
Major political parties include the Greek Cypriots--Progressive Party of Working People or Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou--AKEL (communist); Democratic Party or Dimokratikon Komma--DIKO (center); Democratic Rally or Dimokratikos Synagermos--DISY (center-right); Social Democrats Movement or Kinisi Socialdemocraton--EDEK (socialist); United Democrats or Enomeni Dimokrates--ED (center-left). Turkish Cypriots--National Unity Party or Ulusal Birlik Partisi--UBP (right); Democrat Party or Demokrat Partisi--DP (center-right); Republican Turkish Party or Cumhuriyetci Turk Partisi--CTP (center-left); Freedom and Reform Party or Free Party--Ozgurluk ve Reform Partisi--OP (center-right); Communal Democracy Party or Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi--TDP (left).
Historically, none of the Greek Cypriot parties has been able to elect a president by itself or dominate the 56-seat House of Representatives. The 165,000 Greek Cypriot refugees from the area now administered by Turkish Cypriots are a potent political force, along with the independent Orthodox Church of Cyprus, which has some influence in secular as well as religious matters.
In Cyprus, all interests and all forms of expression are seen as inherently political. Leftists and right-wingers have their own coffee shops and football clubs. The same holds true for labor unions, which are far and away the largest civil society organizations in Cyprus. The parties look at civil society organizations as potential competitors for the affections and loyalties of their voters. The communal violence of the 1960s and the coup/invasion of 1974 are still fresh in the Cypriot psyche and have shaped the first post-war generation in such a way that politics -- and political parties -- are still the primary and dominant form of civic organization. Civil society in Cyprus was fragmented, weak and riven by personal rivalries.
Greek Cypriot "human rights" organizations -- and they are legion -- are concerned almost exclusively with the return of property lost by Greek Cypriots in 1974. The parallel plight of Turkish Cypriots was of little interest to them. The struggle for democracy in Burma or the suffering of refugees in Darfur was utterly irrelevant. This was, at least in part, a function of government-funding practices that advantaged Cyprus-issue NGOs and a small, well-heeled private donor community that thinks inside "the Cyprus box."
The Cypriot media has been openly hostile to NGOs, particularly those that stray from the established government line. The television news and the largest newspapers reflexively toe the government line. Beginning in the fall of 2004, the Greek Cypriot media launched a scorched earth attack on U.S. bicommunal assistance, UNOPS and specific NGOs that had worked with UNOPS to implement bicommunal programs. The charge in the press -- presented without a single shred of evidence -- was that the United States had essentially paid Greek Cypriots to support the Annan Plan and that we had laundered "black money" through complicit NGOs.
At the time of Cyprus's 1960 independence from Great Britain, the island's 580,000 population was 79 percent Greek-Cypriot, 18 percent Turkish-Cypriot, and three percent "other" -- British expats, mainly. Out-migration of citizens from both communities had begun before independence, mainly for economic reason, but spiked after the commencement of inter-communal fighting in 1963, with Turkish Cypriots perceiving threats to their physical security and limited opportunities to make a living. After 1974, significant numbers of Turkish mainlanders -- the so-called "settlers" -- relocated to Cyprus, many for personal economic reasons but some due to Turkey's political decision to repopulate the north with ethnic Turks. By the mid-nineties, the island's population, while having grown substantially over 35 years, remained predominantly bi-communal, or at least bi-ethnic.
An island long accustomed to exporting human capital, Cyprus has witnessed an unprecedented wave of immigration since the late 1990s, altering the historically bi-communal (Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot) demographic balance and potentially affecting the Republic's political landscape longer-term. These new minorities outnumber the country's "official" Armenian, Maronite and Latin minorities by a significant margin; by 2008 reputable media reported a legal migrant population in Cyprus of over 100,000 and estimate the illegal population at 60,000. Of the largest communities, the Filipinos and Sri Lankans have focused on improving their short-term economic lot and shown little interest in politics, while the Pontian Greeks, who in many cases hold EU passports and enjoy limited voting rights, have put down roots and begun to organize politically.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
