• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Ethiopia - Military Personnel

The Ethiopia National Defense Force [ENDF] or National Defense Force of Ethiopia (NDFE) relies on voluntary military service of people above 18 years of age. Although there is no compulsory military service, armed forces may conduct call-ups when necessary and compliance is compulsory.

The size of the ENDF has fluctuated significantly since the end of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war in 2000. In 2002 the Ethiopian Defense Forces had a strength of approximately 400,000 troops. This was roughly the same number maintained during the Derg regime that fell to the rebel forces in 1991. However, that number was later reduced, and in January 2007, during the War in Somalia, Ethiopian forces were said to comprise about 300,000 troops. In 2012, the IISS estimated that the ground forces had 135,000 personnel and the air force 3,000.

Ethiopia’s armed forces were estimated to number about 200,000 in November 2011, making it one of the biggest on the continent. By another estimate, the ENDF was comprised of approximately 150,000 personnel [as of 2012] stationed in bases all over the country in addition to deployment in other countries.

While many active duty personnel are stationed close to their families, many others are not. This distance from their families coupled with their financial and other resources, and their training to feel invincible may put them at increased risk for HIV.

Ethiopia’s 2002 Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy stated that it was the trained manpower that can successfully utilize logistics and weapons of war to win in a battlefield. Even the state-of-the art military technology and the strongest logistical backing would make little or no difference in a battlefield in the absence of able manpower. Although this does not mean that military technology and logistics are not at all important to our capabilities, a strong defense force means primarily the mobilization of capable soldiers.

The efforts to further development and foster democracy, and the endeavor to achieve national consensus and register achievements, would help to create citizens who recognize the benefits and who would go to any length to protect them. Imbue the emerging army with political education, and a committed spirit emerges. Ethiopians as a whole will stand in unison and safeguard with dedication to their country and its security. An army that emerges from such a population would fight with great determination and valour. Doing effective political work among the troops would undoubtedly strengthen the Armed Forces’ singleness of purpose.

At one time, 80 percent of the military had lower primary education while only 1 to 2 per cent attained higher education. By 2012 this had changed, with more than 80 percent of the military having reached higher secondary level of education. The higher education enrollment of the military was also improved significantly, while thousands in the military had diploma, BA and MA degrees.

During the first few years of their rule, TPLF officials, including Meles Zenawi, tried to justify their monopoly of power by the dominance in terms of number and organization of the TPLF fighting force during the fighting to topple the Military dictatorship of Mengistu Hailemariam. The promise they often made was that the force will be ethnically diversified with time.

The monopoly of key government decision making positions in Ethiopia by individuals of one ethnic group, the TPLF led Tigrean elite, was without precedent in Ethiopian history. By 2014 this monopoly of power was in display particularly in the leadership of the armed forces of the country and the security agency. There was widespread discontent among the regular army as well as rank and file officers that was predominantly drawn from the large non Tigrean ethnicity. Among the total of 64 highest military ranks in four departments and commands, 49 of them are Tigrians, two Agews and one from Mixed tribe, while the remaining number of Ormos, Amharas, and SNNPR are eight, four, and zero, respectively.

After the 2005 national elections the Ethiopian military conducted a major purge of over 1,000 mostly Oromo officers from the military on ethnically based suspicion of their loyalty to the ethnic Tigrayan-led ruling party.

Ethnicity in the military was much less a factor in the Derg army than it is now. The current government had years of practice at "systematic segregation" and that they were good at it. The Amhara and Oromo in the military know they serve the Tigrayan elite and not the broader interests of the Ethiopian state.

Military morale and political condition would not allow it to fight. By 2008 the Ethiopian military was limiting itself to tactical operations only in Somalia. Ethiopia cannot afford to fight a war against Eritrea because the military lacked the will to fight and a war would exacerbate the growing cracks in the Ethiopian state.