Egypt - Foreign Relations - Mubarak [1981-2012]
This support continued, with President Mubarak often intervening personally to promote peace negotiations. In 1996, he hosted the Sharm El-Sheikh "Summit of the Peacemakers" attended by President Clinton and other world leaders. In 2000, he hosted two summits at Sharm El-Sheikh and one at Taba in an effort to resume the Camp David negotiations suspended in July of 2000, and in June 2003, Mubarak hosted President Bush for another summit on the Middle East peace process. Throughout mid-2004, Egypt worked closely with Israel and the Palestinian Authority to facilitate stability following Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, which occurred in August and September of 2005. Prior to this Egypt and Israel reached an agreement that allowed Egypt to deploy additional forces along the Philadelphi Corridor in an attempt to control the border and prevent the smuggling of weapons.
Mubarak successfully shepherded Sadat's peace with Israel into the 21st century, and benefitted greatly from the stability Camp David has given the Levant: there has not been a major land war in more than 35 years. Peace with Israel cemented Egypt's moderate role in Middle East peace efforts and provided a political basis for continued U.S. military and economic assistance ($1.3 billion and $250 million, respectively). However, broader elements of peace with Israel, e.g. economic and cultural exchange, remained essentially undeveloped.
Camp David also presented Mubarak with the perpetual challenge of balancing Egypt's international image as a moderate with its domestic image as pan-Arab leader. Mubarak managed this strategic dichotomy most effectively in times of regional stability. However, the Gulf wars, and especially post-Saddam regional crises, taxed this equation. For example, during the 2006 Lebanon war, the Bush Administration asked Egypt to side against Hizballah; at the same time Egyptian protestors demanded the peace treaty with Israel be vacated. The Egyptians were frozen, and relegated to waiting for the situation to stabilize. More recently, with Iran bringing the battlefield closer with Hamas' actions in Gaza and discovery of the Hizballah cell in Egypt, the Egyptians appear more willing to confront the Iranian surrogates and to work closely with Israel.
Mubarak was effective as an intermediary during various phases of the Israeli-Arab conflict. In the Arafat era, Egypt worked between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. At the outset of the Abbas era, Egypt's role was unclear as the Israelis and Palestinians communicated directly, and Mubarak for a time was left with no deliverable either to the West or his public. He firmly believed, incorrectly, that the Bush Administration "forced" the Palestinian legislative elections of 2006 (which Hamas won). Hamas' June 2007 takeover of Gaza allowed the Egyptians back into the game as a go-between, and Mubarak's team has made clear they will not cede the "Palestinian file" to another Arab state. In general, the Egyptian-Israeli strategic relationship was on solid ground as they face a shared threat from Hamas.
Egypt played a key role during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. President Mubarak helped assemble the international coalition and deployed 35,000 Egyptian troops against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. The Egyptian contingent was the third-largest in the coalition forces, after the U.S. and U.K. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, Egypt signed the Damascus declaration with Syria and the Gulf states to strengthen Gulf security. Egypt continues to contribute regularly to UN peacekeeping missions, most recently in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. In August 2004, Egypt was actively engaged in seeking a solution to the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan, including the dispatch of military monitors. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Egypt, which has itself been the target of terrorist attacks, has been a key supporter of the U.S. war against terrorists and terrorist organizations such as Osama bin Ladin and al-Qaeda, and actively supported the Iraqi Governing Council, as well as the subsequent government of Prime Minister Allawi. In July 2005, terrorists attacked the Egyptian city of Sharm El Sheikh. In the same month, Egypt's envoy to Iraq was assassinated.
The ongoing intra-Arab dispute, which cast Egypt and Saudi Arabia against Syria and Qatar and was primarily driven by Iran's regional influence, was a major test for Mubarak. Mubarak has maneuvered with reasonable effectiveness, brandishing Egyptian clout through a hastily prepared but effective summit in Sharm el Sheikh in February 2009, but Iran's Arab surrogates (especially Qatar) continue to unsettle the Egyptians. Mubarak railed [in private] against President Bush's decision to invade Iraq, contending that it opened the door to Iranian influence in the region. The Egyptians expected the US outreach to Iran to fail, and that the US and Egypt should prepare for confrontation through isolation. Mubarak and his advisors were convinced that Tehran was working to weaken Egypt through creation of Hizballah cells, support of the Muslim Brotherhood, and destabilization of Gaza. Egypt has warned that it would retaliate if these actions continue.
Egypt viewed the stability and unity of Sudan as essential to its national security because of concern over its access to Nile waters and the potential for increased Sudanese refugee flows. The GOE used development assistance in South Sudan to encourage unity. Here too, the Egyptians were jealous and sensitive to the Qatari foray into resolving Darfur, a crisis squarely in Egypt's backyard.
President Mubarak saw Iran as Egypt's -- and the region's -- primary strategic threat. Egypt's already dangerous neighborhood, he believed, has only become more so since the fall of Saddam, who, as nasty as he was, nevertheless stood as a wall against Iran. He now saw Tehran's hand moving with ease throughout the region, "from the Gulf to Morocco." The immediate threat to Egypt came from Iranian conspiracies with Hamas (which he saw as the "brother" of his own most dangerous internal political threat, the Muslim Brotherhood) to stir up unrest in Gaza, but he was also concerned about Iranian machinations in Sudan and their efforts to create havoc elsewhere in the region, including in Yemen, Lebanon, and even the Sinai, via Hezbollah. While Tehran's nuclear threat is also a cause for concern, Mubarak was more urgently seized with what he saw as the rise of Iranian surrogates (Hamas and Hezbollah) and Iranian attempts to dominate the Middle East.
Egypt continued its efforts to mediate a permanent cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, to facilitate intra-Palestinian negotiations and to stop the smuggling of arms into Gaza. The GOE realized that Iran was working to undermine all of these Egyptian efforts. The Egyptians were clear they did not intend to resume normal diplomatic ties with the Iranians until specific political and security issues are addressed, including the renaming of "Islambouli Street" named after Sadat's assassin. The GOE recognized that Iran's long arm had extended into Gaza via Hamas.
By 2010 the Egyptians had stepped up their cooperation with the Iraqis considerably, primarily through establishment of a "joint committee" which covers the full range of economic, social, military and political bilateral development. In November 2009, the Egyptians returned an ambassador to Baghdad. MOD is also requesting USG approval to sell Iraq 140 M1A1 tanks manufactured in Egypt under a co-production agreement. On Afghanistan, the GOE has agreed to explore expanding its scope and breadth of programs there, including in the areas of education, women's empowerment and communications. Egypt had operated a military field hospital at Bagram since 2003 with approximately 60 personnel.
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